CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 février 1971

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  THE FACTS   Whereas the applicant states that he is an Irish citizen, born in 1940, and at the time of his application was detained in prison in L.. He is represented by Mr. B., a solicitor, practising in L.. The applicant was granted legal aid by the Commission.   He states that on the night of .. June 1969, he was lying with a friend on a grass patch, and under suspicion of attempting to commit a felony. Two police cars arrived on the scene, and at least six policemen got out, one with a dog. The applicant says that he got up to surrender himself but the dog was released by the police officer, and attacked and salvaged the applicant, causing extensive injuries to both his upper arms, for which he required hospital treatment. The applicant further alleges that, in the police car on the way to the station, he was assaulted by a police officer, who punched him in the face, and that later, in the police station, when his hands were handcuffed behind his back, he was again assaulted by the police officer on two separate occasions. The applicant was later charged with assaulting two police officers; he maintains that those charges were completely false.   When the applicant first tried to write to the Commission he was directed to write to the Chief Constable of S.. The applicant wrote to the Chief Constable of S. Constabulary by letter dated .. June 1969 in which he made complaints against a police dog handler and certain other police officers. As a result of the advice given to the applicant by the Deputy Chief Constable in a letter dated .. July 1969, the applicant took no further action until after his trial at L. Assize in October 1969. As a result of the applicant's letter dated .. October 1969 an enquiry was held by order of the Chief Constable of S.. Constabulary under the direction of Chief Superintendent S.. and the result of the investigation was communicated to the applicant in a letter dated .. May 1970 from the Chief Constable. This letter stated that the applicant could take any action which he considered appropriate. Copies of the statements forming part of the investigation were not made available to the applicant nor were other particulars of the investigation although they were submitted eventually to the Director of Public Prosecutions. It should be noted that the enquiry spread over a period of six months, the Chief Constable having appointed on .. November a Chief Superintendent to carry out the investigation and the report being eventually submitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions on .. April. Despite the length of time which it took the Chief Superintendent to prepare the report, the Director, within three days of receiving it, expressed the view that there was not sufficient evidence to justify the introduction of criminal proceedings against any of the officers named.   In the meanwhile, a further and more serious charge had been made against the applicant, namely that of attacking a police dog handler with a knife and attempting to cause him grievous bodily harm. The applicant says that this charge was equally false. It was brought two weeks after his arrest an he submits that the police could not during that period have overlooked the fact that he had assaulted them with a knife.   At his trial the applicant pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary but not guilty to three charges of assaulting a police officer. He was acquitted on those three charges, but was sentenced to eighteen months' imprisonment for burglary. He alleges that the judge, in passing sentence, was influenced by the other charges since the applicant's accomplice was merely put on probation for an extended period, although already on probation at the time of the offense.   The applicant states that he wishes to maintain his claim for compensation for injuries, unnecessary suffering and damage to clothing. The injuries which he received left twelve scars on his arms, and his clothing was ripped and bloodstained. He also suffered mental strain while detained on remand, knowing that he could expect a very long term of imprisonment if he was found guilty of the allegedly false charges made against him.   The applicant submits that he was unaware of any remedies available to him either in criminal or civil law and that he was unable to obtain any further information from the prison authorities concerning any such remedies as he had been informed by the prison censor at L. Prison, shortly after his conviction in October 1969, that he had no right to contact his solicitor as he had no legal rights while serving a term of imprisonment. This officer informed the applicant of this position when refusing to forward a letter from the applicant to his solicitor. Changes in staff at L. Prison made a verification of this complaint impossible.   The applicant states that he was aware of Rules 35 and 34 of the Prison Rules 1964, insofar that he knew that his mail was restricted, but did not know that he was required to apply to the Home Secretary for permission to write to his solicitor his case had been determined by the Court. The prison sensor did not inform the applicant of this procedure or endeavour to explain Rules 33 and 34 to him.   The applicant invokes Articles 3, 5 (2) and (3) and Article 6 of the Convention, without giving details of the exact provisions relied upon.   