CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 14 octobre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  Application No. 10461/83     A. R. M. CHAPPELL     against   the UNITED KINGDOM   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 14 October 1987)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                               page     I.       INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-21)                             1           A.   The application (paras. 2-4)                       1           B.   The proceedings (paras. 5-16)                      2           C.   The present Report (paras. 17-21)                  4     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 22-61)              5     III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES (paras. 62-92)             16           A.   The applicant (paras. 62-72)                      16           B.   The Government (paras. 73-92)                     18     IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 93-117)             23           A.   Point at issue (paras. 93-95)                     23           B.   Was there an interference with the applicant's    23             rights guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 of the             Convention? (paras. 96-99)           C.   Was the interference justified under Article 8    24             para. 2 of the Convention? (paras. 100-116)             (a) In accordance with the law                      24               (paras. 100-106)             (b) Necessary in a democratic society for           26               a legitimate aim (paras. 107-116)           D.   Conclusion (para. 117)                            29     DISSENTING OPINION OF MR. FROWEIN, joined by MM. TRECHSEL,    30                       BUSUTTIL, SCHERMERS and VANDENBERGHE   SEPARATE OPINION OF MR. KIERNAN                               32   CONCURRING OPINION OF SIR BASIL HALL                          33   APPENDIX I       History of the proceedings                    35   APPENDIX II      Decision on the admissibility                 of the application                            37       I.       INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.       The application   2.       The applicant is a British citizen born in 1948 and living in Frome, Somerset.   He has been represented before the Commission by Mr.   Ross Munro Q.C. and Mr.   Daniel Serota of counsel.   The Government of the United Kingdom were represented by Mr.   M. Eaton and Mrs.   A. Glover and subsequently by Mr.   M. Wood, all of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, as their Agents.   3.       In late 1980 and early 1981 the applicant operated a club for the exchange of video cassettes.   A company controlled by the applicant recorded video cassettes in breach of copyright which were subsequently made available to subscribers through the applicant's club.   On 26 February 1981 two film companies and an organisation formed to protect film companies from activities carried out in breach of copyright issued proceedings against the applicant's company and the applicant and were granted an "Anton Piller Order" allowing representatives of the film companies to enter the premises where the applicant's company and the applicant carried on business ("the premises") and to search for and remove copies of their films made in breach of copyright and documents relating to the acquisition, supply and disposal of such copies.   On 2 March 1981 the film companies' solicitors met with the police outside the premises.   The police had been informed that the applicant was involved in the supply of pornographic video films and had obtained a search warrant to search the premises and seize any such films.   By agreement between the police and the solicitors for the film companies, both parties entered the premises together and the police served and executed the search warrant.   The solicitors for the film companies served the Anton Piller Order on the applicant, and, after the applicant had taken legal advice, proceeded to execute the Anton Piller Order contemporaneously with the police search warrant.   4.       The applicant complains to the Commission of the way in which the Anton Piller Order was served and the subsequent search was carried out on the premises.   He contends that the execution of the Anton Piller Order in the circumstances of this case, including the simultaneous visit by the police and the film companies' solicitors, the numbers of persons involved and the fact that the search of the premises, which were both his home and his business, involved an investigation of aspects of his private life, constituted a disproportionate and unjustified interference with his rights guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.   B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced on 11 October 1982 and was registered on 1 July 1983.   6.       On 14 October 1983 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissiblity and merits pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.   The respondent Government's observations were submitted on 26 January 1984, and observations in reply were submitted by the applicant on 2 July 1984.   Further observations were submitted by the respondent Government on 28 September 1984.   7.       On 11 October 1984 the Commission decided to invite the parties to make submissions on the admissiblity and merits of the application at a hearing pursuant to Rule 42 para. 3 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.   At the hearing, which was held on 12 March 1985, the parties were represented as follows:           For the Government:           Mrs.   A. Glover, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Agent         Mr.   Nicholas Bratza, Counsel         Mr.   R. Jackson, Treasury Solicitor's Department, adviser         Mr.   Michael Carpenter, Lord Chancellor's Department, Adviser         Dr.   Peter Ferdinando, Department of Trade and Industry,                               Adviser.           For the Applicant:           The applicant in person         Mr.   A. Whitehouse, Adviser.   8.       The Commission examined the admissibility of the application in the light of the submissions which it received and, on 14 March 1985, declared admissible the applicant's complaint concerning the way in which the Anton Piller Order was served and the subsequent search was carried out on the premises.   The remainder of the application was declared inadmissible.   The text of the Commission's decision on admissibility is Appendix II to the present Report.   9.       The parties were informed of the Commission's decision by telephone on 14 March 1985 and by letter on 1 April 1985.   They were further informed that the Commission had decided to invite the respondent Government pursuant to Rule 45 para. 2 of the Rules of Procedure to provide certain information concerning the execution of the Anton Piller Order.   The time limit for the submission of this information was to run from the dispatch of the text of the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application.   10.      The Commission's decision on admissibility was dispatched to the parties pursuant to Rule 43 para. 1 of the Rules of Procedure on 23 May 1985.   11.      On 3 July 1985 the respondent Government provided the information requested by the Commission, which was forwarded to the applicant for his comments in reply.   The applicant's comments were submitted on 19 August 1985.   12.      On 12 October 1985 the Commission resumed its examination of the merits of the application and invited the parties to submit such further observations on the merits of the application as they might wish to make before 31 January 1986.   13.      On 6 January 1986 the respondent Government challenged the submissions which the applicant had made on 13 August 1985 and sought the Commission's ruling on the question whether the applicant was entitled to introduce new material under the guise of commenting on their answers to the Commission's questions.   In addition, the respondent Government requested the Commission's permission, and through the Commission, that of the applicant, to approach the solicitors who had acted for the film companies in the proceedings against the applicant, and the Bath police, with the contents of the case file in order to be able to formulate their observations on the merits.   14.      On 31 January 1986 the applicant, who had not been represented at the start of the proceedings, informed the Commission that he had appointed Mr.   Ross-Munro, Q.C. and Mr.   Daniel Serota of counsel as his representatives.   On 5 March 1985 they filed a Memorandum on behalf of the applicant containing further legal submissions.   15.      On 13 March 1986 the Commission resumed its deliberations on the merits of the application and decided that the respondent Government be informed that they might show the applicant's submissions of 13 August 1985 to the solicitors acting for the film companies in the proceedings against the applicant in the context of the proceedings relating to the present application, and that the parties be invited to make such further written submissions on the merits as they may wish before 25 April 1986.   In addition, the applicant's representatives were informed that notwithstanding the submissions which they had made, inter alia, to re-open the question of admissibility in respect of the exhaustion of remedies and the applicability of Article 13 of the Convention, the Commission's decision of 14 March 1985 determined the scope of that part of the application declared admissible.   The time limit for submission of these observations was extended by the President at the respective parties' requests to 23 May 1986 in the case of the respondent Government and 16 May 1986 in the case of the applicant's representatives.   The respondent Government's observations were submitted on 21 May 1986 and the applicant's representatives were invited to submit any further observations in reply before 11 July 1986.   It was also noted that no observations had been filed by them within the time limit which had expired on 16 May 1986.   The applicant's representatives reply to the supplementary observations of the respondent Government were submitted on 16 July 1986.   16.      After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. b of the Convention placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement; in the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement can be effected.   C.       The present Report   17.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present (1):                 MM. C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   J. A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Sir   Basil HALL   18.      The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on 14 October 1987 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   19.