CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 18 janvier 1978

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text-align:right } .sCB9E0544 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:left } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s7ED160F0 { text-decoration:none } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s83BE5C30 { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .s8EB5F569 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super }       COURT (PLENARY)             CASE OF IRELAND v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 5310/71)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   18 January 1978   In the case of Ireland v. the United Kingdom, The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in plenary session in application of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court and composed of the following judges:   Mr.   G. BALLADORE PALLIERI , President ,   Mr.   G. WIARDA ,   Mr.   M. ZEKIA ,   Mr.   J. CREMONA ,   Mr.   P. O’DONOGHUE ,   Mrs.   H. PEDERSEN ,   Mr.   THÓR VILHJÁLMSSON ,   Mr.   R. RYSSDAL ,   Mr.   W. GANSHOF VAN DER MEERSCH ,   Sir   Gerald FITZMAURICE ,   Mrs.   D. BINDSCHEDLER-ROBERT ,   Mr.   D. EVRIGENIS ,   Mr.   P.-H. TEITGEN ,   Mr.   G. LAGERGREN ,   Mr.   L. LIESCH ,   Mr.   F. GÖLCÜKLÜ ,   Mr.   F. MATSCHER , and also Mr. M.-A. EISSEN , Registrar , and Mr. H. PETZOLD , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 10 and 11 February, 22 and 25 to 27 April, 25 to 28 July and 6 to 13 December 1977, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1. This case was referred to the Court by the Government of Ireland ("the applicant Government"). It originated in an application against the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the respondent Government") lodged by the applicant Government with the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 16 December 1971 under Article 24 (art. 24) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). The report drawn up by the Commission concerning the said application (Article 31 of the Convention) (art. 31) was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 9 February 1976. 2. The Irish Government’s application to the Court was lodged with he registry on 10 March 1976, within the period of three months laid own by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention, and referred to Article 48 (art. 48). Its object is "to ensure the observance in Northern Ireland of the engagements undertaken by the respondent Government as a High Contracting Party to the Convention and in particular of the engagements specifically set out by the applicant Government in the pleadings filed and the submissions made on their behalf and described in the evidence adduced before the Commission in the hearings before them". "To this end", the Court is invited "to consider the report of the Commission and to confirm the opinion of the Commission that breaches of the Convention have occurred and also to consider the claims of the applicant Government with regard to other alleged breaches and to make a finding of breach of the Convention where the Court is satisfied that a breach has occurred". The United Kingdom is one of the States which have declared that they recognise the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). 3. The Registrar received twenty-five copies of the Commission’s report from its Secretary on 17 March 1976. 4. The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex officio members, Mr. P. O’Donoghue, the elected judge of Irish nationality, and Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr. G. Balladore Pallieri, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b) of the Rules of Court). On 20 March 1976, the President of the Court drew by lot, in the presence of an official of the registry, the names of the four other members, namely Mr. H. Mosler, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. S. Petrén and Mrs. D. Bindschedler-Robert (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Mr. Balladore Pallieri assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5). 5. On 29 April 1976, the Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court, "considering that the case raise[d] serious questions affecting the interpretation of the Convention". 6. At a meeting held on 18 May 1976, the President ascertained the views of the Agents of the Parties and of the delegates of the Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. He decided by an Order of the same date that the applicant Government should have until 2 August 1976 to file a memorial, that the respondent Government should then have until 30 October 1976 to file a memorial in reply and that the delegates of the Commission should be entitled to present their written observations, if any, within one month of the receipt of the said memorial in reply. By an Order of 19 November 1976, the President extended the last-mentioned time-limit until 15 December. The memorials of the applicant Government, the respondent Government and the delegates of the Commission were received at the registry on 30 July, 28 October and 15 December 1976, respectively. 7. By an Order of 26 July 1976, the President of the Court, having regard to Rule 29 para. 3 and with the agreement of the two Governments concerned and of the Commission, instructed the Registrar to make the Commission’s report public only after incorporation of changes approved by the President and having the sole purpose of protecting the identity of certain persons. The report was so made public as from 2 September 1976. 