CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 28 juin 1984

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margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:-17pt } .sB45F7F7D { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s2433B9D0 { margin-top:12pt; margin-left:17pt; margin-bottom:18pt; text-indent:-17pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sFDE7661F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt }       COURT (CHAMBER)             CASE OF CAMPBELL AND FELL v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 7819/77; 7878/77)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   28 June 1984 In the case of Campbell and Fell, The European Court of Human Rights, sitting, in accordance with Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention") and the relevant provisions of the Rules of Court [] , as a Chamber composed of the following judges:   Mr.   G. Wiarda , President ,       Mr.   J. Cremona ,       Mr.   Thór Vilhjálmsson ,       Mr.   F. Gölcüklü ,       Sir   Vincent Evans ,       Mr.   R. Macdonald ,       Mr.   C. Russo , and also Mr. M.-A. Eissen , Registrar , and Mr. H. Petzold , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 23 September and 8 and 9 December 1983 and on 2 and 3 May 1984, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.    The present case was referred to the Court by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") on 14 October 1982, within the period of three months laid down by Articles 32 para. 1 and 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention. The case originated in two applications (nos. 7819/77 and 7878/77) against the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland lodged with the Commission in 1977 by Mr. John Joseph Campbell and Father Patrick Fell under Article 25 (art. 25). The Commission ordered the joinder of the applications on 14 and 19 March 1981. 2.    The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The purpose of the request was to obtain a decision from the Court as to the existence of violations of Articles 6 and 8 (art. 6, art. 8) in the case of Mr. Campbell and of Articles 6, 8 and 13 (art. 6, art. 8, art. 13) in the case of Father Fell. 3.    The Chamber of seven judges to be constituted included, as ex officio members, Sir Vincent Evans, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr. G. Wiarda, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b) of the Rules of Court). On 28 October 1982, the President drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the five other members, namely Mr. J. Cremona, Mr. Thór Vilhjálmsson, Mr. G. Lagergren, Mr. R. Macdonald and Mr. C. Russo (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr. F. Gölcüklü, a substitute judge, took the place of Mr. Lagergren, who was prevented from taking part in the consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1). 4.    Mr. Wiarda, who had assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5), ascertained, through the Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Government of the United Kingdom ("the Government") and the Delegate of the Commission regarding the procedure to be followed. He decided on 17 November that the Agent should have until 31 January 1983 to file a memorial and that the Delegate should be entitled to reply in writing within two months from the date of the transmission of the Government’s memorial to him by the Registrar. The President agreed on 25 January to extend the first of these time-limits until 14 March 1983. The Government’s memorial was received at the registry on 17 March 1983. By letter of 18 May, the Secretary to the Commission transmitted to the Court a memorial which had been submitted to the Delegate by the applicants’ representatives; that letter also set out the Delegate’s views concerning the scope of the case before the Court and indicated that he reserved the right to comment on both memorials at the hearings. 5.    After consulting, through the Registrar, the Agent of the Government and the Delegate of the Commission, the President directed, on 7 July 1983, that the hearings should open on 20 September 1983 and, on 27 July, that their scope should be limited in the manner set out in his Order of the last-mentioned date. 6.    The hearings were held in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 20 September 1983. Immediately before they opened, the Chamber had held a preparatory meeting. There appeared before the Court: - for the Government:   Mrs. A. Glover , Legal Adviser,       Foreign and Commonwealth Office,   Agent ,   Mr. M. Baker , Barrister-at-Law,   Counsel ,   Mr. C. Osborne ,   Mr. P. Stevens ,   Mr. J. Le Vay , Home Office,   Advisers ; - for the Commission:   Mr. T. Opsahl ,   Delegate ,   Mr. C. Thornberry , Barrister-at-Law,   and Mr. A. Logan , Solicitor, the applicants’ lawyers       before the Commission, assisting the Delegate (Rule 29       para. 1, second sentence, of the Rules of Court). The Court heard addresses by Mr. Baker for the Government and by Mr. Opsahl and Mr. Thornberry for the Commission and also replies to questions put by it and by two of its members. 7.    