CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 6 février 1967

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  THE FACTS   Whereas the facts of the case as presented by the Applicant may be summarised as follows:   The Applicant is a Netherlands citizen, born in 1910. Although residing at Eindhoven (Netherlands), he has worked since 1952 in Belgium.   His complaints may be summarised as follows:   1. Contributions to the Dutch social security system   While referring to a Treaty of 29th August, 1947, between Belgium and the Netherlands and to a certain Ordinance of the European Economic Community (EEC), the Applicant states that, as long as he is employed in Belgium, he is insured exclusively under the Belgian social security system and he receives children's allowances in Belgium. Consequently, he is obliged to pay contributions under the social security scheme in Belgium, but has no similar obligation in the Netherlands. Nevertheless, during periods of unemployment, he receives unemployment relief and children's allowances in the Netherlands and during such periods he falls under the Dutch social security system in general. In 1960, he was unemployed for 83 days and during that time he received in the Netherlands unemployment relief and children's allowances. As, during this period of unemployment, the Applicant still under the Dutch social security system, he had to pay contributions according to the Dutch Old Age Pensions Act (Algemene Ouderdomswet) and the Widows and Orphans Act (Weduwen-en Wezenwet), and he now complains of the way these contributions were calculated. In this respect, he states that, instead of deciding the amount of such contributions exclusively on the basis of his income in the Netherlands during the period of unemployment, the Tax Inspector at Eindhoven took into account his income during the whole year 1960. The result was that he was in fact obliged to pay contributions in the Netherlands in respect of a part of the salary and the children's allowances which he had received in Belgium. In the Applicant's opinion, this way of calculating these contributions was contrary to the Treaty of 1947 and to a certain EEC Ordinance, as in fact he had to pay contributions twice (in Belgium and in the Netherlands) in respect of the same income. As the Applicant found this unreasonable, he lodged an appeal with the Court of Appeal (Gerechtshof) at 's-Hertogenbosch. By decision of ... 1963, the Court rejected his appeal on the ground that his contributions had been calculated according to the rules laid down in an Order issued on 22nd December, 1959 by the Secretaries of State for Social Affairs and Public Health and for Finances and that, moreover, this way of calculating was not contrary to the Treaty and the Ordinance referred to by the Applicant. The Applicant lodged a further appeal (beroep in cassatie) which was rejected on ... 1964 by the Judges' Chamber (Raadkamer) of the Supreme Court (Hoge Raad). The Applicant concludes that, as a result of the decisions taken by the Netherlands courts, he has been obliged to pay contributions twice (in Belgium and in the Netherlands) in respect of the same income; that this implies an unjust "punishment" imposed on him for working outside the Netherlands; that another unreasonable result is that the amount of contributions which a person has to pay in the Netherlands is increased according to the number of his children (the Applicant here refers to the fact that the children's allowances received in Belgium were included in the amount on the basis of which the Dutch authorities calculated his contributions in the Netherlands); and that, in his case, the result was particularly unreasonable, since a part of the children's allowances which he had received in 1960 related to the year 1959 and should therefore, in no circumstances, have been included in his income for 1960. He alleges a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.   2. Taxation in the Netherlands in respect of Belgian children's allowances   In the Applicant's opinion, it follows from the Treaty of 1947 and the EEC Ordinance concerned that as a Dutch citizen working in Belgium he is entitled to the same treatment as a Belgian worker in respect of social security benefits. However, whereas the children's allowances received by a Belgian worker are not subject at all to taxation, the Belgian children's allowances which he receives are subject to taxation by the Netherlands authorities. Although he considers this practice incorrect, it does not appear that he has lodged any appeal on this point. As regards his taxation for the year 1960, he expressly states that he lodged no appeal, since he was ill at the relevant time.   3. Proceedings before the Supreme Court   As stated above, the Judges' Chamber of the Supreme Court rejected, on ... 1964, the Applicant's appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal regarding his contributions to the Dutch social security schemes. The Applicant alleges that he did not receive a "fair hearing" before the Supreme Court as he had not been invited to appear. There had been no public hearing and judgment had not been pronounced publicly. He also considers that, in view of the issues involved in the case, the Supreme Court was obliged, according to Article 177 of the EEC Treaty, to submit the case to the Court of Justice of the European Communities before deciding on the Applicant's appeal. He alleges violations of Article 6, paragraphs (1), (2), (3) (c), of the Convention.   THE LAW   Whereas the Applicant complains of the manner in which social security contributions and taxes are calculated in the Netherlands and, in particular, of the obligations which have been imposed upon him in this regard by the Netherlands authorities;   Whereas, in respect of the social security contributions, he alleges himself to be a victim of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention which provides that "no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment";   Whereas the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention in the present case;   Whereas the Applicant's complaint also gives rise to the question whether there has been a violation of Article 1 of the Protocol (P1-1) which in its first paragraph guarantees to everyone "the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions" and further provides that "no one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law"; whereas the Commission has not considered it necessary to examine the present complaint in relation to the first paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1) since it is clear that the second paragraph of that Article (Art. 1-2) expressly reserves the right of a State "to enforce such laws as it deems necessary ... to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions"; whereas, having regard to this provision, it is also clear that Article 1 of the Protocol (P1-1) has not been violated in the present case;   Whereas it follows that this part of the Application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Whereas, in regard to the alleged violations of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission first observes that paragraphs (2) and (3) of this Article (Art. 6-2, 6-3) are clearly not applicable to the circumstances of the present case since these paragraphs only concern persons "charged with a criminal offense";   Whereas, however, Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), gives everyone certain procedural guarantees "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him"; whereas, consequently, the question arises whether the proceedings in the present case concerned the determination of the Applicant's civil rights or obligations;   Whereas the proceedings before the Supreme Court complained of by the Applicant concerned the determination of his contributions to social security schemes; whereas, in previous cases (Applications Nos. 2145/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 18, page 1, and 1904/63, 2029/63, 2094/63 and 2217/64, Collection of Decisions, Volume 19, page 106), the Commission has already found that Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1) was not applicable to certain proceedings regarding taxation;   Whereas the Commission stated in these previous decisions that the proceedings complained of concerned a matter falling under public law and not under private law, although the fiscal measures concerned might have had repercussions on the property rights of the Applicant;   Whereas the same reasoning applies to the proceedings complained of in the present case; whereas it follows that these proceedings did not concern the determination of the Applicant's civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6, paragraph (1) (Art. 6-1), of the Convention and that the complaint as to these proceedings falls outside the competence of the Commission ratione materiae;   Whereas, therefore, this part of the Application is incompatible with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   Now therefore the Commission declares this Application INADMISSIBLE.