The respondent Government dispute the account of events as given by the applicant with regard to his arrest on .. June and contend that the police had been called to investigate a burglary at B. Road, S. and saw the applicant and another man lying on the ground near the premises concerned. The applicant at once jumped up, and was seen by the officer to reach into his pocket and take out what appeared to be a large knife. The applicant lunged towards the officer with the knife whereupon the dog leapt at him, seizing him by the arm and causing him to drop the knife. The police officer told the applicant and the other man that they were being arrested for forcing an entry into the premises concerned and the applicant kicked out at the police dog which promptly seized his other arm. The applicant was throughout abusive and violent and had to be handcuffed and, when brought to the police station assaulted two officers and used obscene language. On the day of his arrest, he was brought before the S.. City Magistrates and, on .. July 1969 after a voluntary statement made by the person who had been arrested with him, he was committed for trial and charged with aggravated burglary and attempt to wound a police officer with intent to cause grievous bodily harm.   The applicant applied several times to the Chief Constable for the investigation of his complaints and this was ordered after the applicant's trial and disclosed no evidence in support of his allegations. The report of the investigation was transmitted to the Director of Public Prosecutions and it was decided that no action should be taken against the officers concerned.   As regards the applicant's complaint that the prison authorities obstructed an attempt which he made about a week after his conviction to contact his solicitors, with a view to bringing legal proceedings against the police, the respondent Government submit that the prison records have been inspected and, although a record of all letters sent and received by inmates is kept, there is no record of any letter from the applicant to his solicitors having been stopped. The practice is that, if, for any reason, a letter by a prisoner is not posted, it is retained in the prisoner's personal file. If the applicant had attempted to write to solicitors without obtaining the permission of the Home Secretary, his letter would have been stopped and he would have been advised to petition for the necessary permission. Any such petition would have been considered in accordance with the usual practice. It has not been possible to trace the officer who may have given the applicant advice on his right to seek legal advice; this may be due to the fact that there have been changes of staff at the L. Prison since the time when the applicant alleges that his letter was written. If,   however, any advice had been given, the United Kingdom Government would have expected the advice to be in the terms indicated above.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION   Whereas the proceedings before the Commission can be summarised as follows:   In accordance with Rule 45, 1, of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, the application was examined on 21 July 1970 by a group of three members of the Commission, who considered that the application should be communicated to the respondent Government.   In accordance with Rule 45, 3 (b), the application was communicated by the Commission on 23 July 1970 to the Government of the United Kingdom, which was invited to submit, before 22 September 1970, its observations in writing on the admissibility of the application. At the request of the respondent Government, this time-limit was subsequently extended to 8 October 1970. The Government submitted its written observations on 1 October 1970 which were communicated to the applicant on 9 October 1970. A time-limit expiring on 2 November 1970 was fixed for the submission of the applicant's written observations in reply. This time-limit was subsequently extended to 20 January 1971 after the confirmation by the Commission's Secretary of the appointment of Mr. B. on 21 December 1970 as the applicant's legal representative. The applicant's observations were submitted under cover of his lawyer's letter dated 14 January 1971.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   Whereas the submissions of the parties may be summarised as follows:   I. LAW RELATING TO THE INVESTIGATION OF COMPLAINTS AGAINST THE POLICE AND REMEDIES FOR ASSAULT. LAW AND PRACTICE CONCERNING PRISONERS' COMMUNICATIONS IN CONNECTION WITH COURT PROCEEDINGS AND PRISON PRACTICE RELATING THERETO   1. The respondent Government submit that the competence for the investigation of complaints against the police is placed by the Police Act 1964 on local police authorities. Under the same Act the overall direction and control of a police force lies with the Chief Constable who is appointed by the local police authority, subject to the approval of the Home Secretary.   Under Section 49 of the Act, the Chief Constable is required to record a complaint made by a member of the public and to cause it to be investigated. Unless he is satisfied from the report of the investigation that no criminal offence has been committed, he is required to send the report to the Director of Public Prosecutions. It is, however, common practice, even if the Chief Constable himself is of the opinion that no criminal offence has been committed, to submit the report to the Director in order that the decision whether or not to take proceedings may be seen to have been taken impartially.   