At the hearings, Mr. Baker and Mr. Thornberry had made certain submissions regarding the application of Article 50 (art. 50) of the Convention in the event that the Court should find a violation to have occurred. In accordance with the President’s Orders and directions, the registry subsequently received the following documents on this question: - on 13 October 1983, through the Commission’s Delegate, observations of the applicants; - on 2 December 1983, memorial of the Government; - on 13 January 1984, letter from the Secretary to the Commission, indicating, inter alia, that the Delegate left the matter to the decision of the Court. AS TO THE FACTS I.    PARTICULAR FACTS OF THE CASE A. General background and the incident on 16 September 1976 8.    The first applicant, Mr. John Joseph Campbell, is a United Kingdom citizen, born in Northern Ireland in 1944 and resident in England since 1965. In November 1973, he was convicted of various offences, including conspiracy to rob and possession of a firearm with intent to commit robbery, and sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. He was subsequently detained in a number of different prisons and, on 16 September 1976, was in Albany Prison, Isle of Wight. He is now at liberty. 9.    The second applicant, Father Patrick Fell, is a United Kingdom citizen, born in England in 1940. He is a Roman Catholic priest. In November 1973, after being convicted of conspiracy to commit arson, conspiracy to commit malicious damage, and taking part in the control and management of an organisation using violent means to obtain a political end, he was sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment. He too was subsequently detained in a number of different prisons and, on 16 September 1976, was in Albany Prison. He is now at liberty. 10.    At all relevant times, both applicants were classified as "category A" prisoners (see paragraph 44 (a) below). The offences of which they were convicted were believed by the authorities to form part of, or to be connected with, Irish Republican Army terrorist activities. According to the Commission’s report, both applicants have consistently denied that they were members of that organisation. 11.    On 16 September 1976, an incident occurred in Albany Prison. Before the Commission, there was considerable dispute between the Government and the applicants as to precisely what took place, notably as to the weapons and amount of violence used, but the following summary suffices for the present purposes. Mr. Campbell, Father Fell and four other prisoners engaged in a protest at the treatment of another prisoner, by sitting down in a corridor of the prison and refusing to move. They were removed by prison officers after a struggle and in the process injuries were sustained by certain members of staff and by both applicants. Mr. Campbell, who had been more seriously injured, was transferred to Parkhurst Prison hospital for treatment and returned to Albany Prison on 3O September 1976. B. The disciplinary proceedings against Mr. Campbell 12.    The six prisoners involved in the above-mentioned incident were all charged with, and found guilty by the Prison Board of Visitors of, disciplinary offences against the Prison Rules 1964, as amended ("the Rules"; see paragraphs 26-33 below). The Board heard the cases on 24 September 1976, except that of Mr. Campbell who was then still at Parkhurst. 13.    On 1 October 1976, immediately after his return to Albany Prison, Mr. Campbell was informed that he was charged with the disciplinary offences of mutiny or incitement to mutiny and doing gross personal violence to an officer, contrary to Rules 47 (1) and (2) (see paragraph 27 below). The first charge concerned his participation with the other prisoners in the incident; the basis of the second charge was an allegation that, on that occasion, he had struck an officer with a broomhandle. A preliminary hearing before the Prison Governor (see paragraph 31 below) took place on 1 October, when the charges were referred to the Prison Board of Visitors. The latter heard the case, in private, on 6 October. The applicant had received, before both hearings, "notices of report" and, before the Board’s hearing, a copy of a form outlining its procedure (see paragraph 36 below). The "notices of report" in connection with the Board’s proceedings were issued at 8 a.m. on 5 October. One notice began as follows: "A report has been made against you by [a prison officer] that at about 19.30 on 16 September 1976 at ‘D’ hall you committed an offence under paragraph 1 of Rule 47, i.e. mutiny." The other notice began: "A report has been made against you by [a prison officer] that at about 22.05 on 16 September 1976 at ‘D’ hall you committed an offence under paragraph 2 of Rule 47, i.e. did strike an officer with a broomhandle." Both notices concluded as follows: "Your case will be dealt with at adjudication tomorrow, when you will be given every opportunity to make your defence. If you wish to reply to the charge in writing you may do so on the back of this form." Mr. Campbell attended neither hearing. It is recorded that he declared prior to the Governor’s hearing that he would be prepared to attend only if he were legally represented. His request for legal representation before the Board was also refused, in accordance with the standard practice at the time (see paragraph 36 below). Before the Board met, he had been visited by its chairman and warned that it would proceed in his absence; the records state that he understood this warning and the charges against him. It appears that he did not expressly seek either an adjournment of the Board’s hearing or a consultation with a solicitor beforehand; under the then practice, a request of the latter kind would also have been unsuccessful (ibid.). Before the Commission and the Court, Mr. Campbell gave additional reasons for his non-attendance: firstly, having learned of the outcome of the Board’s hearing on 24 September and having previous experience of such proceedings himself, he did not believe that he would receive a fair hearing and considered that his presence would be otiose; secondly, he was feeling very ill as a result of his injuries and, on 6 October, he was "in the punishment cell; lying on the floor; unable to walk; not being fed and in considerable pain". As regards the latter allegations, which were disputed by the Government, the applicant had been certified by the medical officer, before both hearings, to be fit for punishment. The Commission concluded that it was not established that Mr. Campbell was prevented from attending rather than that he had decided, for his own reasons, not to attend; it proceeded on the assumption that his absence from the Board’s hearing was a matter within his own responsibility. 14.    Before the Board of Visitors, a plea of not guilty on each charge was entered on behalf of the applicant, who did not submit any written defence. According to the record of the proceedings - which apparently in neither case lasted longer than fifteen minutes -, one prison officer gave evidence on the mutiny charge, reading a statement describing the part allegedly played by Mr. Campbell and the other prisoners in the incident, and another gave evidence on the personal violence charge, to the effect that he had been struck by Mr. Campbell. The evidence of the first witness was accepted by the Board and its chairman put certain questions to the second. On 6 October 1976, the applicant was found guilty on both charges and was awarded, for the mutiny and the violence offences respectively, 450 days’ and 120 days’ loss of remission, together, again respectively, with 56 days’ and 35 days’ loss of certain privileges, exclusion from associated work, stoppage of earnings and cellular confinement, the sanctions for the two offences to run consecutively (see paragraphs 28 and 29 below). On his reception into prison, Mr. Campbell had been given an estimated date for release (see paragraph 29 below) of May 1980; at the time of the Board’s award, he had already forfeited 145 days of remission in ten separate adjudications for offences against discipline and the balance of potential remission available to him totalled 1,072 days. 15.    Observations filed with the Commission on behalf of Mr. Campbell on 1 September 1977 and on 17 April 1979 indicated, respectively, that he was contemplating making and had made an application to the English courts, by way of certiorari proceedings (see paragraphs 39-41 below), for review of the October 1976 adjudication by the Board of Visitors in his case. A memorandum filed on 23 July 1980 revealed, however, that on counsel’s advice, given in November 1979 and June 1980, both Mr. Campbell and Father Fell had decided not to make such an application; counsel considered, as regards the former, that proceedings would be destined to fail on the ground that he had "refused" to participate in the adjudication. At the hearings of 20 September 1983 before the Court, the Government indicated that, even in 1980, the Home Office would probably not have opposed a request by Mr. Campbell for leave to apply for certiorari out of time (see paragraph 41 below), but would do so now. He has, in fact, never pursued the matter. The question was subsequently reconsidered in the case of Father Fell who had previously been advised, in November 1979, that an application might be feasible. In February 1981, senior counsel advised him to seek certiorari immediately on the ground of "substantial unfairness" in the Board’s hearing of 24 September 1976 in his case, which he had attended. Later in the year, he obtained the necessary leave from the court, but his application failed, both at first instance and on appeal. 16.    Whilst in custody Mr. Campbell was the subject of fifteen adjudications for disciplinary offences, as a result of which he lost 957 days of remission (including the 570 forfeited as a result of the Board’s award of 6 October 1976). Following applications by him pursuant to the procedure described in paragraph 38 below, 236 days of remission were restored to him. He was released from prison on 31 March 1982, having served approximately eight years and eight months of his ten years’ sentence, including time spent in custody on remand. C. The applicants’ access to legal advice in connection with their personal-injuries claim 17.    Father Fell petitioned the Home Secretary on or about 21 September 1976 in the following terms: "During the course of [an incident at Albany Prison on 16 September], I sustained a number of physical injuries. My request to yourself is that I be permitted to see and to consult with my lawyer, pending further action that I may deem necessary to take." About a week later, in a supplementary petition, the applicant stated that he wanted to see his solicitor regarding compensation for his injuries and any civil proceedings he might be advised to take. The Home Secretary replied on 1 October. He informed Father Fell that, in accordance with the "prior ventilation rule" (see paragraph 44 (c) below), he would be able to seek legal advice on the substance of his complaints once they had been investigated through the normal internal channels and he had been given the result of the investigation. 18.    Father Fell petitioned again on 4 October 1976. He gave details of his allegations concerning the incident of 16 September and its aftermath and asked for a thorough investigation; he added further information concerning his injuries in a supplementary petition of 27 October. In his reply of 9 February 1977, the Home Secretary indicated that he was satisfied, after investigation, that there was no substance in the applicant’s allegations of assault and of inadequate or unnecessarily delayed medical treatment; he informed the applicant that he would be granted facilities to seek legal advice on the matters referred to in his petition, if he still wished to do so. 19.    In a petition of 28 November 1976 to the Home Secretary, Mr. Campbell stated, but without indicating the reasons, "I want to see my lawyer". On 8 December, the request was refused, on the ground that he had not supplied sufficient details for a proper internal inquiry to commence. On 3 March 1977, the same ground was given for refusing a further petition, dated 28 December 1976, in the following terms: "As a result of injuries received at the hands of prison staff at Albany Prison I intend to take legal action and therefore need to see my solicitor. The incident happened in mid-September and I have petitioned about it once before." 20.    At this time, there was also a certain amount of correspondence with Messrs. Woodford & Ackroyd, the solicitors then acting for both applicants. After a letter of 17 January 1977 from Mr. Campbell to them had been posted through the normal prison channels, they wrote to the Home Office on 28 January stating that they had been instructed to represent him in civil proceedings and seeking authority to approach the Prison Governor to discuss their client’s allegations. However, a letter of 24 January from them to Mr. Campbell, referring, it seems, to legal aid, was stopped. Instructions from the prisoners involved in the September 1976 incident also apparently reached the solicitors by other means. On 10 February 1977, they wrote to the Albany Prison Governor stating that both of the applicants and four other prisoners wished to see them "concerning certain matters of a legal nature" and requesting confirmation that this could be done in private. On 14 February - that is five days after the Home Secretary had told Father Fell that he could consult a lawyer (see paragraph 18 above) -, the Governor replied that appointments to see, inter alios, that applicant could be made, but that according to prison rules Mr. Campbell was not yet in a position to seek legal advice, since the Prison Department’s examination of his complaints had not yet been completed. In a reply of 3 March to the solicitors’ above-mentioned letter of 28 January, the Home Office stated that Mr. Campbell’s letter of 17 January to them had been posted in error and that he could not correspond with or receive visits from them until the "prior ventilation rule" (see paragraph 44 (c) below) had been complied with as regards any complaint he might wish to make. On 23 March, Messrs. Woodford & Ackroyd were given permission to consult with Mr. Campbell in connection with his application to the Commission (see paragraph 44 (e) below). His account of the September 1976 incident, contained in a memorandum of 1 September 1977 to the Commission, was subsequently accepted by the authorities as a sufficient basis for an internal inquiry into his complaints to be commenced. The inquiry - in which the applicant had not co-operated - was completed on 29 November and, on or about 16 December 1977, he was told that he could take legal advice concerning the complaints that had been investigated. 21.    Both applicants subsequently obtained various legal advice and, by writs issued on 13 September 1979, instituted proceedings, alleging assault, against individual prison officers, the Deputy Governor and the Home Office. These actions, in which statements of claim were served some fifteen months later, were still pending at the time of the hearings before the Court (September 1983). D. Conditions for visits to Father Fell by his solicitors 22.    In a reply of 23 March 1977 to a letter of 21 March from Messrs. Woodford & Ackroyd - who had already raised the matter in their letter of 10 February (see paragraph 20 above) -, the Albany Prison Governor stated that at that stage a visit by them to Father Fell would be subject to Rule 37 (2) (see paragraph 44 (d) below) and would therefore have to take place within sight and hearing of an officer. They replied that they were unable to accept these conditions and intended to refer the matter to "the European Court of Human Rights". On 11 May, the solicitors informed the Governor of the introduction, on 31 March, of Father Fell’s application to the Commission; on the following day, the Governor informed them that they could interview their client in connection with that application in sight but out of hearing of an officer (see paragraph 44 (e) below). E. The applicants’ access to medical advice 23.    On or about 23 September 1976, Father Fell asked, in a petition to the Home Secretary, for the opportunity for an independent medical consultation. On 5 October, the Home Office stated that the Secretary of State was not prepared to grant this request. 24.    After Mr. Campbell’s return from Parkhurst to Albany Prison, a request was made by him or his family, apparently on about 18 October 1976, for him to be examined by an independent doctor. According to the Government, he was advised to pursue the matter by way of petition to the Home Secretary, but did not do so. According to the applicant, the request was categorically refused. F. Restrictions on Father Fell’s personal correspondence 25.    In October 1974, when in Hull Prison, Father Fell was informed, in reply to his petition of the previous July, that the Home Secretary was not prepared to allow him to correspond with a Sister Monica Power, on the ground that although she had been known to him before he came into custody, their relationship was not considered to amount to a "close personal friendship". In a letter of 17 December to a Member of Parliament, the Home Secretary maintained this decision, which he explained by reference to the practice concerning the permitted correspondents of "category A" prisoners (see paragraph 44 (a) below): there was no evidence of a friendship as aforesaid between the applicant and Sister Power, although he had known her for longer than some of his approved correspondents. Father Fell also alleged that he had not been allowed to correspond with other friends, including another nun, Sister Mary Benedict. According to the Government, he corresponded with 200 persons prior to his conviction, whilst detained on remand, and was allowed to correspond with 40 persons thereafter.     II.    DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Prison discipline 1. Disciplinary offences and sanctions 26.    The control over and responsibility for prisons and prisoners in England and Wales is vested by the Prison Act 1952 in the Home Secretary. He is empowered by section 47 (1) of that Act to make rules "for the regulation and management of prisons ... and for the classification, treatment, employment, discipline and control of persons required to be detained therein". Such rules are contained in statutory instruments laid before Parliament and made in accordance with the negative resolution procedure, that is, they come into operation unless Parliament otherwise resolves. The rules made by the Home Secretary and currently in force are the Prison Rules 1964, as amended. 27.    Rule 47 creates a total of twenty-one disciplinary offences of varying degrees of seriousness. So far as relevant to the present case, it provides that "A prisoner shall be guilty of an offence against discipline if he (1) mutinies or incites another prisoner to mutiny; (2) does gross personal violence to an officer". These acts are classified as "especially grave offences". 28.    The Rules list the "awards" which may be made for an offence against discipline; they range from a caution upwards and include: (a) forfeiture of certain privileges; (b) exclusion from associated work; (c) stoppage of earnings; (d) cellular confinement; (e) forfeiture of remission of sentence. In the case of an "especially grave offence", the sanctions mentioned at (b), (c) and (d) above may not be imposed for a period exceeding 56 days but there is no limit as regards those mentioned at (a) and (e) (Rules 51 and 52). Where more than one offence has been committed, the respective awards may be ordered to run consecutively, although there is no provision in the Rules on this point. 29.    Section 25 (1) of the Prison Act 1952 provides: "Rules made under section 47 of this Act may make provision whereby, in such circumstances as may be prescribed by the rules, a person serving a sentence of imprisonment for such a term as may be so prescribed may be granted remission of such part of that sentence as may be so prescribed on the ground of his industry and good conduct, and on the discharge of a person from prison in pursuance of any such remission as aforesaid his sentence shall expire." Under Rule 5 (made pursuant to this section), a prisoner serving a sentence of imprisonment other than for life "may ... be granted remission" not exceeding one-third of his sentence. This therefore represents the maximum period that may be forfeited under a disciplinary award. Under both the Prison Act and the Rules, remission - which is seen by the authorities as part of the process for encouraging the reform of prisoners - is a discretionary measure. In practice, at the outset of his sentence every prisoner is given an estimated date for release, calculated by reference to the maximum possible remission, and he will be released on that date unless remission has been forfeited in disciplinary proceedings. Forfeiture of remission - which is not awarded solely for the most serious offences - does not have the effect of increasing the original sentence and it is the latter which continues to provide the legal basis for the detention. 2. Disciplinary proceedings (a) Institution of proceedings 3O.    Conduct constituting a disciplinary offence under the Rules may also amount to an offence under the criminal law. Thus, doing gross personal violence to an officer corresponds to the crime of assault occasioning actual bodily harm. Mutiny and incitement to mutiny, on the other hand, are not as such offences under the general criminal law, although the underlying facts might found a charge of, for instance, conspiracy. According to the Government, where the conduct amounts to both a disciplinary and a criminal offence, the Prison Department of the Home Office decides on an ad hoc basis whether the matter should be referred to the police with a view to prosecution in the courts. Conduct so referred, they said, generally involved substantial violence; other relevant factors might be the prevalence of the conduct in question within the prison, the feelings of staff and inmates, the prisoner’s record and behaviour, the amount of any remission he might previously have lost and of his sentence remaining to be served, and the cost, inconvenience and security risks involved in a criminal trial. According to the applicants, however, an individual prison officer may himself report the matter to the police, and the Government recognised that, in any case where the police themselves decided not to prosecute, a private prosecution remained a possibility. Moreover, the same facts may, theoretically at least, give rise to both criminal and disciplinary proceedings (see R. v. Hogan [1960] 3 All England Law Reports 149). 31.    Where a prisoner is to be charged with an offence against discipline, the charge must be laid as soon as possible and must, in the first instance, be inquired into by the prison governor, generally not later than the day following the laying of the charge (Rule 48). The prisoner must be informed of the charge as soon as possible and, in any event, before the governor’s inquiry (Rule 49). Certain less serious matters are dealt with by the governor alone. In the case, however, of a charge of an "especially grave offence", he has to inform the Home Secretary forthwith and, unless otherwise directed by him, refer the charge to the prison’s Board of Visitors (Rule 52). (b)    The Board of Visitors 32.    A Board of Visitors is a body that has to be appointed, by the Home Secretary, for each prison in England and Wales; its members, at least two of whom must be justices of the peace - who are not necessarily lawyers -, hold office for three years or such less period as the Home Secretary may appoint (section 6 of the Prison Act 1952, as amended by the Courts Act 1971, and Rule 92). They may be re-appointed. There are l15 Boards in all and each has between 8 and 24 members, who are unpaid but are reimbursed their expenses. Anyone may seek appointment but in practice most candidates are persons suggested by existing members. The main principles adopted in making appointments are to achieve a roughly equal number of magistrates and non-magistrates; to provide members having the requisite personal qualities, interest and time; and to ensure that membership contains a good cross-section of the population. A Board is normally appointed for a three-year term; there is no express statutory provision enabling the Home Secretary to dismiss a member and resignation before expiry of a term of office would, according to the Government, be required only in the most exceptional circumstances. 33.    A Board’s duties include, in addition to inquiring into charges of disciplinary offences, satisfying itself as to the state of the premises, the administration of the prison and the treatment of inmates, hearing a prisoner’s complaints or requests, directing the governor’s attention to matters calling for his attention and making reports to the Home Secretary (Rules 94, 95 and 97). In case of urgent necessity, it has power to suspend any prison officer until the decision of the Home Secretary is known (Rule 94 (4)). Its members are required to visit the prison frequently, have a right of access to every part of the prison and to prison records and may interview any prisoner out of the sight and hearing of officers (Rule 96). A Board’s adjudicatory functions generally account for a small proportion of its overall duties and, of the small percentage of prison disciplinary proceedings which are conducted before Boards, few concern "especially grave offences". The various functions of Boards of Visitors were examined by an independent committee set up by "Justice", the Howard League for Penal Reform and the National Association for the Care and Resettlement of Offenders. In its report of 1975 ("the Jellicoe report"), this committee noted that "Boards take their duties of adjudication very seriously", but that "in spite of the efforts made to do justice it is doubtful whether it is seen to be done". It concluded that to be involved in the adjudication of serious offences was incompatible with the supervisory body’s need to establish conspicuous independence and therefore recommended that "the body responsible for supervision should not have a disciplinary function". Nevertheless, "after careful consideration", the Home Secretary decided in 1976 that "the independence of Boards of Visitors was compatible with their other functions". The status of Boards was also considered in the St. Germain case (see paragraph 39 below). In the Court of Appeal, Lord Justice Waller stated that "Boards of visitors hold the balance between the governor and the internal discipline of the prison and the prisoner himself and, when sitting [in an adjudicatory capacity], can be regarded as ‘an impartial and independent authority’"; for Lord Justice Megaw, a Board’s adjudicatory function "was properly regarded as a separate and independent function, different in character from [its] other functions". (c)    Procedure before the Board of Visitors 34.    When a charge of an "especially grave offence" is referred to a Board, its chairman must summon a special meeting at which not more than five nor fewer than three members - at least two being justices of the peace - must be present (Rule 52). If, after inquiring into the charge, the Board finds the offence proved, it has to make one of the awards mentioned in paragraph 28 above, although the implementation thereof may be suspended. 35.    Neither the Prison Act 1952 nor the Rules lay down a detailed code of procedure for disciplinary proceedings before Boards of Visitors. However, Rule 49 (2) - a similar provision appears in section 47 (2) of the Act - reads as follows: "At any inquiry into a charge against a prisoner he shall be given a full opportunity of hearing what is alleged against him and of presenting his own case." The procedure used to be arranged as a matter of practice. Since 1977 Boards have been issued by the Prison Department of the Home Office with a booklet entitled "Procedure for the Conduct of an Adjudication by a Board of Visitors". 36.    Proceedings before the Board are initiated by means of a report by a prison officer to the governor containing details of the alleged offence. The prisoner will receive a "notice of report", stating the alleged offence and the time, date and place thereof, and may reply to the charge in writing. He will also be given a form, which has no statutory force, outlining the procedure which will be followed when he appears before the Board: he will be asked to plead to the charge and may question witnesses in support of the charge, request that witnesses on his behalf be heard and himself give evidence or make his defence. The hearing takes place in private within the prison and the Board’s decision is pronounced under the same conditions. The Rules themselves contain no specific provision as regards legal advice about, or legal representation at, an adjudication before a Board. Under the practice followed prior to 1981, a prisoner would not have been granted leave to seek legal advice before the hearing. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal held in Fraser v. Mudge ([1975] 3 All England Law Reports 78) that although a Board had to observe the requirements of natural justice and act fairly in disciplinary proceedings, a prisoner was not entitled to legal representation thereat. However, in its judgment of 8 November 1983 in R. v. Albany Prison Board of Visitors, ex parte Tarrant ([1984] 1 All England Law Reports 799), the Divisional Court held that although there is no absolute entitlement to such representation, a Board does have a discretion to allow it. Furthermore, the prisoner has a right to require that that discretion be exercised and that his request for representation be properly considered on its merits; if the Board fails to exercise its discretion properly, its decision must be quashed. Mr. Justice Webster added that in most, if not all, cases involving a charge of mutiny no Board of Visitors, properly directing itself, could reasonably decide not to allow legal representation. 37.    In 1978, in the St. Germain case (see paragraph 39 below), the Court of Appeal had to consider, for reasons of jurisdiction, whether disciplinary proceedings before a Board of Visitors were a "criminal cause or matter", within the meaning of the relevant legislation. It answered this question in the negative. Lord Justice Waller based his decision on the fact that the charges heard by the Board were not "criminal", that is charges "of an offence against public law", and that the Board was not a court of criminal jurisdiction. Lord Justice Shaw considered that the Board’s proceedings possessed some of the attributes of a criminal cause or matter (for example, accusation, inquiry, adjudication and possible punitive consequences) but lacked the essential characteristic, namely a penal proceeding for the infraction of a requirement relating to the enforcement and preservation of public law and order. In determining the nature of proceedings, account also had to be taken of their context and overall objective. Although an offence under the Rules might coincide with a crime under the general law and lead to a measure corresponding to a penalty or punishment, this did not transform the Board’s adjudication into a criminal cause or matter. It was essentially a domestic disciplinary proceeding, which did not purport to deal with misconduct in its relation to the public law or the public interest and was designed and pursued with the limited objective of maintaining order within the confines of a prison. It would also be illogical and anomalous to regard as a criminal cause or matter proceedings arising from an offence under the Rules which did not amount to a criminal offence under the general law. However, in R v. Highpoint Prison Board of Visitors, ex parte McConkey, Mr. Justice McCullough, in his judgment of 2O September 1982 (Times Law Reports, 23 September 1982), referred to the "close similarity" between an accusation of breach of the Rules and an accusation of a criminal offence: each was followed by an adjudication and might lead to consequences of a punitive character, for example, in the former case, forfeiture of remission. Although prison disciplinary offences were offences against a private code, they were also "penal"; in principle, the relevant Rules should be construed no more harshly against a prisoner than would be appropriate were the offences criminal. Again, in the Tarrant case (see paragraph 36 in fine above) it was conceded on behalf of the Board of Visitors that the standard of proof to be applied in disciplinary adjudications was a criminal one. 3. Subsequent review of Board of Visitors’ disciplinary proceedings (a)    Internal channels 38.    