CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 décembre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                          Application No. 11240/84                        by Frank CAMPBELL                        against the United Kingdom           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 12 December 1987, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 9 August 1984 by Mr.   Frank Campbell against the United Kingdom and registered on 13 November 1984 under file N° 11240/84;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 29 October 1985 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 22 March 1986;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1936. He is a universal grinder by profession although he is presently unemployed.   He lives with his wife in London.   Before the Commission he is represented by Susan C. Hulton, legal director of Interights, London.   I.       Particular facts of the case           It appears that certain difficulties arose between the applicant and the Inner London Education Authority concerning the applicant's son A, who was born in 1971.   The Education Authority subsequently applied for a care order because of continuing concern for the welfare of A owing to his persistent non-attendance at school. On 25 October 1982 the Kensington and Chelsea Juvenile Court decided to place A in a children's home for an assessment period of one month.           On 22 November 1982 a care order was made in respect of A under Section 1(2)(e) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969. The Court found that A was in need of care, or control, which he was unlikely to receive unless an order was made in respect of him and he was to remain in the children's home where he had initially been placed.   The applicant lodged a notice of appeal against the Juvenile Court's decision but withdrew his appeal before it was heard.           Under the care order A was taken from the custody of the applicant and his wife into the care of the local education authority. Following the order the local authority made arrangements for access visits by the applicant and his wife on weekdays with A visiting his parents at their home on Saturdays and Sundays.   A did visit his parental home at weekends but only the applicant availed himself of the weekday offered, his wife finding the experience too upsetting.           Difficulties arose in the contacts between the applicant and his son.   The Government submit that the difficulties started in May 1983 when allegedly it was reported by local authority officials concerned with A that he was unhappy about maintaining contact with his parents.   The applicant maintains that the difficulties did not start until January 1984 when he experienced problems in communicating with A, who on several occasions was not in the home on visiting evenings.           It is clear, however, that the applicant obtained advice during the summer of 1983 in relation to seeking the return of A to him and his wife.   Following the advice he received the applicant made an application to the Juvenile Court for a discharge of the care order according to Section 21(2) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969.           The applicant's request for legal aid was refused by the Law Society on 1 November 1983 and the application for the revocation of the care order was refused by the Juvenile Court on 5 December 1983. The applicant did not seek appeal against this decision nor has he made any further application for a discharge of the care order.           The applicant continued to visit A but due to the problems mentioned above these visits became more and more strained.   It was also reported by the applicant himself that in late 1983 there was an incident of violence against A by his mother.   Having regard to these problems and the fact that A was to be starting school in early 1984, for which reason the applicant did not wish to interfere in any way with the prospects for success of the education programme by persisting with visits which might be distressing for A, the applicant ceased visiting his son in January/February 1984.   On 10 February 1984 A's mother wrote a letter to him and after receipt of this letter it appears that A began refusing to see his parents.           In February 1984 the local authority suggested a meeting between the applicant and his wife and the social worker taking care of A.   The meeting was scheduled to take place on 16 March 1984 but the social worker was told by the applicant that he was unwelcome.   By letter of 21 March 1984 the social worker informed the applicant inter alia:           "I regret your unwillingness to discuss (A) with me.         However I wish to state that I shall offer, as a matter         of course, to have a discussion with you every six months         prior to each Statutory Review.   As (A's) next Review,         after this, will be in September I hope you will be         able to respond, at that time, to another approach from         me."           There was no contact between the applicant and his son until June 1984 when the applicant, after a telephone call to the place where A lived, sought to recommence his weekday visits.   The local authority offered a meeting and the meeting took place on 24 July 1984.   At the meeting the applicant maintains that he was informed by A's social worker that he could no longer visit, telephone or write to A.   The Government submit, however, that it was impressed upon the applicant that contact should remain but that there was a need for planned contact and a need to meet to plan such contact.           Referring to the above meeting the local authority by letter of 26 June 1984 expressed the view that:     " ... planned arrangements for (A) to keep in contact with both of you are essential to his commendable progress at school and at (the children's home).   We feel that unnecessary feelings of rejection on your part and disappointment on (A's) part can be avoided by planning the contact as well as possible.   For instance, you might call at (the children's home) and find that (A) is away on holiday or on an outing. It is in (A's) interest that we all make strong efforts to come together to discuss his future contact with both of you.   