CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 16 octobre 1986

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 11688/85                            by Hannes MLYNEK                             against Austria           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 16 October 1986, the following members being present:                       MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                         J.A. FROWEIN                         E. BUSUTTIL                         G. JÖRUNDSSON                         G. TENEKIDES                         S. TRECHSEL                         B. KIERNAN                         A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                         A. WEITZEL                         J.C. SOYER                         H.G. SCHERMERS                         H. DANELIUS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                    Mrs   G.H. THUNE                    Sir   Basil HALL                    Mr.   F. MARTINEZ                      Mr. H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 2 May 1985 by Hannes MLYNEK against Austria and registered on 9 August 1985 under file No. 11688/85;           Having regard to:   -        the Rapporteur's request to the respondent Government of         21 October 1985 for information under Rule 40 para. 2 (a)         of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   -        the information provided by the respondent Government on         15 November 1985 and the reply submitted thereto by the         applicant on 18 December 1985;   -        the first report of December 1985 provided for in Rule 40 of         the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   -        the Commission's decision of 3 March 1986 to bring the         application to the notice of the respondent Government and         invite them to submit written observations on the         admissibility and merits of the application;   -        the observations submitted by the respondent Government on         20 May 1986 and the reply submitted thereto by the applicant         on 6 June 1986;   -        the further information submitted by the respondent Government         on 29 July 1986 and the reply submitted thereto by the         applicant on 11 August 1986;   -        the second report of September 1986 provided for in Rule 40 of         the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case as they have been submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.           The applicant, an Austrian citizen born in 1943, is a lawyer resident in Vienna.           On 21 May 1981 criminal investigations were instituted against the applicant and other persons in respect of various economic offences standing in connection with the bankruptcy of the Oesterreichische K.-T. company.   In particular, Dr. K., the chairman of the board of directors of the E. Union AG, was charged with misappropriation of funds on the occasion of a participation in the share capital increase of the K.-T. company amounting to 32.2 million A.S.   Messrs. T. and S. as well as the applicant were charged with participation in this offence, moreover Messrs. T. and S. with extricating a loan of 25 million A.S. from a bank and Dr. K. and the applicant with participating in this offence.   The applicant was thereupon detained on remand from 1 July until 20 July 1982 on the ground of danger of collusion.           On 20 April 1983 the applicant together with Dr. K. and Mr. S. were indicted at the Vienna Regional Court sitting with lay judges (Landesgericht als Schöffengericht).   The bill of indictment counted 183 pages.   The proceedings in respect of Mr. T. were separated after he was released from custody and had subsequently absconded.           The hearing (Hauptverhandlung) before the Vienna Regional Court lasted from 2 December 1983 until 30 May 1984.   During this period of time, 55 hearings (Verhandlungstage) were conducted.   Up to the hearing the case-file consisted of 63 volumes, thereafter of 81 volumes. During the hearing 120 witnesses were heard.   The minutes of the hearing consisted of 7,150 pages.   In addition there were some 40 volumes of expert opinions and other evidence.   After the evidence proceedings were closed there followed the pleadings of the parties lasting eight days, and the deliberations of the Court lasting four days.           On 30 May 1984, at its fifty-fifth hearing, the Vienna Regional Court pronounced its judgment.   The bench was composed of two professional and two lay judges.   The applicant was convicted of misappropriation of funds (Untreue) and fraud and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.   Mr. S. and Dr. K. were sentenced to six and eight years' imprisonment, respectively.   The applicant announced at the hearing that he would file a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbe- schwerde) and an appeal (Berufung).   The minutes of the hearing on 30 May 1984 were served on 4 June 1984.           Also on 30 May 1984 the applicant was detained on remand on the ground of danger of absconding.   His detention lasted until 2 August 1984.           On 2 July 1986 the judge charged with the motivation (Ausfertigung) of the Court's judgment of 30 May 1984 transmitted the motivation to the Vienna Regional Court.   It was communicated to the parties on 3 July 1986, as the Government state, or on 4 July 1986, as the applicant submits.   The motivation counts 1197 pages.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that he received the motivation of the judgment which was pronounced on 30 May 1984, only on 4 July 1986, i.e. more than 25 months later.   An essential part of the Court proceedings was therefore not terminated within a reasonable time in the meaning of Article 6 para. 1.   This delay is also contrary to Section 270(1) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure which states:           "Every judgment must be motivated in writing within         fourteen days from the date of the pronouncement and must be         signed by the president as well as the reporter         (Schriftführer)."           According to Section 285 of the Code of Criminal Procedure a complainant is granted a period of fourteen days after the motivated judgment has been served in order to substantiate his plea of nullity.           