CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 16 juillet 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  European Commission of Human Rights   Application No. 11508/85   B   against     DENMARK   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 16 July 1987)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                   Page   I.       INTRODUCTION         (paras. 1 - 15 ) ...................................      1       A.   The application         (paras. 2 - 4   ) ...................................      1       B.   The proceedings         (paras. 5 - 10 ) ...................................      1       C.   The present Report         (paras. 11 - 15) ...................................      2     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS         (paras. 16 - 26) ...................................      3       A.   The particular facts of the case         (paras. 16 - 23) ...................................      3       B.   Relevant domestic law         (paras. 24 - 26) ...................................      6           a) The Danish Constitution            (paras. 24 - 25) ................................      6           b) The Greenlandic Penal Code            (para. 26) ......................................      6   III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES         (paras. 27 - 56) ...................................      8       A.   The applicant         (paras. 28 - 38) ...................................      8       B.   The Government         (paras. 39 - 56) ...................................      9     IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION         (paras. 57 - 75) ...................................     13       A.   Point at issue         (para. 57) .........................................     13       B.   Article 10 of the Convention         (paras. 58 - 75) ...................................     13   - ii -                                                                     Page   Concurring opinion of Mr.   Trechsel .........................      17   Dissenting opinion of Mr.   Ermacora .........................      18     APPENDIX I           History of the proceedings before                     the Commission .........................      19   APPENDIX II          Decision on the admissibility of                     the application ........................      20       I.     INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.       The application   2.       The applicant is a Danish citizen, born in 1919.   He is a precious stone cutter by profession and resides at Narssaq, Greenland. Before the Commission he is represented by Mr.   Jan Krøyer, Nuuk, Greenland.   3.       The Government of Denmark are represented by their Agent, Mr.   Tyge Lehmann, Ministry of Foreign affairs.   4.       The case is related to the introduction by the local government of Greenland of taxation of Danish nationals working on American bases in Greenland.   When the applicant learned about a court judgment upholding this measure he published an article in which he criticised the court.   Due to the publication of this article, criminal proceedings were instituted against the applicant for defamation of character and he was subsequently found guilty of the charge brought against him and sentenced to pay a fine.   The applicant considers that this amounts to an interference with his right to freedom of expression which is not justified for any of the reasons set out in Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention.   B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced on 22 March 1985 and registered on 29 April 1985.   The Commission considered the case on 9 October 1985 and decided to give notice of the application to the respondent Government in accordance with Rule 42, para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure and to invite them to present before 20 December 1985 their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   6.       The Government's observations were dated 20 December 1985 and the applicant's observations in reply were dated 4 April 1986.   7.       Legal aid under the Addendum to the Commission's Rules of Procedure was granted to the applicant on 14 March 1986.   8.       The Commission declared the applicant's above complaint admissible on 17 July 1986.   9.       The parties were then invited to submit any additional observations on the merits of the case which they wished to make.   The Government submitted additional observations on 10 February 1987, a copy of which was transmitted to the applicant.   No further observations were received from the applicant.   10.      After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   Consultations with the parties took place between 22 July 1986 and 15 January 1987.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which such a settlement can be effected.   C.       The present Report   11.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:                 MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   C. A. NØRGAARD                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL               M.   F. MARTINEZ   12.      The text of this Report was adopted on 16 July 1987 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   13.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is   (i)      to establish the facts, and   (ii)     to state an opinion as to whether the facts found         disclose a breach by the State concerned of its         obligations under the Convention.   14.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   15.      The full text of the pleadings of the parties, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.       The particular facts of the case   16.      This case originates from the introduction of taxation by the Greenlandic local government of Danish nationals working on American bases in Greenland.   Since these persons had no right to vote in Greenland at that time they took the local government's decisions on taxation to court.   On 28 January 1981 the case was heard in the High Court of Greenland (Grønlands Landsret) sitting with one professional judge and two lay judges who were both employed as civil servants in the local government.   The government won the case and the judgment was subsequently upheld by the High Court for Eastern Denmark (Østre Landsret) on 8 September 1983.   17.      When the applicant learned about the judgment of the High Court of Greenland he wrote an article concerning the matter which was published in a magazine called "Grønland Dansk" in August 1982.   In the article the applicant pointed out inter alia that, in his opinion, the High Court of Greenland was disqualified according to Section 62 of the Danish Constitution since the two lay judges were both employed by the local government.   The applicant questioned the lay judges' power and possibilities of deciding impartially in a case against their employer.   The article included the following passage:     "Til gengæld kunne de fleste af landstingets medlemmer afse tid til at holde øje med, at de to grønlandske lægdommere - der i parentes bemærket begge er ansat direkte under hjemmestyret, som henholdsvis museumsinspektør og konsulent i bygdeanliggender - nu også gjorde deres pligt, og det gjorde de da.   Dommerstemmerne stod to imod een i hjemmestyrefavør, og med det dommerpanel skal der ikke megen fantasi til at gætte, hvem der har stemt hvad."     Translation     "Most of the local government's members could on the other hand afford the time to watch that the two Greenlandic lay judges - who are by the way both employed directly by the local government, as director of the museum and as consultant in urban housing affairs - did their duty, and that they did.   The vote was two to one in favour of the local government and with such a bench of judges it does not require much imagination to guess who voted how."     18.      As supreme authority of the Greenlandic judiciary the High Court judge found that these remarks on the two lay judges, who had participated in the judgment of the tax case, were of a kind which might damage their reputation among the people and hence in general impair confidence in the legal system.   The High Court judge consequently applied to the Greenland Chief of Police, requiring him to institute a criminal investigation of the case.   The applicant was subsequently charged with defamation of character within the meaning of Section 71, para. 1 of the Greenlandic Penal Code (Kriminalloven for Grønland).     19.      The case was scheduled to be heard by the District Court of Narssaq (Narssaq Kredsret), which, as all other district courts of Greenland, is composed exclusively of lay judges.   On 27 April 1983 the applicant, however, requested that his case be transferred to the High Court of Greenland in accordance with Chapter 1, Section 15 of the Greenlandic Administration of Justice Act.   The District Court of Narssaq rejected the request on 4 May 1983 inter alia with reference to the fact that the president of the High Court was disqualified.   The applicant appealed against this decision to the High Court but the president of the High Court rejected the appeal by letter of 27 May 1983.   The applicant unsuccessfully lodged a complaint against this decision with the Special Court of Revision (Den særlige Klageret) in Denmark.   20.      The case was thus heard by the District Court of Narssaq on 9 December 1983.   Before the Court the applicant confirmed that he had written the article in question but maintained that the lay judges, according to Section 62 of the Danish Constitution, could not sit as judges in the taxation case.   Furthermore he maintained that the present case brought against him violated Section 77 of the Danish Constitution which guarantees his freedom of expression.   In its judgment of 9 December 1983 the District Court stated:     "The Court does not find that the validity of the High Court judgment of 28 January 1981 should be considered during the present proceedings but only whether the accused, through the contents of his article, has insulted two of the judges sitting in that case.   The Court finds that in the particular paragraph of the article in question the accused has used such words that the two judges concerned may rightly consider their honour offended.   The right invoked by the accused to freedom of expression in accordance with Section 77 of the Constitution is not found to be violated since the accused is entitled, without prior censorship, to state his views but this at the same time subject to responsibility towards the courts.   Hereafter the Court finds the accused guilty of having violated Section 71, para. 1 of the Greenlandic Penal Code since the Court does not find that the accused, in accordance with Section 71, para. 2 of the same Act, has proved the justification of his choice of words in the article in question."   21.      The applicant was fined 2,000 Danish crowns.   He appealed against this decision to the High Court for Eastern Denmark but the case was transmitted to the High Court of Greenland as being the proper appeal court.   The case was heard in this Court on 3 July 1984.   The Court was composed of one professional judge and two lay judges.   The professional judge replaced the usual judge since he was disqualified being the person who had started the case.   22.      In its judgment pronounced the same day upholding the District Court's judgment the High Court found it appropriate, in respect of the judgment pronounced in 1981 concerning the tax case, to emphasize that all three judges were in agreement on deciding in favour of the local government.   Regarding the charge brought against the applicant the Court stated inter alia:     "Like the District Court, the High Court agrees with the prosecution that the words of the article that the two Greenlandic lay judges did their duty - namely as employees in the local government to rule in favour of it - is a serious accusation which lends itself to depreciating them in public esteem.   Proof of the accusation has not been brought, which, however, would not have been possible since it cannot be excluded that they would have reached the same result, had they not been employed by the local government. The accused will hereafter be considered guilty of having violated Section 71, para. 1 of the Penal Code.   Finally, concerning the question of the competence of the two lay judges, the High Court agrees with the accused that they, as employed in leading positions by the defendant party - notwithstanding the specific difficulties in Greenland of upholding strict rules in regard to competence - in accordance with what has been pointed out by the defence, ought to have considered themselves disqualified and thus refrained from participating in the case and that the accused had reason to point it out.   Having regard to, on the one hand, the seriousness of the accusation and the information about the accused's economic situation now available - which would give grounds for a considerable increase of the fine imposed - and, on the other hand, the appropriateness of pointing at the omission which occurred, in the observation of reasonable rules of competence, the Court finds that the fine imposed should be confirmed."     23.      The applicant subsequently asked the Ministry of Justice for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Højesteret).   His request was rejected on 14 March 1985.   B.       Relevant domestic law   a)       The Danish Constitution (Danmarks Riges Grundlov)   24.      "§62.   Retsplejen skal stedse holdes adskilt fra         forvaltningen.   Regler herom fastsættes ved lov."   Translation   "Section 62.   The administration of justice shall remain separated from the Administration.   Rules in this respect shall be provided by law."                               * * *   25.      "§77.   Enhver er berettiget til på tryk, i skrift og tale         at offentliggøre sine tanker, dog under ansvar for         domstolene.   Censur og andre forebyggende forholdsregler kan         ingensinde påny indføres."   Translation   "Section 77.   Everyone shall be entitled to make public his views in print, in writing and in speech, provided that he may be held responsible in a court of justice.   Censorship and other preventive measures shall never again be introduced."       b)       The Greenlandic Penal Code (Kriminalloven for Grønland)   26.      "§71.   For ærefornærmelse dømmes den, der krænker en andens         ære ved fornærmelige ord eller handlinger eller ved at         fremsætte eller udbrede sigtelse for et forhold, der er         egnet til at nedsætte den fornærmede i medborgeres agtelse         eller i øvrigt skade ham i forholdet til andre.           Stk. 2.   Ingen kan dog dømmes for en sigtelse, når dens         sandhed bevises, eller den er fremsat i god tro, og den         pågældende har været forpligtet til at udtale sig eller har         handlet til berettiget varetagelse af åbenbar almen         interesse eller af eget eller andres tarv.           Stk. 3.   Den, der fremsætter en sigtelse, for hvilken         sandhedsbevis føres, kan dog dømmes, når sigtelsen ved sin         form er utilbørlig fornærmende, eller gerningsmanden ikke         har haft rimelig anledning til at fremsætte den.           Stk. 4.   Er en ærefornærmende sigtelse ubeføjet, bliver der         efter den fornærmedes påstand i domsslutningen at optage en         bemærkning herom."   Translation:   "Section 71.   Any person shall be liable to punishment for defamation of character if he degrades the honour of another person through insulting words or acts or if he makes or disseminates an accusation which is likely to damage the esteem in which the insulted party is held by his fellow citizens or which may in other ways damage his relationship with other people.   (2)   However, no judgment shall be passed on anyone for an accusation the veracity of which can be proved or if the accusation has been made in good faith and the perpetrator has been under an obligation to make a statement or has acted with justification to the benefit of the common weal or his own weal.   (3)   A person making an accusation of which evidence can be produced may nevertheless be sentenced if the wording of the accusation is unduly insulting or if the perpetrator has had no reasonable cause to make the accusation.   (4)   Whenever a defamatory accusation is unwarranted the insulted party may claim a note to this effect to be included in the conclusions of the judgment."   III.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   27.      The following is a summary of the parties' main arguments submitted on the merits at the admissibility stage and during the examination of the merits.   A.       The applicant   28.      The applicant alleges a violation of his freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention.   He submits that in any democratic society every citizen has certain fundamental rights of which freedom of expression is one of the most important ones.   In Denmark freedom of expression is secured through the Danish Constitution and is considered irrevocable although the right is subject to responsibility towards the courts of law.   29.      Regarding the request for an investigation by the police of the case it is important to note that it was not the lay judges in question but the High Court judge, whose honour was not at stake, who submitted the request to the police.   The two lay judges were never interrogated by the police and it is still unclear whether they consider their honour offended by the statements made by the applicant.   30.      The objective description of the Greenlandic court system as submitted by the respondent Government may be true, but their evaluation remains questionable.   It is a fact that in connection with the tax case of 1981, criticised by the applicant, procedural errors were committed by the High Court of Greenland in that the two lay judges, being employed by the local government, were disqualified.   In such circumstances when the public authorities commit errors they must be prepared to accept harsh criticism, in particular in small communities such as in Greenland.   31.      In this connection it should be pointed out that the so-called tax case was characterised by political undertones and followed with great interest by the local government and the press.   32.      Therefore the applicant should not be punished for publishing his remarks since, in accordance with the Greenlandic Penal Code Section 71, sub-section 2, they were true, as the lay judges were disqualified, and since the applicant pointed at procedural errors and thus obviously acted in the interest of the public.   33.      When the respondent Government submit that the freedom of expression in small local communities, as the one in Greenland, is less far-reaching than normal due to the fact that confidence in lay judges should be of overriding importance for the maintenance of law and order, this is to turn things upside down.   Such an argument should on the contrary lead the courts, selecting their lay judges from the community, to be particularly careful in order to avoid qualification problems and conflicts of interest which follow from that.   34.      When the courts, as in the present case, neglect their duty to resolve conflicts of interest they must accept public criticism even where this criticism is brought forward in harsh phrases.   Had the High Court of Greenland fulfilled its duties there would have been no reason for the applicant to publish his article and he would not have done so.   35.      When the respondent Government submit that the applicant was not barred from stating his points of view publicly this is a matter of course since the press in Greenland is not subject to preceding censorship.   Regarding the limitations of the freedom of expression as set out in Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention the applicant agrees to the objective description thereof but maintains that he precisely criticised the partiality of the judiciary, the impartiality of the judiciary being mentioned in the second paragraph, and therefore it appears contradictory to punish the applicant for having exceeded his right to freedom of expression.   36.      The respondent Government have submitted, regarding the restrictions on the freedom of expression, that they move progressively towards greater tolerance, for example in a political debate where the persons affected normally have the possibility of remonstrating.   If this is so, it should be pointed out that the tax case was indeed political and the remarks made by the applicant should enjoy the same status as remarks made in a political debate where the limits are wider than usual.   37.      It is correct that the legal system in Greenland is characterised by its special origin but the applicant's article does not criticise the legal system as such but the neglect on behalf of the High Court regarding the conditions for qualification.   38.      Finally, it should be pointed out that instead of being defamatory against the two disqualified lay judges the applicant's article rather affected the High Court judge due to the procedural error committed by him when appointing disqualified lay judges.   The High Court judge, however, has no right to protection in regard to procedural errors committed by him during the tax case.       B.       The Government   39.      The point of departure in the present case is the atypical organisation of the Greenlandic legal system which, in conformity with the traditions of the Greenland community, consists mainly of a system of lay courts.   This system springs from the special conditions prevailing in Greenland: time-honoured traditions, the country's vast extension and the widely scattered settlements.   Hence the Greenlandic legal system is based on local district courts in the charge exclusively of lay judges who discharge the task as a civic duty along with their civilian jobs.   The Greenland High Court is also dominated by the lay element in that in every case the court is composed of one professional judge and two lay judges.   The Greenlandic legal system functions well for all practical purposes, and the lay judges enjoy considerable respect among the people who have great confidence in their decisions.   Any man or woman of unblemished character may be selected to act as lay judge.   They shall honourably and conscientiously judge in accordance with what they consider right and true under the law and the evidence of the case.   This system has always functioned satisfactorily, but it is essential for its maintenance that the lay judges, including those who sit with a professional judge, have the necessary authority and enjoy the same confidence as professional judges.   40.      It is a fundamental principle of Danish as well as Greenlandic administration of justice that a judge is in duty bound to be impartial and to be guided solely by the law and the evidence produced.   This principle applies to all persons having judicial power in the administration of justice, i.e. professional as well as lay judges adjudicating civil and criminal cases.   41.      A decision given by a judge under the influence of considerations other than those following from the law or the evidence produced, e.g. in deference to his employers, would thus be a manifest neglect of duty for which the penal remedies are disciplinary punishment under the Greenlandic Administration of Justice Act and conviction of abuse of public authority under the Greenlandic Penal Code.   42.      The rules relating to disqualification of judges are laid down in the Greenlandic Administration of Justice Act.   The provisions there do not explicitly mention employee/employer relationship between judges and parties as being a ground for disqualification.   However, the Government agree with the High Court of Greenland that the two lay judges to whom the applicant referred in his statement, as employed in leading positions by the defendant party, should have refrained from sitting because this relationship might raise doubt as to their impartiality.   43.      Section 71, sub-section 2, of the Greenlandic Penal Code provides that judgment shall not be passed on any person for an accusation, the truth of which is susceptible of proof, or if the person who made the accusation was in good faith and under an obligation to make a statement or acted with justification to the obvious benefit of the public weal or to safeguard his own interests or the interests of others.   44.      While no objection can be raised in the present case against the fact that the applicant publicly criticised the disqualification of the two Greenlandic lay judges as an objectively ascertainable fact - which was indeed confirmed subsequently in the judgment pronounced on 3 July 1984 by the High Court of Greenland - it is clearly beyond the limits of freedom of speech for the applicant to exploit this aspect in order to contend - without producing evidence thereof - that the local government of Greenland influenced the lay judges and that the latter heeded the local government when pronouncing their judgment.   This is the gist of the matter and the reason why the prosecuting authority found that this sort of claim - not least in a local community like that existing in Greenland where confidence in lay judges is of overriding importance for the maintenance of law and order - must be considered as defamatory.   45.      The applicant's statement that the lay judges "did their duty" - namely as employees of the local government to rule in favour of it - is therefore not only an accusation of neglect of duty but also an accusation of committal of an indictable offence.   There can be no doubt that an accusation of this kind lends itself to depreciating the persons in question in public esteem and impairing confidence in the judiciary.   46.      The authority of and confidence in the courts of justice are a sine qua non for a society basing itself on the rule of law.   It is thus a precondition for confidence in the courts that the very risk of partiality is eliminated.   Hence, the rules relating to competence prescribe that a professional or lay judge shall leave his seat on the bench in certain, specified situations even though there be no ground to assume that the judge in the specific situation would act under the influence of non-objective considerations.   47.      If a judge is disqualified under the relevant provisions of the Administration of Justice Act this does not mean that de facto he has not been impartial.   Consequently, the fact that the lay judges sitting in the taxation case were disqualified cannot be adduced as proof of partiality.   48.      Accordingly, whilst it was understandable and above any reproach that the applicant alleged that the two lay judges were disqualified, he had no justifiable reasons to make the accusations in question after judgment in the tax case had been pronounced and appealed against.   49.      In Danish law freedom of speech is guaranteed by Section 77 of the Danish Constitution and in the present case neither the courts nor any other public authority prevented or obstructed the publication of the applicant's viewpoints.   50.      Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention provides that freedom of speech may be subjected to such restrictions and penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, inter alia for the protection of the reputation of others or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.   51.      The limit to freedom of speech depends on time, space and circumstances attendant upon the execution of freedom of speech. Undoubtedly, as time passes, the limit to freedom of speech moves progressively towards greater tolerance and in a political debate, for example, in which the affected person will normally have the possibility of remonstrating, the limits to freedom of speech will be more flexible than if the comments were made outside a political context.   Furthermore, the limit to freedom of speech may depend on the size of the local community in which an utterance or a statement is made or on the isolation of the community in question.   52.      It is also appropriate to underline that considerations for conduct of a free public debate might lead to acceptance of greater outspokenness in the debate when the criticism is directed against persons who e.g. themselves take part in the public debate or voluntarily discharge public functions, e.g. as politically elected members of governing bodies.   But this does not apply to lay judges in Greenland who do not discharge their judicial functions voluntarily but as a civic duty.   