CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 mai 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY   Application No. 12040/86 by G.M. against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 4 May 1987, the following members being present:                         MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                         E. BUSUTTIL                         G. JÖRUNDSSON                         S. TRECHSEL                         B. KIERNAN                         A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                         A. WEITZEL                         J.C. SOYER                         H.G. SCHERMERS                         H. DANELIUS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                    Mrs   G.H. THUNE                    Sir   Basil HALL                    Mr.   F. MARTINEZ                      Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 20 February 1984 by G.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 4 March 1986 under file No. 12040/86;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant is a British citizen, born in 1939 and resident in W..           The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.           The Inland Revenue obtained judgment against the applicant for the sum of £246.81 on 12 December 1977 in respect of taxes owed on past earnings.   The applicant had unsuccessfully appealed the tax assessment in issue before the General Commissioners on 17 March and 24 November 1982.   The applicant had requested that the Inland Revenue provide him with copies of the capital statements prepared by his tax inspector which he alleged would assist him to challenge the tax assessments in issue but none had been provided.   Following request for further information by the Commission's Secretariat, the applicant asked the Inland Revenue for explanation of this.   A letter from the Inland Revenue in response to the applicant's further enquiry dated 30 December 1986 however states that such capital statements are only prepared in a small number of cases and that none had been prepared in his particular case.   On 23 December 1982 the applicant submitted an application for a case to be stated to the High Court in respect of his unsuccessful appeal.   He was informed that he had failed to comply with the appropriate time-limits and that no case could be stated.   The Inland Revenue proceeded to serve a bankruptcy notice on the applicant on 15 March 1983 and after a hearing before the Registrar of the Bankruptcy Court on 19 October 1983, a receiving order was made against the applicant.           On 20 October 1983 the applicant attended the Official Receiver's office for oral examination.   On that occasion, he informed the Official Receiver of County Court proceedings in which he was involved against the company which had been repairing a road on which the applicant had been driving.   The applicant's windscreen had been broken by loose chippings, and he was claiming some £58.58 from the private company, who had been carrying out road-repairs.   The Receiver stopped and adjourned indefinitely the County Court proceedings, apparently on the grounds that even if the applicant were to win, the costs involved would be likely to make the action as a whole a liability.           A notice of first creditors meeting was sent out in February 1984, but it seems that it was sent to the wrong address and the applicant could not therefore attend or be represented at that meeting.   There was no quorum at the meeting and it was adjourned to 24 February 1984.   There was again no quorum and the meeting was concluded.   On 16 March 1984, the applicant attended W. County Court, when he was adjudicated bankrupt.           A trustee in bankruptcy was appointed and, by letter of 2 July 1984, the applicant was told that, as regards the claim against the road repairing contractors, the trustee had no objection to a reassignment of the right of action to the applicant, who would then have been entitled to pursue the claim, with the possibility of being granted legal aid.   Any money received would have to be paid to the trustee for the benefit of creditors generally.   The applicant does not appear to have taken any further steps in regard to this aspect of his claim.           The applicant subsequently applied for legal aid in order to appeal against his bankruptcy.   Counsel's opinion of 22 October 1986 however stated that there were no grounds on which the bankruptcy could be challenged and the applicant's legal aid certificate was discharged.           The applicant alleges that following the commencement of the bankruptcy proceedings he received three visits from an official from the Receiver's Office enquiring as to the content of his 86 year old mother's will.   The official requested the applicant to make enquiries of his mother on this subject.   The applicant did so and his mother was distressed that such enquiries should be made.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains of violations of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention in that, first, he was unable to have a case stated in connection with his appeal against an income tax assessment; secondly, the Receiver's decision to adjourn the civil proceedings against the road repairing contractor denied him the opportunity of a fair public hearing of his case; and, thirdly, he did not receive any notice of the first creditors' meeting because the notice was incorrectly addressed, and he was therefore denied a fair and public hearing in respect of the meeting.           The applicant also alleges violations of Article 10 of the Convention in connection with the refusal of the Inland Revenue to provide him with capital statements prepared by his tax inspector which he alleges would have enabled him to challenge the various assessments in issue before the General Commissioners and secondly in that, because he was unable to attend the first creditors' meeting referred to above, he was denied the right to freedom of expression at the meeting.           Finally, the applicant alleges a violation of Article 8 of the Convention because inquiries were made by the Official Receiver's Office as to the contents of the applicant's mother's will, in particular as regards the property which had been transferred by the applicant and in a part of which the applicant was living and for which he was paying rent.   THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains of violations of his rights under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides that:           "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations         or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled         to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an         independent and impartial tribunal established by law."        i.   The applicant complains firstly that he was denied the opportunity to have the dispute concerning income tax assessment dealt with by case stated before the High Court.           The Commission must first consider however whether the subject matter of the proceedings of which the applicant complains concerns the determination of civil rights or obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           In previous cases, the Commission has already found that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not applicable to proceedings regarding taxation or related fiscal matters (see e.g.   Applications Nos 2552/65, Dec. 15.12.67, Collection 26 p. 1, and 8903/80, Dec. 8.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 246).   The Commission recalls that the subject matter of the proceedings in question was the applicant's dispute as to the amount which he has to pay to the Inland Revenue in respect of his past earnings.   The Commission finds therefore that this is a matter of a taxation which falls outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.       ii.   The applicant also complains that he has been denied access to court by the action of the Official Receiver in stopping his claim for damages in the County Court.           The Commission first of all notes that the subject matter of the claim was the damage caused to applicant's car by allegedly negligent road-repairers and that this would appear to fall within the scope of the concept of "civil rights" set out in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           The Commission recalls however that the applicant had become bankrupt in the early stages of this action and that the Official Receiver had apparently exercised his right to interfere in the action on the ground that the damages claimed (£58,58) were likely to be outweighed by the legal costs to such an extent as to make the action a liability.           The case-law of the Commission and of the European Court of Human Rights has established that the right of access to the courts is not absolute but may be subject to limitations (see e.g.   Eur.   Court H.R., Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A, No. 18 and Eur. Court H.R., Ashingdane judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A, No. 93).           In the majority of the contracting states, the right of access to court is regulated in respect of minors, vexatious litigants, persons of unsound mind and persons declared bankrupt.   Such regulations are not in principle contrary to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, where the aim pursued is legitimate and the means employed to achieve the aim is proportionate.   The Commission recalls that the Official Receiver was of the view that the action was likely to be a liability and was therefore acting in pursuance of his duty to protect the rights of the applicant's creditors.   The measure taken to stay the proceedings could not be said to be disproportionate to this legitimate aim of safeguarding the fair administration of the applicant's estate.   The Commission in any event recalls that the trustee in bankruptcy who succeeded the Official Receiver as administrator of the applicant's estate has subsequently agreed to re-assign the right of action to the applicant, who however appears to have taken no further steps in the matter.   In these circumstances, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.      iii.   The applicant further complains that he did not receive any notice of the first creditors' meeting because the notice was incorrectly addressed, and that he was therefore denied a fair and public hearing in respect of the meeting.           From the information supplied by the applicant it would appear however that the meeting, to which the applicant complains that he was denied access, never took place because of a lack of a quorum. Therefore, even assuming the creditors' meeting, as an integral part of the bankruptcy proceedings, could be said to involve the applicant's civil rights and obligations within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission finds that no final determination of such rights was reached, since the meeting was adjourned for lack of quorum and no resolution was passed.   In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant's rights were not substantially affected and that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           It follows therefore that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).   2.       The applicant also alleges violations of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention in that the Inland Revenue failed to provide him with capital statements in respect of his assessments and in that he was unable to attend the creditors' meeting referred to above and to express his opinion in that meeting.           Article 10 para. 1 (Art. 10-1) of the Convention provides that:           "Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This         right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive         and impart information and ideas without interference by         public authority and regardless of frontiers..."           Insofar as the applicant complains of being unable to exercise his freedom of expression at the creditors' meeting due to lack of notification, the Commission finds that Article 10 (Art. 10) does not confer the right on every person to attend and take part in any meeting which he may wish to.   The Commission therefore considers that this complaint fails to disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.   It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (27-2) of the Convention.           The applicant also complains that the Inland Revenue have violated his right to receive information guaranteed under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention by refusing to supply him with capital statements prepared by his tax inspector which he alleged would have enabled him to challenge the tax assessments before the Inland Revenue Commissioners.           In this regard the Commission recalls that the Court has recently given consideration to the scope of Article 10 (Art. 10) with regard to the freedom to receive information.   In Leander (Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, para. 74), the Court said:           "... that the right to freedom to receive information         basically prohibits a Government from restricting a person         from receiving information that others wish or may be willing         to impart to him.   Article 10 (Art. 10) does not, in         circumstances such as those of the present case, confer         on the individual a right of access to a register containing         information on his personal position, nor does it embody an obligation         on the Government to impart such information to the individual."           In any event the Commission recalls that in the present case it appears that the capital statements to which the applicant refers, are only prepared in a small number of cases and that none appear to have been prepared in connection with the applicant's case.           In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the applicant has failed to substantiate this complaint and that accordingly there is no appearance of an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention in this regard.           It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       The applicant also complains of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention as a result of the enquiries of the Official Receiver's office into the contents of his mother's will.           Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention provides that:           "Everyone has the right to respect for his private and         family life, his home and his correspondence."           However, the applicant has not shown that he was under any obligation to answer the questions put to him concerning his mother's will or that he was under any compulsion to put the same questions himself to his mother.   It also does not appear that if the applicant had objected to these enquiries he would have been liable to any penalty for failing to respond to them.   In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the facts as submitted by the applicant fail to disclose any interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.             Secretary to the Commission          President of the Commission                      (H.C. KRÜGER)                       (C.A. NØRGAARD)