The applicant contends that, while in theory he still had to be considered innocent, in fact he suffered considerable disadvantages on account of this delay in respect of his economic situation and his honour.   He submits that there is no remedy in Austria at his disposal to complain about this undue length of time required for the motivation of the judgment.   2.       The applicant submits that the written judgment should not be prepared (erstellt) but only written reasons added after the Court has pronounced its judgment.   The reasons of the judgment must have been prepared before its pronouncement.   If this is not the case, it will not be a tribunal established by law but a single judge who is deciding.   In view of the fact that the Court required four days to deliberate the decision and that the motivated judgment was served more than 25 months later, the applicant submits that the judgment in fact still had to be prepared.   He complains that the judgment has, therefore, not been given by a "tribunal established by law" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 2 May 1985 and registered on 9 August 1985.           On 1 October 1984 the Rapporteur decided to request information from the respondent Government pursuant to Rule 40 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure as to whether the motivation of the judgment had been served upon the applicant.           The information was provided by the respondent Government on 15 November 1985, and the reply thereto was submitted by the applicant on 18 December 1985.           On 3 March 1986 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit observations on its admissibility and merits in respect of the complaint under Article 6 para. 1 concerning the length of the proceedings pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.           The respondent Government's observations were submitted on 20 May 1986 and the reply thereto by the applicant on 6 June 1986.           The respondent Government submitted further information on 29 July 1986 and the applicant replied thereto on 11 August 1986.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.       The respondent Government   I.       The application and the facts (see THE FACTS above)           The respondent Government point out that in his complaint the applicant alleges a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention (length of proceedings).   He argues in particular that under Section 270 (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure any judgment has to be available in written form within a period of 14 days.   II.      Requirement under Article 26 of the Convention           The applicant complains that on account of the delay in motivating the previously pronounced judgment he has suffered economic damage.   If, however, it is claimed that such damage was due to the unlawful and culpable conduct of a public authority - as the applicant maintains - a complaint could have been filed in accordance with the Official Liability Act for damage caused by one of the State's organs. It would first of all certainly fall to the regular Courts to decide on the damage alleged by the applicant.   If damages were awarded, the applicant would no longer be considered a victim of a violation of the Convention.   III.     Admissibility and merits of the application   1.       In accordance with the consistent practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the following criteria have to be used to judge the appropriateness of the length of the proceedings:   the complexity of the case; the applicant's conduct; and the conduct of the competent authority.   2.       The present proceedings involved an economic offence and are based on very complex and comprehensive facts.   In this regard, reference is made to the number of files, hearings and witnesses.   The objection raised by the applicant, namely that within the framework of the prosecution against himself investigations were carried out involving more than 40 persons, cannot disprove the argument of the complexity of the case.   Rather, the objection reflects the great variety of intricate business implications which the competent judge had to review and to assess within the framework of the proceedings instituted against the applicant.   It was not possible to consider the conduct of the applicant in isolation, as it is above all the context of the offences committed by the other accused from which the illegality of the applicant's conduct results.   3.       The conduct of the applicant may be disregarded in the present case as he could not influence the motivation of the judgment.   4.       As regards the conduct of the competent authority the Government refer to the Guincho case, in which the European Court of Human Rights decided that delays may be justified if the Courts become overburdened by a sharp increase in business (judgment of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81).   Such delays, however, would have to be kept as short as possible by the State.   The question of the workload of the competent judge, resulting from other pending cases after the time when the judgment was pronounced until April 1986, has been answered by the Government in detail.   From the submitted chart it appears that on 30 July 1984 the respective judge sat alone in several hearings.   In November 1984 she sat in four hearings.   In 1985 she sat in approximately 80 hearings lasting between ten minutes and seven hours and on average four hours each.   Between 7 January and 9 April 1986 the judge again sat in 31 hearings.           As head of the department 3d) of the Vienna Regional Court, the judge was exempted from new business in view of the conduct of the present proceedings from 1 July 1983 until 31 December 1984.   Until 30 June 1983, she was allocated a total of 119 new cases.   In 1984, there were eight new proceedings (appeal proceedings, resumption of a case after interruption, ending of older proceedings).           As from 1 January 1985, the judge was put in charge of the newly established economic crimes department 12b).   From 5 March 1985 to 31 December 1985, she was also exempted from new business there on account of the so-called "WBO-case" (another spectacular economic criminal prosecution); at the same time, however, she remained in charge of (also future) proceedings connected with this case.           In this Court department, the judge had to deal with a total of 18 criminal cases between 1 January and 4 March 1985, and a total of 24 between 1 January and 31 March 1986.           In the jury department 20v), which has been headed by the respective judge concerned since 1 July 1983, there were four cases in 1983, four cases in 1984, five cases in 1985 and one case until March 1986. Of these, two were terminated in 1983, four in 1984, and six in 1985, so that the only unsettled jury case is the one of 1986.   5.       On the part of the competent supervisory authority, the following steps were taken in order to attain the motivation of the judgment at issue:   In view of the extraordinary extent of the proceedings (81 files, 55 hearing days, 7,150 pages of the trial minutes) and the fact that the supervisory panel (Personalsenat) ordered that no new cases were to be referred to the head of the department 3d), the motivation of the judgment was initially monitored only on the basis of the respective monthly reports.           Later on, the motivation was checked in the course of an administrative supervision procedure, the competent judge stating in her reports to the president of the Court of Appeal that the motivation of the judgment progressed steadily and would be completed soon.   As the judge did not keep the deadlines set for her, the president of the Court of Appeal took disciplinary action against her in early November 1985.   The disciplinary proceedings, during which a hearing was held on 25 April 1986, are still pending.           Furthermore, the supervisory panel of the Vienna Regional Court decided on 21 April 1986 to appoint as of 1 May 1986, until further notice, another judge as deputy head of the economic crimes department 12b) in order to end the delay in the motivation of the judgment.   As a result, the competent judge guaranteed the motivation by the end of June 1986.   6.       In view of the consistent practice of the European Court of Human Rights, according to which delays cannot entail responsibility of the State if the latter takes immediate appropriate remedial action (cf. judgment of Zimmermann and Steiner of 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66), the Government submit that the delay that has occurred is a result of the complexity of the case and that the competent authorities took all possible measures to expedite the motivation of the judgment (exemption from new business; monitoring by the supervisory authority; disciplinary action; as well as relieving the judge as head of the department 12b).   However, considering the constitutionally ensured principle of the independence of judges, guaranteed by the rules of irremovability and intransferability, as well as the resulting principle of the fixed allocation of business, delays may occur in the interest of the certainty of law as long as, in exceptional cases, judges who do not satisfy the requirements which they are expected to meet may be transferred within the framework of disciplinary proceedings.   Another judge can then be appointed as head of the department.   In this respect the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings must now be awaited.           Realistically speaking, there is always the possibility that a certain judge is not able to cope with particularly complex proceedings.   In such a case, however, the State can be made responsible under the Convention only insofar as arrangements have to be made that lead to a (in this case: written) decision.   In the present case, this has been done as the above explanations show.   7.       It is inaccurate if the applicant alleges that a violation of Section 270(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           The case of Crociani et al. which was based on similar facts was declared inadmissible by the European Commission of Human Rights on grounds of evident non-existence of a Convention violation (Nos. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79, 8729/79, Dec. 18.12.1980, DR. 22 p. 147). Also in a decision of the European Commission of Human Rights it was stated that a violation of Section 270(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, even if the motivation of the judgment is not available eight months after its pronunciation (No. 4459/79, Dec. 3.4.71, Collection 38 p. 44).   8.       This opinion can also be shared inasmuch as the applicant suffered no disadvantage from the fact that the judgment was not motivated sooner.           In the trial of 30 May 1984, the decision was publicly pronounced.   Subsequently, an explanation of the essential underlying reasons was given.   Contrary to the statements of the applicant, there existed then already a draft version of the judgment of some 80 pages.           The fact that the motivation of the judgment, the essentials of which had already been communicated to the applicant, was not served on the applicant until 3 July 1986 only means that the applicant did not have to begin serving his sentence of six years' imprisonment in view of the fact that the judgment had not entered into legal force due to a plea of nullity and an appeal to a higher Court.   In its decision, the Supreme Court will certainly have to take into consideration the specific circumstances of the case.   As a result, the applicant may possibly rather enjoy an advantage from the delay.   IV.      Summary and motion           In summing up, it transpires from the application that in the light of the above considerations there is no violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention and the application will have to be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.           If, despite the above considerations, however, the Commission should declare the present application admissible, reference may be made, also in respect of the merits of the case, to the above explanations which equally demonstrate that there is no violation of the Convention.   B.       The Applicant   I.       The application and the facts (see THE FACTS above)   1.       The applicant states that the motivation of the judgment at issue was only served on him on 4 July 1986.   The domestic appeal proceedings will now, after an unlawful delay of some 25 months, again begin to run their course.           Nevertheless, the applicant confirms his application to the European Commission of Human Rights.   A delay of more than 25 months to motivate a judgment which should, by law, have been served within 14 days violates the right to a hearing within a reasonable time enshrined in the Convention.   Beyond the circumstances of the present case, the administration of justice in Austria stands to gain by a decision in Strasbourg on a case of this kind.   2.       The applicant submits that he has never claimed that a breach of Section 270(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure will in itself constitute a human rights violation.   Moreover, he only lodged his application well after the eight month period on which a decision was taken in the case No. 4459/79 (Dec. 3.4.71, Collection 38 p. 44).   His application was filed at a time when the serving of the motivation of the judgment had already been delayed for 11 months, and indeed it was only served more than 25 months after the judgment was pronounced in Court.   Nevertheless, a breach of Section 270(1) does indeed constitute a violation of the Convention when the actual delay in motivating the judgment goes beyond a certain limit.   When this happens, a breach of the time-limits laid down in Austrian procedural law (something which the Government in their observations regard as entirely normal) ceases to be merely quantitative and becomes of qualitative relevance too, thus violating the Convention as well.           This point of view is fully consistent with that expressed by Mayerhofer/Rieder in their commentary on the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure with regard to Section 281(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure (2nd ed. 1984, p. 788 at footnote 8).   According to these authors, when the proper duration of criminal proceedings up to the motivation of the judgment is exceeded through delay in motivation, this may very well violate Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, though it does not constitute a ground of nullity.   This note refers to the above-mentioned case No. 4459/79 in which the motivation of the judgment was delayed for eight months.   II.      Requirement   under Article 26 of the Convention           The Government argue next that the applicant could have remedied the economic damage caused by the delay in providing the motivation of the judgment by bringing a domestic action alleging State liability for damage caused by one of its agencies.   In the applicant's submissions, the Government ignore the fact that the application is not concerned solely with economic damage, but also with the damage clearly caused by the delay to his and his family's reputation, and with the severe mental anguish which he suffered on this account.   The economic damage is only part of the overall damage resulting from the delay. In any event, an action alleging State liability is unlikely to accelerate proceedings.   According to the Commission's case-law in respect of Article 26 of the Convention, complaints and State liability actions are a possibility, but are not adequate to accelerate proceedings the undue length of which is the object of the complaint. A State liability action, like a disciplinary complaint, cannot therefore be regarded as a domestic remedy required under Article 26 of the Convention.   III.     Admissibility and merits of the application   1.       As regards the complexity of the proceedings, the Government have attempted to refute the applicant's argument that facts were investigated which had absolutely nothing to do with the charges.   In doing so, the Government try to argue that the applicant's conduct had to be seen, not in isolation, but in the context of the offences committed by the other accused.   This ignores the fact that, although 40 persons were involved in the preliminary investigation phase, only three accused were left once proceedings against Mr. T. were discontinued who had been released from detention on remand and had absconded.   2.       It is hard to form an idea, from the time schedule supplied by the Government, of the actual workload of the judge concerned.   It is clear, however, that a series of hearings lasting 10-30 minutes were held up to July 1985, whereas the various proceedings in the "WBO-case" began in August 1985.   At any rate, the schedule does not indicate that the judge's workload was particularly heavy in early 1985.   Later she would have had a period of more than one year, during which exemption from new cases and a clearly reduced workload would have given her time to prepare the motivation.   3.       The Government argue that delays may be justified under the Convention if the Courts are overburdened, and that the State cannot be held responsible when a particularly heavy workload prevents a judge from doing his work rapidly.   In answer to this it must be said that the State is necessarily responsible for the conduct of its representatives - particularly since it is not merely negligence by the judge in question which is at issue.           As stated in the Government's observations, the judge in question was put in charge of the new economic crimes department 12b) of the Vienna Regional Court on 1 January 1985.   This means that she was appointed at a time when the delay in serving the motivation had already lasted seven months and was thus exceptional to start with (the first date promised by the judge to the defence counsel in the case for the motivation was October 1984).   Subsequently, and although the case was, as the observations point out, particularly complex, nothing was done to help the judge to conclude it for example by granting her exemption from new cases.   On the contrary, she was given additional work.   4.       The Government state that the President of the Court of Appeal took disciplinary action against the judge in early November 1985. However, it must be noted that the authorities waited one and a half years before taking this action.   This makes it impossible to accept the Government's claim that "all possible measures (were taken) to expedite the motivation of the judgment".   Disciplinary supervision clearly had no effect.   The judge was insufficiently exempted from new cases and she herself was relieved as head of the economic crimes department 12b) to which she had been appointed - clearly on the basis of an inaccurate assessment of her workload and/or capacity for work - on 1 January 1985, at a time when judgment in the applicant's case had already been pending for seven months.   5.       The Government state that the applicant suffered no disadvantage from the fact that the judgment had not been motivated, the only effect being that he had not yet had to begin serving the prison sentence.   The Government further speculate as to how this circumstance will affect the judges in the Supreme Court and suggest that it may even work to the applicant's advantage.           The only conclusion to be drawn from this is that the provisions of the Human Rights Convention are, at least in the opinion of the respondent Government, wholly misconceived.   It is obviously assumed that the applicant shall definitely have to serve a prison sentence, and not the faintest allowance is made for the possibility that the judgment given at first instance may be altered on appeal. In the applicant's view, the Government's observations blatantly contravene Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention, since there is a clear presumption that he is guilty, whatever happens.   The Government's observations also consider that proceedings of maximum length can only benefit the person concerned, and this clearly suggests that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention is seen as being either completely misconceived or inapplicable in Austria.   6.       The suggestion that the judgment caused the applicant no disadvantage is answered as follows.           Prior to judgment, the applicant was manager of the firm which he is alleged to have defrauded in collusion with the chairman of the board.   The firm did not participate as a private party in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and took no disciplinary action against him, but continued to employ him as it had before the K.-T. company collapsed.   The relevant sections of the firm do not therefore regard the applicant as having caused them any damage, and no one has suggested that he intentionally set out to cause such damage, which would have been necessary to make the applicant an accessory to the misappropriation of funds.           The fact that these accusations have now been made in a judgment - even an oral judgment - caused the applicant considerable damage since, quite apart from the merely human aspects and the effects on his family's reputation, his employers have also suspended him without pay until the case has been cleared up.   Even so they have not chosen to dismiss the applicant without notice.   The applicant has also had to suffer during this period of more than two years all the disadvantages of being largely debarred from practising his profession, since the "presumption of innocence" by no means applies in practice to a person who has not been finally convicted and is trying to work in business or the law.   Notwithstanding the contrary view so strangely put forward by the Government in their observations, this state of uncertainty, which will last until the case has been decided with legal force is so clearly to the applicant's disadvantage that he prefers to say nothing further on this point.           Finally, to secure his release from detention on remand, the applicant was obliged to find bail of 2,500,000 AS.   The cost of finding bail obviously increases with time, and clear financial damage thus results from the failure to finalise the judgment.   IV.      Summary           A breach of Section 270(1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure constitutes a violation of the European Convention on Human Rights when a time-limit is exceeded which makes the failure to motivate the judgment appear unreasonable as part of the overall length of the proceedings.           The judge's repeated promises to motivate the judgment, which have been cited in the Government's observations, are a clear indication that the Court considered that this could have been done sooner.           The Government's observations show that the judge's work-load was not excessively increased by major cases until August 1985, when the reasonable time for motivating the judgment had long since expired.           The action taken to remedy this situation, referred to in the Government's observations, is thus irrelevant, because it came too late and because, to some extent, instead of decreasing, it actually increased the work-load of the judge who, although she had already fallen behind, was given responsibility for a new department on 1 January 1985.           Failure to motivate the judgment has caused the applicant very substantial non-material and material damage.           On the basis of the above, the applicant requests the Commission to declare the present application admissible and to find a violation of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that he received the motivation of the judgment which was pronounced on 30 May 1984, only on 4 July 1986, i.e. more than 25 months later.   An essential part of the Court proceedings in which he continues to be involved was therefore not concluded within a reasonable time in the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   As a result of the delay in motivation he has suffered both material and immaterial damage.   The applicant also submits that there is no remedy at his disposal under Austrian law to complain of this undue length of time required for the motivation.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention states:           "1.      In the determination of his civil rights and         obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone         is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable         time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by         law."   a)       The Commission notes at the outset that is is not in dispute between the parties that the proceedings at issue concern "the determination of ... <a> criminal charge" against the applicant and that his complaints therefore fall to be considered under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   b)       The Commission furthermore recalls its constant case-law according to which a complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) concerning the length of proceedings may be brought even before the termination of the proceedings in question (see No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31).   