In such situations there is special reason to protect these persons against accusations of having committed a criminal offence and, in relation to them, there should not be a special margin for what they should tolerate being accused of in the discharge of their civic duty.   It cannot therefore be claimed with justification that the decisions taken by the courts exceeded the discretion which according to Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention must be vested in the national authorities.   53.      Finally, the Government refer to the case of Lingens v. Austria (Eur.   Court H.R., Lingens judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A no. 103).   In its decision the Court attached importance to the following factors:   that the observations in question were value-judgments the truth of which is not susceptible of proof, that a free political debate is the very core of the concept of a democratic society, that whilst the press must not overstep the bounds set for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, it is incumbent on it to impart information and ideas on political topics, and that, in the Court's opinion, the limits to acceptable criticism are narrower when it comes to private individuals than to politicians.   54.      In the opinion of the Government the Lingens case differs from the instant case on quite decisive points.   The background to the broader limits set for political debate is that politicians often desire and provoke a debate and, in consequence, must tolerate such freedom in use of language as follows from that.   55.      In the instant case the aggrieved parties are lay judges, not politicians.   Consequently, they are debarred from participating in public debate on pending cases and thereby from refuting accusations against them.   Furthermore, the applicant's observations were not value-judgments but accusations of committal of indictable offences directed against persons whose reputation society has a special interest in protecting.   56.      Considering that the applicant's observations contained grave accusations and were directed against judges, and taking into account the special conditions which prevail in Greenland, the Government submit that the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression, which indisputably took place, was necessary in a democratic society in order to safeguard the authority of the judiciary and to protect the individual, and, furthermore, that the interference was proportionate to the aim pursued.   IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.       Point at issue   57.      The only point at issue in the present case is the question whether or not the restriction of the applicant's freedom of expression by his conviction for defamation of character constituted a violation of Article 10 of the Convention.   B.       Article 10 of the Convention   58.      Article 10 of the Convention reads as follows:   "1.    Everyone has the right to freedom of expression.   This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers.   ...   2.   The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary."   59.      It is not disputed in the present case that there was an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant's freedom of expression.   This interference resulted from the applicant's conviction for defamation of character by the District Court of Narssaq on 9 December 1983, which conviction was upheld by the High Court of Greenland on 3 July 1984.   Such interference contravenes the Convention if it does not satisfy the requirements of the second paragraph of Article 10.   The Commission must accordingly examine whether the interference was "prescribed by law", had an aim that was legitimate and was "necessary in a democratic society" for the aforesaid aim (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Lingens judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A No. 103).   60.      As regards the two first points the Commission finds that the applicant's conviction was prescribed by law in that it was based on Section 71 of the Greenlandic Penal Code.   The restriction moreover pursued a legitimate aim covered by Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention, namely, the protection of the reputation of others and the aim of maintaining the authority of the judiciary.   What remains to be examined is accordingly the question whether the restriction complained of was necessary in a democratic society as required by Article 10 para. 2.   61.      The adjective "necessary", within the meaning of Article 10 para. 2, implies the existence of a "pressing social need".   The Contracting States have a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but it goes hand in hand with a European supervision, embracing both the legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an independent court (cf. above-mentioned Lingens judgment p. 25, para. 39).   62.      Accordingly, while it is not the task of the Commission to pronounce itself on an interpretation of domestic legislation as adopted by the domestic courts or otherwise take the place of the competent national courts, it is called upon to review under Article 10 of the Convention the decisions they delivered (cf. notably Eur. Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A No. 24 and Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A No. 30).   63.      The Commission recalls, as the European Court of Human Rights has underlined, that in exercising their supervisory functions the Convention organs must pay particular attention to the principles characterising a "democratic society" and the fundamental role which freedom of expression has to fulfil in such a society.   In the above-mentioned Handyside judgment, the Court stated as follows:   "Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of such a society, one of the basic conditions for its progress and for the development of every man. Subject to paragraph 2 of Article 10, it is applicable not only to 'information' or 'ideas' that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a matter of indifference, but also to those that offend, shock or disturb the State or any sector of the population.   Such are the demands of that pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness without which there is no 'democratic society'" (p. 23, para. 49).   64.      The Commission furthermore observes that in formulating the exceptions where interferences with the right to freedom of expression are justified, Article 10 para. 2 refers to necessity in a democratic society.   For the citizen to keep a critical control of the exercise of public power it is essential that particularly strict limits be imposed on interferences with the publication of opinions which refer to activities of public authorities, including the judiciary.   65.      In order to assess, in the light of these principles, whether there existed such a pressing social need as to justify the interference with the applicant's freedom of expression the Commission must look at the prohibited statement in its proper context and in the light of the particular circumstances of the case.   66.      In this respect the Commission recalls that the applicant's article appeared in the magazine "Grønland Dansk" after the judgment of the High Court of Greenland of 18 January 1981 in a case in which two lay judges participated who were both employed as civil servants in the local government, which was the defendant party in that case. The Commission also recalls the applicant's statement which set out the following (in translation):   "Most of the local government's members could on the other hand afford the time to watch that the two Greenlandic lay judges - who are by the way both employed directly by the local government, as director of the museum and as consultant in urban housing affairs - did their duty, and that they did. The vote was two to one in favour of the local government and with such a bench of judges it does not require much imagination to guess who voted how."     67.      In this text two elements of criticism can be distinguished. First, there is criticism with regard to the fact that the court was not composed in such a way as to assure its impartiality; second, there is a suggestion that the two lay judges cast their votes rather as employees of the local government than as independent and impartial judges.   68.      As far as the first aspect of the criticism is concerned, it does not raise any issue as it was not invoked as a basis for the interference.   The question therefore remains, whether the interference was "necessary" for the protection of the reputation of the two lay judges.   69.      The Government have pointed out that it was clearly beyond the limits of freedom of speech for the applicant to exploit the situation contending - without providing evidence thereof - that the local government of Greenland influenced the lay judges and that the latter heeded the local government when pronouncing their judgment.   The applicant has on the other hand maintained that when the courts, as in the present case, neglect their duty to resolve conflicts of interest, they must accept public criticism even where this criticism is brought forward in harsh phrases.   The applicant maintains that his criticism was justified and since he pointed at procedural errors he obviously acted in the interest of the public.   70.      The Commission has found no indications permitting the assumption that it was the intention of the applicant to attack the two lay judges personally.   It also refers to the fact that the criminal prosecution of the applicant was not started at the initiative of these lay judges, but that it was the High Court judge who required the Chief of Police of Greenland to initiate criminal proceedings.   71.      In matters of public interest involving the functioning of the public administration, including the judiciary, the test of necessity in Article 10 para. 2 of the Convention must be a particularly strict one.   It follows that even if the article in question could be interpreted as an attack on the integrity or reputation of the two lay judges, the general interest in allowing a public debate about the functioning of the judiciary weighs more heavily than the interest of the two judges is being protected against criticism of the kind expressed in the applicant's article.   "Most of the local government's members could on the other hand afford the time to watch that the two Greenlandic lay judges - who are by the way both employed directly by the local government, as director of the museum and as consultant in urban housing affiars - did their duty, and that they did.   The vote was two to one in favour of the local government and with such a bench of judges it does not require much imagination to guess who voted how."   67.      In this text two elements of criticism can be distinguished. First there is criticism with regard to the fact that the court was not composed in such a way as to assure its impartiality; second, there is a suggestion that the two lay judges cast their votes rather as employees of the local government than as independent and impartial judges.   68.      As far as the first aspect of the criticism is concerned, it does not raise any issue as it was not invoked as a basis for the interference.   The question therefore remains, whether the interference was "necessary" for the protection of the reputation of the two lay judges.   69.      The Government mhave pointed outthat it was clearly beyond the limits of freedom of speech for the applicant to exploit the situation contending - without providing eviden