Under Rule 56, disciplinary awards made by a Board of Visitors may be remitted or mitigated by the Home Secretary or, subject to his directions, by the Board itself. Procedures and criteria for the restoration of forfeited remission of sentence are laid down in Circular Instruction 58/1976 issued by the Minister: basically, the prisoner must show a significant improvement indicative of a genuine change of attitude, and the power to restore is not to be used merely to modify an award which is subsequently thought excessive or open to doubt. Applications for remission or mitigation of awards are normally made in the first instance to the Board itself. Its decision may be the subject of a petition by the prisoner to the Home Secretary. Under Rule 7, every prisoner has to be provided on or shortly after his reception into prison with information in writing about, inter alia, the proper method of making petitions. In the St. Germain case (see paragraph 39 below), the members of the Court of Appeal expressed the view that a petition under Rule 56 was not to be regarded as a formal appeal; it was noted, amongst other things, that the Home Secretary was not empowered to quash the Board’s finding of guilt. (b)    Application to the domestic courts 39.    (a) The question whether the English courts have jurisdiction to review disciplinary proceedings before Boards of Visitors was considered in R. v. Hull Prison Board of Visitors, ex parte St. Germain and others. In that case, application was made for orders of certiorari to quash, on the ground of failure to observe the rules of natural justice, certain decisions imposing disciplinary awards, taken by a Board in 1976. (b) In a judgment of 6 December 1977 ([1978] 2 All England Law Reports 198), the Divisional Court held that although a Board was in the nature of a judicial body under a duty to act judicially, it was not subject to control by way of certiorari, a remedy which did not extend to private disciplinary proceedings in a closed body enjoying its own form of discipline and rules. It was stressed that a Board had an "intimate relationship" with the prison and, when adjudicating, was part of the latter’s disciplinary machinery. (c) Notice of appeal against this decision was served on 20 December 1977. The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in its judgment of 3 October 1978 ([1979] 1 All England Law Reports 701). It held that there was no rule of law that the courts were to abdicate jurisdiction merely because the proceedings under review were of an internal disciplinary character. There was no binding authority as to whether certiorari would lie against disciplinary decisions of a Board of Visitors and the question had to be decided in the light of public policy. A Board’s disciplinary functions were separate and independent from its other functions. When hearing disciplinary charges it was not imposing summary discipline as part of the day to day administration of the prison but was instead an independent body which could only punish a prisoner after a formalised inquiry and/or hearing. In doing so it was exercising a judicial function and its decisions were therefore subject to control by the courts by certiorari in appropriate cases. However, the remedy was discretionary and relief would be granted only where there had been a failure to act fairly, having regard to all the circumstances and such unfairness had given rise to a substantial, as distinct from a trivial or merely technical, injustice. 4O.    The case was then remitted to the Divisional Court which, by judgment of 15 June 1979 ([1979] 3 All England Law Reports 545), quashed certain of the decisions taken by the Hull Prison Board of Visitors. The Divisional Court observed that section 47 (2) of the Prison Act 1952 and Rule 49 (2) (see paragraph 35 above) were declaratory of the basic rule of natural justice that every party to a controversy had a right to a fair hearing; although, on the facts, this rule had not been observed as regards the quashed decisions, there was nothing in the Board’s procedure in general to which any objection could properly be taken. The Divisional Court pointed out that the right to a fair hearing before a Board of Visitors included the right to call evidence; the chairman’s power to refuse to allow a prisoner to call witnesses had to be exercised reasonably, in good faith and on proper grounds (which would not include mere administrative convenience). Further, the prisoner must also have a sufficient opportunity to deal with the evidence given against him, which might necessitate giving him the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses whose evidence was initially before the Board in hearsay form. 41.    Applications for certiorari must in principle be made within a prescribed time-limit running from the date of the decision challenged: in 1976, the time-limit was six months; since 11 January 1978, it has been three months. Leave may be