c)       In their submissions summarised above the respondent Government point out in respect of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention that the applicant has not exhausted all remedies at his disposal within the meaning of that provision.   In particular, insofar as the applicant complains of having suffered economic damage on account of the delay at issue, he could, if such delay was due to the unlawful and culpable conduct of a public authority, have filed a complaint in accordance with the Official Liability Act for damage caused by one of the State's organs.   If damages were awarded, the applicant would no longer be considered a victim of the Convention.           Under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention the Commission may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law.           In respect of the present complaint, the Commission recalls its constant case-law concerning the length of criminal and civil proceedings according to which there is no remedy available to the applicant under Austrian law (see No. 7987/77, ibid).           It is true that in his application the applicant has referred to material damage resulting from the delay in motivation.   In the Government's submissions, such a damage could be remedied by an action under the Official Liability Act.           However, the Commission notes on the one hand that the applicant has also alleged immaterial damage.   On the other hand, he has alleged such negative consequences in order to demonstrate that he has been substantially affected by the delay in motivation.   In fact, the applicant's complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) are directed primarily against the length of the criminal proceedings in which he continues to be involved.   The object of the applicant's complaint thus extends beyond that of a material damage as required by the Official Liability Act.   Moreover, an action under this Act would not serve to remedy the applicant's complaints by accelerating the proceedings (see No. 4459/70, Dec. 3.4.71, Collection 38 p. 44).           The Commission concludes that the action under the Official Liability Act cannot therefore be considered an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26), and that the applicant had no other such remedy at his disposal.   The complaint cannot, therefore, be rejected under Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.   d)       The Government have submitted that the complaint at issue is manifestly ill-founded.   In particular, the delay can be explained by the fact that the proceedings were based on very complex and comprehensive facts.   Moreover, the judge in question was overloaded, though the competent authorities took all possible measures to expedite the motivation of the judgment.   In view thereof, the State can no longer be held responsible under the Convention.   The alleged breach of Section 270(1) of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure does not in itself entail a violation of the Convention.   Finally, the Government point out that the applicant suffered no disadvantage from the fact that the judgment was not motivated sooner.           The Commission considers that the complaint concerning the length of the criminal proceedings in which the applicant continues to be involved raises difficult questions of fact and law which are of such complexity that their determination should depend on an examination of the merits.   This part of the application is therefore not manifestly ill-founded and must be declared admissible, no other grounds for declaring it inadmissible having been established.   2.       The applicant also complains under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that the judgment was not given by a "tribunal established by law" within the meaning of that provision.   In particular, the written judgment should, after its pronouncement, no longer have to be prepared (erstellt) but only written reasons added. In view of the fact that 25 months lapsed after the motivation was served on the applicant, he submits that the judgment in fact still had to be prepared by a single judge.           The Commission notes that the applicant has not shown that he raised this complaint before the competent Austrian Courts.   An issue arises therefore as to whether the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   The Commission nevertheless decides not to resolve this question since this part of the application is in any event inadmissible for the following reasons:           The Commission observes that the applicant has not alleged that the Vienna Regional Court which convicted the applicant was not "established by law" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in that, for instance, it was not the competent jurisdiction to deal with the applicant's case.   Rather, the applicant solely deduces from the delay in motivating the judgment the conclusion that a single judge had prepared the decision rather than the Court consisting of two professional and two lay judges.   However, the Commission considers that the delay in motivating does not in any way imply that it was a single judge rather than the Court which prepared the judgment.           Accordingly, this complaint does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   The Commission concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission   1.       DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, WITHOUT PREJUDGING THE MERITS,         THE COMPLAINT CONCERNING THE LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS (PARA.         1 OF THE LAW); AND   2.       DECLARES INADMISSIBLE THE REMAINDER OF THE APPLICATION.   Secretary to the Commission                 President of the Commission         (H.C. KRÜGER)                                (C.A. NØRGAARD)