CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mars 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                      AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                     Application No. 12237/86                   by Maria De Souza                   against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 4 March 1987, the following members being present:                   MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   G. SPERDUTI                   J. A. FROWEIN                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   S. TRECHSEL                   B. KIERNAN                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   H. VANDENBERGHE                   F. MARTINEZ                 Mr.   H. C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 13 January 1986 by Maria De Souza against the United Kingdom and registered on 24 June 1986 under file N° 12237/86;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen born in 1939 in Kenya.   She is a secretary/personal assistant by profession and resides in Basingstoke, England.   She is represented before the Commission by Mr A.P. Fishleigh, solicitor with Messrs Snow and Bispham, Basingstoke.           The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows:           The application arises out of the applicant's complaint to an Industrial Tribunal of racial discrimination, contrary to Section 4 of the Race Relations Act 1976 (the 1976 Act), by her employer.           The applicant, a coloured woman, was employed without any work problems from 4 January 1977 with a private company.   After some five years she reached the top of her salary scale in that grade.           In January 1982 a work reorganisation required her to work for two rather than one of the firm's managers as she had done previously. Her wage was not increased.   This made her feel that she was being discriminated against on racial grounds.   Moreover she was no longer invited to the staff Christmas lunch and she overheard one of the managers tell a clerk to give some typing to "the wog", meaning the applicant.   ("Wog" is a term of abuse regarding coloured people.)           The Industrial Tribunal, and, on appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the Court of Appeal, found that the applicant had not suffered racial discrimination contrary to the 1976 Act.   In the final decision of the Court of Appeal on 19 December 1985 it was held that the work reorganisation did not affect the applicant's workload and that she received no increase in her salary because she had already reached the top of her salary scale in her grade.   Section 4 (2)(c) of the 1976 Act makes it unlawful for any employer to discriminate against an employee "by dismissing him, or subjecting him to any other detriment".   As regards the phrase "any other detriment" the Court of Appeal stated as follows:   "Racially to insult a coloured employee is not enough by itself, even if that insult caused him or her distress;   before the employee can be said to have been subjected to some 'other detriment' the Court or Tribunal must hold that by reason of the act or acts complained of a reasonable worker would or might take the view that he had thereby been disadvantaged in the circumstances in which he had thereafter to work ....   .... even though the use of the insulting word in respect of the appellant may have meant that she was being considered less favourably, whether generally or in an employment context, than others <the Court does not> think that she can properly be said to have been 'treated' less favourably by whomsoever used the word, unless he intended her to overhear the conversation in which it was used, or know or ought reasonably to have anticipated that she was overhearing it, or knew or ought reasonably to have anticipated that the person he was talking to would pass the insult on or that the appellant would become aware of it in some other way ...."           Without more concrete evidence of actual prejudice, the Court of Appeal found that the applicant's complaint of racial discrimination was unsubstantiated.           The applicant was apparently dismissed by her employers before the Court of Appeal gave its judgment, but this was not an element of the case before that Court.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains of the findings of the domestic courts and of numerous alleged errors of law or fact, particularly, by the Industrial Tribunal which first heard her case.   She alleges that this Tribunal conspired with her employer to prevent the course of justice; it deliberately gave the wrong decision and agreed that she should be used as cheap forced labour.   As regards these aspects of her case, she invokes Articles 3, 4 and 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   The applicant further claims that the Employment Appeal Tribunal came to a perverse decision regarding the racial abuse she had suffered, in breach of Articles 3, 6 para. 1 and 14 of the Convention.   These breaches were allegedly compounded by the Court of Appeal.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant has complained of racial discrimination during her employment with a private company.   This complaint was rejected by various industrial relations courts, for although it was acknowledged that the applicant may have overheard a conversation in which she was insultingly referred to as a "wog", this was not considered, along with her other allegations, to have occasioned her any significant detriment in her work.           However, the applicant complains that the domestic courts, in rejecting her complaint of racial discrimination, perpetrated breaches of Articles 3, 4, 6 para. 1 and 14 (Art. 3, 4, 6-1, 14) of the Convention.           Article 3 (Art. 3) of the Convention prohibits, inter alia, degrading treatment;   Article 4 (Art. 4) prohibits forced labour;   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) ensures a fair hearing in the determination of civil rights and obligations before an impartial tribunal and Article 14 (Art. 14) prohibits discrimination in the securement of Convention rights and freedoms.           The Commission notes that the applicant's complaints under Articles 3, 4 and 14 (Art. 3, 4, 14) of the Convention concern principally her private employer, which complaints the Commission is unable to examine by virtue of its competence ratione personæ.   However, English domestic law has provided protection from racial discrimination and abusive conditions of employment under the Race Relations Act 1976 and substantial employment protection legislation.   Enforcement of this protection for employees is ensured by specialised courts, namely Industrial Tribunals and Employment Appeal Tribunals, followed by the other normal channels of appeal to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords.   In this respect the British Government has taken positive steps to protect persons within its jurisdiction from possible degrading treatment through discrimination, and from forced labour.           The Commission finds that there is no evidence to substantiate the applicant's allegation that the domestic courts conspired with her employer or themselves perpetrated breaches of Articles 3, 4 and 14 (Art. 3, 4, 14) of the Convention.   This aspect of the case is, therefore, manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The remaining question in this case is whether in respect of the applicant's civil claim against her employer, in which she had alleged racial discrimination, degrading treatment and forced labour, the domestic courts ensured her right to a fair hearing before an impartial tribunal, within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           In this context the Commission observes the applicant's claims that the domestic courts gave perverse and wrong decisions, committing numerous errors of law or fact.   However the Commission is not competent to examine such allegations except when it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of the Convention. The Commission finds no evidence of failure by the industrial relations courts in question to allow the applicant every opportunity to argue her case;   nor is there any evidence of their partiality.   In these circumstances the Commission concludes that the case discloses no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention. It follows that this aspect of the application must also be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.             For these reasons, the Commission             DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     Secretary to the Commission            President of the Commission               (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (C.A. NØRGAARD)