Further, the applicant could institute legal proceedings for damages for tort (or civil wrong) within three days from the date when the cause of action accrued. By virtue of Section 48 (1) of the Police Act 1964, the Chief Constable is in such cases treated for all purposes as being jointly liable with the police officers concerned, and Section 48 (2) provides that any such damages or costs awarded shall be paid out of the police fund thereby ensuring that a successful claim shall be met.   The victim of an assault, in this case allegedly the applicant, could also himself institute criminal proceedings against the persons who commit the assault, either for common assault or for assault occasioning actual bodily harm or for unlawful wounding.   A prisoner may take legal proceedings after obtaining leave of the responsible authority. According to Prison Rules 1964 (Rule 37 (1)), he is to be given all reasonable facilities to consult his lawyer and may do so out of hearing, but within sight, of a prison officer. He may also apply for legal aid.   The above is subject to restrictions. The respondent Government submit that the Prison Rules 1964 made by the Secretary of State under Section 47 of the Prison Act 1952, place certain restrictions on communications between prisoners and other persons. The relevant provisions are contained in Rules 33 and 34, the text of which has been submitted to the Commission. In particular, Rule 34 (8) provides that a prisoner may not communicate with any person in connection with any legal or other business, or with any person other than a relative or friend, except with the leave of the Home Secretary.   A prisoner who wishes to take legal advice in connection with his treatment in prison, as with any other matter, must therefore obtain the permission of the Home Secretary before communicating with a solicitor. In deciding whether or not to grant a request for leave to seek legal advice, the Home Secretary takes into account the extent to which the particulars contained in the request reveal a possible cause of action and leave will not normally be granted if the particulars are insufficient in indicate the precise nature of the prisoner's complaint. If the particulars are not sufficient for this purpose, the prisoner is normally invited to submit further particulars. In considering whether a prisoner should be allowed to communicate with a solicitor while still serving his sentence, the Home Secretary takes into account whether any proceedings which the prisoner might wish to take would, before his release from prison, become barred by statutory limitation on account of the passage of time since the alleged cause of action arose. But in any event it is not the practice of the Home Secretary to refuse leave to communicate with a solicitor for the purpose of obtaining legal advice if the request indicates the nature of the complaint in question and the complaint is of such a nature as, on a reasonable and objective view of the facts, to reveal a cause of action.   In considering a request to pursue legal action against the prison authorities or against individual prison officers it is the responsibility of the Home Secretary to satisfy himself as to the full circumstances of the case and, where appropriate, to cause such enquiries to be made as are necessary for this purpose. Where the complaint involves accusations of misconduct by prison officers (e.g. assault) it is the practice of the Home Secretary to insist that, before he entertains a request for permission to consult a solicitor with a view to bringing legal proceedings, the prescribed procedure for dealing with such allegations of disciplinary offenses by the prison officers concerned (or, in appropriate cases, as criminal offenses) should first be exhausted.   2. The applicant submits, with regard to the investigation of complaints made against members of the police force, that under the existing system he was entirely dependent upon what in effect was an internal police inquiry, although the eventual decision as to whether or not proceedings should be instituted was taken by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Nevertheless, the inquiry, the interviewing of witnesses, the taking of statements, the interview of the applicant's accomplice and other interviews were carried out in private by a serving police officer in respect of complaints relating to other serving police officers. It is submitted that an investigation under Section 49 (1) of the Police Act 1964, is most unsatisfactory from the point of view of the complaint, as it is not sufficient for there to be an independent assessment of the evidence adduced at the end but the preparation of such evidence and the enquiries necessitated by such an investigation, the taking of proofs, the interviewing of witnesses should be conducted in a more independent manner rather than by a fellow officer of those against whom complaints are, in fact, being made. The applicant further submits, with regard to prisoners' communications in connection with court proceedings that it is clearly not sufficient to say that a convicted prisoner is "open to take any action which he considers appropriate", as indicated in the respondent Government's observations. Clearly, as will be adduced hereafter, steps open to a convicted prisoner are completely different from those open to a person able to seek legal advice unhampered by the restrictions hereafter referred to. It is noted that the respondent Government concedes that these restrictions may, in practice, have the effect of restricting the prisoner's ability to institute legal proceedings. It is in respect of these restrictions upon a prisoner to institute such legal proceedings that the present application is, in fact, made. It is submitted that such concession on the part of the respondent Government is sufficient to permit the general admissibility of this complaint.   