CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 21 février 1984

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GERMANY   (Application no. 8544/79)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   21 February 1984   In the Öztürk case, The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in plenary session in pursuance of Rule 48 of the Rules of Court [] and composed of the following judges:   Mr.   G. Wiarda , President ,   Mr.   R. Ryssdal ,   Mr.   J. Cremona ,   Mr.   Thór Vilhjálmsson ,   Mr.   W. Ganshof van der Meersch ,   Mrs.   D. Bindschedler-Robert ,   Mr.   D. Evrigenis ,   Mr.   L. Liesch ,   Mr.   F. Gölcüklü ,   Mr.   F. Matscher ,   Mr.   J. Pinheiro Farinha ,   Mr.   E. García de Enterría ,   Mr.   L.-E. Pettiti ,   Mr.   B. Walsh ,   Sir   Vincent Evans ,   Mr.   R. Macdonald ,   Mr.   C. Russo ,   Mr.   R. Bernhardt , and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen , Registrar , and Mr. H. Petzold , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 21 September 1983 and 25 January 1984, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.       The present case was referred to the Court by the Government of the Federal Republic of Germany ("the Government") and the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission").   The case originated in an application (no. 8544/79) against that State lodged with the Commission on 14 February 1979 under Article 25 (art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") by a Turkish national, Mr. Abdulbaki Öztürk. 2.       The Government's application and the Commission's request were lodged with the registry of the Court within the period of three months laid down by Articles 32 § 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) - the application on 13 September and the request on 15 October 1982.   The application, which referred to Article 48 (art. 48), invited the Court to hold that there had been no violation.   The purpose of the request was to obtain a decision as to whether or not there had been a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e). 3.       The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex officio members, Mr. R. Bernhardt, the elected judge of German nationality (Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention), and Mr. G. Wiarda, the President of the Court (Rule 21 § 3 (b) of the Rules of Court).   On 1 October 1982, the President drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the five other members, namely Mr. R. Ryssdal, Mr. M. Zekia, Mr. F. Matscher, Mr. J. Pinheiro Farinha and Mr. E. García de Enterría (Article 43 in fine (art. 43) of the Convention and Rule 21 § 4).   Subsequently, Mr. Thór Vilhjálmsson and Mr. W. Ganshof van der Meersch, substitute judges, took the place of Mr. Zekia and Mr. Garcia de Enterria, who were prevented from taking part in the consideration of the case (Rules 22 § 1 and 24 § 1). 4.       Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 § 5), ascertained, through the Deputy Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission regarding the procedure to be followed.   On 19 October 1982, he decided that the Agent should have until 31 January 1983 to file a memorial and that the Delegates should be entitled to file a memorial in reply within two months from the date of transmission of the Government's memorial to them by the Registrar. Following an extension of the first-mentioned time-limit granted to the Government on 18 January 1983, the latter's memorial was received at the registry on 24 February.   On 10 March, the Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar that the Delegates would present their own observations at the hearings. 5.       After consulting, through the Deputy Registrar, the Agent of the Government and the Delegates of the Commission, the President directed on 4 May that the oral proceedings should open on 25 May. 6.       The hearings were held in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day.   Immediately before they opened, the Chamber had held a preparatory meeting; it had authorised the Agent and the advocates of the Government and the person assisting the Delegates of the Commission to use the German language (Rule 27 §§ 2 and 3). There appeared before the Court: - for the Government   Mrs. I. Maier , Ministerialdirigentin       at the Federal Ministry of Justice,   Agent ,   Mr. E. Göhler , Ministerialrat       at the Federal Ministry of Justice,   Adviser ; - for the Commission   Mr. S. Trechsel ,   Mr. G. Sperduti ,   Delegates ,   Mr. N. Wingerter , the applicant's lawyer       before the Commission, assisting the Delegates (Rule 29 § 1, second sentence, of the Rules of Court). The Court heard addresses by Mrs. Maier for the Government and by Mr. Trechsel, Mr. Sperduti and Mr. Wingerter for the Commission, as well as their replies to its questions.   The Commission supplied the Registrar with certain documents that the Registrar had requested on the instructions of the President. 7.       At the close of deliberations held on 27 May, the Chamber decided under Rule 48 to relinquish jurisdiction forthwith in favour of the plenary Court. Having taken due note of the agreement of the Agent of the Government and the concurring opinion of the Delegates, the Court decided on 21 September that the proceedings should continue without re-opening the oral procedure (Rule 26). 8.       