CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 mai 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application No. 11723/85 by Ernest CHATER against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 7 May 1987, the following members being present:                       MM. G. SPERDUTI, Acting President                         J.A. FROWEIN                         F. ERMACORA                         G. JÖRUNDSSON                         G. TENEKIDES                         B. KIERNAN                         A. WEITZEL                         H.G. SCHERMERS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                    Mrs   G.H. THUNE                    Sir   Basil HALL                    Mr.   F. MARTINEZ                      Mr.   K. ROGGE, Head of Division, acting as                    Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 4 May 1985 by Ernest CHATER against the United Kingdom and registered on 10 July 1985 under file No. 11723/85;           Having regard to:   -        reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of         the Commission;   -        the Commission's decision of 14 March 1986 to bring the         application to the notice of the respondent Government and         invite them to submit written observations on its         admissibility and merits;   -        the observations submitted by the respondent Government on         19 May 1986 and 2 March 1987;   -        the observations submitted by the applicant on 5 August and         13 November 1986;           Having deliberated;   THE FACTS           The facts apparently not in dispute between the parties may be summarised as follows.           The applicant is a British citizen, born in London in 1938. He is a haulage contractor by profession and lives in Hoddesdon in Hertfordshire.   He is represented before the Commission by Ms.   M. Carss-Frisk, barrister.           The application arises from a dispute between the applicant and planning authorities over the interpretation of the facts of this case for the purposes of planning legislation, as applied to the applicant's property in Hoddesdon.           In 1960 the applicant, with his wife, bought the house in which he now lives.   His property abuts a road in an established residential area and forms one of a number of properties dating from the turn of the century.   There are houses adjacent to and opposite the property.   To the rear are allotments.   The site comprises about 0.028 hectares on which the principal building is the applicant's two-bedroomed house.   Attached to the house is a building which could serve as a garage for two small vehicles, and along one boundary is a single storey outbuilding of some 44 square metres which has been used partly as an office and mostly as a workshop and store.   The open parts of the site are largely laid out as a hard standing.   There is a single vehicular access, approximately 5 metres wide, to the main road.           It seems that between 1910 and 1940 the outbuilding was used by a blacksmith, who also lived in the house.   In 1951 a dairy was transferred to the premises, planning permission having been granted in 1950 for conversion of an existing engineering workshop to a dairy. It became more of a milk distribution depot rather than a dairy.   On taking over the property, the applicant and his family lived in the house.   He gave up his previous job as a bus driver and from 1960 to 1972 was self-employed as a lorry driver with his own lorry, which he kept, repaired and serviced at the site.   From 1972 to 1977 he ran a haulage business with three tractor units and four trailers, which he kept and repaired on the site.   From 1960 until 1977 the applicant also claims to have repaired vehicles for others on the site at modest prices and often without invoices.    The haulage business declined and from 1977 the applicant undertook vehicle repairs on a full-time basis, although keeping a haulage vehicle on the site, obtaining a specialised haulage licence in 1979 and doing odd haulage jobs, as well as a weekly grocery delivery until 1980.           In 1971 the applicant applied for and was granted planning permission to build an extension to the house to provide a double garage with a bedroom over it.   Only the garage was built and it was subject to the condition that it be used for storing the applicant's private cars.   At that time the applicant's solicitors assured the planning authorities that no vehicle repairs were being conducted at the premises.   (The applicant claims that this statement was true then because he was in hospital).   However, it seems that the premises were used for repair work and, in particular, paint spraying.   It was this latter activity, together with the noise and late hours, seven days a week, aggravated by traffic congestion caused by customers' vehicles parked in the main road, which led some of the applicants' neighbours to complain to the local Council, the competent planning authority.           At no point did the applicant have planning permission for his business activities.           The current Development Plan for the area, including the applicant's property, designates the area as a Primary Residential Area and an Environmental Improvement Area.   The effect of these designations is that Council policy is to improve the local amenities and the overall quality of the environment, and in general not to grant planning consent for the introduction, extension or intensification of commercial activities within the curtilage of residential properties.           In March 1980 the applicant was invited to stop repairing and maintaining motor vehicles at the property, or to apply for a certificate of established use for light engineering and vehicle repair purposes.   The applicant applied for such a certificate under the terms of Section 94(1)(a) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 which provides, so far as relevant, as follows:             "94(1) ... a use of land is established if -           (a) it was begun before the beginning of 1964         without planning permission in that behalf and has         continued since the end of 1963 ..."             On 9 September 1980 the Council refused to grant the certificate as they were not satisfied that the vehicle repair use had begun before 1964 and had continued ever since.   On 14 October 1980 the Council served an enforcement notice on the applicant for him to cease the vehicle repair and maintenance use within six months because, in breach of planning controls, he had made a material change in the use of the property without planning permission.   The applicant appealed against both the enforcement notice and the refusal to grant an established use certificate.   He alleged, inter alia, that the service of the enforcement notice was ultra vires, there being other alternatives open to the Council, and that a distinction could not be made between the established haulage use, including the repair of his own haulage vehicles, and the repair of other people's vehicles.           A public inquiry was held on 14 April 1981.   In his report to the Secretary of State for the Environment, the Inspector appointed to conduct the inquiry concluded that a material change of use of the applicant's property had occurred in 1960 without planning permission when the applicant had begun his haulage business.   The applicant could not be said to have established a vehicle repair use in its own right before 1964, the car repair work being minimal compared with that generated by the haulage business, with its ancillary use of repairing the haulage vehicles.   A further material change of use occurred at the property in 1977 when the applicant ceased hauling and began vehicle repairs full-time.   This change was in breach of planning control.   Thus the Council's enforcement notice and the refusal to grant an established use certificate were deemed well-founded.           On the planning merits, the Inspector was of the opinion that a vehicle repair business must significantly detract from the amenities of the neighbouring properties and the general residential environment, and was not a use for which planning permission should be granted.   On 23 April 1982 the Secretary of State informed the applicant of his decision, upholding the Inspector's conclusions.           In 1984 the applicant was convicted of two breaches of the 1980 enforcement notice in that he was alleged to be still using the property for repairing and maintaining motor vehicles.   He was fined £125 and ordered to pay compensation.   He appealed on the grounds that the maintenance was part of the haulage business which he had resumed, and not commercial repair work.   The appeal was dismissed, although the applicant was given an absolute discharge.           On 22 March 1984 a second enforcement notice was issued requiring the applicant to cease use of the site as a haulage depot within six months.   The applicant appealed to the Secretary of State. He claimed that the use had been continuous since 1963.   The power to determine this appeal was transferred to an Inspector appointed to hold a public inquiry.   The inquiry was held on 25 October 1984.           The Inspector upheld the findings of the previous planning inquiry that there had been a material change of use of the property in 1960 when the haulage business was started without planning permission.   This use was unlawful.   In 1977 a further unlawful material change in use of the property occurred with the creation of a full-time vehicle repair business.   When enforcement action required the cessation of the latter use, the applicant could not revert to the haulage business which, being unlawful, required planning permission. The reversion to this use was, therefore, in breach of planning control.           The Inspector did not accept the applicant's contention that during the period 1977 to 1982 his premises were used for three separate purposes:   as a dwelling, a motor repair and maintenance business and a haulage depot.   He noted that between 1980 and 1982 the applicant had had a 10 cwt. van which was occasionally used for haulage and that the applicant had wished to resume haulage contracting.   However, he found no evidence that a significant proportion of the applicant's premises had actually been used as a haulage depot during that period and concluded that this previously established use had been abandoned between 1980 and 1982, if not also throughout the period 1977 to 1982.   Hence the applicant could not claim to have used the site as a haulage depot without interruption since 1960.   The Inspector found that the need to protect the residential amenities outweighed the personal and economic considerations relating to the applicant and his customers.   He therefore dismissed the applicant's appeal and refused planning permission for a haulage depot.   His decision was notified to the applicant by letter dated 25 January 1985.   COMPLAINTS             The applicant complains that he has been deprived of his livelihood by the interaction of the two enforcement notices, which prevent him using his premises as either a haulage depot or as a vehicle repair and maintenance business.   He states that he has been deprived of his yard and workshop because he is now obliged to use them for residential purposes for which they are utterly unsuitable. He also states that he has been deprived of his business which consisted of mixed user and which continued, albeit in varying proportions of user, from before 1964 until it was prohibited in 1985.           He invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, claiming that while a small industrial site in the middle of a residential area may not be ideal, he should have been entitled to some form of compensation.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION             The application was introduced on 4 May 1985 and registered on 10 July 1985.           