So far as the observations of the respondent Government are concerned, the applicant is further disturbed to note that the Home Secretary is not prepared to allow the matter to be considered in a dispassionate way by the defendant's independent legal adviser, in each and every case without hesitation. But, the Home Secretary, in the event of receiving a request to pursue legal action against prison authorities or individual prison officers (and to some extent the position of a police officer must be allied to these two) and in order to satisfy himself as to the full circumstances of the case, causes his own inquiries to be made. Thus again, do we have an internal and far from independent inquiry touching upon matters which one would hope would be dealt with at a later stage by an independent judicial tribunal. It could then be cleaned up and whitewashed prior to such independent judicial inquiry.   II. CONSIDERATION OF ADMISSIBILITY   A. As to Article 3   1. The respondent Government submit that the applicant does not particularise his complaint under Article 3 but it is assumed that it relates to the alleged assault by police officers when he was arrested.   The applicant's allegations in this respect were investigated in pursuance of Section 49 of the Police Act and no evidence in support of these allegations was disclosed. However, this investigation does not preclude civil or criminal proceedings instituted by he complainant himself. It was open, and it is still open, to the applicant to pursue one or more of the remedies described subject, of course, to prior permission of the Home Secretary, as described above to communicate with a solicitor.   The Government accordingly submit that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies in this respect, as required by Article 26 of the Convention, and his complaints under Article 3 should be considered as inadmissible under Articles 26 and 27 (3) of the Convention.   2. The applicant submits that the respondent Government's observations in this respect should be rejected having regard to the nature of the inquiry under the Police Act. A fuller open inquiry before a jury at L. Assize would have been preferable. The court had in fact accepted the applicant's version and not the version submitted by the police officers on oath with regard to the facts at the time of his arrest.   It is further submitted that the applicant's complaints under Article 3 relate to the assault by the police dog and its handler and to the police officers concerned in the arrest. The officer in charge of the dog failed to warn the applicant that the dog would attack if he moved and made no effort to call the dog off when he was it salvaging the applicant. The applicant further complains that the assault on him by the police officers carrying out the arrest were a further breach of Article 3.   It is finally submitted that the necessity to obtain the permission of the Home Secretary to communicate with a solicitor and to set out the grounds of complaint amount to a disclosure of a possible statement of claim. This must be made prior to the receipt of legal advice and thus makes difficult the pursuit of domestic remedy.   B. As to Article 5 (2) and (3)   1. The respondent Government submit that the applicant does not indicate the respects in which he contends that this Article has been violated.   With regard to Article 5 (2), reference is made to the facts of the case as presented by the Government and it is submitted that, since the reason given to the applicant for his arrest was true and the charges against him were genuinely preferred and in absence of evidence to the contrary, it is undisputed evidence that the provisions of the said Article were fully complied with in the present case. And, further, that the subsequent amendment of the charges against the applicant (before he was finally committed for trial and as a result of further evidence coming into the hands of the police) to include certain more serious charges arising out of the same events was not in itself any way improper and cannot be taken as casting any doubt on the property, in terms of Article 5 (2) of the Convention of the conduct of the police at the time of the arrest and the initial preferment of charges.   With regard to Article 5 (3), reference is again made to the Government's observations on the facts and it is submitted that the applicant was arrested under circumstances contemplated by Article 5 (1) (c) and was brought before the judge on the same day. He was further tried within fifteen weeks and four days from the date of his arrest and this period, is, in the Government's submission, reasonable.   The Government suggest that the applicant's complaints under Article 5 (2) and (3) are therefore inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.   