CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 18 juillet 1986

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 18 July 1986, the following members being present:                       MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President                         C.A. NØRGAARD                         F. ERMACORA                         G. JÖRUNDSSON                         G. TENEKIDES                         S. TRECHSEL                         B. KIERNAN                         A. WEITZEL                         J.C. SOYER                         H.G. SCHERMERS                         H. DANELIUS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                     Sir Basil HALL                       Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission   Having regard to Art. 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;   Having regard to the application introduced on 3 May 1985 by A.H. against the United Kingdom and registered on 10 May 1985 under file No. 11590/85;   Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   Having deliberated;   Decides as follows:   THE FACTS   The applicant is a British and Italian citizen born in 1920, and resident in Manchester.   She is represented by Messrs. Clifford Otten & Co., solicitors.   The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.   The applicant's husband was employed as a part-time cleaner at Manchester High School.   After suffering chest pains, he took time off work but returned on 17 March 1981 to collect his wages.   At 16.10 hrs he was discovered collapsed.   Several people, including teachers with some first aid training saw him and decided he was dead.   The school called the police who arrived on foot at 17.00 hrs.   The police called an ambulance at 17.25 hrs and it took the applicant's husband to the hospital nearby where he was pronounced dead by doctors at 18.05 hrs. A post mortem conducted revealed that her husband had died of a coronary occlusion.   The applicant was appalled by the attitude of the school in failing to summon medical help immediately on finding her husband's body.   She brought an action herself for negligence against the school and in an order dated 3 December 1984, the County Court judge found in favour of the defendants on the grounds that, even if the school had acted more promptly, it would not have been possible to resuscitate the applicant's husband.   Medical evidence indicated that death was inevitable within 4-5 minutes of the seizure and could have only been delayed by immediate, skilled cardiac resuscitation.   Therefore even if the applicant's husband was not already dead when discovered it was highly improbable that he could have been resuscitated by the staff who were untrained in cardiac resuscitation.   The judge also found that even if an ambulance had been summoned immediately, it would have been too late.   The applicant was unable to appeal to the Court of Appeal due to lack of financial means.   She had been refused legal aid.   COMPLAINTS   The applicant complains that not all the necessary measures which might have saved or prolonged her husband's life were taken. She finds it unacceptable that lay people could presume to pronounce a man dead and fail to call an ambulance immediately.   If medical help had been rushed to her husband, the applicant feels there was a chance for him to have been resuscitated, if only to allow him to die in dignity with his family by his side, instead of left on the floor of the school for almost two hours.   She complains that British law appears to condone such negligence by not imposing a specific obligation to take prompt emergency steps in such circumstances and by not awarding compensation to the victims or their families.   The applicant accordingly invokes Articles 2, 6 and 13 (Art. 2, art. 6, art. 13) of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains that her husband did not receive the prompt medical attention which may have increased his chances of resuscitation.   Article 2 (Art. 2) guarantees that everyone's right to life shall be protected by law.   Insofar as the applicant complains of the conduct of the members of staff of a private school, the Commission recalls that under Article 25, para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention, the Commission may only admit an application from a person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals, where the applicant alleges a violation by one of the Contracting Parties of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention and where that Party has recognised this competence of the Commission.   The Commission may not, therefore, admit applications directed against private individuals.   In this respect the Commission refers to its constant jurisprudence (see e.g. the decisions on the admissibility of applications Nos. 172/56, Yearbook 1 pp. 211, 215, and 3925/69, Collection of Decisions 32 pp. 56, 58).   It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione personae with the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   However, the applicant also complains that English law fails to place a general obligation on persons to take prompt medical action in emergencies.   The Commission recalls that the medical evidence established that the death was inevitable as a result of the massive coronary damage, that the staff of the school, who were unskilled in cardiac resuscitation, would have been unable to resuscitate him even if they had tried and that even if an ambulance had been summoned it could not have arrived in time.   In these tragic circumstances, the existence of any express obligation to take prompt emergency action would not have been of any avail to the applicant's husband. Therefore, even assuming Article 2 (Art. 2) of the Convention can be said to impose an obligation on States to protect individuals by such legal measures, the Commission finds that an examination of this complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of the above Article (Art. 2).   It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant also complains that her claim for compensation against the school authorities was unsuccessful and that she has no remedy.   She invokes Articles 6 and 13 (Art. 6, art. 13) of the Convention.   However, the Commission recalls that the applicant was able to bring her claim before a county court, which had the power to grant damages if she could show that the school authorities' negligence had contributed to her husband's death.   The applicant therefore did have access to court within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6).   The Commission also finds in light of the above previous reasoning that no separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13).   Accordingly, an examination of the facts as submitted by the applicant fails to disclose the appearance of a violation of these Articles.   It follows that as regards Article 6 (Art. 6), this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and that as regards Article 13 (Art. 13), this part of the application is (Art. 27-2) incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   For these reasons, the Commission   DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE   Secretary to the Commission           Acting President of the Commission          (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (J.A. FROWEIN)