CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mars 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }    AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application No. 11356/85 by Irka CEDERBERG-LAPPALAINEN against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 4 March 1987, the following members being present:                 MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   G. SPERDUTI                   J. A. FROWEIN                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   S. TRECHSEL                   B. KIERNAN                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   H. VANDENBERGHE                   F. MARTINEZ                 Mr.   J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 9 November 1984 by Irka Cederberg-Lappalainen against Sweden and registered on 14 January 1985 under file No. 11356/85;           Having regard to:   -        the Commission's decision of 2 December 1985 to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits;     -        the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 7 March 1986 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 23 May 1986;   -        the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:     THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1942 and resident at Malmö.   She is an information secretary by profession.   The applicant's child, born on 1 October 1977, was attending a nursery school in Malmö at the time of the introduction of the application, which concerns a peace demonstration in which the children of the school were supposed to participate.   Domestic law and practice           Provisions on freedom of expression and freedom to         arrange demonstrations           The constitutional safeguards concerning fundamental, human rights and freedoms are contained in the 1974 Instrument of Government (regeringsformen).   Under Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument, every citizen is, in relation to the community, guaranteed the right to freedom of expression and the freedom to arrange and participate in any demonstration on public grounds.           According to Section 12 of the same chapter, the right to freedom of expression and the right to arrange and participate in any demonstration can be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and, inter alia, necessary for a purpose which is acceptable in a democratic society.   Such a limitation may never be extended so far as to constitute a threat to the free formation of opinions.           According to Chapter 2 Section 2 every citizen shall, in relation to the community, be protected against, inter alia, any compulsion to make known his opinion in any political, religious, cultural or other such matter, or to participate in any demonstration or other expression of opinion.           Provisions concerning public social services           The goals of the public social service, as well as the basic means by which these goals are to be reached, are outlined in the 1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlag 1980:620).   According to Section 2 of the Act, each municipality carries the responsibility for social services within its own territory.   For the purpose of fulfilling this obligation, there shall be in each municipality a Social Council, cf.   Section 4 of the Act.           All forms of care provided for in the Act are, with a few exceptions, offered on a voluntary basis.   The Act has taken the form of a general, goal-oriented framework legislation, which leaves leeway for the municipalities in forming and organising, having regard to their own particular conditions and requirements, the services to be offered.           According to Section 1 of the Act, public social services are to be established on the basis of democracy and solidarity.   Under the same Section, one of the goals of such services is to promote, while paying due respect to the individual's right to self-determination and privacy, active participation in the life of the community.   In respect of children and young persons, Section 12 further provides that social services should, inter alia, promote, in close co-operation with their families, a comprehensive personal development as well as a favourable physical and social development.           As regards children, who have not reached compulsory school age, the Act enjoins the municipalities to organise the pre-school activities, cf.   Section 13.   Each municipality shall have a plan for its pre-school activities, adopted by the publicly elected Municipality Council and covering a period of at least five years, cf.   Section 17.   The Social Council shall endeavour to ensure that children avail themselves of the opportunity of attending the pre-school activities and shall also inform the parents of the activities and their purposes, Section 16.           The Act does not contain any provisions in respect of the substance of the pre-school education.   According to the travaux préparatoires, one goal of pre-school activities should be to lay the foundation of children's desire to seek and use knowledge with a view to improving the living conditions for themselves and others (SOU 1972:27, p. 24).           The 1980 Compulsory School Curriculum is not directly applicable to pre-school activities.   However, regarding the goals of the education, the curriculum points to the necessity of making the pupils realise the importance of international relations and co-operation and explicitly designates "peace education" as a proper element of the educational programme.           Decisions by the Social Council are taken at a meeting. Minutes shall be taken of the meeting containing, among other things, a brief description of each subject matter dealt with and also any decision taken at the meeting.   Upon completion, the minutes shall be verified by the chairman, and notice of the minutes shall be posted on a public noticeboard, cf.   Section 28 of the Social Services Act and Chapter 2 Sections 10 and 25 of the 1977 Act on Local Government (kommunallag 1977:179).   A decision by the Social Council may be appealed, under a special appeal procedure laid down in Chapter 7 of the Act on Local Government, to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) by a citizen of the municipality.   The grounds that may be invoked in support of such an appeal are that the decision   -        has not been taken in the legally prescribed manner   -        conflicts with existing laws or regulations   -        falls outside the competence of the local government in         any other way   -        infringes on the individual rights of the complainant or   -        is otherwise based on unjust grounds.           A judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal may be appealed, as a last resort, to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten).           The particular facts of the case           On 3 May 1983 the Social Council's Committee for Pre-school and Leisure Home Activities in the municipality of Malmö (socialnämndens delegation för förskole- och fritidshemsverksamheten i Malmö kommun) approved a proposal to arrange a peace demonstration for around 3,000 children attending the pre-school and leisure home activities of Malmö municipality.   The peace demonstration was to take place on 15 and 16 June 1983 in connection with the annual "People's Park Days" (Folkets Parkdagar) which were arranged on the theme of peace.   The intention was that on both days the activities should commence with a peace demonstration with the participation of the children, the personnel and the parents, who wished to and had the possibility of attending.   The participants should meet at a place outside the park and then walk in a peace march to the park.   Further, the intention was that the children should prepare, in advance, flags, peace doves and other symbols of peace to be carried during the demonstration.   In the decision it was further stated that "the parents will be informed of the peace march and the children will only participate with the consent of the parents".           The Government have submitted that the Social Council's decision to arrange a peace demonstration was formally made known to the public in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Social Services Act and the 1977 Act on Local Government.   In addition the Government have submitted that, according to the information procured from the official in charge of the child care activities in the municipality of Malmö, each pre-school was informed in writing of the decision and that no child was to be engaged in the demonstration unless the consent of the parents was obtained.   In view of the almost daily contacts between the pre-school staff and the parents, the ultimate responsibility of informing the parents and obtaining their positions on the matter was placed upon each individual pre-school.           The applicant has stated that she was never asked by her child's nursery school about the demonstration.   She was informed, however, at the beginning of June, that the Administration had sent out instructions to the nursery schools that the parents had to be informed and asked about their children's participation in the demonstration.           The applicant lodged a municipal appeal (kommunalbesvär) with the Administrative Court of Appeal of Gothenburg which in a judgment of 8 June 1983 rejected the appeal.   The applicant appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court, which on 29 May 1984 rejected the appeal with the following reasoning:             "In the appealed decision, the Social Council's Committee for Pre-School and Leisure Home Activities of Malmö municipality approved that the children involved in these activities, with personnel and parents, should participate in a so-called peace march in connection with the arrangement in the People's Park on the theme of peace.   The idea was that in the march the children should carry flags, peace doves and other peace symbols which they had made in advance.   An express condition for the decision was that the parents were asked about the participation of the children.   (The applicant's) submissions first raise the issue whether it is at all compatible with the intended pedagogic activity in nursery schools and leisure homes to engage children in activities for peace.   It is to be observed that there are no regulations for the pedagogic activities in the nursery schools and leisure homes.   An overriding objective for the nursery school is to lay the foundation for the child being willing to seek and use knowledge in order to improve its own living conditions and those of other people (SOU 1972:27 p. 24).   This appears to be entirely compatible with the aim of creating in the child, through its own activities, a wish for peace in the world.   In the curriculum for the basic school (grundskolan) it is said: 'It is necessary to choose, at school, material which allows the children to realise our society's international dependence and the importance of international contacts and international co-operation' (Lgr 80 p. 31).   Peace education is furthermore indicated as an example of issues which the individual school may take up in its working plan (Lgr 80 p. 59).   Against this background it is clear that the activity at the leisure homes could also comprise activities for peace.   According to Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument of Government every citizen is, in relation to the community, guaranteed the freedom to arrange and participate in a demonstration in a public place.   A municipal organ may also be considered to have the right, in a matter which falls within its competence, to arrange a demonstration provided it is done with objectivity and in a positive spirit.   The Committee cannot be considered to have, from the said points of view, exceeded its competence by approving the arrangement of a peace march.   Every citizen is, according to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of Government, in relation to the community, protected from compulsion to participate in demonstrations.   It can be questioned whether it was entirely compatible with this provision that a child, who had not attained such an age at which it could be assumed to have an opinion of its own on the peace issue, was allowed to participate in the peace march.   This, however, is a question for the judgment of the parents.   In view of the fact that the participation of the children had been made dependent of the consent of the parents the decision of the Committee cannot be considered to have been in conflict with the provisions of Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of Government.   In summary, the Supreme Administrative Court finds that what (the applicant) has submitted does not lead to the conclusion that the the Committee through the appealed decision, can be considered to have exceeded its competence or that the decision is otherwise unlawful on any ground laid down in Chapter 7 Section 1 of the Act on Local Government."             One of the five judges dissented, considering that the appealed decision should be quashed, mainly since the request for consent from the parents could constitute an interference with the parents' right not to be forced to disclose their opinion in political or other matters.           Prior to the above decision, on 22 September 1983, the Parliamentary Ombudsman (JO) had stated that the peace march did not call for any further action on his part since it had been arranged with the consent of the parents.           The applicant's child did not attend the peace demonstration. The applicant took a week's holiday and stayed at home with her child.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant invokes Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1.   1.       She alleges that the use of pre-school children in a demonstration is a violation of the child's right to respect for its integrity.   2.       She complains that the request for permission from the parents violates the parents' right to respect for their private and family life, to freedom of thought and conscience and to freedom of expression.   Moreover, it encourages the parents to violate the child's right to respect for its integrity.   3.       The applicant also complains that the parent is forced to disclose his/her opinion regarding an issue which has been the subject of substantial political debate.   4.       The applicant furthermore complains that the authorities have failed to respect the right of the parents to ensure such education as is in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.   5.       The applicant finally complains that the action of the authorities' violates the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.   She submits that "freedom" must include the right to abstain from acting.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 9 November 1984 and registered on 14 January 1985.           On 2 December 1985 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on the application.           The Government's observations were submitted on 7 March 1986.           After the grant of an extension of the time-limit the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 23 May 1986.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES           The Government           The Government have submitted that the applicant's answer as to whether or not her child could participate in the peace demonstration was obtained in accordance with the applicable provisions of the Social Services Act and the Act on Local Government as well as in accordance with instructions given to the pre-school staff having the ultimate responsibility for informing her.           However, even assuming that the applicant was not informed in this manner this should be of no relevance when considering whether her rights under the Convention and Protocol No. 1 to the Convention were infringed.   The applicant did in fact, and this she admits, have access to all relevant information concerning the prerequisites of the demonstration.   Given her position at that time as an information secretary, employed by the Social Council of Malmö and working at its information department, her knowledge of these prerequisites must have been well known by all officials involved in the matter.   Furthermore, in view of the actions taken by the applicant to have the decision revoked, it must also have been clear to them that informing her would have been of no use since she had already clearly demonstrated that she was not going to let her child take part in the manifestation.           The Government have furthermore submitted that they will not go beyond what is required by the facts of the applicant's case in answering the issues raised but that they have no objections to considering any possible interference with the applicant's son's rights under the Convention or under Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as equally infringing the applicant's rights.   Re Article 8 of the Convention           The Government fail to see that the facts presented by the applicant could at all be viewed so as to involve any right guaranteed by this Article.   Under all circumstances, and since the reasons invoked in support of the Government's position as regards the alleged violation of Article 9 of the Convention apply with equal force in respect of the present Article, the Government, with reference to the following arguments, submit that the complaint under this Article is manifestly ill-founded.   Re Article 9 of the Convention           The Government first observe that the only manner, in which the purpose and shaping of the demonstration was defined, was that it was supposed to be a "peace demonstration".   In the Government's view, this would appear to entail no constraint as regards the positive aspects of the applicant's right to freedom of thought in respect of the question of peace.   This is so since, while the basic topic of the participant's manifestation was given, each individual participating in the manifestation was free to express his or her own ideas and opinions on the topic.           The participation in the peace demonstration was, as by the way the attendance of the pre-school and leisure home activities in general, entirely voluntary.   There was no obligation for the applicant and her child to state any reasons whatsoever for their decision not to take part in the demonstration, and this decision did not entail any form of sanctions or other negative effects.   The applicant was well aware of this voluntary character of the demonstration and she availed herself of the opportunity not to let her child take part in it.   If she had decided to join the demonstration herself, she would have done so as an individual, free to express her own opinions on the topic, and not in the capacity of spokesman for any public establishment.   The same applies, if she had decided to let her child participate.           In view of this, the Government maintain that the facts presented by the applicant fall short of suggesting any interference with her, or her son's rights under Article 9 of the Convention.           In case the Commission would consider that the applicant's right under Article 9 para. 1 has been interfered with, the Government submit that this interference was justified under para. 2 of the Article.   The right to arrange demonstrations is laid down in Chapter 2 Section 1 of the Instrument of Government.   This right is of vital importance as an element of the freedom of expression, and an indispensable feature of a democratic society, also guaranteed by Article 10 of the Convention.   In the Government's view, therefore, any possible interference with the applicant's rights under Article 9 para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as necessary for the effective protection of the rights of others under Article 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression.   It should be added that not even the applicant has asserted any interferences in excess of those allegedly following as a necessary consequence of the very fact that the demonstration was arranged.           In view of this, the Government submit that the complaint under Article 9 of the Convention is manifestly ill-founded.   Re Article 10 of the Convention           The Government maintain that the reasons invoked in support of their position as regards the alleged violation of Article 9 of the Convention apply with equal force in respect of Article 10. Consequently, with reference to the above submissions, the Government submit that the complaint under this Article is also manifestly ill-founded.   Re Article 11 of the Convention           The Government take, in respect of the alleged violation of Article 11 of the Convention, the same position as in regard to the complaint under Article 8.   Consequently the Government maintain that the complaint under Article 11 is also manifestly ill-founded.   Re Article 2 of Protocol No. 1           With reference to what has been said above, the Government first submit that the organising of the demonstration did not in any way involve an expression of views that could possibly give rise to any conflict with the applicant's religious and philosophical convictions.           Even in case the Commission does not share this view, the Government, for the following reasons, maintain that the complaint under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is manifestly ill-founded.           The applicant's allegations are apparently founded on the assumption that the present Article requires a State under all circumstances to refrain from including in education and teaching any religious and philosophical views.   In the Government's opinion, this assumption is inaccurate.   In the case of Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and Pedersen (Eur.   Court H.R., Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen, Pedersen judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A No. 23) the European Court of Human Rights adopted the view that teaching or education imparting information or knowledge of a religious or philosophical kind would violate the present Article only when they were not carried out in an objective, critical and pluralistic manner, but rather assumed the character of indoctrination (p. 26, para. 53).   With reference to what has been said above, the Government submit that the demonstration in the present case was in fact carried out in precisely the manner thus alluded to by the Court and that it bore no stamp of indoctrination. As regards this point, the Government further observe that no other view appears to have been expressed by the applicant.   In this context, the Government would finally like to draw attention to the facts that the demonstration was an exceptional and transitory element of the educational programme and that, as has been pointed out above, it was entirely voluntary.           The applicant           In the applicant's view the Government do not seem to realise the difference between the administrative aspects of demonstrations - such as security, traffic and timing, in which the Government have a proper role to play - and every citizen's right to freedom of expression and demonstration.           If the Government start arranging, sponsoring and supporting political demonstrations, this limits the individual citizen's right to demonstrate, particularly if the Government provide the demonstrators through government-controlled institutions.   These actions, in themselves, are sufficient to violate the rights cited in this case.   Further, to claim that the participants, children of pre-school age, were freely exercising their rights is illogical.           According to Chapter 2 Section 2 of the Instrument of Government every citizen shall, in relation to the community, be protected against, inter alia, any compulsion to make known his opinion in any politicial, religious, cultural or other such matter, or to participate in any demonstration or other expression of opinion. When the Government state that the ultimate responsibility of informing the parents and obtaining their positions on the matter was placed upon each individual pre-school, they admit that the authorities asked or were supposed to ask each parent of his or her opinion.           The action described above necessarily violates the rights secured under both the Instrument of Government and the Convention, since the freedom of speech and expression includes the right not to be compelled, either directly or indirectly, by any government body to express an opinion on certain matters.           The Government's position reveals some misunderstanding regarding political demonstrations and their purpose.           The Government assert that no constraint was placed on individual participants since they could express their own ideas on the basic topic of peace.   If no constraint at all is manifested by the general topic of a demonstration, then there is no purpose for it. If there is no purpose, then there is no need for the demonstration. The Government's reasoning reduces the right to demonstrate to an absurdity.   Individuals participate in demonstrations in order to manifest a political opinion.   A "peace" demonstration is necessarily a political demonstration which manifests the opinions of the participants - at least with regard to those who are mature enough to have formed an opinion.   If the participants are too young, as the children in the present case, they are going to reflect, on the whole, the opinions of the adult participants who in this case were the pre-school personnel.   So it is quite naive to say the children were free to express their own opinions.           In addition, since it was a normal workday many parents would have to take time off from work in order to be able to "freely" express their opinions or "freely" influence their children, if their views differed from those of the authorities.           The demonstration was admittedly voluntary in the narrow sense.   However, if the term is compared to what voluntary means in relation to normal demonstrations which are arranged and sponsored by private organisations or individuals, a parent of a potential participant is not required to "avail" herself of the opportunity not to let her child participate.   In this sense, it was not voluntary.           Furthermore, voluntary in the broader sense also means that nobody will be asked by the Government about their participation.   Nor will anybody be required by the Government to approve or disapprove of their child's participation.   Participation here is as voluntary as participation in the pre-school system in general.   For some people it might be entirely voluntary, but for most people it is a question of economic necessity.           Finally, being forced to state a position regarding participation is enough to constitute a violation of the right to privacy and freedom of speech etc, which again is not remedied by the assertion that "this decision did not entail any form of sanctions or other negative effects".   The latter assertion has nothing to do with the question of whether or not a violation occurred.           The ideas presented by the Government regarding the right to demonstrate are at least unique, if not absurd.   Fortunately the Government recognise the right to demonstrate as a vital element of freedom of expression.   Unfortunately the Government go on to assert that "any possible interference with the applicant's rights under Article 9 para. 1 in the present case is undoubtedly justified as necessary for the effective protection of the rights of others under Article 10 of the Convention to freedom of expression".           It is true that in some sense the Government have a right, or more accurately a duty, to assist the organisers of a demonstration regarding the practical arrangements of the demonstration.   However, in most countries which are Parties to the Convention this presumably does not mean that the Government have somehow obtained the right to demonstrate.   Each citizen is guaranteed this right and the Government do not have a right to interfere with the citizens' right in order to protect the rights of the local Government.           The assertion that any interference of the rights guaranteed was necessary in order to protect the rights of the local Government is absurd, since the purpose of this Section of the Instrument of Government and of various Articles of the Convention is to protect citizens from the Government, and not the other way around.           Finally, the very fact that the Government arranged, sponsored and financed the demonstration, in addition to providing the bulk of the demonstrators, that is the employees and the children from the pre-school, also violated the Convention in a more general way since the freedom of expression and the right to demonstrate imply some form of competition between various ideas.   