CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 mars 1986

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 3 March 1986, the following members being present:                         MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                         G. SPERDUTI                         J.A. FROWEIN                         G. JÖRUNDSSON                         S. TRECHSEL                         B. KIERNAN                         A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                         A. WEITZEL                         J.C. SOYER                         H.G. SCHERMERS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                    Mrs   G.H. THUNE                    Sir   Basil HALL                      Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission     Having regard to Art. 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (art. 25);   Having regard to the application introduced on 2 July 1985 by B.S. against the United Kingdom and registered on 5 August 1985 under file No. 11674/85;   Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   Having deliberated;   Decides as follows:   THE FACTS   The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1942 and is resident in Brierly Hill, West Midlands.   The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.   In April 1985, the applicant's son was sent home from Thorns Comprehensive School for not wearing a tie.   Since her son was due to leave school on 24 May 1985, the applicant refused to incur the expense of buying one.   The applicant's son was summoned to attend the headmaster's office each morning for seven days which caused him considerable humiliation.   He was threatened with expulsion, though this was later withdrawn.   The applicant wrote to the acting headmaster explaining her reasons for her attitude, namely that the question of personal clothing was a private and family matter.   She refused to go to the school to discuss the matter.   The applicant complained to the Local Education Authority which explained that it was their policy to allow the question of uniform to be determined by the school governors.   The applicant then applied to the Secretary of State to intervene.   She was told that while there was nothing in the Education Acts or Schools Regulations dealing specifically with clothing, uniforms were regarded as a matter of school discipline under the responsibility of the headteachers and governors.   On another occasion, the applicant's daughter, attending Mount Pleasant Junior School suffered distress and humiliation, when at a school assembly, those not in uniform were asked to stand and their appearance commented on unfavourably.   This procedure was repeated on other occasions, but the applicant's daughter remained seated on her instructions.   The applicant complained to the Local Education Authority, which suggested it was an internal matter to be dealt with by discussion with the headmaster.   The applicant's son has now left school, but her daughter will in due course be attending the same comprehensive school.   COMPLAINTS   The applicant complains that the conduct of the schools in humiliating her children and herself in respect of their clothing constitutes an interference with private and family life.   The applicant acknowledges that her children should meet certain standards of cleanliness, tidiness and warmth in their dress at school, but submits that school requirements of colour and particular types of clothing go beyond this and constitute expensive and objectionable intrusion in their private family life.   The applicant also complains that school uniform requirements and the harassment resulting from infringement of those rules constitute an interference with the right of her children to express themselves as they wish in the way they dress.   The applicant further submits that the facts outlined above constitute an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions in that her children are not able to wear their personal clothing free from harassment.   Further, the daughter would also run the risk of being sent home from school if she wears clothes of her own choice and would thus be deprived of the right to education.   The applicant therefore invokes Arts. 8 and 10 of the Convention (art. 8, art. 10) and Arts. 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1, P1-2).   THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains that the school's conduct in enforcing school uniform rules constitutes an interference with the private and family life of her children and herself.   It is true that Art. 8 of the Convention (art. 8) guarantees to everyone the right to respect for their private and family life.   The Commission recalls that in McFEELEY v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8317/78, D.R. 20 p. 44 and X. v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 8231/78, D.R. 28 p. 5, it was held that the requirement for prisoners to wear prison clothing was an interference with their rights under Art. 8, para. 1 (art. 8-1).   However, the Commission considers that the conditions of life pertaining to penal institutions are totally distinct from the facts of the present case and that the nature and extent of the rules differ to such a degree that they cannot be equated.   Prison uniforms retain a certain stigma and mark a particular status.   Prison uniforms are also worn continuously whether the prisoner is working or at leisure. Therefore, after examining the complaint as it has been submitted, the Commission concludes that any constraint imposed by rules as to dress during school hours on school premises cannot be said to be so serious as to constitute an interference with the right to respect for private and family life contrary to Art. 8, para. 1 of the Convention (art. 8-1).   It follows therefore that this part of the application must be rejected as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (art. 27-2).   2.       The applicant also complains that her children are prevented from expressing themselves as they wish through their dress.   It is true Art. 10 of the Convention (art. 10) guarantees to everyone the right to freedom of expression.   However, the Commission finds that although the right to freedom of expression may include the right for a person to express his ideas through the way he dresses, it has not been established on the facts of the case that the applicant's children have been prevented from expressing a particular opinion or idea by means of their clothing. Further any rules regarding clothing only affect the children during their attendance at school and they remain at liberty to express themselves as they wish outside.   The Commission concludes therefore that an examination of this complaint as it has been submitted fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of Art. 10 of the Convention (art. 10).   It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 of the Convention (art. 27-2).   3.       The applicant further complains that the enforcement of rules as to school uniform interferes with the right to peaceful enjoyment of the family's possessions and they might lead to her daughter being sent home from school.   It is true that Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) guarantees to everyone the right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions and that Art. 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) states that no one shall be denied the right to education.   However, the Commission recalls that any threat to the applicant's daughter of being sent home would only materialise if she fails to obey the rules as to school uniform.   The Commission also finds that any requirements imposed by the rules as to school uniform cannot be said to impose a constraint so serious as to constitute a violation under Art. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   Accordingly, an examination of these complaints as submitted fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of Arts. 1 and 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1, P1-2).   It follows that this part of the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Art. 27, para. 2 (art. 27-2).   For these reasons, the Commission   DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE   Secretary to the Commission                President of the Commission   (H.C. KRÜGER)                              (C.A. NØRGAARD)