On 4 October, the Agent of the Government transmitted to the Registrar two documents and her replies to two questions that Judge Ganshof van der Meersch had put to her at the hearings. AS TO THE FACTS I.       THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE 9.       Mr. Öztürk, a Turkish citizen born in 1934, is resident at Bad Rappenau-Heinsheim in the Federal Republic of Germany. He arrived in the Federal Republic in 1964 and works in the motor-car industry.   After passing the necessary test, he was issued with a German driving licence on 7 May 1969. In 1978, he estimated his net monthly income at approximately DM 2,000. 10.      On 27 January 1978 in Bad Wimfen, the applicant drove his car into another car which was parked, causing about DM 5,000's worth of damage to both vehicles.   The owner of the other car reported the accident to the Neckarsulm police. On arriving at the scene of the accident, the police, by means of a notice written in Turkish, informed the applicant, amongst other things, of his rights to refuse to make any statement and to consult a lawyer.   He availed himself of these rights, and a report (Verkehrs-Ordnungswidrigkeiten-Anzeige) was thereupon transmitted by the police to the Heilbronn administrative authorities (Landratsamt). 11.      By decision of 6 April 1978, the Heilbronn administrative authorities imposed on Mr. Öztürk a fine (Bussgeld) of DM 60 for causing a traffic accident by colliding with another vehicle as a result of careless driving ("Ausserachtlassen der erforderlichen Sorgfalt im Strassenverkehr"); in addition he was required to pay DM 13 in respect of fees (Gebühr) and costs (Auslagen). The decision was based on section 17 of the Regulatory Offences Act of 24 May 1968, in its consolidated version of 1 January 1975 (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten - "the 1968/1975 Act"; see paragraph 18 below), on section 24 of the Road Traffic Act (Strassenverkehrsgesetz) and on Regulations 1 § 2 and 49 § 1, no. 1, of the Road Traffic Regulations (Strassenverkehrs-Ordnung).   Regulation 1 § 2 reads as follows: "Every road-user (Verkehrsteilnehmer) must conduct himself in such a way as to ensure that other persons are not harmed or endangered and are not hindered or inconvenienced more than is unavoidable in the circumstances." Regulation 49 § 1, no. 1, specifies that anyone who contravenes Regulation 1 § 2 is guilty of a "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit).   Under section 24 sub-section 2 of the Road Traffic Act, such an offence gives rise to liability to a fine. 12.      On 11 April 1978, the applicant, who was represented by Mr. Wingerter, lodged an objection (Einspruch) against the above-mentioned decision (section 67 of the 1968/1975 Act); he stated that he was not waiving his right to a public hearing before a court (section 72). The public prosecutor's office (Staatsanwaltschaft) attached to the Heilbronn Regional Court (Landgericht), to which the file had been transmitted on 5 May, indicated six days later that it had no objection to a purely written procedure; it further stated that it would not be attending the hearings (sections 69 and 75). 13.      Sitting in public on 3 August 1978, the Heilbronn District Court (Amtsgericht) heard Mr. Öztürk, who was assisted by an interpreter, and then three witnesses.   Immediately thereafter, the applicant withdrew his objection.   The Heilbronn administrative authorities' decision of 6 April 1978 accordingly became final (rechtskräftig). 14.      The District Court directed that the applicant should bear the court costs and his own expenses.   On 12 September 1978, the District Court Cashier's Office (Gerichtskasse) fixed the costs to be paid by Mr. Öztürk at DM 184.70, of which DM 63.90 represented interpreter's fees. 15.      On 4 October, the applicant entered an appeal (Erinnerung) against the bill of costs with regard to the interpreter's fees.   He relied on Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention and referred to the Commission's report of 18 May 1977 in the case of Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç.   At the time, that case was pending before the Court, which delivered its judgment on the merits on 28 November 1978 (Series A no. 29). The District Court dismissed the appeal on 25 October.   It noted that the obligation to bear the interpreter's fees was grounded on Article 464 (a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) and section 46 of the 1968/1975 Act (see paragraphs 21 and 35 below).   Relying on a 1975 decision by the Cologne Court of Appeal, it held that this obligation was compatible with Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) of the Convention.   According to the District Court, the above-mentioned opinion of the Commission did not alter matters since, unlike a judgment of the Court; it was not binding on the States. 16.      According to undisputed evidence adduced by the Government, the court costs, including the interpreter's fees, were paid by an insurance company with which Mr. Öztürk had taken out a policy. II.      THE RELEVANT LEGISLATION A.   The 1968/1975 Act 17.      The purpose of the 1968/1975 Act was to remove petty offences from the sphere of the criminal law.   Included in this category were contraventions of the Road Traffic Act.   Under section 21 of the Road Traffic Act (in its former version), commission of such contraventions had given rise to liability to a fine (Geldstrafe) or imprisonment (Haft).   Section 3 no. 6 of the Act of 24 May 1968 (Einführungsgesetz zum Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) classified them as "Ordnungswidrigkeiten" and henceforth made them punishable only by fines not considered to be criminal by the legislature (Geldbussen). The 1968/1975 Act had been foreshadowed in the Federal Republic by two enactments: the Act of 25 March 1952 on "regulatory offences" (Gesetz über Ordnungswidrigkeiten) and, to a certain extent, the Economic Crime Act of 26 July 1949 (Wirtschaftsstrafgesetz). 1.   General provisions 18.      Section 1 sub-section 1 of the 1968/1975 Act defines a "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit) as an unlawful (rechtswidrig) and reprehensible (vorwerfbar) act, contravening a legal provision which makes the offender liable to a fine (Geldbusse). The fine cannot be less than DM 5 or, as a general rule, more than DM 1,000 (section 17 sub-section 1).   The amount of the fine is fixed in each case by reference to the seriousness of the offence, the degree of misconduct attributable to the offender and, save for minor (geringfügig) offences, the offender's financial circumstances (section 17 sub-section 3). If the act constitutes both a "regulatory" and a criminal offence, only the criminal law is applicable; however, if no criminal penalty is imposed, the act may be punished as a "regulatory offence" (section 21). 2.   The prosecuting authorities 19.      Ordnungswidrigkeiten are to be dealt with by the administrative authorities (Verwaltungsbehörde) designated by law, save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act confers the power of prosecution of such offences on the public prosecutor and their judgment and sentencing on the courts (sections 35 and 36).   Where an act has come before him as a criminal matter, the public prosecutor may also treat the act as a "regulatory offence" (section 40). 20.      The administrative authorities will remit the matter to the public prosecutor if there is reason to suppose that a criminal offence has been committed; he will refer the matter back to them if he does not take proceedings (section 41).   In the case of a "regulatory offence" having a close connection with a criminal offence in respect of which the public prosecutor has instituted proceedings, the prosecutor may extend the criminal proceedings to cover the "regulatory offence" as long as the administrative authorities have not fixed any fine (section 42). The public prosecutor's decision to treat or not to treat an act as a criminal offence is binding on the administrative authorities (section 44). 3.   Procedure in general 21.      Subject to the exceptions laid down in the 1968/1975 Act, the provisions of the ordinary law governing criminal procedure, and in particular the Code of Criminal Procedure, the Judicature Act (Gerichtsverfassungsgesetz) and the Juvenile Courts Act (Jugendgerichtsgesetz), are applicable by analogy (sinngemäss) to the procedure in respect of "regulatory offences" (section 46 sub-section 1).   The prosecuting authorities (see paragraph 19 above) have the same rights and duties as the public prosecutor in a criminal matter unless the 1968/1975 Act itself states otherwise (section 46 sub-section 2).   Nevertheless, various measures permissible in criminal matters may not be ordered in respect of "regulatory offences", notably arrest, interim police custody (vorläufige Festnahme) or seizure of mail or telegrams (section 46 sub-section 3). The taking of blood samples and other minor measures, within the meaning of Article 81 (a) § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, remain possible. 22.      The prosecution of "regulatory offences" lies within the discretion (pflichtgemässes Ermessen) of the competent authority; so long as the case is pending before it, the competent authority may terminate the prosecution at any time (section 47 sub-section 1). Once the case has been brought before a court (see paragraphs 27-28 below), power to decide on a stay of proceedings rests with the court; any such decision requires the agreement of the public prosecutor and is final (section 47 sub-section 2). 23.      As regards the judicial stage (if any) of the proceedings (see paragraphs 28-30 below), section 46 sub-section 7 of the 1968/1975 Act attributes jurisdiction in the matter to divisions (Abteilungen) of the District Courts and to chambers (Kammern; Senate) of the Courts of Appeal (Oberlandesgerichte) and of the Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof). 4.   Preliminary procedure 24.      Investigations (Erforschung) into "regulatory offences" are a matter for the police authorities.   In this connection, the police authorities enjoy discretionary powers (pflichtgemässes Ermessen); save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise, they have the same rights and duties as in the prosecution of criminal offences (section 53 sub-section 1). 25.      Prior to any decision being taken, the person concerned (Betroffener) has to be given the opportunity of commenting, before the competent authorities, on the allegation made against him (section 55). In the case of a minor (geringfügig) offence, the administrative authorities may give the person concerned a warning (Verwarnung) and impose on him an admonitory fine (Verwarnungsgeld) which, save for any exception laid down under the applicable law, may range from DM 2 to 20 (section 56 sub-section 1).   However, sanctions of this kind are possible only if the person concerned consents and pays the fine immediately or within one week (section 56 sub-section 2). 26.      If necessary, the administrative authorities will designate an officially appointed lawyer to act for the person concerned in the proceedings before them (section 60). Measures taken by the administrative authorities during the preliminary procedure can in principle be challenged before the courts (section 62). 5.   The administrative decision imposing a fine 27.      Save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act provides otherwise - as in the case of the matter being settled by payment of an admonitory fine -, a "regulatory offence" is punishable by an administrative decision imposing a fine (Bussgeldbescheid; section 65). The person concerned may lodge an objection (Einspruch) within one week (section 67).   Unless they withdraw their decision, the administrative authorities will then forward the file to the public prosecutor who will submit it to the competent District Court (sections 69 sub-section 1 and 68) and thereupon assume the function of prosecuting authority (section 69 sub-section 2). 6.   Judicial stage (if any) of the procedure 28.      Under section 71, if the District Court finds the objection admissible (section 70) it will, unless the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, examine the objection in accordance with the provisions applicable to an "Einspruch" against a penal order (Strafbefehl): in principle, it will hold a hearing and deliver a judgment (Urteil) which may impose a heavier sentence (Article 411 of the Code of Criminal Procedure). However, its ruling may take the form of an order (Beschluss) if the District Court considers that a hearing is not necessary and provided the public prosecutor or the person concerned does not object (section 72 sub-section 1).   In that event, it may, inter alia, acquit the person concerned, settle the amount of a fine or terminate the prosecution, but not increase the penalty (section 72 sub-section 2). 29.      The person concerned has the option of attending hearings but is not bound to do so unless the District Court so directs (section 73 sub-sections 1 and 2); he may be represented by a lawyer (section 73 sub-section 4). The public prosecutor's office may attend the hearing; if the District Court considers the presence of an official from that office to be appropriate, it will inform the latter accordingly (section 75 sub-section 1). The District Court will give the administrative authorities the opportunity to set out the matters which, in their view, are of importance for the decision to be given; they may address the Court at the hearing, if they so wish (section 76 sub-section 1). 30.      Subject to certain exceptions, section 79 allows an appeal on points of law (Rechtsbeschwerde) to be brought against a judgment or an order issued pursuant to section 72; save in so far as the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, in determining the appeal the court concerned will follow, by analogy, the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure relating to cassation proceedings (Revision). 7.   Administrative procedure and criminal procedure 31.      The administrative authorities' classification of an act as a "regulatory offence" is not binding on the court ruling on the objection (Einspruch); however, it can apply the criminal law only if the person concerned has been informed of the change of classification and enabled to prepare his defence (section 81 sub-section 1).   Once this condition has been satisfied, either by the court of its own motion or at the public prosecutor's request, the person concerned acquires the formal status of an accused (Angeklagter, section 81 sub-section 2) and the subsequent proceedings fall outside the scope of the 1968/1975 Act (section 81 sub-section 3). 8.   Enforcement of decisions imposing a fine 32.      A decision imposing a fine is enforceable once it has become final (sections 89 and 84).   Unless the 1968/1975 Act states otherwise, enforcement of a decision taken by the administrative authorities is governed by the Federal Act or the Land Act, as the case may be, on enforcement in administrative matters (Verwaltungs-Vollstreckungsgesetze) (section 90 sub-section 1).   When the decision is one taken by a court, certain relevant provisions of, inter alia, the Code of Criminal Procedure are applicable (section 91). 33.      If, without having established (dargetan) his inability to pay, the person concerned has not paid the fine in due time, the court may, at the request of the administrative authorities or, where the fine was imposed by a court decision, of its own motion order coercive imprisonment (Erzwingungshaft - section 96 sub-section 1).   The resultant detention does not replace payment of the fine in the manner of an Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe under the criminal law, but is intended to compel payment.   The period of detention may not exceed six weeks for one fine and three months for several fines (section 96 sub-section 3).   Implementation of the detention order is governed, inter alia, by the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 97). 9.   Interpretation and other costs 34.      As far as the costs of the administrative procedure are concerned, the competent authorities apply by analogy certain provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure (section 105). 35.      Under section 109, the person concerned has to bear the costs of the court proceedings if he withdraws his "Einspruch" or if the competent court rejects it. The costs in question are made up of the expenses and fees of the Treasury (Article 464 (a) § 1, first sentence, of the Code of Criminal Procedure).   These fees and expenses are listed in the Court Costs Act (Gerichtskostengesetz) which in turn refers, inter alia, to the Witnesses and Experts (Expenses) Act (Gesetz über die Entschädigung von Zeugen und Sachverständigen).   Section 17 sub-section 2 of the last-mentioned Act provides that "for the purposes of compensation, interpreters shall be treated as experts". Interpretation costs (Dolmetscherkosten) are thus included in the costs of judicial proceedings.   However, as far as criminal proceedings - and criminal proceedings alone - are concerned, the German legislature amended the schedule (Kostenverzeichnis) to the Court Costs Act following the Luedicke, Belkacem and Koç judgment of 28 November 1978 (see paragraph 15 above; see also Resolution DH (83) 4 of 23 March 1983 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe).   According to no. 1904 in this schedule, henceforth no charge is to be made for "the sums due to interpreters and translators engaged in criminal proceedings in order to translate, for an accused who is deaf or dumb or not conversant with the German language, the statements or documents which the accused needs to understand for his defence" (Act of 18 August 1980). 36.      Under the terms of section 109 of the 1968/1975 Act, the question of payment of the costs of the proceedings, including the interpretation costs, only arises once the withdrawal or dismissal of the objection has become final.   The person concerned may never be required to make an advance payment in respect of the costs concerned. B.   Road traffic fines 37.      The Road Traffic Act, the Road Traffic Regulations and the Road Traffic Licence and Vehicle Conformity Regulations (Strassenverkehrs-Zulassungs-Ordnung) contain lists of "regulatory offences" punishable by fine (section 24 of the Road Traffic Act). In the case of a "regulatory offence" committed in gross (grob) and persistent (beharrlich) violation of the duties incumbent on a driver, the administrative authorities or, where an objection has been lodged, the court may at the same time disqualify the person concerned from holding a driving licence (Fahrverbot) for a period of one to three months (section 25 of the Road Traffic Act).   According to the Government, in 1982 such a measure was taken in 0.5 per cent of cases. 38.      The Länder have co-operated together to adopt rules (Verwaltungsvorschriften) establishing a uniform scale of fines (Bussgeldkatalog) for the various road traffic "regulatory offences"; legally, these rules are binding on the administrative authorities empowered to impose fines but not on the courts. Section 26 (a) of the Road Traffic Act, which was inserted in the Act of 28 December 1982 but which has not yet been implemented, provides that the Minister of Transport shall issue such rules with the agreement of the Bundesrat and in the form of a Decree (Rechtsverordnung). 39.      Under section 28 of the Road Traffic Act, a fine imposed for contravention of the road traffic regulations may in some specified cases be entered on a central traffic register (Verkehrszentralregister) if it exceeds a certain level (DM 39 at the time of the facts in issue, DM 79 as from 1 July 1982); on the other hand, no mention of it is included in the judicial criminal records (Bundeszentralregister). The entry must be deleted after a maximum of two years, unless further entries have been made in the meantime (section 29). Only certain authorities have access to this register, notably for the purposes of a criminal prosecution or a prosecution for a road traffic "regulatory offence" (section 30). 40.      According to undisputed evidence supplied by the Government, the 1968/1975 Act in practice plays a particularly important role in the area of road traffic; thus, it was said that 90 per cent of the fines imposed in 1982 concerned road traffic offences. The Government stated that each year in the Federal Republic of Germany there were 4,700,000 to 5,200,000 decisions imposing a fine (Geldbusse) and 15,500,000 to 16,000,000 warnings accompanied by a fine (Verwarnungsgelder).   The statistics of the Länder on Road Traffic Act offences were said to show that in 1982 fines exceeding DM 200 and DM 500 came to 1.5 per cent and 0.1 per cent respectively of the total, as compared with 10.8 per cent for fines of between DM 101 and DM 200, 39.4 per cent for fines of between DM 41 and DM 100 and 48.2 per cent for fines of DM 40 or less. 43.4 per cent of road traffic offences consisted of contraventions of a prohibition on stopping or parking, approximately 17.1 per cent of speeding, 6.5 per cent of non-observance of traffic lights and 5.9 per cent of illegal overtaking.   Other offences totalled less than 4 per cent by category.   The offences covered by Regulation 1 § 2 of the Road Traffic Regulations, the provision applied in Mr. Öztürk's case (see paragraph 11 above), amounted to approximately 2.8 per cent. 41.      Despite the absence of statistics in this connection, the Government estimated that 10 to 13 per cent of the five million or so fines imposed each year concerned foreigners.   Of the 4,670,000 foreigners living in the Federal Republic, approximately 2,000,000 possessed a motor vehicle. PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 42.      In his application of 14 February 1979 to the Commission (no. 8544/79), Mr. Öztürk complained of the fact that the Heilbronn District Court had ordered him to bear the interpreter's fees; he relied on Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) of the Convention. 43.      The Commission declared the application admissible on 15 December 1981. In its report of 12 May 1982 (Article 31 (art. 31) of the Convention), the Commission expressed the opinion, by eight votes to four, that there had been a violation of Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e). The report contains two dissenting opinions. FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT 44.      At the close of the hearings on 25 May 1983, the Government requested the Court "to hold that the Federal Republic of Germany has not violated the Convention". AS TO THE LAW 45.      Under the terms of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention: "1.   In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal ... 2.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence shall   be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law. 3.    Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:   ... (e)   to have the free assistance of an interpreter if he cannot understand or speak   the language used in court." In the applicant's submission, the Heilbronn District Court had acted in breach of Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) in ordering him to pay the costs incurred through recourse to the services of an interpreter at the hearing on 3 August 1978. I.       APPLICABILITY OF ARTICLE 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) 46.      According to the Government, Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) is not applicable in the circumstances since Mr. Öztürk was not "charged with a criminal offence".   Under the 1968/1975 Act, which "decriminalised" petty offences, notably in the road traffic sphere, the facts alleged against Mr. Öztürk constituted a mere "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit).   Such offences were said to be distinguishable from criminal offences not only by the procedure laid down for their prosecution and punishment but also by their juridical characteristics and consequences. The applicant disputed the correctness of this analysis.   Neither was it shared by the Commission, which considered that the offence of which Mr. Öztürk was accused was indeed a "criminal offence" for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6). 47.      According to the French version of Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e), the right guaranteed is applicable only to an "accusé". The corresponding English expression (person "charged with a criminal offence") and paragraph 1 of Article 6 (art. 6-1) ("criminal charge"/"accusation en matière pénale") - this being the basic text of which paragraphs 2 and 3 (art. 6-2, art. 6-3) represent specific applications (see the Deweer judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 30, § 56) - make it quite clear that the "accusation" ("charge") referred to in the French wording of Article 6 § 3 (e) (art. 6-3-e) must concern a "criminal offence" (see, mutatis mutandis, the Adolf judgment of 26 March 1982, Series A no. 49, p. 15, § 30). Under German law, the misconduct committed by Mr. Öztürk is not treated as a criminal offence (Straftat) but as a "regulatory offence" (Ordnungswidrigkeit).   The question arises whether this classification is the determining factor in terms of the Convention. 48.      The Court was confronted with a similar issue in the case of Engel and others, which was cited in argument by the representatives. The facts of that case admittedly concerned penalties imposed on conscript servicemen and treated as disciplinary according to Netherlands law.   In its judgment delivered on 8 June 1976 in that case, the Court was careful to state that it was confining its attention to the sphere of military service (Series A no. 22, p. 34, § 82).   The Court nevertheless considers that the principles set forth in that judgment (ibid., pp. 33-35, §§ 80-82) are also relevant, mutatis mutandis, in the instant case. 49.      The Convention is not opposed to States, in the performance of their task as guardians of the public interest, both creating or maintaining a distinction between different categories of offences for the purposes of their domestic law and drawing the dividing line, but it does not follow that the classification thus made by the States is decisive for the purposes of the Convention. By removing certain forms of conduct from the category of criminal offences under domestic law, the law-maker may be able to serve the interests of the individual (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment, ibid., p. 33, § 80) as well as the needs of the proper administration of justice, in particular in so far as the judicial authorities are thereby relieved of the task of prosecuting and punishing contraventions - which are numerous but of minor importance - of road traffic rules.   The Convention is not opposed to the moves towards "decriminalisation" which are taking place - in extremely varied forms - in the member States of the Council of Europe.   The Government quite rightly insisted on this point.   Nevertheless, if the Contracting States were able at their discretion, by classifying an offence as "regulatory" instead of criminal, to exclude the operation of the fundamental clauses of Articles 6 and 7 (art. 6, art. 7), the application of these provisions would be subordinated to their sovereign will.   A latitude extending thus far might lead to results incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention. 50.      Having thus reaffirmed the "autonomy" of the notion of "criminal" as conceived of under Article 6 (art. 6), what the Court must determine is whether or not the "regulatory offence" committed by the applicant was a "criminal" one within the meaning of that Article (art. 6).   For this purpose, the Court will rely on the criteria adopted in the above-mentioned Engel and others judgment (ibid., pp. 34-35, § 82).   The first matter to be ascertained is whether or not the text defining the offence in issue belongs, according to the legal system of the respondent State, to criminal law; next, the nature of the offence and, finally, the nature and degree of severity of the penalty that the person concerned risked incurring must be examined, having regard to the object and purpose of Article 6 (art. 6), to the ordinary meaning of the terms of that Article (art. 6) and to the laws of the Contracting States. 51.      Under German law, the facts alleged against Mr. Öztürk - non-observance of Regulation 1 § 2 of the Road Traffic Regulations - amounted to a "regulatory offence" (Regulation 49 § 1, no. 1, of the same Regulations).   They did not fall within the ambit of the criminal law, but of section 17 of the Ordnungswidrigkeitengesetz and of section 24 sub-section 2 of the Road Traffic Act (see paragraph 11 above).   The 1968/1975 legislation marks an important step in the process of "decriminalisation" of petty offences in the Federal Republic of Germany.   Although legal commentators in Germany do not seem unanimous in considering that the law on "regulatory offences" no longer belongs in reality to criminal law, the drafting history of the 1968/1975 Act nonetheless makes it clear that the offences in question have been removed from the criminal law sphere by that Act (see Deutscher Bundestag, Drucksache V/1269 and, inter alia, the judgment of 16 July 1969 by the Constitutional Court, Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts, vol. 27, pp. 18-36). Whilst the Court thus accepts the Government's arguments on this point, it has nonetheless not lost sight of the fact that no absolute partition separates German criminal law from the law on "regulatory offences", in particular where there exists a close connection between a criminal offence and a "regulatory offence" (see paragraph 20 above).   Nor has the Court overlooked that the provisions of the ordinary law governing criminal procedure apply by analogy to "regulatory" proceedings (see paragraph 21 above), notably in relation to the judicial stage, if any, of such proceedings. 52.      In any event, the indications furnished by the domestic law of the respondent State have only a relative value.   The second criterion stated above - the very nature of the offence, considered also in relation to the nature of the corresponding penalty - represents a factor of appreciation of greater weight. In the opinion of the Commission - with the exception of five of its members - and of Mr. Öztürk, the offence committed by the latter was criminal in character. For the Government in contrast, the offence in question was beyond doubt one of those contraventions of minor importance - numbering approximately five million each year in the Federal Republic of Germany - which came within a category of quite a different order from that of criminal offences.   The Government's submissions can be summarised as follows.   By means of criminal law, society endeavoured to safeguard its very foundations as well as the rights and interests essential for the life of the community.   The law on Ordnungswidrigkeiten, on the other hand, sought above all to maintain public order.   As a general rule and in any event in the instant case, commission of a "regulatory offence" did not involve a degree of ethical unworthiness such as to merit for its perpetrator the moral value-judgment of reproach (Unwerturteil) that characterised penal punishment (Strafe).   The difference between "regulatory offences" and criminal offences found expression both in procedural terms and in relation to the attendant penalties and other legal consequences. In the first place, so the Government's argument continued, in removing "regulatory offences" from the criminal law the German legislature had introduced a simplified procedure of prosecution and punishment conducted before administrative authorities save in the event of subsequent appeal to a court.   Although general laws on criminal procedure were in principle applicable by analogy, the procedure laid down under the 1968/1975 Act was distinguishable in many respects from criminal procedure.   For example, prosecution of Ordnungswidrigkeiten fell within the discretionary power of the competent authorities and the 1968/1975 Act greatly limited the possibilities of restricting the personal liberty of the individual at the stage of the preliminary investigations (see paragraphs 21, 22 and 24 above). In the second place, instead of a penal fine (Geldstrafe) and imprisonment the legislature had substituted a mere "regulatory" fine (Geldbusse - see paragraph 17 above).   Imprisonment was not an alternative (Ersatzfreiheitsstrafe) to the latter type of fine as it was to the former and no coercive imprisonment (Erzwingungshaft) could be ordered unless the person concerned had failed to pay the sum due without having established his inability to pay (see paragraph 33 above).   Furthermore, a "regulatory offence" was not entered in the judicial criminal records but solely, in certain circumstances, on the central traffic register (see paragraph 39 above). The reforms accomplished in 1968/1975 thus, so the Government concluded, reflected a concern to "decriminalise" minor offences to the benefit not only of the individual, who would no longer be answerable in criminal terms for his act and who could even avoid all court proceedings, but also of the effective functioning of the courts, henceforth relieved in principle of the task of dealing with the great majority of such offences. 53.      The Court does not underestimate the cogency of this argument. The Court recognises that the legislation in question marks an important stage in the history of the reform of German criminal law and that the innovations introduced in 1968/1975 represent more than a simple change of terminology. Nonetheless, the Court would firstly note that, according to the ordinary meaning of the terms, there generally come within the ambit of the criminal law offences that make their perpetrator liable to penalties intended, inter alia, to be deterrent and usually consisting of fines and of measures depriving the person of his liberty. In addition, misconduct of the kind committed by Mr. Öztürk continues to be classified as part of the criminal law in the vast majority of the Contracting States, as it was in the Federal Republic of Germany until the entry into force of the 1968/1975 legislation; in those other States, such misconduct, being regarded as illegal and reprehensible, is punishable by criminal penalties. Moreover, the changes resulting from the 1968/1975 legislation relate essentially to procedural matters and to the range of sanctions, henceforth limited to Geldbussen.   Whilst the latter penalty appears less burdensome in some respects than Geldstrafen, it has nonetheless retained a punitive character, which is the customary distinguishing feature of criminal penalties.   The rule of law infringed by the applicant has, for its part, undergone no change of content.   It is a rule that is directed, not towards a given group possessing a special status - in the manner, for example, of disciplinary law -, but towards all citizens in their capacity as road-users; it prescribes conduct of a certain kind and makes the resultant requirement subject to a sanction that is punitive.   Indeed, the sanction - and this the Government did not contest - seeks to punish as well as to deter.   It matters little whether the legal provision contravened by Mr. Öztürk is aimed at protecting the rights and interests of others or solely at meeting the demands of road traffic.   These two ends are not mutually exclusive.   Above all, the general character of the rule and the purpose of the penalty, being both deterrent and punitive, suffice to show that the offence in question was, in terms of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, criminal in nature. The fact that it was admittedly a minor offence hardly likely to harm the reputation of the offender does not take it outside the ambit of Article 6 (art. 6).   There is in fact nothing to suggest that the criminal offence referred to in the Convention necessarily implies a certain degree of seriousness.   In this connection, a number of Contracting States still draw a distinction, as did the Federal Republic at the time when the Convention was opened for the signature of the Governments, between the most serious offences (crimes), lesser offences (délits) and petty offences (contraventions), whilst qualifying them all as criminal offences.   Furthermore, it would be contrary to the object and purpose of Article 6 (art. 6), which guarantees to "everyone charged with a criminal offence" the right to a court and to a fair trial, if the State were allowed to remove from the scope of this Article (art. 6) a whole category of offences merely on the ground of regarding them as petty.   Nor does the Federal Republic deprive the presumed perpetrators of Ordnungswidrigkeiten of this right since it grants them the faculty - of which the applicant availed himself - of appealing to a court against the administrative decision. 54.      As the contravention committed by Mr. Öztürk was criminal for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6) of the Convention, there is no need to examine it also in the light of the final criterion stated above (at paragraph 50).   The relative lack of seriousness of the penalty at stake (see paragraph 18 above) cannot divest an offence of its inherently criminal character. 55.      The Government further appeared to consider that the applicant did not have the status of a person "charged with a criminal offence" because the 1968/1975 Act does not provide for any "Beschuldigung" ("charge") and does not employ the terms "Angeschuldigter" ("person charged") or "Angeklagter" ("the accused").   On this point, the Court would simply refer back to its well-established case-law holding that "charge", for the purposes of Article 6 (art. 6), may in general be defined as "the official notification given to an individual by the competent authority of an allegation that he has committed a criminal offence", although "it may in some instances take the form of other measures which carry the implication