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention is           (i)   to establish the facts, and           (ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found         disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations         under the Convention.   20.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   21.      The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   __________ (1) Mr.   B. Kiernan was not present when the final vote was taken,     but the Commission decided when adopting this Report under Rule 52     para. 3 of the Rules of Procedure to permit him to express his     separate opinion.   II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   22.      The applicant is a British citizen born in 1948 and living in Frome, Somerset.   23.      In late 1980 and the early part of 1981 he operated a club for the exchange of video cassettes under the name of the Video Exchange Club, through a company which he controlled, Video Exchange Limited. According to the applicant, Video Exchange Limited operated by "pirate" (i.e. unauthorised) recording of video cassettes which were subsequently made available through the Video Exchange Club.   These pirate recordings were made in breach of copyright, but the applicant contends that he had been advised that the means by which these videos were distributed was, in fact, lawful.   24.      The applicant's business activities with pirate recordings came to the attention of two film companies and an organisation formed to protect film companies from activities carried out in breach of copyright ("the plaintiffs").   They employed an investigator who was a former policeman.   The investigator discovered that the applicant and his company were in his view breaching the plaintiffs' copyright.   He so reported to the plaintiffs, who took steps to obtain an Anton Piller Order against the applicant and his company.           Domestic law and practice concerning Anton Piller Orders   25.      An Anton Piller Order governs the compulsory collection and taking of evidence in certain civil proceedings.   It may be granted at the initiation of civil proceedings to an intending plaintiff, and orders the proposed defendant to reveal and allow inspection of evidence in his possession or known to him.   The order is mandatory and failure to comply with it may place the proposed defendant in contempt of court.   (This he may decide to risk, and refuse compliance, if he considers that the whole basis of the civil proceedings against him is so insubstantiated that he could persuade the court that the order should never have been granted.)   The order would be granted in cases where the court is satisfied that essential evidence would, or might be, lost, or destroyed, unless the order is made, and hence that the intending plaintiff's action would be seriously prejudiced if no order was made.   For the same reason, orders are typically made ex parte, i.e. without notice to the proposed defendant, for fear that notice to the proposed defendant would jeopardise the evidence.   26.      An order is granted on detailed terms specified by the Court on the intending plaintiff's application.   The intending plaintiff will submit to the judge a draft order in the terms which he seeks and the application will be supported by sworn affidavits (or drafts which are sworn subsequently) setting out evidence as to the way in which the prospective defendant carries on his business and how the intending plaintiff's rights - for example copyright in videofilms - are prejudiced thereby.   The Court of Appeal (Lawton LJ) has described the purpose for which an Anton Piller Order may be used in the following terms:           "Those who make charges must state right at the beginning what         they are and what facts they are based on.   They must not use         Anton Piller Orders as a means of finding out what sort of         charges they can make."           (Hytrac Conveyers Ltd v.   Conveyers International Ltd (1982)         3 All E R 415).   27.      Before making an order the Court must be satisfied first that the intending plaintiff has made out a strong prima facie case that his claim will succeed, secondly that the damage which has occurred or will occur is very serious to the intending plaintiff and thirdly that there is clear evidence that the prospective defendant has in his possession incriminating documents or things and that there is a real possibility that he may destroy such material if given notice of the application.   28.      If the Court is so satisfied it will impose various terms and conditions in the order.   These may include an undertaking by the intending plaintiff to pay any damages which may result from the order if the claim ultimately fails at trial, an undertaking that the order and evidence in support will be served on the proposed defendant by the intending plaintiff's solicitor, who is an officer of the Court. In addition the intending plaintiff's solicitor would undertake to the Court to offer to explain to the person served with the order its meaning and effect fairly and in every day language and to advise him that he has a right to obtain legal advice before complying with the order or parts of it, provided that such advice is obtained forthwith. Finally, the intending plaintiff's solicitor would undertake to retain in his safe custody anything taken under the order.   