2. The applicant submits with regard to the alleged violation of Article 5 (2) of the Convention, that he was informed of the charge of burglary at the time of his arrest but he was not charged with the further offenses in relation to the police officers until .. July 1969 although the incident giving rise to these further charges took place on .. June 1969 and were of such a nature that the length of investigation, prior to the charges being brought, should not have taken fourteen days.   Further, the applicant's allegation of the breach of Article 5 (3) relates to the delay in his being brought to trial by reason of the police waiting for fourteen days before bringing the further charges which resulted in a delay in the applicant being brought to trial. Had he been charged with the further offenses upon his arrest, his case would have been dealt with at the July Assizes. Due to delay, however, he was retained in custody until his case came before the Assizes in October. There can be no excuse for the delay in preferring the further charges as no further inquiries were needed and no further witnesses had to be brought.   C. As to Article 6 of the Convention   1. With regard to the applicant's general allegation of a violation of Article 6, the respondent Government submit that, insofar as the allegation relates to the trial itself, i.e. that the judge, in determining his sentence was influenced by the charges of assault of which he was in fact acquitted, such allegation is totally unsupported by any evidence. They further point out that the applicant failed to seek leave to appeal, or leave to appeal out of time, against his sentence on grounds of it being excessive or having been determined by reference to improper considerations.   The Government submit, in this context, that the applicant's complaint relating to his trial, is inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded or for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.   Insofar as the applicant's complaints of being obstructed by the prison authorities in the institution of proceedings against the police officers concerned in his arrest, the respondent Government submit that detention in prison, pursuant to a sentence passed on conviction of a criminal offence (this being a deprivation of liberty permitted under Article 5 of the Convention), necessarily involves a deprivation of liberty going beyond the mere fact of confinement. There is inherent in physical confinement a restriction on the ability of the person confined to see to the conduct of his affairs. It is, therefore, further submitted that the fact of confinement affects the application of provisions of the Convention beyond those of Article 5, for example, those relating to family life, correspondence, assembly and marriage, and that this is a necessary consequence of the inherent characteristics of confinement and is distinct from the express qualifications on certain of the provisions of the Convention such as those set out in Articles 8 (2), (9), 10 (2) and 11 (2). In support of these submissions, the respondent Government refer to the final decision of the Commission as to admissibility in the application of de Courcy against the United Kingdom (No. 2749/66, Yearbook, Vol. X, p. 388 at p. 412),   and to the decision of the Commission in relation to Article 12 of the Convention (which does not contain any express qualifying provision such as is to be found in Article 8 (2)) in Application No. 892/60 (Yearbook, Vol. IV, p. 240 at p. 256).   The respondent Government further submit that the circumstances of a regime of detention are such that certain restrictions on the free access of prisoners to the machinery of civil litigation are both necessary and justifiable; that, even as regards persons who are not prisoners, it is generally accepted that there may be circumstances in which it is legitimate to impose restrictions in appropriate cases on their untrammelled recourse to the machinery of litigation; and that, in the case of convicted persons there is a greater necessity for such restrictions.   The respondent Government further submit that, as explained in the part of their observations concerning the facts of the case, they have no evidence that the applicant did in fact make any attempt to write to his solicitors or that any letter signed by him for this purpose was stopped by the prison authorities. It is also clear that the applicant did not seek the permission of the Home Secretary to send any such letter as he was required to do under the practice described above. If he had done so, his request would have been considered and leave would then have been granted or withheld in accordance with that practice. Accordingly, the applicant's complaint in this respect should be considered inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.   Without prejudice to the above, the Government also submit that it is still open to the applicant to request the Home Secretary's permission to consult his solicitor and until such a request has been made and refused, the applicant cannot be considered to be the victim of a final decision in violation of his rights under the Convention. Therefore this complaint should be, in the alternative, inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in accordance with Articles 26 and 27 (2) of the Convention.   2. The applicant alleges a breach of Article 6 in that the offence with which he was originally charged would have been brought before the Court in July 1969, but, as a result of the further charges being brought fourteen days after his arrest, the applicant had to await trial at the Assize held in October 1969.   