8. The President met the Agents of the Parties and the delegates of the Commission on 7 December 1976 in order to consult them on the organisation of the hearings. On 7 January 1977, he decided, with the agreement of the Court, that the first part of the oral proceedings would open on 7 February and would concern the following questions: "(a) Is the jurisdiction of the Court to examine any particular issue of fact or law limited by the original allegations of the Government of Ireland and/or by the decision of the Commission on the admissibility of application no. 5310/71? In the affirmative, do certain issues of fact or law fall outside this jurisdiction in the present case? (b) Has the Court jurisdiction to pronounce on the existence of the violations of the Convention found by the Commission in its report and which are not contested by the United Kingdom Government? In the affirmative, should the Court exercise that jurisdiction? (c) Should the Court examine the cases mentioned in paragraphs 2.30 and 2.31 of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission? (d) Is it proper in the circumstances of this case for the Court, without further enquiry into the facts, to: (i) confirm the conclusions of the Commission to the extent that they are not contested? (ii) deal only with the substance of those questions which give rise to dispute between the Parties? (e) Has the Court jurisdiction to review the procedural decisions of the Commission as such and/or should the Court, when assessing the conclusions of the Commission, have regard to the procedure followed by the latter body? (f) Does Article 1 (art. 1) of the Convention create any rights in addition to those defined in Section I and can it be the subject of a separate breach?" Oral hearings were accordingly held in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, from 7 to 9 February. Immediately afterwards, the Court deliberated in private. At its request, the President, by Order of 11 February, advised the Parties and the Commission of the following matters to be taken into account by them during the further procedure: "1. In the circumstances of this case, the Court does not consider that the reasons which have been given why it should refrain from pronouncing on the non-contested allegations of violation of Article 3 (art. 3) of the Convention are such as to preclude it from so pronouncing. However, the Court considers that it is already in possession of sufficient information and materials to enable it to make such a pronouncement. 2. The Court takes note of the fact that it is no longer invited by the applicant Government to examine the cases mentioned in paragraph 2.30 of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission; it does not deem it necessary to examine them proprio motu. 3. The Court finds that is has jurisdiction to take cognisance of the other contested cases of violation of Article 3 (art. 3) (paragraph 2.31 of the memorial of the delegates of the Commission) if and to the extent that the applicant Government put them forward as establishing the existence of a practice. 4. The Court finds that it does not have jurisdiction to rule on the correctness of the procedure followed by the Commission for hearing the witnesses G 1, G 2 and G 3 in London on 20 February 1975, but that it is empowered to assess the relevance and probative value of the evidence so obtained." After consulting the representatives of the two Governments concerned and of the Commission, the President, by the same Order, fixed 19 April 1977 as the date for resumption of the hearings. The second part of the hearings was held in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, from 19 to 22 April. 9. At the hearings of February and/or April 1977 there appeared before the Court: - for the applicant Government:   Mr. F.M. HAYES, Legal Adviser,       Department of Foreign Affairs,   Agent ,   Mr. D. COSTELLO, S.C., Attorney General,   Mr. A.J. HEDERMAN, S.C.,   Mr. R.J. O’HANLON, S.C.,   Mr. A. BROWNE, S.C.,   Mr. J. MURRAY, Barrister-at-Law,   Counsel ,   Mr. L. LYSAGHT, Chief State Solicitor,   Mr. P.P.D. QUIGLEY, Legal Assistant,       Attorney General’s Office,   Mr. M. BURKE, First Secretary,       Department of Foreign Affairs (February hearings only),   Mrs. J. LIDDY, Assistant Legal Adviser,       Department of Foreign Affairs (February hearings only),   Mr. P. HENNESSY, First Secretary,       Department of Foreign Affairs,   Mr. D. WALSHE, Office of the Chief State Solicitor,         Advisers ; - for the respondent Government:   Mr. D.H. ANDERSON, Legal Counsellor,       Foreign and Commonwealth Office,   Agent ,   Mr. I.K. MATHERS, Assistant Legal Adviser,       Foreign and Commonwealth Office,   Assistant Agent ,   The Rt. Hon. S. SILKIN, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General,   Mr. J.B.E. HUTTON, Q.C.,   Mr. A. LESTER, Q.C.,   Mr. N. BRATZA, Barrister-at-Law,   Counsel ,   Sir Basil HALL, K.C.B., M.C., T.D., Treasury Solicitor,   Mr. C. LEONARD, Treasury Solicitor’s Department,   Mr. M.L. SAUNDERS, Law Officers’ Department       (February hearings only),   Mr. W.C. BECKETT, Law Officers’ Department       (April hearings only),   Mr. A.P. WILSON, Northern Ireland Office,   Mr. N. VARNEY, Northern Ireland Office,   Mr. N. BRIDGES, Northern Ireland Office       (February hearings only),   Mr. R. SEAMAN, Northern Ireland Office       (April hearings only),   Advisers ; - for the Commission:   Mr. G. SPERDUTI,   Principal Delegate ,   Mr. C. NØRGAARD,   Delegate ,   Mr. T. OPSAHL,   Delegate . The Court heard addresses by Mr. Costello for the applicant Government, by Mr. Silkin, Mr. Hutton and Mr. Lester for the respondent Government and by Mr. Sperduti, Mr. Nørgaard and Mr. Opsahl for the Commission, as well as their replies to a question put by the Court. 10. In the course of the hearings and during the interval between the two parts thereof those appearing before the Court produced various documents including written submissions on Article 1 (art. 1) of the Convention. The Commission subsequently furnished to the Registrar other documents which he had requested on the instructions of the Court or its President. AS TO THE FACTS I. THE EMERGENCY SITUATION AND ITS BACKGROUND 11. The tragic and lasting crisis in Northern Ireland lies at the root of the present case. In order to combat what the respondent Government describe as "the longest and most violent terrorist campaign witnessed in either part of the island of Ireland", the authorities in Northern Ireland exercised from August 1971 until December 1975 a series of extrajudicial powers of arrest, detention and internment. The proceedings in this case concern the scope and the operation in practice of those measures as well as the alleged ill-treatment of persons thereby deprived of their liberty. 12. Up to March 1975, on the figures cited before the Commission by the respondent Government, over 1,100 people had been killed, over 11,500 injured and more than £140,000,000 worth of property destroyed during the recent troubles in Northern Ireland. This violence found its expression in part in civil disorders, in part in terrorism, that is organised violence for political ends. A. Social, constitutional and political background 13. Prior to 1922 the whole of the island of Ireland formed part of the United Kingdom. In that year, following a treaty of 1921, legislation was passed which endorsed the setting-up, with self-governing status within the British Commonwealth, of the Irish Free State comprising initially all of the island’s thirty-two counties. Provision was made for six of the nine counties of the province of Ulster in the north to opt out and remain within the United Kingdom and they did this in 1922. Thereafter, the Irish Free State became responsible for the government of the remaining twenty-six counties and, in 1937, a new Constitution was introduced proclaiming the independence and sovereignty of the State of what is now known as the Irish Republic. After the Second World War it left the Commonwealth and declared itself a republic. 14. From the 1920’s onwards, Northern Ireland, that is the above-mentioned six counties, had a separate Government and Parliament of its own. In addition, the electorate of the province (meaning in this judgment the six counties) returned twelve members to the United Kingdom Parliament. With certain defined matters excepted, the Northern Ireland Parliament and Government were the legislative and executive authorities for the six counties until 30 March 1972 when the United Kingdom authorities resumed "direct rule" of the province (see paragraph 49 below). 15. Northern Ireland is not a homogeneous society. It consists of two communities divided by deep and long-standing antagonisms. One community is variously termed Protestant, Unionist or Loyalist, the other is generally labelled as Catholic, Republican or Nationalist. About two-thirds of the population of one and a half million belong to the Protestant community, the remaining third to the Catholic community. The majority group is descended from Protestant settlers who emigrated in large numbers from Britain to Northern Ireland during the seventeenth century. The now traditional antagonism between the two groups is based both on religion and on social, economic and political differences. In particular, the Protestant community has consistently opposed the idea of a united Ireland independent of the United Kingdom, whereas the Catholic community has traditionally supported it. 16. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) is a clandestine organisation with quasi-military dispositions. Formed during the troubles prior to the partition of the island and illegal in the United Kingdom as well as in the Republic of Ireland, the IRA neither accepts the existence of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom nor recognises the democratic order of the Republic. It has periodically mounted campaigns of terrorism in both parts of the island of Ireland and in Great Britain. After 1962, the IRA was not overtly active for some years. During the time covered by the complaints of the applicant Government that is from 1971 to 1975 virtually all those members of the IRA living and operating in Northern Ireland were recruited from among the Catholic community. 17. Legislation designed to deal with matters affecting law and order and the security of the State was first enacted by the Northern Ireland Parliament in 1922 in the form of the Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland). This legislation (hereinafter referred to as "the Special Powers Act") was an enabling Act under which Regulations were from time to time made and brought into operation. Thus, for instance, a Regulation dating from before 1949 declared illegal certain organisations, including the IRA. In 1950 and 1954, following raids carried out by the IRA in Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Regulations were introduced granting powers of entry and search. In 1956 and 1957, in order to combat an IRA campaign then being launched, further Regulations were made dealing with internment, curfew, special trial procedures, firearms and explosives control, and restriction on movement. An account of the particular Regulations at issue in the present case, namely Regulations 10, 11 (1), 11 (2) and 12 (1), appears below at paragraphs 81 to 84. 18. The differing aspirations of the two communities resulted in the division between the main political parties in Northern Ireland being based primarily on their attitude to the status of the province as part of the United Kingdom rather than on political differences of the type commonly found in the rest of the United Kingdom and elsewhere. The Protestant community in general voted for the Unionist Party, which wished Northern Ireland to remain within the United Kingdom, whilst the Catholic community in general supported candidates favouring a united, independent Ireland. Given the relative sizes of the two communities, the inevitable result of this polarisation was that the Unionist Party, supported almost exclusively by Protestants, had a permanent majority in the Northern Ireland Parliament and formed the Government of the province throughout the fifty years leading up to direct rule in 1972. The abolition of proportional representation in the early 1920’s and the geographical arrangement of constituencies affected a great increase in the size of the Parliamentary majority. This situation understandably disenchanted the Catholic community. 19. Thus, whilst only a small minority of the latter community has ever actively supported the IRA, a very much greater proportion had always been discontented with Unionist government and the effects of its in-built majority. The Catholics in the population regarded themselves as discriminated against on various counts. The Cameron Commission, a body appointed by the Northern Ireland Government in March 1969 to report, inter alia, on the causes of disturbances in the six counties in 1968-1969 (see paragraph 23 below), considered justified many of the grievances then felt by the Catholics, in particular those concerned with the allocation of houses, local authority appointments, limitations on local electoral franchise and deliberate manipulation of ward boundaries and electoral areas. The European Commission of Human Rights itself came to the conclusion that there certainly was an element of inherent bias in the whole political system in Northern Ireland in favour of one community. From the time of partition onwards there has always been a greater or lesser degree of tension between the two communities, although since the early 1920’s there have been no disturbances comparable in scale to those of recent years. B. Development of the crisis up to 1969 20. In 1963 the first moves towards a campaign for "civil rights" for the Catholic community began to be made. The objectives of this campaign were, broadly speaking, the removal of the discrimination referred to above. At the same time, though, manifestations of Protestant violence began to emerge. In 1964 there was serious rioting in Belfast following a Protestant march. In March 1966, several petrol bombs were thrown at Catholic schools and property. In May 1966, a body calling itself the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), previously unknown to the police, issued a statement declaring war on the IRA and warning of its intention to execute all IRA men. Shortly thereafter, two Catholics were murdered and two others seriously wounded in Belfast. Three Protestants, members of the UVF, were subsequently charged and convicted for these attacks. The UVF, believed by the police to have consisted of only 5 to 6 persons, was declared illegal in June 1966 and seems to have remained inactive from then until 1969. During this period, there was no violent activity of significance by the IRA, who, after 1962, appear to have concentrated on political activity. 21. Throughout 1967, the movement for "civil rights" for the Catholic community gathered momentum. The first civil rights march took place in August 1968 without incident, but in October a clash with the police and two days’ rioting ensued after a march in Londonderry. 22. On 22 November 1968, the Northern Ireland Government announced a reform programme to deal with the Catholic grievances. Nevertheless, the civil rights movement continued its campaign and marches. The marches again led to clashes with the police and to violent confrontation with Protestant counter-demonstrators, often armed with cudgels, stones and the like. 23. The demonstrations, disturbances and rioting continued in various places into 1969. In paragraph 226 of its report, presented to the Northern Ireland Parliament in September 1969, the Cameron Commission expressed the view that certain Protestant extremist organisations "must ... bear a heavy share of direct responsibility for [certain of] the disorders ... and also for inflaming passions and engineering opposition to lawful, and what would in all probability otherwise have been peaceful, demonstrations or at least have attracted only modified and easily controlled opposition". Police conduct in handling certain disturbances was also criticised by the Cameron Commission. 24. In March and April 1969, five major explosions thought to have been caused by the UVF occurred at water and electricity installations in three counties. Units of British troops were flown into the province. The Northern Ireland Prime Minister, whose reform policies were unpopular with many Protestants, resigned at the end of April. A few days later, his successor declared a general amnesty for persons charged with or convicted of offences connected with the recent political protests and demonstrations. 25. Tension remained high; sectarian disturbances continued periodically up to mid-August. On 12 August 1969, a traditional Protestant anniversary parade sparked off several days of large-scale rioting, first of all in Londonderry and thereafter spreading to Belfast and other places. After 10 civilians had been killed and 145 civilians and 4 policemen wounded, it was found necessary to call in aid units of the British army. The riots in August 1969 greatly exceeded in severity any that had occurred in the previous years. Casualties and damage to property were extensive. In Belfast, for instance, a large number of houses and licensed premises, mostly Catholic owned or occupied, were burnt down, destroyed or damaged. 26. The Northern Ireland Prime Minister called a peace conference on 18 August which was attended by representatives of the two communities. On the next day, the United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments issued a joint declaration re-affirming, inter alia, their commitment to reforms in the six counties. In October, a programme of reform was announced; it included the reorganisation of the police force and local government, measures to prohibit discrimination in public employment, and the establishment of a Community Relations Commission and a central housing authority. 27. However, the publication of a government report into the functions and organisation of the province’s police force had produced a violent reaction in Protestant circles. On 11 October, a policeman was shot dead by a bullet fired from a crowd of Protestant rioters in Belfast. He became the first member of the security forces to be killed during the disorders of the past few years. 28. The IRA carried out no major acts of violence in 1969. However, at Easter 1969 they had reactivated their forces, placing all volunteers on full alert. At the same time, the IRA are thought to have gained much more support as a result of the riots and of an accompanying loss of confidence by Catholics in the police. Towards the end of the year, the IRA split into two wings. For some time there had been dissension in the movement between those who hoped to bring about a form of socialist people’s republic for all Ireland and those who considered that such involvement deflected the IRA from its traditional aims. The traditionalists formed themselves into the Provisional IRA whilst the followers of the new political doctrines became the Official IRA. Both factions remained organised along military lines. C. Situation from 1970 until the introduction of internment on 9 august 1971 29. The situation worsened in 1970. The number of explosions recorded by the police jumped dramatically from a total of 8 in 1969 to 155 in 1970. Some explosions were caused by Loyalists - about 25 according to statistics cited by the Commission - but there is no dispute that the majority were the work of the IRA. In total, 23 civilians and 2 policemen were killed during the course of the year. None of these deaths was attributed by the police to Protestant activity. 30. The terrorist campaign by the IRA appears to have begun in earnest in 1970 and to have been one primarily of bombing buildings and attacking the security forces. There was also undoubtedly some terrorist activity on the part of Loyalists, directed largely against politicians seen as hostile to Unionism and against Catholic owned or occupied property, particularly licensed premises. Responsibility for certain explosions was in fact claimed by the UVF. 31. The sharp increase in what may be termed terrorist-type activity was not accompanied by the cessation of inter-communal street disturbances which continued sporadically during the year of 1970 and accounted for the deaths of a number of people. 32. Between January and July 1971, the violence intensified, being marked by a dramatic upsurge in terrorist activity by the IRA. Police statistics record a total of 304 explosions, including 94 for the one month of July. Shooting at the security forces’ patrols built up and for the first time soldiers numbered amongst those killed. By 9 August, 13 soldiers, 2 policemen and 16 civilians had died since the beginning of the year. In addition, serious and prolonged rioting occurred in both Catholic and Protestant areas. Apart from one explosion in which a civilian was killed, there is no evidence of any deaths or even injuries having been caused by Loyalist terrorists. On the applicant Government’s own approximate estimate, Loyalist explosions accounted for only 14 out of the overall total of 304. Furthermore, as in 1970, Loyalist terrorists used mainly pipe bombs which were not very powerful in comparison with the devices employed by the IRA. The Commission stated in its report that the IRA were indisputably responsible for the very great majority of the acts of violence during this period. Loyalist terrorist activity had declined; there is no evidence that such Loyalist terrorism as did exist formed part of a highly organised campaign in the sense that IRA activity did. The Commission’s conclusion was that the threat and reality of serious terrorism came almost exclusively from the IRA. 33. On the political front during 1970 and 1971, progress was made in implementing the reforms announced in October 1969 (see paragraph 26 above). The Prime Minister of Northern Ireland, however, resigned in March 1971. In June 1971, his successor proposed a number of further steps designed to provide a positive role for representatives of the minority community in the actual process of government. D. 9 August 1971 (introduction of internment) until 30 March 1972 (introduction of direct rule) 1. The decision to introduce internment 34. It was against the background outlined above that on 9 August 1971 the Northern Ireland Government brought into operation extrajudicial measures of detention and internment of suspected terrorists. From 9 August 1971 until 7 November 1972, when certain of the Special Powers Regulations were replaced, the authorities in Northern Ireland in fact exercised four such extrajudicial powers: (i) arrest for interrogation purposes during 48 hours (under Regulation 10); (ii) arrest and remand in custody (under Regulation 11 (1)); (iii) detention of an arrested person (under Regulation 11 (2)); and (iv) internment (under Regulation 12 (1)). An account of the operation of these powers and the procedures there under is given below at paragraphs 81 to 84. 35. For some time, the possibility of internment had been extensively canvassed in the press and amongst politicians. Pressure had also been mounting within the Protestant community for its introduction; in the early months of 1971 there had been demonstrations against the then Prime Minister because of his Government’s alleged failure to deal with the IRA threat. The decision to introduce a policy of detention and internment was taken on 5 August 1971 by the Northern Ireland Government, following a meeting in London between the Northern Ireland and United Kingdom Governments. Prior to this, the question had been considered at the highest level in Northern Ireland and frequent consultations had taken place between the two Governments. In the latter half of July 1971, as an apparent last resort to avoid introducing internment, the security forces had intensified operations against suspected terrorists, mounting searches and detaining for questioning what were believed to be key figures in the IRA. Some 90 persons were arrested but no significant results were yielded. Prior to August 1971, the intelligence obtained by the police had failed to provide anything but a very general picture of the IRA organisation. 2. Reasons for the decision to introduce internment 36. The campaign of violence carried out by the IRA had attained unprecedented proportions by the middle of 1971. This was clearly the dominant factor behind the decision to exercise the extrajudicial powers. Three principal reasons for the decision have been cited by the respondent Government. Firstly, the authorities took the view that the normal procedures of investigation and criminal prosecution had become inadequate to deal with IRA terrorists; it was considered that the ordinary criminal courts could no longer be relied on as the sole process of law for restoring peace and order. The second reason given, which was closely related to the first, was the widespread intimidation of the population. Such intimidation often made it impossible to obtain sufficient evidence to secure a criminal conviction against a known IRA terrorist in the absence of an admissible confession or of police or army testimony. Furthermore, the conduct of police enquiries was seriously hampered by the grip the IRA had on certain so-called "no-go" areas, that is Catholic strongholds where terrorists, unlike the police, could operate in comparative safety. Thirdly, the ease of escape across the territorial border between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland presented difficulties of control. In addition to the three "security" reasons, there was, in the judgment of both the Northern Ireland Government and the United Kingdom Government, no hope of winning over the terrorists by political means, the reform programme initiated in 1969 having failed to prevent continuing violence. The authorities therefore came to the conclusion that it was necessary to introduce a policy of detention and internment of persons suspected of serious terrorist activities but against whom sufficient evidence could not be laid in court. This policy was regarded as a temporary measure primarily aimed at breaking the influence of the IRA. It was intended that a respite would be provided so as to enable the political and social reforms already undertaken to achieve their full effects. 3. The decision whom to arrest, detain and intern 37. The possibility of interning Loyalists was discussed in the preparatory stages. The security forces were aware of some Loyalist terrorist activity in 1971 and also of certain Protestant extremists, described by those forces as "rabble rousers" and suspected by them of acts of violence or intimidation, if not of terrorism strictly speaking. However, the security forces did not judge at this stage that there was any serious threat coming from the Loyalist quarter. There was said to be no army or police intelligence then available which indicated that any organisation other than the IRA had been actively engaged in bombing and killing in the very recent months. On account of the unprecedented level it had reached, and because of its nature as a highly organised, politically motivated campaign designed to overthrow the State, IRA terrorism was regarded as the real menace to law and order. Protestant terrorist activity, which was in the main directed against the Catholic community and not the State or the security forces, was seen by the authorities more as sporadic and as being on a minute scale in comparison and on a much less organised basis. 38. In the weeks preceding the introduction of internment, the police, in consultation with the army, were preparing lists of persons to be arrested. The lists included not only suspected IRA terrorists but also persons suspected of being involved or associated with the IRA or even, in a few cases, of possessing information about others so involved or associated. It was generally understood that the target of the planned exercise was the IRA. 4. Operation Demetrius 39. Starting at 4.00 a.m. on Monday, 9 August 1971, the army, with police officers occasionally acting as guides, mounted an operation to arrest the 452 persons whose names appeared on the final list. In the event, some 350 persons were arrested in accordance with the Special Powers Regulations. The arrested persons were taken to one of the three regional holding centres (Magilligan Weekend Training Centre in County Londonderry, Ballykinler Weekend Training Centre in County Down and Girdwood Park Territorial Army Centre in Belfast) that had been set up to receive the prisoners during 48 hours. All those arrested were subjected to interrogation by police officers of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC). 104 persons were released within 48 hours. Those who were to be detained were sent on to the prison ship "Maidstone" or to Crumlin Road Prison, both in Belfast. Prior to being lodged in detention, 12 individuals were moved to one or more unidentified centres for "interrogation in depth" extending over several days. Operation Demetrius, as the Commission points out, was not a selective manoeuvre aimed at individuals but a "sweeping-up" exercise directed against the IRA organisation as a whole. It is generally accepted that because of the scale and speed of the operation, some persons were arrested or even detained on the basis of inadequate or inaccurate information. 5. Events subsequent to Operation Demetrius 40. At 11.15 a.m. on 9 August 1971, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland announced to the public the introduction of internment. He stated, inter alia: "The main target of the present operation is the Irish Republican Army ... They are the present threat; but we will not hesitate to take strong action against any other individuals or organisations who may present such a threat in the future." 41. Arrests continued to be made during the rest of the year, partly of persons on the above-mentioned list and partly of persons who came under suspicion thereafter. The three regional holding centres were closed down in August 1971 shortly after Operation Demetrius was completed, and in September/October 1971 police centres were established at Palace Barracks (Holywood, County Down), Girdwood Park (Belfast), Gough (County Armagh) and Ballykelly (County Londonderry) for the purpose of holding and interrogating persons arrested under the Special Powers Regulations. 42. The introduction of internment provoked a violent reaction from the Catholic community and the IRA. Serious rioting broke out in Belfast and elsewhere, there was a considerable increase in shootings and bombings, and the security situation in general deteriorated rapidly. Within the minority community there occurred a further alienation from the authorities and the security forces, together with a rise in support for the IRA. 43. Although surprised by the extent of this reaction, both the Northern Ireland and the United Kingdom Governments continued their efforts to secure political progress. In London, the Home Secretary announced in September 1971 his Government’s determination to ensure that the Catholic population in the province should have an active, permanent and guaranteed role in the conduct of public business. In the same month, a meeting took place in England between the Prime Ministers of the United Kingdom, Northern Ireland and the Irish Republic. In October, the Belfast Government published proposals for involving the opposition in government. However, these proposals were considered unacceptable by the political representatives of the Catholic community and nothing came of them. 44. Neither internment nor the political initiatives ended the violence. On the contrary, the numbers of deaths, explosions and shootings recorded by the police for each month throughout the period from August to December 1971 were higher than those recorded in any of the previous seven months of the year. There was a total of 146 persons killed, including 47 members of the security forces and 99 civilians, 729 explosions and 1,437 shooting incidents. 45. Apart from rioting and a small-scale bombing campaign of licensed premises, there was apparently little serious violence by Protestants in 1971. Only one death occurring between August and the end of the year, an assassination of a Protestant in September, was attributed by the police to Loyalists. On the other hand, intimidation of members of the opposite community to move from their homes seems to have become more prevalent on both sides, although the official figures indicate that Catholics were principally affected. 46. On the Protestant side, the increased violence at this time led to the formation of defence associations or vigilante groups which ultimately amalgamated in or about September 1971 to become the Ulster Defence Association (UDA). The UDA did not appear openly on the streets until the spring of 1972. There was also seen the start of a development later to become significant, that is the holding of large, carefully prepared parades by Loyalist organisations (see paragraph 51 below). The latter and in particular the UDA were looked on by the police as primarily political organisations not engaged in violence as such. 47. At the beginning of 1972, despite a small drop, the level of violence remained higher than at any time before 9 August 1971. On 30 January 1972, 13 people were killed by army gunfire in the course of disorders taking place in the predominantly Catholic town of Londonderry. This incident led to a new upsurge in support for the IRA amongst the Catholic community. In the first three months of 1972, 87 people were killed, including 27 members of the security forces. Two assassinations carried out in March, one of a Protestant and the other of a Catholic, were the only deaths attributed to Loyalist activity. 421 explosions, the vast majority attributed to the IRA, were caused during the same period. 48. From August 1971 until 30 March 1972 there had been in Northern Ireland 1,130 bomb explosions and well over 2,000 shooting incidents. 158 civilians, 58 soldiers and 17 policemen had been killed, and 2,505 civilians, 306 soldiers and 107 RUC members injured. Throughout these months the numbers held under detention or internment orders proceeded to rise until a total of over 900 persons, all suspected of involvement with the IRA, were held at the end of March 1972. At the same time, the ordinary processes of the criminal law continued to be used, against Protestants as well as Catholics, whenever there was thought to be sufficient evidence to ground a criminal conviction. Thus, between 9 August 1971 and 31 March 1972, over 1,600 people were charged with "terrorist-type" offences. 49. In March 1972, in view of the deteriorating circumstances, the Government in London decided that they should assume direct responsibility for the administration of law and order in Northern Ireland if there was to be any hope of political progress. This decision was unacceptable to the Government of the province and accordingly it was announced on 24 March 1972 that direct rule from Westminster not only on law and order but on all matters was to be introduced. Under the Northern Ireland (Temporary Provisions) Act 1972 (hereinafter referred to as the "Temporary Provisions Act"), which was passed by the United Kingdom Parliament and came into force on 30 March 1972, temporary provision was made for the exercise of the executive and legislative powers of the Northern Ireland Parliament and Government by the United Kingdom authorities. The Belfast Parliament was prorogued and the Queen empowered to legislate in its stead by Order in Council. The executive powers of the Belfast Government were transferred to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. This was a new office created for the purpose; its holder was a member of the United Kingdom Government and answerable to the United Kingdom Parliament. The legislation was enacted for a period of one year but was subsequently extended. E. 30 March 1972 (introduction of direct rule) until 5 February 1973 (first detention of loyalists) 50. On assuming direct rule, the United Kingdom Government stated that one of their most important objectives was to bring internment under the Special Powers Act to an end and to consider how far the powers under that Act could be dispensed with. On 7 April 1972, the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland announced the immediate release of 47 internees and 26 detainees. By mid-May 259 persons had been released. The decision to phase out internment was not dictated by any fall in the level of violence. Rather it was intended to open the way for political progress by reducing tension as the first step in the process of reconciliation. On the political level, the United Kingdom was seeking the establishment of an equitable form of government for Northern Ireland, acceptable to both communities. 51. The introduction of direct rule, together with the release of detainees, caused resentment and dismay amongst the Protestant community. A two-day strike, which proved largely effective, was immediately called by the leader of one of the extremist movements on the Loyalist side. Street demonstrations and marches called by the UDA appear to have begun shortly after 30 March 1972. The UDA was organised on pseudo-military lines, its members, estimated at between 20,000 and 30,000 persons, giving themselves military ranks. The UDA used its forces to erect barricades, set up road blocks and disrupt civil life generally. They paraded in large numbers through the centre of Belfast and elsewhere, many of them masked and dressed in para-military uniforms and on occasions openly carrying weapons such as sticks or cudgels. Such demonstrations, however, seem rarely to have led to physical violence. Whilst it was illegal to