29.      The solicitor might also undertake to answer the prospective defendant as to whether any particular item is within the scope of the order, to use the information received only in connection with the proceedings in question and to ensure that the execution of the order remains under the control of a solicitor at all times.   In view of the solicitor's status as an officer of the Court, such an undertaking could provide the Court with a sanction over the way in which an order is implemented.   30.      An order will contain an injunction to restrain the prospective defendant from dealing with infringing articles, such as pirated video tapes, and order compelling disclosure to the intending plaintiff of the whereabouts of infringing materials and documents and their suppliers and recipients, an order to deliver such materials and documents to the intending plaintiff, an order to allow the intending plaintiff entry to premises and to allow him to search the premises and an order that the prospective defendant should serve a sworn statement containing the information which the order requires him to disclose within a specified time-limit.   31.      An Anton Piller Order is to be distinguished from a search warrant in that, first, it is issued in civil, not criminal, proceedings, secondly, it is issued to private parties to litigation and not the police and, thirdly, it does not authorise entry by force, but only orders the prospective defendant to permit entry.   The intending plaintiff has no right to force an entry to the premises if permission is refused.           The conditions attaching to the Anton Piller Order ("the         Order") granted in the present case   32.      On 26 February 1981 the plaintiffs applied to a judge for an Anton Piller Order.   Their application was supported by two affidavits, one sworn by the investigator and one by the solicitor H, in the firm of solicitors with day to day responsibility for the conduct of the litigation on behalf of the plaintiffs.   33.      In the present case the Order which was granted prohibited the applicant and his company from in any way parting with possession of any illicit copy of any film the copyright of which was owned by the plaintiffs, or parting with possession of any documents relating to the supply of such films to other persons, or warning any person of the possibility of further proceedings being taken against such other persons.   34.      In addition, the Order provided:           "That the <applicant and the other> Defendants and each of         them ... do permit such persons as may be duly authorised by         the plaintiffs, not exceeding three in number, together with         their solicitor and not more than one other solicitor or         employee of the plaintiffs' solicitors, to enter forthwith         the said premises and any other premises under the control of         the <applicant and the other> Defendants or any of them (which         premises they are by this Order obliged to disclose) on any         week day at any time between eight o'clock in the morning and         nine o'clock in the evening for the purpose of searching for         and removing into the custody of the plaintiffs' solicitors         any of the following articles :           (a) any unlicenced copies of any relevant film (as defined) or         any copies of a substantial part thereof, whether such copies         be on tape or celluloid or in any other medium           (b)   any documents which appear to relate to the acquisition,         supply or disposal of such copies as aforesaid."   35.      In addition, the applicant was ordered to reveal to the plaintiffs' solicitors the whereabouts of all the documents specified in the Order, and to supply the names and addresses of all persons to whom the applicant and his company had supplied or offered to supply pirated cassettes.   Finally, the Order required that the applicant swear an affidavit containing this information within four days of the service of the Order on him.   36.      The plaintiffs gave undertakings to issue and serve the proceedings against the applicant and his company for breach of copyright in respect of which the Order was a preliminary step.   The plaintiffs gave further undertakings as follows:           "(c)   to abide by any order this Court may make as to damages         in case this Court shall hereafter be of opinion that the         Intended Defendants (hereinafter called the Defendants) shall         have sustained any loss by reason of this Order which the         plaintiffs ought to pay           (d)    that any articles or documents obtained as a result of         this Order shall be retained by the plaintiffs' solicitors in         safe custody until further order           (e)    not to use any documents or information obtained as a         result of the execution of this Order save the purpose of         civil proceedings against these Defendants or third parties in         connection with the subject matter of this dispute without         leave of the Court and           (f)    not to commence or instigate any criminal proceedings         against any of the Defendants herein in respect of the acts         forming the subject matter of this action".   37.      This interim relief was granted until 5 March 1981 or until further order.   38.      The Order so granted was not executed separately, but contemporaneously with a police search warrant.   This occurred as a result of the way in which the applicant's activities came to the attention of the plaintiffs' investigator.   The investigator had visited the applicant's business premises, which it seems were also the applicant's home, on 16 February 1981, in order to collect pirate video cassettes of three films, the copyrights of some of which were owned by the plaintiffs.   39.      The investigator was shown an extract from one cassette which he considered to be obscene.   In describing this incident in a passage of his affidavit in the subsequent proceedings which was criticised by the judge at first instance for incompleteness, the investigator stated that he "did not pursue this as such material is not of interest to my (employers)".   In fact, straight after his visit to the premises, the investigator went to the Bath police and informed them of the material.   The investigator spoke with Detective Chief Inspector A. whom he provided with a written statement.   Following the investigator's report, the plaintiffs instructed their solicitors to obtain the Order in respect of the evidence on the premises.   On 17 February 1981 the investigator informed the solicitors in this connection that the Bath police were interested in the "porno material" which he had seen at the premises.   A note of their telephone conversation states that they discussed "arrangements" to be made "with the police in Bath".   40.      On 24 February 1981, the investigator telephoned Detective Chief Inspector A. at the plaintiffs solicitors' request to inform him that the Order was to be applied for on 26 February 1981 and that, if the Order was granted, the intention was to serve and execute it on 2 March 1981.   He arranged with Detective Chief Inspector A. that, if the Order was obtained, there would be a meeting between those who were to serve and execute it and the Bath police at Bath police station at 10.45 in the morning of 2 March 1981.   The judge at first instance in the subsequent proceedings found as a fact that the Bath police's plan to obtain and execute a search warrant in connection with possible proceedings under the Obscene Publications Act 1959 at or about the same time as the Order was discussed and that this was the reason for the arrangements to meet at the police station before going to the premises.   41.      The judge at first instance in the subsequent proceedings found that there were various inaccuracies in the investigator's affidavit, including the omission of a clear explanation of the investigator's contact with the police following the visit to the premises.   As a result, the judge who considered the plaintiffs' application for the Order was not on notice of the plan to serve the Order and a search warrant at the same time.   42.      When applying for the Order counsel for the plaintiffs referred to the proposed search warrant which the police were seeking, and the cooperation between the plaintiffs and the police, in the following terms:           "(Counsel for the plaintiffs): My Lord, there is one other         matter which I ought to draw to your Lordship's attention and         that is that the local police force are very much interested         in these defendants in relation to matters which are not the         subject of this action, namely, the adult films.           (The application judge): Yes.   Well, that is a different matter         altogether.           (Counsel for the plaintiffs): My Lord, it is a different         matter, but I felt I ought to draw your Lordship's attention         to the fact that they propose a visitation upon <the         applicant> and his company at about the same time as we         propose to serve this order upon them.           (The application judge): Yes, but they are not interested in         ...           (Counsel for the plaintiffs): No.           (The application judge): ... these films.           (Counsel for the plaintiffs): They are just interested in the         obscenity.           (The application judge): It's only the self-incrimination.           (Counsel for the plaintiffs): My Lord, that's right.           (The application judge): So far as that is concerned there is         no indication that the police are ...           (Counsel for the plaintiffs): None whatever.           (The application judge): As to that you gave the undertaking."   43.      The reference made by the application judge to the plaintiffs' undertaking was presumably a reference to an undertaking by the plaintiffs not to use the material to be seized under the Order in connection with any criminal, as opposed to civil, proceedings against the applicant.   Hence the application judge appeared to be asking whether there was any indication that the police, in seeking a search warrant, were interested in the same films as the plaintiffs.   44.      The judge at first instance in the subsequent proceedings described the plaintiffs' actual intentions in respect of their proposed cooperation with the police as being "more accurately expressed" in their solicitors' letter to the applicant of 27 August 1981.   The solicitors there stated:           "We would like to deal ... with the point about the         simultaneous execution of the police search warrant with         the <Order> ... <w>e would like to make our position         plain...   On 17 February <we> first received instructions         to obtain an <Order>.   It is quite clear from our attendance         note of the conversation that <the investigator> also told <H>         that the police were interested in you and <the applicant's         company> in relation to pornographic material.   It was also         clearly assumed that should the police wish to take action         then a joint execution of the search warrant and the <Order>         would be the ideal arrangement.   Obviously anything other than         a simultaneous execution might well prove to be to little or         no effect.   Of course noone could be certain at that time that         such simultaneous execution would take place since it         depended, inter alia, on a judge granting a full Anton Piller         Order and the police obtaining a search warrant quite apart         from any other practical difficulties.   That was the position         when the application before the application judge was made on         <26> February <1981>.   Let us be quite clear, we do not in any         way deny that it was the intention that the <Order>, if         granted, would be served and executed at the same time as the         search warrant, assuming that was granted to the police and         that the other arrangements could be made.   We repeat that         such is obvious.   We also think reference to the transcript         <of the hearing concerning the application for the <Order>>         makes it quite clear that the application judge was informed         of the police interest and the likelihood or possibility of a         search warrant being executed."   45.      As soon as the Order had been granted, the plaintiffs' solicitor informed the Bath police who had themselves obtained a search warrant on the same day.   It was agreed to proceed as previously arranged to conduct both searches on 2 March 1981.           The events of 2 March 1981   46.      On 2 March 1981 the plaintiffs' party, consisting of H and another solicitor and three employees of the plaintiffs, including the investigator, met at Bath police station at 10.45 with the police officers responsible for implementing the search warrant.   There were eleven policemen, who were in plain clothes; they were led by Detective Chief Inspector A.   The police party and the plaintiffs' party then went to the premises.   The investigator went in first, posing as a customer as on his previous visit.   His stated object was to be able to "observe what happened right from the start".   47.      Thereafter Detective Chief Inspector A rang the door bell.   He was accompanied by some of the plaintiffs' party including H and the other solicitor, but by no policemen.   The door was opened by a lady who sought to refuse admission.   Detective Chief Inspector A produced the search warrant and told her that he would enter whether she liked it or not.   She then reluctantly let the group in.   The judge at first instance in the subsequent proceedings found that she "obviously took it that H and the others were also police officers".   48.      The premises were on four floors.   The ground floor entrance gave access to a corridor and the stairs leading to the upper floors. On the first floor the applicant had his office and there was a general office.   On the second floor there was the applicant's bedroom and the office of an employee of the applicant's company.    On the third floor there were three further rooms, one of which was apparently not used for the applicant's business purposes.   49.      Detective Chief Inspector A and those of the plaintiffs' party who accompanied him found the applicant on the first floor in his office.   He was served with the search warrant and the remaining ten policemen entered the building at 11.40.   They were assigned one to each room, one to the front door, two to seize the materials and Detective Chief Inspector A to oversee the operation (total 11 policemen).   Their search was concluded at 16.20, after 274 items had been logged and signed for, the majority of them being video tapes.   50.      As soon as the search warrant had been served and while the police were beginning their search, H served the Order on the applicant.   51.      The applicant was advised by H of the effect of the Order and of the advisability of obtaining legal advice.   He arranged for a member of the firm of solicitors whom he usually instructed to attend; the only person at the firm who was available was a trainee solicitor who arrived shortly thereafter.   During this interlude, the police proceeded to execute their search warrant, but the search under the Order was not begun.   52.      On the arrival of the trainee solicitor, the applicant, who was distracted by the police search, was advised of the implications of the Order and accepted service of it.   The trainee solicitor accepted service of the Order on behalf of the applicant's company. Thereupon the plaintiffs' party started their search of the premises contemporaneously with the police search which was still in progress. The applicant contended before the domestic courts that he was stunned and overwhelmed by the scale of the searches but the courts found, having heard the evidence, that he was as well able to look after his interests as anyone in his position would have been.   53.      The applicant contends that owing to the contemporaneous searching of the premises by the police and the plaintiffs' party he was unable to supervise the search and to take note of the documents which were seized.   In particular he contends that a number of private and confidential documents of a personal nature were seized by the plaintiffs' solicitors which had no bearing on the action which they were bringing against him.   These documents included bank statements, the mortgage on the applicant's life assurance policy, details of the applicant's non-registration for value added tax (a criminal offence), a confidential bill from the applicant's previous partner and solicitor, details of adult films in respect of which the applicant was negotiating, and a privileged written barrister's opinion on the legality of the activities conducted by the applicant through his company.   In addition, the applicant contends that the correspondence between him and girlfriends and other personal correspondence was seized by the plaintiffs' solicitor.   Furthermore, the applicant contends that further highly confidential documents were seized, including a leaflet showing that he was using contact magazines to meet men and women for sexual relations, correspondence concerning the applicant's relationship with his former partner's wife and various other correspondence and documentation implicating the applicant more or less directly in various criminal activities concerning the use of drugs and the supply of "hard core" pornographic materials.   The Government submit that they are not in a position to dispute or comment upon these contentions because they were not a party to the search.   54.      A file note on the plaintiffs' solicitors' file confirms that H went through the drawers of correspondence and other documents on the premises and "encountered some protest" from the applicant "who attempted to separate material which he claimed was not relevant," but that "all necessary material was finally removed ...".   It also appears from that note and another contemporaneous note made by another solicitor present for the plaintiffs that after the search of the premises, the plaintiffs' solicitors went back to the police station and went through the documentation which the police had seized under the search warrant and copied certain relevant documents.   The applicant was not present.   55.      Under the terms of the Anton Piller Order, the applicant was obliged to swear an affidavit of disclosure relating to his business activities including the operation of the Video Exchange Club, within four days.   The case came before the High Court with both parties present on 5 March 1981 when the applicant was granted further time to swear his affidavit.   Thereafter the applicant changed solicitors twice and visited the plaintiffs' solicitors' office several times to examine the seized documents.   On 6 May 1981 he was served with a notice of motion for contempt of court for failure to file the affidavit.   56.      On 26 May 1981 the applicant withdrew his instructions from the second firm of solicitors and counsel who had been advising him and from then on conducted his case in person.   The applicant then issued a variety of cross motions against the plaintiffs, alleging that the Order had been obtained improperly, and improperly executed, in particular because the judge who granted the order had been inadequately informed of the plaintiffs' plans to execute the Order in concert with the police execution of their search warrant.   He contended that this combined operation, of which the judge was not made aware, made both the search warrant and in particular the Order and the evidence obtained under it invalid.   These proceedings came before the High Court on 27 July 1981 and were followed by the issue of committal proceedings by the plaintiffs to have the applicant committed to prison for contempt of court for failure to file the affidavit of disclosure required by the original Order.   57.      On 10 November 1981 the High Court gave judgment on these respective motions after substantial argument and held that, in the light of the inadequacies of one of the affidavits which had supported the original application for the Order, and of the need for alertness in controlling the scope of Anton Piller Orders, the applicant and his company should be relieved from the undertaking to make an affidavit of disclosure concerning the operation of their business practices and the names and addresses of the members of the Video Exchange Club.   In particular the Court considered that, had the proposed cooperation between the police and the plaintiffs in the operation of the search warrant and the Order been brought to the attention of the High Court more clearly when the Order was granted, it was probable that the Court would have provided further safeguards for the applicant to ensure that he was better able to be advised as to the relevance of the Order and to protect his interest generally during its execution.           The judge held:           "In my judgment, there was nothing inherently wrong with the mode of execution of the Order, except that the presence of the police executing their search warrant at the same time made it more oppressive than it should have been.   In my judgment the real vice lies in the fact that (the judge who granted the Order) was not told with all the candour that was called for in the circumstances what the intentions of the plaintiffs and of the police were ...   As the facts in this case show, the simultaneous execution of a search warrant and of an Order also makes it difficult for a defendant's solicitor to explain