The applicant wrote to his solicitors shortly after his conviction in October 1969 raising the question of appeal against sentence, together with a request for advice concerning any remedy he might have against the police force. This letter was censored by the prison censor. It is basically because of this measure that a breach of Article 6 is complained of, in that, although domestic remedies might have been available both for the bringing of proceedings and the submission of an appeal, the refusal by the prison authorities to permit access to his solicitor prevented the applicant from pursuing this remedy. The applicant maintains that the respondent Government's observations are inconsistent with Article 6 as, although clearly certain restrictions upon liberty necessarily result from prison detention, it is inconsistent with basic human rights that a prisoner should be ill-treated in the manner described in Article 3 and should have subsequently no proper recourse to law, particularly when he alleges that it is the prison officials themselves who are so treating him.   It is further submitted that a proposed defendant should not be the person to decide whether or not a complaint is frivolous or vexatious. Had the applicant been permitted to seek legal advice and subsequently bring proceedings, then an application for legal aid could be granted, the Law Society would have made an independent assessment of the question whether or not the application was frivolous or vexatious. It is submitted that such a safety valve, as regards an appreciation of the value of a detained person's claim, is preferable in that it is at least independent.   The applicant finally notes that within recent months the respondent Government has brought into operation regulations whereby an accused person after conviction, can make specific representations upon specific forms seeking advice from his solicitor upon the question of an appeal. These forms have been brought into use since the present case was heard and a copy of one such form has been submitted to the Commission.     THE LAW   Whereas the applicant first complains of a violation of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention which provides that "no-one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment";   Whereas, although the applicant has not himself specified which part of Article 3 (Art. 3) he invokes, the Commission has not considered that his complaint could possibly raise any question as regards "torture" or "inhuman or degrading punishment" but only as regards "inhuman or degrading treatment"; whereas the applicant alleges that at the moment of his arrest on .. June 1969 he was attacked and salvaged by a police dog and that, in the police car on the way to the police station and in the station itself, he was twice assaulted by police officers while his hands were handcuffed behind his back; whereas the respondent Government disputed the account of events as given by the applicant and submitted that in actual fact the applicant at the time of his arrest became violent and lunged towards the police dog handler with a knife whereupon the dog leapt at him and gripped his arm; that afterwards he kicked out at the police dog which promptly seized his other arm; that, after his arrest, the applicant continued to be abusive and violent and, when brought to the police station, assaulted two police officers;   Whereas the applicant was committed for trial on .. July 1969 and charged with aggravated burglary, with attempt to wound a police officer with intent to cause grievous bodily harm and with assaulting two other police officers; whereas, it is not disputed that at his trial the applicant was convicted only on the charge of burglary and was acquitted on the other charges; whereas the applicant's allegations in regard to his being assaulted by the police were investigated in pursuance of Section 49 of the Police Act 1964, and the Director of Public Prosecutions decided that no evidence in support of these allegations was disclosed and therefore refused to take action against the police officers concerned;   Whereas, further, the respondent Government contended in this respect that the applicant has not exhausted the domestic remedies available to him in that he failed to institute criminal or civil proceedings against those persons who had allegedly ill-treated him;   Whereas the Commission notes that the institution of such proceedings require the prior permission of the Home Secretary but in fact, the applicant did not petition the Home Secretary for such permission;   Whereas, however, the Commission has previously found in similar circumstances that it is doubtful whether the institution of such proceedings constitutes an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention (see Application No. 3868/68, in Collection of Decisions, Vol. 34, p. 10 (17));   Whereas, the Commission next had regard to the account of events as given by the respondent Government and to the results of the investigation carried out under the authority of the Chief Constable;   Whereas it considers that the account of events given by the Government appears to be generally correct; whereas, the Commission in any case finds that even the applicant's version of the various incidents does not disclose a treatment so serious as to amount to inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention (see Report of the Commission on First Greek Case, Vol. II, I, p. 1); whereas, therefore, the Commission is in any event of the opinion that the applicant's complaints as regards his alleged ill-treatment are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Whereas, the applicant also complains of a violation of Article 5, paragraph (2) (Art. 5-2) of the Convention which provides that "everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him";   Whereas, the applicant submits that he was informed of the charge of burglary at the time of his arrest but it was not until .. July 1969 that he was charged with the further offenses in relation to the police officers, although the incidents giving rise to these charges took place on .. June 1969 and were of such nature that the length of their investigation prior to the charges being brought should not have taken fourteen days.   