CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 19 décembre 1972

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  THE FACTS   The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows:   The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in Liverpool in 1916. When he introduced his application he was held in H.M. Prison, A. but was released early in 1972 and now lives in F., London.   On .. June 1966, while serving a prison sentence in W., he underwent an operation to straighten the toes of his right foot. He was released from prison on .. September   1966. The applicant was again sent to prison in about July 1967: this time to P. On .. August 1969 he underwent a further operation in the prison hospital to amputate the small toe of his right foot. Some time between the date and .. October 1969 the applicant petitioned the Home Secretary for compensation and for permission to seek legal advice with a view to claiming compensation for disability in his right foot. It appears that he complained of negligence by the prison medical authorities. His petition was rejected as, in the view of the Home Office, the first operation was properly successfully carried out and the applicant had throughout received all the treatment and advice which would have been expected from competent and conscientious doctors; in any case, according to the Home Office, the Statute of Limitations barred the applicant from taking legal action as the original operation had taken place more than 3 years previously. The applicant again petitioned the Home Secretary, apparently for the same purpose, on .. February 1970 and .. October 1970, but his petitions were rejected.   The applicant underwent a further operation in A. Prison hospital on .. October 1971 to straighten the big toe of his right foot. The operation was carried out by the P. prison surgeon and entailed a month in P. prison hospital.   The applicant states that he did not consider making any further petitions to the Home Office after his treatment in 1971, because he expected that any further petitions would be rejected like the earlier ones.   In March 1972 the applicant was discharged from A. prison and went to live in Southampton. It seems that he then underwent yet another operation to shorten the bone in his big toe. He is still receiving out-patient hospital treatment. He moved to F. in July 1972.   Complaints   The applicant complains that he entered prison a fit man and was discharged a cripple. He now walks with a limp. He can no longer take work as a labourer and is obliged to live on Social Security.   He complains of the fact that while he was in prison his petitions from compensation were rejected and that he was not granted facilities to seek legal advice.   He does not allege the violation of any particular Article of the Convention but requests the Commission to grant him compensation.   THE LAW   The applicant has complained that he entered prison a fit man and was discharged a cripple. He states that he now walks with a limp, can no longer take work as a labourer and is obliged to live on Social Security. He further complains of the fact that while he was in prison he petitioned for compensation and for permission to see a lawyer and that his petitions were rejected.   It is not clear from the way in which the applicant has presented the facts of his case to the Commission how he considers that they constitute a violation of the Convention. He has not specified the violation of any particular Article of the Convention but has asked the Commission to grant him compensation.   It appears that the applicant's main object has at all times been to obtain the payment of a sum of money as compensation. He has applied on several occasions to the United Kingdom authorities for payment and this has been refused. Such refusal in no way constitutes a violation of the Convention which does not provide, as such, for payment of social and medical benefits. But on one occasion the applicant also applied for permission to seek legal advice and it seems that this application was also refused. The Commission has examined this aspect of the case in the light of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention which provides that "in the determination of his civil rights and obligations ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal ...". If the applicant applied for leave to see a solicitor with a view to the eventual "determination of his civil rights" and such leave was refused, this might appear, prima facie, to raise an issue under Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It would not be relevant that the authorities themselves considered that he had no civil right or that they considered that such right had been barred by the passing of time. This was something which should have been decided by the "independent and impartial tribunal" unless, for example, he abandoned his action because a lawyer, acting on the applicant's behalf, intervened to inform him that the matter was not worth taking before a tribunal.   In this respect the facts of the case cause some difficulty. The applicant originally petitioned the prison authorities for compensation and for permission to see a lawyer. Both requests were refused. The applicant then states that he did not consider making any further petitions to the Home Office after his treatment in 1971, because he expected that any further petitions would be rejected like the earlier ones. This does not seem unreasonable. In December 1971, however, a White Paper was laid before the United Kingdom Parliament announcing that existing prison practice would be liberalised in such a way that where a prisoner had suffered some physical injury or disablement and when there was an allegation of negligence on the part of the prison authorities or staff, that prisoner would be granted access to a solicitor in order to obtain advice as to the possible institution of civil proceedings. Under this new practice it seems that the applicant was entitled to seek legal advice for that purpose. Yet he did not attempt to take advantage of it. Nor, when he was released from prison in March 1972, did he attempt to consult a solicitor.   Although, therefore, it appeared that the applicant was prevented from consulting a lawyer in 1969, it seems that he took no advantage of the opportunity to see a lawyer which was offered to him from December 1971 onwards. Neither during the last three months of his imprisonment, nor on his release from prison, did he attempt to consult with a lawyer. Such conduct appears to indicate that he did not wish after all to have his "civil rights determined" within the meaning of Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   Even supposing, therefore, that the refusal of the authorities in 1969 to allow the applicant to consult a solicitor was not in conformity with Article 6 (1) (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission notes first that such a situation will not occur again because the relevant United Kingdom practice has been liberalised; and, secondly, that the applicant did not consult a solicitor when he was able to do so. In this respect the Commission refers to the legal principle of "de minimis non curat lex". It seems improper to hold that the authorities prevented the applicant from obtaining the "determination of his civil rights" when his later conduct indicates that he was seeking nothing beyond a lump sum payment of compensation directly from the Government or the Commission.   An examination by the Commission of this complaint as it has been submitted, including an examination made ex officio, does not therefore disclose an appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and in particular in the above Article.   It follows that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE