CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 avril 1974

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  I.    THE FACTS   The facts as originally submitted by the applicant:   The applicant is a German barrister and notary (Rechtsanwalt und Notar) practising in H. He is represented by the Action Committee of German Barristers (Aktionsgemeinschaft der Deutschen Rechtsanwälte), a registered association at H., of which he is a member of the executive board. He is furthermore represented and supported by about 25 other barristers who have submitted powers-of-attorney and stated that they fully agree with the arguments expounded by the applicant. The chairman of an association for the protection of individual rights (Verein gegen parlamentarischen und bürokratischen Missbrauch e.V.) has likewise submitted a power of attorney.   By decision of .. February 1970 the Regional Court (Landgericht) at Detmold ordered that the applicant should represent, in a divorce case, the defendant who had been granted legal aid (Armenrecht). The applicant had not been asked by the Court whether he was willing to act as a legal aid counsel. He appealed (Beschwerde) against the order of .. February 1970 alleging that the instruction to represent a poor party against his (the lawyer's) will violated Articles 3, 12 and 14 of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz). By decision of .. May 1970 the Court of Appeal (Oberlandesgericht) at Hamm rejected this appeal.   The Court found that the obligation of barristers to represent poor parties as provided for in Section 48, paragraph 2 of the Federal Barristers' Act (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung = BRAO) was a legitimate restriction of the right to exercise a profession (Berufsausübung) as guaranteed by Article 12, paragraph 1, of the Basic Law, since this obligation is in the interest of the public and does not unreasonably burden the applicant.   Furthermore, the Court denied that this was a violation of Article 14 of the Basic Law which guarantees the rights of ownership and inheritance (Eigentumsgarantie). The Court stated that, although it is true that a barrister, who is ordered by a court to represent a poor party, can only claim a part of the normal fees from the public treasury (Sections 121, 123 of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees = Bundesrechtsanwaltsgebührenordnung), this does not constitute an act of expropriation (Enteignung oder enteignungsgleicher Eingriff). The reason given was that the obligation of barristers to represent poor parties already existed before the applicant was admitted to the Bar and, consequently, the legal position which he acquired by admission was restricted from the beginning.   Finally, the Court stated that the principle that all persons shall be equal before the law, as expressed in Article 3 of the Basic Law (Grundsatz der Gleichbehandlung), was not violated since Article 3 only forbids arbitrary differentiations. The Court found that, although it is true that there are other professions which do not have an obligation similar to the obligation of barristers to represent poor parties without receiving adequate consideration from the public treasury, this obligation is justified in the interest of the public. The Court pointed out that, on the other hand, barristers profit from the fact that in most court proceedings the parties have to be represented by legal counsel. It therefore considered it to be justified that barristers carry part of the burden resulting from the need to grant legal aid to poor persons.   The applicant lodged a constitutional appeal (Verfassungsbeschwerde) against the Appeal Court's decision. On .. July 1970 a group of three judges of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) rejected the appeal in accordance with Section 93 a, paragraph 3, of the Act concerning the Federal Constitutional Court (Gesetz über das BverfG) as being clearly ill-founded. The applicant points out that, if he had refused to act as legal aid counsel he would have risked disciplinary proceedings leading to a professional punishment in the form of a warning, a reprimand, a fine of up to 10,000 DM or even exclusion from the Bar under Sections 48, 49, 113, 114 BRAO.   COMPLAINTS   The applicant alleges that the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients without adequate consideration amounts to forced or compulsory labour and violates Article 4 (2) and 14 of the Convention as well as Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.   Furthermore, he alleges that Sections 48, 114 BRAO, which provide for a sanction affecting professionally those barristers who refuse to act as legal aid counsels, violate Article 11 of the Convention.   I.    Arguments of the applicant concerning the alleged violation of Article 4, paragraph 2, and Article 14 of the Convention.   In this respect the applicant refers to the Commission's decision concerning application No. 1468/63 (Iversen v. Norway, Yearbook, Vol. VII, p. 278) in which four members of the Commission expressed the opinion that, following the provisions and application of ILO Conventions and Resolutions on Forced Labour, the elements of forced or compulsory labour are first, that the work or service is performed by the worker against his will and, secondly, that the requirements that the work or service be performed is unjust or oppressive or the work or service involves avoidable hardship.   The applicant is of the opinion that these elements are to be found in his case since barristers are forced to represent poor clients under the threat of severe punishment affecting their profession, while in such cases they do not receive an adequate consideration for their services. For example, in criminal proceedings the fees paid by the public treasury to the official defence counsel (Pflichtverteidiger) amount to only a quarter of the fees which he could claim from the client himself, if the latter were solvent. The State has enough money to cover the full fees of barristers since it is even supporting the political parties by granting them generous financial subsidies.   Therefore the State deliberately abuses its power by forcing barristers, through threat of professional sanctions, to give their services in legal aid cases without receiving adequate consideration. It thus partly divests itself, to the detriment of the legal profession, of a burden which ought to be carried by the public and not by a single professional group. In fact no other professional group in Germany is obliged to give their services to the poor without adequate consideration. Judges or other officials of the judiciary are likewise not supposed to do extra work in legal aid cases without adequate compensation. For the last mentioned reasons the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients cannot be considered as a normal civic obligation within the meaning of Article 4, paragraph (3) (d), of the Convention.   The applicant points out that the present situation also causes prejudice to those who need legal aid, because a barrister appointed to defend the case of a poor party will naturally not put much effort into a difficult and perhaps long lawsuit if he cannot expect to be paid adequately for his services.   Summing up, it can be concluded that the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients is, at least in most cases and especially in the present one, imposed on them against their will; it is furthermore unjust and oppressive as a barrister has to face a punishment if he refused to carry out his task. The obligation consequently amounts to forced or compulsory labour. This violation of Article 4, paragraph (2), of the Convention could easily be remedied by the respondent Government if it provided the necessary financial means.   II.   Violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention.   A barrister's office is a private enterprise and as such constitutes a property right within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (Recht am eingerichteten und ausgeübten Betrieb; the applicant refers in this respect to Schorn, Die Menschenrechtskonvention, 1965, p. 426). This property right is diminished in each case where a barrister has to represent a poor party without receiving adequate consideration. The services of a barrister given in civil aid cases enrich the respondent Government without just cause, as it is their proper obligation to provide legal aid to the poor and not the obligation of a single professional group. Of course it is in the public interest that barristers also represent the poor parties, but this public interest does not justify lawyers being inadequately paid for their services, taking into consideration that the respondent Government has sufficient financial means and furthermore that, according to the Emergency Assistance Law (Bundesleistungsgesetz, BGBI I, 1961, 1769, Sections 20 et seq.) members of all other professions have a claim for adequate compensation where they have to perform services.   III. Violation of Article 11 of the Convention   The Action Committee of German Barristers was founded as a kind of trade union for the protection of the interests of the legal profession. One of its aims is the abolition of the obligation of barristers to represent poor parties without adequate payment. The executive board has in vain requested the respondent Government to change the present situation. The most effective way to push through this well-founded request would now be a strike. However no barrister would dare to go on strike as he would consequently face a professional sanction under Sections 48, 49, 114 BRAO. It follows that these provisions restrict the Action Committee in the exercise of its rights and therefore violate Article 11 (1) of the Convention since the restriction is not justified for any of the reasons listed in paragraph (2) of this Article.   The applicant has, inter alia, submitted two articles which he published in German legal periodicals and in which he also expounded his arguments concerning the legality of the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients without adequate consideration.   Proceedings before the Commission   On 1 April 1971 the Commission first examined this application and decided to invite the respondent Government to submit its observations on the admissibility of the application before 24 May 1971. At the request of the Government this time-limit was extended until 20 July 1971.   The Government justified their request for an extension of the time-limit by stating that their experts on questions of costs and fees had been occupied in preparing a bill amending the Acts on court costs and barristers' fees (Entwurf eines Gesetzes zur Änderung des Gerichtskostengesetzes und der Bundesgebührenordnung für Rechtsanwälte). A copy of this Bill was submitted.   The applicant was informed of this. In a letter of 22 July 1971 he replied that a raise in fees alone would not solve the problem. As long as Sections 48 and 49 of the Federal Barristers' Act (BRAO)   were not repealed, the duty of barristers to represent poor clients would always have to be considered as "forced labour" because these Sections provide that a barrister can be subjected to disciplinary measures if he refuses to represent a person to whom legal aid has been granted. He pointed out that the largest Bar Association (Rechtsanwaltskammer) of the Federal Republic of Germany, namely that of Hamm, had in a session on 20 January 1971 declared unconstitutional the fact that barristers are by the threat of disciplinary punishment compelled, without receiving adequate remuneration, to represent poor clients.   The respondent Government's observations were received on 17 July 1971. The applicant was then invited to submit his reply before 6 September 1971.   Following a request of the applicant, the time-limit for the submission of his reply to the Government's observations was extended until 20 September 1971 when his reply was received.   Summary of the observations of the parties on admissibility   I.    The respondent Government   (1)   Barristers are organs of the administration of justice and they enjoy extensive privileges, e.g. in civil proceedings the parties have to be obligatorily represented by a barrister before all courts other than the District Court (Section 78 (1) of the Code on Civil Procedure). The monopoly position of barristers is further protected by the Law for the Prevention of Abuses in the Field of Legal Advice (Rechtsberatungsmissbrauchsgesetz).   The duty to represent poor clients balances these advantages.   (2)   The applicant complains of his appointment to act for an assisted party in divorce proceedings. He can only allege that this appointment violated certain provisions of the Convention but he cannot allege in general that the duty of barristers to represent poor persons in all kinds of proceedings is incompatible with the Convention.   As to divorce proceedings, it is pointed out that the Government is preparing a Bill concerning the proceedings in matrimonial and infancy cases. Within the framework of this Bill the Government will propose a considerable increase in the fees for legal aid counsels.   Although this application does not concern criminal proceedings, it is further pointed out that, on 28 May 1971, the Government has submitted a Bill to the Federal Council (Bundesrat) suggesting a considerable increase of fees for official defence counsels. The Federal Council has given its observations and the Bill will soon be submitted to the Federal Parliament (Bundestag).   (3)   The duty to represent poor clients is a necessary and inherent obligation connected with legal practice. This duty does not constitute forced labour within the meaning of Article 12 (2) of the Basic Law, but is a lawful regulation concerning the exercise of the profession (Article 12 (1) phrase 2 of the Basic Law).   The duty in question does also not conflict with the international concept of the notion of "forced or compulsory labour". The basic provisions on the abolition of forced labour are contained in the ILO Conventions No. 29 (28.6.70) and No. 105 (25.6.57). The background of Convention No. 29 was the abolition of slavery and colonial oppression and the exploitation of manpower under degrading conditions connected therewith. Convention No. 105 was essentially intended to prohibit forced labour as a means of political teaching and economic development. Furthermore, it covers forced labour as a measure of work discipline, as a penalty for strikes and as a means of racial, social, national or religious discrimination. In view of this categorical enumeration, a special definition of the term "forced labour" was considered unnecessary (ILO Report of the Committee of Experts on the Application of the Conventions and Recommendations, Geneva 1962, Report III, Part IV, p. 203 - this report mentions as an example that the duty to sit on a jury or the duty of students to work before they are admitted to their profession cannot be regarded as forced labour).   Considering that the elements of forced labour are, first, that the work is performed by the worker against his will, and, secondly, that the requirement that the work be performed is unjust or oppressive or the work itself involves avoidable hardship (see Iversen case, application No. 1468/62, Yearbook, Vol. VI, p. 278 et seq.) it cannot be maintained,   - that the requirement that a lawyer has to represent a poor party is unjust. The public is charged with a considerable part of the costs which are the result of legal aid. The State renounces the court fees and pays the fees of the legal aid counsel, unless these fees can be recovered from the opponent party.   Not only lawyers but, for example, lay judges and jurymen serve for a remuneration that is not determined by economic considerations.   - that the requirement is oppressive. Usually the courts only appoint those lawyers who have declared themselves interested in acting as legal aid counsels.   The economic burden resulting from the fact that the fees paid to legal aid counsels are below the standard fees is not inadequate or unreasonable in relation to the total income of those counsels. According to the applicant's own statements the loss of fees only amounts to about 6 or 7 per cent of their total earnings. It must also be taken into consideration that legal aid is mostly granted in criminal proceedings and for these a considerable increase in fees is being proposed.   (4)   In reply to the applicant's arguments that the "underpaid" legal aid counsel might not take much interest in the case of his client, it suffices to refer to Section 46 of the Rules for the practice of the legal profession, which provide that a barrister has to exert the same diligence in legal aid cases as in other cases.   (5)   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is not violated. It is questionable whether the work of a barrister can be considered as a property right within the meaning of that Article. In any event, the duty in question only constitutes a limitation of the economic freedom of development and is, as such, justified in the general interest. It is not unreasonable because the time and working capacity of the barrister concerned are not taken up excessively and his total earnings are only slightly reduced.   (6)   With regard to Article 11, the applicant has not shown that he is himself a victim.   II.   The applicant   (1)   A barrister is in no sense an organ of the administration of justice and neither is he specially protected by the State nor does he enjoy extensive privileges.   (a)   Compulsory representation by barristers applies only to civil matters. It is in fact a burden on the Bar because litigation is no longer a paying matter for lawyers. Furthermore, a barrister is restricted in the exercise of his professional freedom by the fact that he is only admitted to a single regional court or court of appeal. This system was justified at a time when the number of barristers admitted to the Bar was regulated (numerus clausus).   Today everyone with the necessary qualifications is at his request admitted to the Bar.   These out-of-date rules on compulsory representation and restriction to one court are not being maintained to protect lawyers but for reasons of public interest, namely the convenience of judges, who prefer to deal with cases which are coherently prepared by barristers instead of by the parties themselves.   (b)   It is furthermore not true that, in the field of legal advice, barristers enjoy a monopoly position. There are legal advisers (Rechtsbeistände), tax representatives and tax advisers (Steuerbevollmächtigte, Steuerberater), business consultants and chartered accountants (Wirtschaftsberater, Wirtschaftsprüfer), who can to a certain extent give legal advice. There are also employers' associations, trade unions, banks etc. which can, also to a certain extent, give legal advice to their members or protégés. in the field of social insurance law, the administration keeps the fees so low that they do not even cover the official expenses of a barrister.   In general the fees of barristers, which are fixed by the administration, are far too low.   (c)   As a result of all the above considerations, the majority of barristers, in spite of their long university and professional training, do not earn more than an ordinary skilled worker.   Adding together a district court judge's (Oberamtsrichter) salary, pension and additional perquisites, it will be found that he receives three times as much as the average barrister.   Nevertheless, the Government dares to argue that "the principle of equality demands that barristers should be required to perform compulsory legal service".   (2)   An increase in fees does not change the situation. The system must be completely voluntary and there should not be any sanctions against barristers who refuse to represent poor parties.   (3)   The applicant was not free in choosing his profession. After he graduated from high school he had to join the Labour Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst) and later the army. As a consequence he could not start his professional career before he was 36 years old. He intended to enter the foreign service but was refused because of his age. In public service there were no vacancies. He therefore had no choice but to become a barrister.   (4)   Both literally and in the current usage, the term "forced labour" is any work extorted by the threat of crippling punishment. These elements are present.   (5)   The comparison with jurymen and other lay judges is inaccurate, because they are not requested to render professional services but to assume an honorary office. In any event they are also much better paid than legal aid counsels.   (6)   According to recent statistics collected by the Federal Statistics Office, the compulsory services required of barristers amount to 48% of all criminal cases and 11.2-13.6% of the civil cases in which lawyers are involved. The applicant is not only a barrister but at the same time a notary, and notaries are also obliged to give their services free of costs if the client is indigent.   (7)   The "professional statutes" referred to by the Government were not established by the "opinio communis" of all barristers but by the few leaders of the profession. These statutes were then forced on all other lawyers.   (8)   Compulsion to undertake underpaid work cannot be justified by the moral standards of the profession.   (9)   There can be no question of the utilisation of barristers' services being a reasonable social obligation imposed on property. Such an obligation would imply the existence of property subject to communal obligations, whereas the barristers' work consists of strictly personal services.   (10) Article 11 is violated. The applicant has, in his capacity as chairman of the Action Committee of German Lawyers, requested the Government to repeal Sections 48 and 49 of the Federal Barristers' Act.   The Government deliberately refrained from doing so, so as to be able to continue using these provisions as a means of exercising pressure on the Bar. The refusal to repeal Sections 48 and 49 therefore violates Article 11 of the Convention.   It is pointed out in this context that the Minister of Justice of Hessen threatened to use disciplinary measures when the Law Society (Anwaltsverein) of S. issued a strike notice.   (11) The applicant realises that the service of barristers in legal aid cases is necessary in the public interest. But the common weal should never be defended on the ruins of the legal system and morality at the expense of a small professional group.   Further proceedings and developments   The Commission examined the application on 10 February 1972 on the basis of the written observations of the parties on admissibility.   In view of the fact that the respondent Government had submitted to Parliament a Bill providing for higher fees for official defence counsel, and was preparing a further Bill purporting, inter alia, an increase in fees for legal aid counsel in matrimonial and infancy cases, the Commission decided to adjourn the examination of the case.   By letter of 21 July 1972 the applicant informed the Commission that the Federal Council (Bundesrat) was opposed to the proposed increase in fees for official defence counsels and had decided to appeal to the Conciliatory Committee (Vermittlungsausschuss) in order to have the Government's Bill amended accordingly. The applicant was of the opinion that this procedure and the then imminent dissolution of Parliament would lead to a considerable delay in the adoption of the Bill. He stated that, even if an increase in fees were finally agreed, the rising inflation would render it insignificant. He alleged that the Federal Council's attitude in respect of the Bill in question was "unfair" and incompatible with "good morals" (unlater und gegen die guten Sitten verstoßend) and requested the Commission to give a decision as soon as possible.   A copy of the applicant's letter was sent to the respondent Government for information. The Government replied in a letter of 7 August 1972 that there were no reasons to fear that the adoption of the Bill would be unreasonably delayed. Furthermore, the Government stated that they considered the applicant's above-quoted remarks to be insulting and asked the Commission in this respect to proceed in accordance with its established practice and jurisprudence concerning insulting remarks made in applications.   A copy of this letter was sent to the applicant for his information only.   On 13 September 1972 the applicant sent a further letter stating that in his opinion the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients was clearly "forced or compulsory labour" within the meaning of Article 2 (1) of the ILO Convention 29, which states:   "For the purpose of this Convention the term 'forced or compulsory labour' shall mean all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which the said person has not offered himself voluntarily".   On 5 October 1972 the Commission decided to adjourn the examination of the case until December 1972.   By letter of 9 November 1972 the respondent Government informed the Commission that the Bill in question concerning increase of fees for official defence counsel had been adopted and that the new Law had come into force on 1 November 1972. Section 2 of this Law contains amendments of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees. Section 2 No. 3 provides for an increase of the fee for defence counsel appointed by the court in criminal matters. It provides:   "Section 97, paragraph 1 (of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees) reads as follows:   (1)   Where Counsel has been appointed by the Court, he shall be paid by the State Treasury four times the minimum amounts laid down in Sections 83-86, 90-92, 94 and 95, but not more than half the maximum amount. If he acted as Defence Counsel also prior to the opening of the main proceedings, he shall be paid, irrespective of the date of his appointment, an additional fee in the sum of four times the minimum amounts laid down in Section 84."   The Government point out that under the old version, counsel was paid only one and a half times the amount of the respective minimum fees.   The fees for official counsel appointed by the court in proceedings concerning deprivation of liberty were also raised. The relevant Section 112, paragraph 4 of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees now reads as follows:   "(4) Where Counsel has been appointed by the Court he shall be paid by the State Treasury four times the amount of the minimum fees laid down in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3; ..."   The Government concluded that, in consequence of these amendments, the financial situation of German barristers had improved.   In his reply of 30 November 1972 the applicant pointed out that his complaint concerned an appointment in civil proceedings and that fees for legal aid counsels in civil proceedings had not been raised.   He insisted on the repeal of Sections 48, 49 of the Federal Barristers' Act which obliges barristers to accept appointments as legal aid counsels. He stated that the Ministers of Justice in two Lander have threatened to institute disciplinary proceedings based on these Articles if the members of the Bar Associations concerned went on strike as they had threatened. He was of the opinion that the obligation of barristers to represent poor clients amounts to compulsory labour within the meaning of Article 2 of ILO Convention No. 29, and Article 4 (2) of the Convention irrespective of the fees paid by the State. He pointed out that, as long as barristers are compelled to accept appointments by the courts to represent poor clients, they are prevented from fighting for higher fees by way of a strike.   On 20 December 1972 and in subsequent sessions the Commission again decided to adjourn the examination of the application pending the outcome of the legislation prepared by the respondent Government and purporting an increase in fees for legal aid counsel in matrimonial and infancy cases.   By letter of 15 August 1973 the respondent Government submitted as follows:   "By Article 2 No. 5 of the Act Amending the Federal Barristers' Act, the Federal Act for Barristers' Fees and Other Provisions of 24 October 1972, paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 123 of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees, which dealt with the fees for Counsel appointed under the legal aid scheme, have been repealed...   As a result of the repeal of paragraph 2 the fees payable to a barrister appointed under the legal aid scheme in the civil cases mentioned therein, e.g. in divorce cases, have been improved considerably ... Counsel appointed under the legal aid scheme are now entitled to a fee amounting to DM 113 instead of the full fee where the value of the property in the divorce case is DM 3000 while formerly the fixed amount of DM 75 was, independently of the value of the property in dispute, paid instead of the full fee.   According to Section 14 of the Court Fees Act of 26 July 1957, the value of the property in dispute amounts to DM 3000 in divorce cases. However, in the individual case it may be assessed at a higher amount, the maximum being DM one million.   It is intended to provide in Article 10 No. 1 (e) of the First Act Reforming Matrimonial and Family Law for this normal value of the property in dispute amounting to DM 3000, as laid down in Section 14 of the Court Fees Act, to be replaced by a value amounting to DM 4000. This Bill has been tabled in the Bundestag. According to it the fee provided in Section 123, paragraph 1, of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees for Counsel appointed under the legal aid scheme would be further increased to DM 123."   THE LAW   I.    The applicant has first complained that his appointment by the Regional Court at Detmold to represent the defendant, who had been granted legal aid in a divorce case, violated Article 4 (2) (Art. 4-2) of the Convention as he had to accept this appointment against his will and otherwise would have been subjected to disciplinary punishment.   Article 4, paragraph (2) (Art. 4-2), of the Convention provides that no-one shall be required to perform forced or compulsory labour.   The Commission is of the opinion that the concept of compulsory or forced labour cannot be understood solely in terms of the literal meaning of the words. It shares the opinion, which was expressed by four of its members in the Iversen case, that it had in fact "come to provisions and applications of ILO Conventions and provisions and applications of ILO Conventions and Resolutions on forced labour, as having certain elements and that it is reasonable, in the interpretation of Article 4 (2) (Art. 4-2) of the Convention, to have due regard to those elements; these elements of forced or compulsory labour are first, that the work or service is performed by the worker against his will and, secondly, that the requirement that the work or service is performed is unjust or oppressive or the work or service itself involves unavoidable hardship".   The Commission has first examined whether the applicant in the present case was required under the legal aid system to work against his will. It notes that the applicant has freely chosen his profession as a barrister knowing that barristers have, according to German law, the obligation to represent poor clients if a court appoints them as legal aid counsel. The Commission is therefore of the opinion that the applicant cannot therefore now claim that he acted against his will as legal aid counsel in the divorce case.   Furthermore, the work required by the applicant was not unjust since the right to receive legal aid is provided for under the Convention, and is thus recognised as an obligation of the State. There is also no hardship involved since the work required was a barristers' normal professional work. The alleged financial loss, which in any event does not, in view of the recent changes of the respective German law, seem to be important, can also not be regarded as causing the applicant any real hardship. In this connection the Commission points out that, according to the undisputed statement of the respondent Government, the German courts respect, as a rule, the suggestions of the Bar and only appoint those barristers who have declared an interest in taking on the representation of persons who have been granted legal aid by the court.   It follows that the application is in this respect manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   II.   The applicant has further alleged that his obligations as a barrister to represent poor persons, who were granted legal aid, violates Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) because he is not receiving the full fee in such cases.   Article 1, first paragraph, of this Protocol (P1-1-1) provides that every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.   The fact that counsel receives a fee from the State less than the obtainable for the same work in private practice, does not mean that he is deprived of any property right; for there was no property right accruing to him until the grant of legal aid.   Further, as regards any claim against private party in civil proceedings it has to be noted that a legal aid counsel can recover his full fees from the adverse party which is also the losing party (see Section 124 of the Code of Criminal Procedure = ZPO). This will often be the case as legal aid is, in civil proceedings, only granted if the case offers any prospects of success (see 114 (1) of the Code on Civil Procedure). It does not in fact follow from the applicant's submissions that in the divorce proceedings in question he could not recover his fees from private party.   An examination of this complaint does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   It follows that the application is in this respect also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   III. The applicant has further complained that the work imposed upon him, as well as the alleged financial losses he had to bear, were of a discriminatory nature since other professions allegedly receive an adequate remuneration if they have to render services required by the State in certain circumstances.   This complaint falls within the scope of Article 14 (Art. 14) in conjunction with Article 4 (2) (Art. 4-2) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1). According to the established case-law of the Commission and the Court of Human Rights on the meaning and scope of Article 14 (Art. 14) and its role as an integral part of each Article laying down rights and freedoms, a measure which, as in the present case, in itself is in conformity with the requirements of the Articles ensuring the rights or freedoms in question may however infringe these Articles when read in conjunction with Article 14 (Art. 14) for the reason that it is of a discriminatory nature (see European Court of Human Rights, case "relating to certain aspects of the laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium" (merits), judgment of 23 July   1968, p. 33 and the decisions of the Commission on the admissibility of applications No. 4372/70, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 37, p. 101 and No. 2727/66, Collection of Decisions, Vol. 35, p. 12).   The Commission first notes that members of other professions may under certain circumstances also be obliged to perform their duties (see e.g. Section 2 (1) paragraph 9 Bundesleistungsgesetz). The only difference between the situation of barristers and other professions is, according to the applicant, that other professions are better paid in cases where they are obliged to carry out their professional duties. The Commission doubts whether this allegation is correct, at least generally. Taking into account the recent increases of legal aid fees and considering that, for example, a divorce case, where both parties consent to the divorce, may give very little work to the barristers representing the parties, it can be assumed that in many cases the legal aid fees in fact constitute an adequate remuneration for the services of legal aid counsels. But, even on the assumption that other professions are financially treated more favourably than barristers, the Commission is of the opinion that such differential treatment is fully justified taking into account the factual differences between the situation of barristers and of other professions and taking further into account that, at least in civil proceedings, the legal aid counsel eventually has the possibility to claim his full fees from the other party or from his own client where the financial situation of the latter improves (see Sections 115 (1) No. 1, 125 of the Code on Civil Procedure; Section 100 of the Federal Act on Barristers' Fees).   An examination of this complaint does not therefore disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 14 (Art. 14) read in conjunction with others, Article 4, paragraph (2) (Art. 4-2), of the Convention or Article 1 first paragraph of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1-1).   It follows that this part of the application is again manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   IV.   The applicant has finally alleged a violation of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. He stated in this respect that the action Committee of German Barristers could not make use of the most effective weapon, namely the strike, to push through its members' well-founded request for adequate remuneration in legal aid cases, because no barrister would dare to go on strike as he would consequently face a disciplinary sanction.   It is true that Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention guarantees to everyone the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.   However, the Commission notes that the applicant was not prevented from joining, or even forming, the Action Committee of German Barristers. Furthermore, it has to be noted that, as the applicant has in his letter of 30 November 1971 himself admitted, in various parts of the Federal Republic barristers, who were apparently not members of the Action Committee went on strike, refusing to take on legal aid appointments. The authorities apparently took no action against these lawyers. In these circumstances the applicant can himself not be considered a victim of the alleged violation of Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention.   It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27, paragraph (2) (Art. 27-2), of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Commission DECLARES THIS APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.