Whereas, the respondent Government submit that the applicant was brought before the S. Magistrates' Court on .. and .. June and .. July 1969, and that there is no evidence to show that the reason given to him for his arrest was untrue or that the charges against him were not genuinely preferred; further, that the subsequent amendment of the charges against the applicant, before his committal for trial, was a result of subsequent evidence, in particular, of the statement made on .. June 1969 by a person arrested together with him;   Whereas the Commission has frequently found that Article 5, paragraph (2) (Art. 5-2) of the Convention does not require this information about the charges to be given in any special form (see Applications Nos. 1211/61, Yearbook, Vol. 5, p. 224; 1216/61, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 2, p. 1; 2621/65 Yearbook, Vol. 9, p. 474 (480));   Whereas, the Commission is also satisfied that the reasons given to the applicant for his arrest were true and indeed resulted in his conviction on the charge of burglary and that, moreover, Article 5 (2) (Art. 5-2) does not require that a complete description of all the charges should be given to the accused at the moment of his arrest;   Whereas, therefore, the Commission finds that the examination of the case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 5 (2) (Art. 5-2) of the Convention; whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Whereas the applicant further alleges a violation of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, in that his being brought to trial was unduly delayed as it was not until fourteen days after the date of his arrest that the police brought further charges and he was therefore tried at the Assizes in October instead of July 1969;   Whereas it is true that under Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention "everyone arrested or detained in accordance with paragraph (1) (c) (Art. 5-1-c) of this Article, shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial."   Whereas the applicant was arrested on .. June 1969 and remanded in custody. He was brought before the Magistrates' Court on the morning of his arrest, and appeared again before that Court on .. June and .. July 1969; whereas it is therefore clear that the applicant was "brought promptly" before the competent judge within the meaning of the above provision;   Whereas the Commission is next called upon to decide whether or not the applicant's detention on remand has been prolonged beyond a reasonable time and was thereby contrary to the second requirement of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention;   Whereas the Commission observes that the charges were clearly serious that they involved an accomplice, and that the applicant's detention on remand lasted for a period of fifteen weeks and four days only;   Whereas, consequently, an examination of the case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 5, paragraph (3) (Art. 5-3) of the Convention;   Whereas it follows that similarly this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Whereas, in regard to the applicant's further complaint a violation of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) in that he allegedly did not have "a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time", the proceedings from the time of his arrest until his conviction lasted, as did his detention on remand, for a total period of fifteen weeks and four days;   Whereas this period can equally in no way be considered as a violation of this right mentioned in Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1); whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Whereas, finally the applicant further complains under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) that by the refusal of the prison authorities to allow him to consult a solicitor he was prevented from obtaining the determination of a civil right by a tribunal in that he was unable to pursue his claim against the police officers before a court; whereas it is true that such a refusal might give rise to the question whether the applicant's right to access to a court, insofar as it can be considered as being guaranteed under the said provision (see Application No. 4115/69, Knechtl v. United Kingdom), had been interfered with; whereas, however, the applicant has failed to substantiate his allegation that he has written to his solicitor or, if so, that any such letter was stopped by the prison authorities;   Whereas an examination of the case does not disclose any appearance of a violation of this particular right under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1);   Whereas it follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention;   Now therefore the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE