CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 11 mai 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application No. 11373/85 by Cecilia and Lisa ERIKSSON against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 11 May 1987, the following members being present:                 MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   G. SPERDUTI                   M. A. TRIANTAFYLLIDES                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   G. TENEKIDES                   B. KIERNAN                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   H. VANDENBERGHE               Mrs G. H. THUNE               Sir Basil HALL               Mr.   F. MARTINEZ                 Mr J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 7 December 1984 by Cecilia and Lisa Eriksson against Sweden and registered on 31 January 1985 under file No. 11373/85;           Having regard to:           - the Government's written observations dated 5 September 1985           - the applicants' written observations in reply dated           25 October 1985           - the Government's supplementary written observations dated           12 February 1986           - the applicants' supplementary written observations dated           21 March 1986           - the submissions of the parties at the hearing on 11 May 1987;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:     THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties' submissions, may be summarised as follows:           The first applicant, Mrs.   Cecilia Eriksson, is a Swedish citizen, born in 1942 and residing at Ulricehamn.   She is a municipal child-minder (kommunal dagbarnvårdare).   The second applicant, Lisa Eriksson, is the first applicant's child and a Swedish citizen. Lisa was born on 24 February 1978 and has, since March 1978, been living in a foster home at Oskarström.   The applicants are represented before the Commission by Mrs.   Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.           On 23 March 1978 the Southern Social District Council (södra sociala distriktsnämnden) of Lidingö decided that Lisa should be taken into care pursuant to Sections 25 (a) and 29 of the 1960 Act on Child Welfare (barnavårdslagen).   She was placed in the foster home at Oskarström.           In May 1980 the first applicant applied to the Social District Council that the care of her daughter be terminated.           On 8 May 1981 the Council rejected the application.   The first applicant appealed to the Regional Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Stockholm, which on 22 October 1981 rejected the appeal.   The first applicant submitted a further appeal to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm, which on 11 March 1982 rejected the further appeal.           In March 1982 the first applicant again applied to the Social District Council requesting that the care be terminated.   She also applied for permission to see Lisa in the first applicant's home.   Both requests were rejected by the Council.   The first applicant appealed to the Regional Administrative Court.           On 3 November 1982 the Court decided, as regards the question of care, to reject the appeal since preparatory contacts between Lisa and her natural parents had not taken place to a sufficent extent.   As regards the question of contact with Lisa, the Court referred the case back to the Social District Council for reconsideration.           The first applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal.   In the meantime on 21 January 1983 the Social District Council decided that the care of Lisa should be terminated and that Lisa and her natural parents could have contact in a certain way.   In these circumstances the Administrative Court of Appeal found no reason to examine the further appeal.           The decision by the Social District Council of 21 January 1983 on the question of care was taken on the basis of a report on a social investigation dated 17 January 1983 stating that the reasons for continued care under the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga) no longer existed.   Consequently, the Council decided to terminate the care of Lisa.           In the same decision the Council decided pursuant to Section 28* of the Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen) to order a prohibition on removal (flyttningsförbud) until further notice.   This order implied that the first applicant and her husband were not allowed to move Lisa from the foster home.   This decision was based on inter alia five certificates by the chief doctor E. and a curator of the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Halmstad.   In these certificates it was stated, inter alia, that Lisa was deeply rooted in the foster home and that her transfer to her natural parents' home would jeopardise her mental health and development.   The Social District Council also decided to request from the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Halmstad recommendations as to how the contacts between Lisa and her natural parents ought to be arranged.           The first applicant appealed against this part of the decision to the Regional Administrative Court of Stockholm claiming in the first place that the prohibition on removal be reversed and in the second place that the prohibition be limited in time.   The Court held a hearing in the case.   It heard chief doctor E. and Lisa's natural father.   The Court also heard an expert from the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen).           On 10 October 1983 the Regional Administrative Court granted the appeal insofar as it set a time limit until 31 March 1984 for the prohibition on removal.           The Social District Council appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal of Stockholm requesting that the prohibition be unlimited in time.   The first applicant maintained in the first place that the prohibition be reversed and in the second place that the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court be confirmed.           The Administrative Court of Appeal held a hearing in the case. It heard chief doctor E. and Lisa's foster mother.   The National Social Welfare Board (socialstyrelsen) submitted, on 13 February 1984, an opinion to the Court.   This opinion read inter alia as follows:     _____________   *        Section 28 first paragraph reads:           "The Social District Council may for a certain period of time or until further notice prohibit the custodian of a minor to take the minor from a (foster home), if there is a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or mental health if separated from that home."     "As regards the assessment from a child psychiatric point of view it is noted that the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Halmstad has clearly expressed the opinion that a removal of Lisa from the foster home ought not to take place. This view is, in the opinion of the National Welfare Board, well-founded as based on knowledge of the development and need of children applied to the special situation of Lisa.   It is the opinion of the National Social Welfare Board that a change of foster parent is always a serious interference for a child and should not take place unless there are strong reasons for it, for instance that the child is badly cared for where it is staying.   Through child psychological research and clinical experience it is known that separations can imply a risk of serious mental damage to the child.   In this case the now six year old Lisa has, since a very young age, been staying in the present foster home, where she has developed well together with the adults to which she is attached. She is in an important phase of development and has not yet attained the age and maturity where she can decide for herself. She ought not to be placed in such a situation of choice.   There are no established contacts with the natural parents despite efforts which have been made.   From the documents it appears that the father has not participated in the meetings with the foster parents which were arranged during 1983.   He has not seen Lisa since 1982.   In this case new facts have been added which change the picture of the parents' home.   From (the documents received from the court) it only appears that the rehabilitation of the parents has developed well.   From a telephone contact with the social director of Ulricehamn on 17 January 1984 it appeared that the father had lost his temporary job and had started to drink alcohol again.   He has been convicted of drunken driving and lost his driving licence.   The mother's post as a child-minder for a child is a temporary post while the ordinary employee is on maternity leave.   There is however no criticism levelled against the mother in her work.           ...           ...   Against the background of the facts of this case, it is the assessment of the National Social Welfare Board that Lisa, if she is moved from the foster family, will be subjected to a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of harm to her psychological health and development.   It is therefore important that she can stay in the foster home ..."           By judgment of 6 March 1984 the Court amended the judgment of the Regional Administrative Court to the effect that the time limit for the prohibition was set at 30 June 1984.           Both the first applicant and the Social District Council appealed to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten). The first applicant later withdrew her appeal.           In its judgment of 11 October 1984 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the appeal of the Council by confirming the Council's decision of 21 January 1983.           The Court gave the following reasons for its judgment:           "Under Section 28 of the Social Services Act, the Social District Council may, where the interests of the child so require, prohibit the custodian from removing a child from a foster home provided there is a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or mental health if it is moved from the home.   When a child is placed in a foster home, the aim should normally be to bring the child and its parents together again.   A prohibition under Section 28 of the Social Services Act ought to be regarded as a temporary measure while awaiting an appropriate time for moving the child from the foster home without the risk of such detrimental effects as indicated in the said section.   The following circumstances should inter alia be taken into consideration when deciding on a prohibition on removal: the child's age; stage of development; character and emotional relations; the time the child has been taken care of by someone else than its natural parents; the present living conditions of the child and those it will have as well as the contact between the parents and the child during the time they have been separated.   Since (the first applicant) has withdrawn her appeal against the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal, the Supreme Administrative Court must examine whether the prohibition on removal shall be in force until further notice, as claimed by the Social District Council, or limited in time, in accordance with the position adopted by the first applicant.   The examination of the question of the duration of a prohibition on removal must be made in the light of the existing risk to the child's physical or mental health if separated from its home. If, already at the time of the issue of the prohibition, it is considered, with sufficient certainty, that such a risk will not be at hand after a certain date - when certain actions may have been taken or the effects thereof have occurred - the prohibition ought to be limited until that date.   However, if it is uncertain when the child could be transferred to the parents, without this involving a risk which is not of a minor nature, the prohibition ought to be in force until further notice and the question of a transfer raised again at a later stage when the risk of harming the child's health could be better assessed.   Irrespective of the duration of the prohibition, the Social District Council is obliged to see to it that appropriate actions aiming at a reunification are taken without delay.   Such actions are required in particular when the Council, in accordance with what has been said, has found reasons to order a prohibition until further notice. Otherwise there is a great risk that, in the meantime, the child will become more closely linked to the family it is about to leave.   The efforts to establish a contact between Lisa and her natural parents, which began already some three years ago, have as far as can be seen from the documents not progressed any further than to the point that Lisa occasionally has seen them together with her present family and generally - as a result of the orders given by the Social District Council - also in the presence of an adult outsider.   The meetings have been coloured by the antagonism between the adults of the two families, and Lisa, who appears only at a late stage to have realised who her natural parents were, has reacted before and after these meetings with anxiety and with a psychological state of strain.   What has appeared concerning the intensity of Lisa's reactions clearly shows that a longer period of time than decided by the lower courts is required before a transfer could be made.   Since appropriate measures aiming at the reunification have not yet been taken there is, at the moment, no basis for setting a date on which the transfer could be made without jeopardising Lisa's mental health.   The prohibition on removal shall therefore be in force until further notice."           On 28 November 1984 the first applicant requested the Social District Council of Lidingö that her child be returned to her custody. This request was dismissed by the Council on 18 January 1985.   The Council found that the risk for the child's mental health resulting from a removal from the foster home would be the same as when the Supreme Administrative Court rendered its judgment of 11 October 1984.           The first applicant appealed to the Regional Administrative Court.   She requested that the prohibition on removal be quashed and that the child be returned in accordance with the rules laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken).   On 8 October 1985 the first applicant withdrew her appeal and, as a result, the Court struck the case off its list on 23 October 1985.           Prior to the withdrawal of the appeal, on 6 August 1985, the first applicant lodged with the Social District Council of Lidingö a request for access to the child every second weekend.   The request was dealt with by the Council on 16 August 1985.   The Council found that there was no legal basis for making a formal determination as regards the merits of the request.   The Council therefore decided not to take any formal decision as to the first applicant's request for access to the child.           The first applicant subsequently brought a request to the Legal Aid Board (rättshjälpsnämnden) of Gothenburg for legal aid for the purpose of bringing the present application to the European Commission of Human Rights.   The Board rejected the request on 8 November 1984.           The first applicant appealed to the Legal Aid Appeals Board (besvärsnämnden för rättshjälpen), which rejected the appeal on 4 March 1985.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants complain that they have been victims of a breach of Article 8 of the Convention as a result of the decision by the Supreme Administrative Court to order a prohibition on removal for an indefinite period of time, despite the fact that the care has terminated, and as a result of the refusal of the Social District Council to decide on the right of contact between the first and the second applicant.           Furthermore, they allege that the mere existence of a provision enabling the Swedish authorities to issue a prohibition on removal for an indefinite period of time constitutes a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.   2.       The first applicant also complains that in the proceedings concerning the prohibition on removal she has not been afforded a fair hearing and that accordingly Article 6 of the Convention has been violated.   She submits that the foster parents and the social authorities can control Lisa and influence her attitudes.   The observations allegedly made by the foster parents and the social authorities as regards Lisa's attitudes, for instance with respect to her willingness to move home, seem to be accepted by the courts.   As a result of this control, Lisa is prejudiced by the authorities and the foster parents.   Furthermore, by being prevented from seeing Lisa alone the first applicant is prevented from ascertaining Lisa's attitude towards her home and the first applicant is therefore prevented from submitting such information to the courts.   The first applicant also complains about the length of these court proceedings, lasting for a total of seven years.   She considers this to be unreasonable.   3.       The applicants also complain about the decision of the Social District Council of 16 August 1985 not to decide on the contacts between the applicants.   They allege that they do not have any effective remedy in this respect and that there has been a breach of Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention.   4.       The first applicant also complains that, in relation to her appeal to the Regional Administrative Court against the Social District Council's decision of 18 January 1985 not to grant the request to have the second applicant returned to her, she was subjected to a "blackmailing procedure" which forced her to withdraw her appeal.   She submits that she has been denied access to court for the determination of her civil rights as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.   5.       Furthermore, the first applicant contends that Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 has been violated since she has been denied the right to ensure for her child an education in conformity with her own religious and philosophical convictions.   6.       Finally, the first applicant complains that her right to petition the Commission has been interfered with by the refusal of the Legal Aid Appeals Board to grant her legal aid for this purpose.   She alleges a breach of Article 25 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 7 December 1984 and registered on 31 January 1985.           On 16 May 1985 the Commission decided to invite the Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           The Government's observations were received by letter dated 5 September 1985 and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 25 October 1985.           On 11 December 1985 the Commission decided to invite the Government to submit supplementary written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           The Government's observations were dated 12 February 1986 and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 21 March 1986.           On 16 May 1986 the Commission granted legal aid to the applicants.           On 5 March 1987 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.           At the hearing, which was held on 11 May 1987, the parties were represented as follows:           The Government           Mr.   Hans CORELL          Ambassador, Under-Secretary for Legal                                 and Consular Affairs, Ministry for                                 Foreign Affairs, Agent           Mr.   Leif LINDGREN        Legal Adviser, Ministry of Health                                 and Social Affairs, Adviser           Mr.   Carl-Henrik          Legal Adviser, Ministry for Foreign             EHRENKRONA           Affairs, Adviser           The applicants           Mrs.   Siv WESTERBERG      Lawyer           The first applicant was also present.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.       The Government   1.       The relevant Swedish law           The Government submit that the aim of the Social Services Act is to protect children and young persons up to the age of 18 years.   Various rules have been laid down in the Act to achieve this aim.   One of them is the rule concerning the prohibition on removal in Section 28 of the Act.           This provision is not valid for children who are being cared for in foster homes under Section 1 of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons.   As long as such care continues, the right of the custodian to decide the domicile of the child is suspended.   The right, however, is in principle returned to the custodian if the care of the child in a foster home is terminated. But if the social authorities find that there is a risk to the health of the child, it is possible to suspend the right of the custodian by applying the rule on the prohibition on removal in Section 28 of the Social Services Act.           In the travaux préparatoires of the Act it is mentioned that only a passing disturbance or other occasional disadvantage to the child is not a sufficient ground for issuing a prohibition on removal.           In the Government Bill presenting the Act it is further stated that among the factors which shall be considered are the age of the child, the degree of development, character and emotional ties.   The time the child has been cared for away from the parents must also be taken into account as well as the living conditions the child has and might be subjected to.   The parents' contacts with the child during the separation period must also be taken into account.   One important factor which must be considered in connection with a possible decision on the prohibition on removal is the child's own preference.   If the child has reached the age of 15 years, its preference must not be opposed without good reasons.   But even the preferences of younger children must be considered.   The child's preferences can be of importance in considering the risk of damage to the child as a result of a removal.   In this connection it should be noted that a prohibition on removal can be issued until the child is 18 years old.           Commenting on the above rules, the Standing Social Committee of the Parliament said in its report, inter alia, that a prohibition might be issued if removal might imply a risk that the child's physical or mental health could be damaged.   The provision is applicable in cases where separation or removal is detrimental to the child.   This could be the case even if no serious objections exist in regard to the custodian.   The Committee also stressed that the provision was aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child.           The interest of the custodian in deciding the domicile of the child must give way when it conflicts with what is in the best interests of the child.   The Committee also referred to the risk of damage to the child which a separation generally involves.   Repeated removals and removals which take place after a long time when the child has managed to develop strong links with the home where it lives should thus not be accepted without good reasons.   The child's need for secure relations and living conditions must be decisive in any decision in these questions.           The main rule in Section 28, first paragraph of the Social Services Act is supplemented with a second paragraph which gives the Social District Council the right to issue a temporary prohibition on removal until the question is finally decided.   A temporary prohibition may not be in force for more than four weeks.           A Social District Council cannot enforce a decision on the prohibition on removal against the judgment of a general court or an administrative court.   A council decision is not enforceable if a court decides otherwise.           According to Section 30 of the Social Services Act, it is the Social District Council of the custodian's district which shall supervise the child's situation in the foster home and also decide concerning the prohibition on removal.           Section 73 of the Social Services Act prescribes that appeals against decisions taken by a Social District Council under Section 28 of the Act can be made to the Regional Administrative Court.   Appeals against the judgments of this court can be made to the Administrative Court of Appeal and further to the Supreme Administrative Court.           Rules concerning the enforcement of judgments and decisions concerning the custody of children are laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken).   According to Section 1 of this chapter the Regional Administrative Court decides on questions concerning the enforcement of judgments or decisions taken by the general courts on questions concerning custody or the right to visit children.    According to Section 6 the Regional Administrative Court may also take similar decisions on the request of the custodian even in cases where there is no judgment or decision taken by a general court.   2.       The Facts           The Government observe that the Social District Council stated in its decision of 21 January 1983 - in addition to the fact that the care of the child should be terminated but that a prohibition on removal should remain in force - that the long-term goal was that the child should eventually be moved back home to her parents.   This decision on the prohibition on removal was based on five medical certificates (8 April 1981, 24 June, 4 October, 6 December and 16 December 1982).   They were issued by the child psychologist of the case and the curator of the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic in Halmstad.   The certificates deal with the reactions of the child during attempts in 1982 to accustom the child to her natural parents.   The Government refer to the contents of these certificates.           The Government also refer to two further certificates by the same persons, dated 24 February and 7 September 1983 respectively, the last of which states inter alia the following:     "For our part it is self-evident that Lisa must stay in the foster home.   The research during the last decades in the area of child psychology and psychiatry has been comprehensive.   It has shown that the child-parent relationship is of an enormous importance to the child and what it canmean to break it up.   A breaking up of this relationship always implies a psychological trauma for the child.   One of our tasks at the children's psychiatric clinic is to take a stand as to whether a child should be placed in a foster home or not.   In these cases the decisive question is what has the least detrimental effects for the child, to remain in an unsatisfactory environment or to come to a new home.   In the case of Lisa it is another matter.   She lives in a good home environment which well satisfies her needs. It is accordingly in this case not a question of moving Lisa for her own best.   Our assessment is still that a removal of Lisa would imply a risk for her mental health which is not of a minor nature."           In addition the Government refer to the contents of a letter of 21 March 1983 from the County Administrative Board of Stockholm to the Regional Administrative Court, and a letter of 13 February 1984 from the National Social Welfare Board to the Administrative Court of Appeal.           The situation today is that Lisa is nine years old.   She is still living with her foster parents.   She sees her mother regularly once a month and she has been left alone with her during the visits. It has so far not been possible to make an arrangement which would permit Lisa to stay overnight with her mother.   All efforts made in order to create a relationship between Lisa and her mother trustful enough to make such an arrangement possible have been unsuccessful.           The conflict between Lisa's mother and the foster parents is still very serious.   The Social District Council of Lidingö has, with assistance from a team of psychologists, tried to see to it that a better relation between Lisa's mother and her foster parents is created.   Lisa is aware that the first applicant is her mother and she is now torn between her loyalty to her foster parents and to her mother.   The efforts which have been made by the social authorities to solve the situation have aimed at finding the best possible solution for Lisa.           On 27 January 1987 the first applicant made a new appeal to the Social District Council claiming that the prohibition on removal should be quashed.   She urged that the Council should deal with her application as quickly as possible.           According to the social authorities, the first applicant earlier accepted that it was best for Lisa to remain with her foster parents but to see her mother on a more regular basis.   This was clearly declared by her at a meeting with the foster parents on 12 September 1985.   Since Lisa had shown anxiety when meeting her mother, the first applicant was aware that it was necessary to move slowly so that Lisa got to know her mother better.   The aim should be to create such a relation between Lisa and her mother that Lisa could stay overnight with her mother over a weekend and perhaps spend a few days with her during a holiday.   It has been important to the first applicant that Lisa got over her sense of fear of her mother.           In January 1987 the conflict between the first applicant and the foster parents culminated when they visited a photographer together with Lisa.   Lisa became very upset.   After this event Cecilia Eriksson made her new appeal to the Council now under consideration. On 3 March 1987 the Social District Council decided to have examined what the consequences would be if the order of prohibition on removal was quashed and Lisa was to move to her mother.           For that purpose the Council asked the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic in Halmstad that a psychologist deliver an opinion regarding the consequences that could be expected as to Lisa's mental and physical health if Lisa were moved to her mother from her foster parents.   The psychologist has contact with Lisa on a regular basis.   The Clinic has not yet delivered its opinion but according to information available to the Government this opinion will be delivered in May 1987.           According to information submitted by the social authorities, Lisa has visited her mother on 15 March 1987, and on one occasion in April.   After both these visits Lisa has, according to the same authorities, explained that she does not want to visit her mother and that she has felt forced to visit her.           Lisa's father has recently moved out and the first applicant is now living alone with her second child, her son Jonas.   3.       The Admissibility           The Government have no objections to make as far as the six months' rule in Article 26 of the Convention is concerned.           In the Government's view the Commission's examination of a case should be limited to the facts to which the original complaint relates.   The development of the matter after the Commission has started its examination of the case falls outside the scope of the examination.   Another interpretation of the principles for the scope of the examination might lead to an interference, for example, with a case pending before a domestic court.           The question of how and when Lisa should be returned to her mother is still not solved.   It is therefore important to set a limit for new complaints when the case is pending before the Commission.   It seems natural not to allow complaints regarding new circumstances after the Government have submitted their observations as to the admissibility of the case.           The Government further maintain that the complaint under Article 6 must be rejected ratione materiae as falling outside the scope of the Convention (cf. below).   In any event and for the reasons given in the following, the Government maintain that the application should be declared inadmissible for being manifestly ill-founded.   4.       The Merits           4.1      Article 6 of the Convention           4.1.1    The proceedings concerning the prohibition on                 removal           Article 6 concerns the determination of an individual's civil rights and obligations or a criminal charge against him.   The Government fail to see that any of these two prerequisites are fulfilled in this case.   Since there is no question of a criminal charge, Article 6 can only be applicable if the subject matter concerns the applicants' "civil rights and obligations".           However, the decisions by the Social District Council and the three courts that are contested in the present case do not concern civil rights and obligations.   In fact, the Convention does not contain any provisions on how the High Contracting Parties should deal procedurally with matters concerning care of minors, except those laid down in Article 5.   But those provisions are not applicable in the present case.           It follows that the only provision which could be invoked in this context is Article 13, according to which everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority.   The proceedings before the courts show that the applicants have had such a remedy.           With reference to the above the Government maintain that the complaint under Article 6 falls outside the scope of the Convention and should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention.           In case the Commission does not share this opinion, the Government submit the following.           As far as the question regarding the prohibition on removal is concerned there have been three court hearings in the present case: by the Regional Administrative Court (judgment of 10 October 1983), the Administrative Court of Appeal (judgment of 6 March 1984) and the Supreme Administrative Court (no oral hearing; judgment of 11 October 1984).   It does not seem to be contested that these court hearings were public or that the courts were established by law.           The applicants' counsel seems however to suggest that, as the child was still in the foster home, the foster parents and the social authorities had easier access to or more influence over the child and therefore a procedural advantage over the applicant.   The courts have neglected this inequality of the parties or perhaps found the foster parents and the authorities more trustworthy than the applicant.   The hearings - if the Government have correctly understood the reasoning of the applicants' counsel - could not therefore be said to have been "fair" and the courts perhaps not "impartial".           The reasoning of the applicants' counsel could perhaps be understandable if the courts had based their decisions on an opinion that the child might have expressed concerning its preference for a future home.   However, an opinion of the child is not even mentioned by the courts in their decisions.   There is, in the Government's opinion, nothing to substantiate the allegation of the applicants that a procedural disadvantage has affected the possibilities for them to obtain a fair hearing.           For this reason the Government maintain that the applicants' allegation of a violation of Article 6 of the Convention should in the alternative be declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded.           4.1.2    The request concerning access to the child           The Government submit that a consequence of a decision to prohibit a custodian from removing a minor from a foster home is that the custodian's right of access to the child is to some extent affected.   As a matter of law, the Social District Council could change this situation only by a decision that the prohibition on removal be discontinued.           As to the question whether the first applicant's "civil rights" were concerned the Government refer to their submissions above.   The view that care of minors does not concern "civil rights and obligations" is relevant also in this context.   In view of the circumstances this argument applies a fortiori in relation to the access to the child.           The Government add the following in case the Commission should not agree with this opinion.           The position taken by the Social District Council on 16 August 1985 can hardly be considered a "determination" within the meaning of Article 6.   Subsequent to the decision on prohibition on removal, the main concern of the Social District Council was to provide for facilities by which the obstacles preventing the reunification of the first applicant and the child could be removed.   The means by which this should be endeavoured are not regulated by law.           As a practical matter, the Council in this situation naturally had to consider a number of different ways of approaching the problem, some of which led to some form of practical action, some of which did not.   This process might well have required the Council to take decisions on particular issues.   In the Government's opinion it would, however, not be feasible to view each position taken by the Council in the course of these considerations as a "determination" within the meaning of Article 6, and this is particularly so in respect of tentative considerations concerning possible measures to be taken that ultimately did not lead to any form of practical action.           As regards the present issue, there is certainly no reason to believe that the Council did not all but continuously consider when, and under what forms, to bring together the first applicant and the child.   The fact that the Council at its meeting of 16 August 1985 did not feel that the time was ripe to go so far in this respect as suggested by the first applicant and, accordingly, did not take a decision to this effect, cannot, in the Government's view, constitute a "determination" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.           Moreover, there exists no provision on which the Social District Council could base a negative or a positive decision regarding an application lodged by a parent for access to a child when an order of prohibition on removal has been issued.   It could therefore be argued that the Social District Council has only informed the first applicant of the contents of the law in this regard, i.e. that the Social District Council was not competent from a legal point of view to make any kind of decision regarding access to the child in the way she wished.           Viewed this way, and given the first applicant's status in respect of this question as outlined above, it is of no relevance that she, prior to the Council's meeting, had expressed her opinion as to how the matter should be handled.   As has previously been indicated, her only way of procuring a decision by the Council, that in the Government's view would have amounted to a "determination" within the meaning of Article 6, would have been to request the prohibition of removal to be terminated.           In view of the said, the Government submit that the position taken by the Social District Council on 16 August 1985 did not constitute a "determination" of the first applicant's "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           The Government submit that there is,   in principle, no difference between the considerations required as regards the question of bringing together the first applicant and the child, and those necessary in respect of the great number of other questions appearing in the course of the process aiming at the ultimate goal of permanently reuniting them.   If, therefore, the Council's manifestation of its position as regards the first question were to be viewed as a "determination" within the meaning of Article 6, it would be inconsistent not to take the same view in respect of many other questions.   Obviously, this would lead to unmanageable consequences.           In case the Commission should come to the conclusion that the position taken by the Social District Council on 16 August 1985 constituted a "determination" of the first applicant's "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6, the Government admit that the first applicant did not have the benefit of the guarantees provided for in the said Article.           The decision of 16 August 1985 could not have been reviewed by a court.   The way in which the applicant could have had the matter examined by a court was to apply for a termination of the prohibition on removal.           In the proceedings concerning termination of a prohibition on removal, the Council and the courts shall decide whether such a prohibition is necessary and, if the answer to this is affirmative, whether a time limit should be set for the prohibition.   This means that the contacts between a child and its parents cannot be determined explicitly in those proceedings in the same way as in proceedings between two parents concerning custody, or in proceedings pursuant to Section 16 of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons.   However, the practical measures taken by the Social District Council in this regard are one factor that must be taken into account when an order of prohibition on removal is issued with or without a time limit.           When a time limit is set it is intended that the child shall be returned to its parents when the time lim