If governments have a right to demonstrate which is equal to that of the individual citizens, this freedom will become meaningless for most people.           The demonstration was not objective, since demonstrations are not the place for objective, critical and pluralistic transmissions of philosophical views.   The whole purpose of a demonstration is to manifest already existing views which participants share.   Since most of the participants were children, the main views expressed were necessarily those of the pre-school personnel.   Since the Government did not limit the demonstration to presenting an "objective" view of "peace", the demonstration was not objective.           The Government assert that "the demonstration was an exceptional and transitory element of the educational programme".   The "exceptional and transitory" nature of the demonstration is irrelevant as a defence regarding the issue of a violation of the rights guaranteed by the Convention.   In fact, it may indicate that the Government have recognised that they should not participate in the organisation and promotion of demonstrations.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant has complained about the fact that the responsible local authorities in Malmö arranged a peace demonstration in which the intention was that children attending pre-school and leisure homes should participate.   The applicant has alleged breaches of Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 (Art. 8, 9, 10, 11) of the Convention and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.           Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention provides that the Commission may receive petitions from a "person ... claiming to be a victim of a violation ...".   It follows from this provision that normally the person who submits a petition to the Commission must himself be the victim of the alleged violation.   An applicant cannot, however, complain as a representative of people in general, because the Convention does not permit such an "actio popularis".   In the present case, the applicant complains not only on behalf of herself and her child, but also on behalf of other parents and children who might have been affected by the proposed peace demonstration.   It follows from the above that the applicant can only claim to be a victim insofar as she, or her child, were affected by the peace demonstration.   In this respect the Commission notes that the applicant's child never participated in the peace demonstration.   The applicant chose to stay at home and take care of her child during the week when the peace demonstration took place.   The decision of the applicant to avoid her child's participation was in conformity with the decision of the Social Council Committee which required the parents' consent for such participation. Accordingly, the applicant's child was not forced to take part in the demonstration.           It follows that the applicant's complaint that the participation in the demonstration violates the child's integrity (complaint no. 1), and the right to abstain from a peaceful assembly (complaint no. 5), are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       As regards Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2), the applicant has submitted that the authorities have failed to respect the right of the parents to ensure such education as is in conformity with their religious and philosophical convictions (complaint no. 4).           The Commission notes that the participation of the applicant's child in the peace demonstration presupposed the consent of the applicant and that the applicant did not let her child participate in the demonstration.   The Commission considers that by making the participation dependent on the consent of the parents the Swedish authorities have shown sufficient respect for the applicant's rights as parent under Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-2) to the Convention.           It follows that this aspect of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       It remains to examine the applicant's complaints (nos. 2 and 3) that the facts of the case disclose a violation of her right to respect for private and family life, to freedom of thought and conscience and to freedom of expression in that she was allegedly obliged to disclose her opinion when keeping her child at home and not letting him participate in the peace demonstration.   The applicant has invoked Articles 8, 9 and 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention in this respect.           The Commission does not agree with the applicant.   It may be questioned whether, in a democratic state, it should be the task of public authorities to arrange demonstrations involving children of an age at which they cannot be assumed to have an opinion of their own. However, the applicant's decision to keep her child at home and thereby avoiding his participation in the peace demonstration does not necessarily imply any views as to peace issues in general.   It is true that the applicant's attitude could be interpreted as a disagreement with the local authorities as to the appropriateness of arranging a peace demonstration in which children should take part.   However, the Commission does not find that the authorities' decision concerning the organisation of the demonstration can for this reason be considered to interfere with the applicant's, or her child's, rights under para. 1 of Articles 8, 9 or 10 (Art. 8, 9, 10) of the Convention.           It follows that in this respect the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE   Deputy Secretary to the Commission          President of the Commission                  (J. RAYMOND)                           (C. A. NØRGAARD)