After a preliminary examination of the case by the Rapporteur, the Commission considered the application on 14 March 1986 and decided to give notice of it to the respondent Government, pursuant to Rule 42, para. 2(b) of its Rules of Procedure.   The Government was also invited to submit its written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application and, in particular, on the issues which it raises concerning the control and deprivation of property in the general or public interest, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.           The Government's observations were submitted on 19 May 1986, to which the applicant replied summarily on 5 August 1986 in person, and fully on 13 November 1986 through his legal representatives, after two extensions of the time limit for the submission of these latter observations had been granted by the President of the Commission.   The applicant was granted legal aid by the Commission on 18 July 1986.           On 2 March 1987 the Government submitted further observations on the admissibility and merits of the application on their own initiative.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES             The Government   Part I: Facts           The Government's description of the facts has been largely incorporated in THE FACTS above.           As regards the Secretary of State's decision of 23 April 1982, the Government submits that, on its true construction, this decision was based not on the view that there had been a material change of use of the site by reason of an increase in the vehicle repair use leading to a loss of ancillary status, but rather that the vehicle repair use amounted to the introduction onto the site of a new primary use which, as a matter of fact and degree, constituted a material change of use.   Part II:   Domestic law and practice   Local planning authority ------------------------           The competent authority for the planning decisions in this case is the applicant's local Council (cf.   Section 1 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 ("the 1971 Act"), as amended by the Local Government Act 1972.)   Planning control ----------------           Planning permission has been necessary since 1948 for any development of land, and development includes any material change in the use of property (cf.   Sections 22 and 23 of Part III of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947, re-enacted in Part III of the Town and Country Planning Act 1962, and Section 23(1) of the 1971 Act).   Material change of use ----------------------           Whether a material change of use amounting to development has occurred is primarily a matter of fact and degree in each case.   The case-law has developed to permit the ancillary use of property.   An ancillary activity is one ordinarily regarded as incidental to a primary use.   It is not a separate use.   However such ancillary status may be lost where the activity is conducted on such a scale as to constitute a separate primary use in its own right.   In consequence, land may acquire a new primary use or a "composite" or "mixed" use, for which planning permission will be required.   Lawful and unlawful use of land --------------------------------           Since 1948, in general, a use is lawful if it has, and is conducted in accordance with, planning permission, either express or implied.   Without such permission the use is unlawful, but may be established (i.e. immune from enforcement action, see below, p. 8).   If after enforcement action a previous use of land is resumed, planning permission is not required if that previous use is itself lawful and immediately preceded the activity against which enforcement proceedings were taken.   Normal applications for planning permission -------------------------------------------           Applications for planning permission are made to local planning authorities who, having regard to their Development Plans and any other material considerations, may grant planning permission either conditionally or unconditionally, or refuse it.   Appeals against refusal lie to the Secretary of State for the Environment and then to the courts if the Secretary of State's decision is ultra vires or has not complied with the relevant requirements.   Enforcement of planning control:   Enforcement notices -----------------------------------------------------           The enforcement of planning control is the responsibility of local planning authorities.   They may issue enforcement notices, pursuant to Section 87 of the 1971 Act, in order to remedy breaches of planning control.   The considerable discretion of local planning authorities to issue enforcement notices in respect of allegedly unlawful development may be challenged in the courts where it can be shown to have been exercised arbitrarily or capriciously.   Enforcement action may not be taken against a breach of planning control consisting of a material change of use which occurred before the end of 1963.   Appeals against enforcement notices -----------------------------------           Appeals against enforcement notices lie to the Secretary of State for the Environment (Section 88 of the 1971 Act).   Such appeals are also deemed to be applications for planning permission for the development in question.   The Secretary of State has power to grant planning permission.   Appeals under Section 88 of the 1971 Act are governed by the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement Notices and Appeals) Regulations 1981.   The parties have several procedural rights including a right to be heard, by way of public inquiry, if wished (Section 282 of the 1971 Act and Section 250 of the Local Government Act 1972).   The procedure at a public local inquiry is governed by the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1981.   The Secretary of State appoints Inspectors to hear such inquiries.   In general it is the Inspector himself who determines the appeal (Schedule 9 of the 1971 Act and the Town and Country Planning (Determination of appeals by appointed persons) (Prescribed Classes) Regulations 1981).   Where the Secretary of State directs that he himself will decide an appeal, the Inspector reports to him, setting out his findings of fact, his conclusions and his recommendations. The Secretary of State and the Inspector must take into account local Development Plans and any other material considerations.   These may include the personal circumstances of the person in breach of planning control.           The burden of proof (based on the balance of probabilities) in enforcement notice appeals is on the appellant to establish that there has been no breach of planning control.   Non-compliance with enforcement notices ---------------------------------------           Failure to comply with an enforcement notice constitutes a criminal offence, subject to financial penalties.   Established use ---------------           A material change in the use of land, made without planning permission before the beginning of 1964 and which has continued since the end of 1963, is immune from enforcement action, although it remains unlawful.   It is termed an established use and a certificate may be obtained from the local planning authority to this effect (Section 94 of the 1971 Act;   see above p. 3).   The procedure governing applications for an established use certificate is prescribed by the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1977.           The Secretary of State has accepted that a use might subsist at the date of such an application, even if not active at that time, provided it had not been abandoned (Appeal Decision 5411/D/78/111). An established use may be abandoned if the use has ceased with no intention that it should be resumed.   Whether land has ceased to be used for a purpose, and whether an intention to abandon the use may be inferred, are questions of fact to be determined according to whether a reasonable man might conclude that the previous use had been abandoned in the particular circumstances of the case (Hartley v. Minister of Housing and Local Government (1970) 1 QB 43).   Where an established use has been abandoned, planning permission would be required for its lawful resumption.   But the legal concept of abandonment is inapplicable where one use has been followed by another without interruption;   a subsequent reversion to the former use may constitute a material change of use requiring planning permission (Young v.   Secretary of State for the Environment (1983) 2 AC 662). These rules apply, mutatis mutandis, where land has more than one established use.           In deciding whether to grant an established use certificate it would not be appropriate, in the Government's opinion, to take into account considerations of personal hardship, as these proceedings are solely concerned with the certification of facts.   Appeals against refusal of established use certificate ------------------------------------------------------           An appeal against refusal of an established use certificate lies to the Secretary of State (cf.   Section 95 of the 1971 Act, the Town and Country Planning General Development Order 1977 and the Town and Country Planning (Enforcement) (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1981).   Relevance of Development Plan and other planning considerations ---------------------------------------------------------------           Appeals against an enforcement notice or the refusal of an established use certificate are all deemed to constitute applications for planning permission.   In considering whether to grant planning permission, the Secretary of State must have regard to the provisions of the Development Plan and any other material considerations.   The Development Plan outside Greater London consists of a structure plan, i.e. a broad statement of strategic planning policy for the county, and local plans containing the implementation details of that policy for the whole or any part of a district.   It is for the Secretary of State, or his Inspector, to decide the weight to be given to the various relevant considerations in each case.   Further appeals to the courts -----------------------------           Appeals lie against the Secretary of State's decisions to the courts.   As regards enforcement notices, decisions may be challenged before the High Court by reason of illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety (cf.   The Council for the Civil Service Unions v.   Minister for the Civil Service (1985) AC 374, Sections 88, 243(1) and 246(1) of the 1971 Act and Order 53 of the Rules of the Supreme Court).           The validity of a decision of the Secretary of State concerning an established use certificate may be challenged under Section 245 of the 1971 Act on the grounds that the decision is not within the powers conferred by the Act or that there has not been compliance with relevant requirements.           An appeal on a point of law under Section 246 of the 1971 Act and an appeal on the grounds that a decision is not within the powers of that Act, raise substantially the same issues.   The High Court may interfere with a decision if the Secretary of State, or his Inspector, acted on no evidence; or if he came to the conclusion to which, on the evidence, he could not reasonably come; or if he has given a wrong interpretation to the words of the statute; or if he has ignored relevant matters or has taken into account matters which he should not have; or if the rules of natural justice have not been observed; or if a decision is unintelligible or inadequate.           In both cases there is a further right of appeal on a point of law from the High Court to the Court of Appeal, and, thereafter, with leave, to the House of Lords.   Compensation ------------           Part VII of the 1971 Act contains provisions for compensation when planning permission is refused or only granted conditionally. However Section 147 of that Act expressly excludes compensation for a refusal of planning permission for any development involving a material change in the use of land or buildings.   Part III:   Admissibility and Merits   Article 26 of the Convention ----------------------------           The Government submits that in respect of the 1980 enforcement proceedings and the Secretary of State's decision of 23 April 1982, the application is inadmissible for non-observance of the six months' rule, these being matters not giving rise to a continuous situation. Each enforcement notice and each appeal decision involved separate, self-contained matters, dependent on the facts as determined at the relevant time.           Moreover, in respect of those first proceedings and the enforcement proceedings in 1984/1985 the application is inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies, the applicant not having sought to challenge the validity of the decisions in question before the High Court or challenge the apparent lack of consideration given by the competent authorities to his contentions about personal hardship.   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ---------------------------           The Government submits that the applicant has not been deprived of his property.   The loss of the applicant's business with its goodwill was an incidental consequence of the enforcement of planning controls because of the applicant's own unlawful use of his property, and should not be regarded as a deprivation of possessions. The "deprivation rule" in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 concerns deprivation of ownership rather than restrictions on the use of property.           The Government contends that the applicant's property was the subject of controls in accordance with the general interest, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The Commission and Court's case-law recognises a wide margin of appreciation in the State's appreciation and implementation of planning policies in the general or public interest (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52 para. 69, and James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98 para. 46).           The United Kingdom's Town and Country Planning legislation provides a careful system of checks and balances between the individual's wishes and the community's needs, i.e., the rights of the individual and the general interest.   The present case demonstrates the care taken by the competent authorities in weighing up all the relevant factors.           The Government also submits that the enforcement action taken in the present case was justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The Contracting States are the sole judges of the necessity of promulgating legislation controlling the use of property, as well as of the necessity of particular implementation measures.   The Convention organs' function is limited to an examination of the lawfulness and legitimacy of the purpose of the interference in question, and does not encompass an examination of its proportionality.   Nevertheless, the enforcement measures were proportionate in the present case.           Since 1948 no one has had the right to use land precisely as he chooses.   The applicant could have verified the planning possibilities of his property before launching his business even prior to its purchase (Section 17(1) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1947 and Section 53(1) of the 1971 Act).   The applicant may use his property as a residence or a dairy.   The vehicle repair and haulage uses were at all times unlawful, being without planning permission, even if the haulage use was immune from enforcement action until 1977 when he changed to the vehicle repair use.   In this respect he cannot be said to have acquired property rights.   In failing to ensure planning permission for his activities, the applicant risked the consequences which flow from a breach of planning law.           It is no part of the purposes of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to protect the peaceful enjoyment of the illegal use of land.   The applicant seeks compensation for losses which are attributable to his own unlawful acts.   It would be wrong in principle for compensation to be paid when there has in effect been no interference with the rights protected by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Part IV:   Conclusions           The Government requests the Commission to declare the application inadmissible partly for failure to exhaust domestic remedies and partly for failure to observe the six months' rule. Alternatively, it should either be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded or the Commission should declare that there has been no breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.             The applicant     I.       Facts           The applicant submits that he did not abandon his haulage business in 1977, but continued it as far as work was forthcoming. However, because there was a decline in demand he was obliged to rely more heavily on the vehicle repair business for income.   Since the two enforcement procedures he has been unable to   use his property to earn his living.           In 1960 when the applicant took over the property there were no residential properties adjacent to it on either side.   The dwelling houses now abutting the applicant's property were built in the 1970's pursuant to the local Council's residential development policy.     II.      Domestic law and practice           The applicant generally agrees with the Govenment's description of the domestic law and practice, but emphasises the following points:           Section 94(1) of the 1971 Act does not distinguish between primary and ancillary uses.   An established use certificate cannot be issued for an ancillary use.           An established use may acquire immunity from enforcement action but nevertheless is not deemed to be lawful.   Therefore, it is unlawful to revert to such a use after enforcement action.           In respect of the decision to issue an enforcement notice or grant planning permission, the applicant contends that the planning legislation makes no provision for the personal circumstances of, or consequences for, the land owner to be taken into account as a material consideration.           Section 147 of the 1971 Act expressly excludes the payment of compensation for a refusal of planning permission in respect of a material change of use.           As regards enforcement notices, Section 246 of the 1971 Act expressly restricts appeals to the High Court to points of law. Judicial review is limited to allegations of unlawfulness, irrationality or procedural impropriety.           As regards established use certificates, Section 245 of the 1971 Act restricts High Court applications to allegations of ultra vires or non-compliance with relevant requirements.   It is not possible to challenge the authorities' findings of fact.     III.     Admissiblity and merits   Article 26 of the Convention ----------------------------           As regards exhaustion of domestic remedies the applicant contends that he could not have complained of the deprivation of his livelihood to the courts as the failure by the competent authorities to take this into account would not have been deemed to have been an error of law or irrational.   Moreover, such compensation is expressly excluded by Section 147 of the 1971 Act.           Thus domestic law in itself and as applied violated the applicant's rights.   The applicant contends that he has complied with this aspect of Article 26 of the Convention.           As regards the six months' rule, the applicant contends that his grievance falls within the notion of a "continuing violation" (De Becker v.   Belgium Dec. 9.6.58, Yearbook 2 p. 244).   The combination of the Secretary of State's decision of 23 April 1982 and the Inspector's decision of 25 January 1985 created a continuing situation in which he is unable to use his property other than for residential purposes.   Thus the six months' rule has no application in this case.   Alternatively, the relevant decisions, culminating with the Inspector's decision of 25 January 1985, all form part of a continuing process.   Prior to this latter decision the applicant considered that he was at least able to conduct a haulage business at his premises.   It was only after the Inspector's decision that the full implications of the domestic law became apparent to him.     Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 ---------------------------           The applicant submits that his right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions has been violated without compensation.   He complains of certain features of the domestic law and practice:-     (i)      an ancillary use cannot became an established use;   (ii)     reversion to an established use is not possible, as such uses         are unlawful;   (iii)    the personal consequences for the land owner are not         obligatorily taken into account by the competent authorities.             As in the Sporrong and Lönnroth case the possibilities concerning the exercise of his ownership rights have been reduced even if there has not been a total deprivation of property (Eur.   Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52 para. 60), and James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98 para. 37).           The general structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 requires a fair balance to be struck "between the demands of the general interests of the community and the requirements of the protection of individual rights", so that the individual does not have to bear an excessive   burden (aforementioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment paras. 146 and 173).   The applicant contends that by failing to take account of the personal consequences for the owner, by excluding compensation and by maintaining the three features emphasised above, United Kingdom planning law, as applied in his case, failed to strike that fair balance and obliged him to bear an excessive burden.           The applicant also claims that the measures taken against him were disproportionate, for conditions could have been attached to the business use of his property in order to improve neighbourhood amenities.     IV       Conclusions           The applicant requests the Commission to reject the Government's contentions under Articles 26 and 27 of the Convention, and to declare his application admissible.   THE LAW   1.       The applicant has complained of a deprivation of his property rights, without compensation, by virtue of the interaction of planning control decisions regarding his premises.   He has invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) which provides as follows:           "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful         enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of         his possessions except in the public interest and subject to         the conditions provided for by law and by the general         principles of international law.           The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way         impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems         necessary to control the use of property in accordance with         the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or         other contribrutions or penalties."   2.       The Government has contended that the application should be rejected partly for non-observance of the six months' rule and partly for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   Alternatively, it is contended that the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       As regards the question of the observance of the six months' rule, the Commission notes that there were two sets of enforcement proceedings against the applicant:-   a)       from March 1980 until April 1982, when the applicant was required to cease using his premises for vehicle repair and maintenance work;   b)       from March 1984 until January 1985, when the applicant was required to cease using his premises for a haulage business.           Although these proceedings could technically be said to be separate, the Commission considers it necessary to take account of the first enforcement measures as part of the relevant history of the applicant's property, and in order to evaluate the consequences of the second enforcement measures upon the applicant's property rights.   The interaction of these proceedings did have an impact on the applicant's business activities and, in the particular circumstances of the case, can be deemed to be part of a continuous action by the competent planning authorities to ensure the reversion of the applicant's property to a lawful use.   In the light of these considerations, the Commission does not find that the part of the application concerning the first enforcement proceedings should be rejected for non-observance of the six months' rule, pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   The final decision in the present application was that of the Inspector, in his letter of 25 January 1985, when the applicant's appeal against the second enforcement notice was refused and planning permission for a haulage depot refused.   The applicant lodged his application with the Commission within six months of that decision.   4.       As regards the Government's contention that the application should be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, the Commission's notes that one of the applicant's main complaints is of a deprivation of property without compensation.   The facts of the present case concern enforcement action and refusals of planning permission in relation to the material changes of use of the property in question made by the applicant.   Section 147 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1971 (the 1971 Act) expressly excludes the payment of compensation for a refusal of planning permission in respect of any development involving a material change in the use of land or buildings.   The secondary remedies' dispute between the parties (cf. pp. 7, 8, 12 and 13 above) concerning the extent to which an owner may plead his personal circumstances before the competent planning authorities, and the extent to which those authorities must take such pleadings into account as a material consideration, is a question which the Commission considers linked to the substantive issues raised in the case, and will be dealt with below (see p. 17 point e) below).           In these circumstances, the Commission finds that the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies pursuant to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   5.       Turning to the substantive issues raised by the present application, the Commission first finds that there has been an interference with the applicant's peaceful enjoyment of possessions, within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   In principle the owner of a house with adjacent premises has the right to use that property for whatever purpose he sees fit.   Limitations on that use require justification, either in the public interest, if they amount to a deprivation of possessions, or in the general interest, if they constitute the control of the use of property.   6.       The Commission next finds that the present case does not disclose any deprivation of the applicant's property, within the meaning of the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   The interference with property rights disclosed by this application falls solely within the ambit of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the contested decisions in the case being taken to enforce planning legislation deemed necessary, by the competent authorities, "to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest".           The Commission's task under the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) is to supervise the lawfulness, purpose and proportionality of the restrictions in question (see e.g.   No. 10378/83 Dec. 7.12.83, D.R. 35 p. 235).   The question of proportionality, which is an inherent aspect of the whole Convention, requires the Commission to determine whether, whilst recognising the wide margin of appreciation afforded to States in the planning field, a fair balance was struck between the general interest of the community and the protection of the individual's rights (cf. mutatis mutandis aforementioned Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment para. 69, and Comm. Report 8.10.83 in the same case para. 105).           With regard to the lawfulness of the enforcement proceedings and planning restrictions imposed on the applicant's property, the Commission notes that the applicant does not seriously dispute that they were lawful and complied with the relevant planning legislation and domestic case-law, in particular the Town and Country Planning Act 1971.   In this context note must be taken of the applicant's complaint that it is the state of domestic law itself, which provides no compensation for someone in his position, which violates his property rights.           As regards the purpose of planning controls, the Commission acknowledges that they are necessary and desirable in order to preserve and improve the amenities of residential areas.   The Development Plan, i.e. planning policy, of the applicant's local planning authority is thus, prima facie, in accordance with the general interest.           Concerning the proportionality of the measures taken against the applicant, which required him to cease using his premises for vehicle repairs or a haulage business, the Commission takes account of the following factual considerations:-   a)       The applicant at no time applied for planning permission to use his premises for vehicle repair or haulage work.   At all times these uses were unlawful (although for a certain period the haulage business was immune from enforcement action, i.e., it was an established use).   b)       The applicant apparently never inquired, either prior to the purchase of his property or afterwards, whether he would require planning permission for these uses or whether, if so, he would be likely to be granted it.   c)       Thus, although certain