I wish to repeat my invitation to you both to come to this office to meet Mr.   W and me for this discussion."             A meeting took place on 1 August 1984 but the applicant nevertheless felt that he was now barred from seeing his son and complained on 18 September 1984 to the Director of Social Services who, on 1 October 1984, replied:     "I have discussed the situation with the social worker (Mr. M).   It seems that Mr.   M has been in contact with you and has talked about (A's) contact with you and your wife.   From the records which have been kept I see that you and your wife have not been able to agree to see Mr.   M at your home. In view of the Department's responsibilities there has been a reasonable expectation that a discussion takes place concerning (A's) contact with you.   This expectation is very much linked to the fact that on the last occasion at which (A) visited there was an incidence of violence being used against him.   I regret that you have not seen (A) during the last nine months or so as you have been unable to accept a visit from Mr.   M which must precede this.   You have been informed by Mr.   M and Mr.   W of (A's) progress at school and the encouraging advances he has made in other areas.   I am aware of your great love and concern for (A) and would wish to help in whatever way possible to re-establish a contact which relates to (A's) long-term needs.   If you think it would be of assistance I am prepared to meet you and (your wife) at this office and discuss the basis on which we can proceed.   I hope you can accept this offer and look forward to hearing from you giving me some idea of the most suitable days and times convenient for you."             Due to this development another meeting was arranged at the Social Services Building on 25 October 1984 in order to clarify the situation.   The applicant was informed that only prearranged visits with his son would be offered in the future, supervised by the responsible social worker at the offices of the Social Services or at the parents' home.   Continuing review of the situation would follow these visits and the wishes of A should be taken into consideration. It was finally decided that the first visit should take place on 1 November 1984 at the Social Services Building.           The meeting took place but the applicant submits that it was very unsuccessful.   He therefore complained to the Social Services about the responsible social worker whose presence he felt to have been unnecessary and intrusive.   Nevertheless a new meeting was arranged on 16 November 1984, this time at the children's home but otherwise under the same conditions.   After these two meetings the Government submit that A refused further visits unless and until his mother retracted the statements made in her letter of 10 February 1984 mentioned above.           On 3 December 1984 the applicant's complaints against the responsible social worker were dismissed.   In his letter the Area Officer of the Social Services wrote inter alia:     "Lastly, therefore, I come to your request for a different social worker and your belief that this will facilitate your 'starting afresh'.   After careful thought and examination of Mr M's objectives I find I am unable to agree that the ends you seek will be brought about by the means you advocate.   Indeed, I think it important that for the first time since the care proceedings (your wife) has joined her voice with yours in signing the letter you sent me.   I do consider that this bodes well for the future and hope that it is not long before (A) is able to meet you both, albeit in the first instance on his terms in the presence of his social worker."             There were no further visits arranged but certain contacts between the local authority and the applicant.   The situation was described in a letter of 6 February 1985 to the applicant and his wife from the local authority stating inter alia:     "Now the situation, (the applicant) insists, is one in which he says there is no point in any further discussion with me unless I am planning for (A's) return to live with you.   In the present situation, as I explained, this is not the Department's plan.   I again told you that a social worker from the Fostering and Adoption Unit has been allocated to pursue plans to obtain a foster family for (A).   We seem now to be in a position of stalemate concerning a very important part of (A's) life: his contact, or lack of it, with you both.   It cannot be in (A's) interest to have his uncertainty and anxiety unrelieved.   This is a matter as I told (you) I shall be discussing with my supervisor, Miss D."             The local authority held a review of the case on 1 April 1985 as a result of which it was agreed that quarterly visits to the applicant and his wife should be offered with the acquiescence of A. Such a supervised visit to the parental home was arranged for and took place on 1 May 1985.   The applicant and his wife did not attend or participate in the review of the case.   Nor were they informed of the reasons for the decision taken.   They subsequently conveyed to the local authority the wish that they be allowed weekly or monthly visits but by letter of 5 September 1985 the applicant was informed of "the Review's view that a visit every three months seemed to offer benefits to all concerned".           In accordance with the offer of quarterly access decided by the local authority in April 1985 a visit for September 1985 was arranged.   The Government submit, however, that the visit was abandoned at the applicant's son's own request and that he is at present still refusing to visit his parents.     II.      Domestic law and practice   The compulsory placing of a child in care by order of the Juvenile Court under the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969           A local education authority, as defined in Section 114 of the Education Act of 1944, has, by virtue of Section 2(8) of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1969 ("CYPA 1969"), a duty under Section 2(2) of the CYPA 1969 to apply to the Juvenile Court, which is a specially constituted Magistrates' Court, for an order under Section 1(3) of the CYPA 1969 in respect of a child who it appears to that local education authority is of compulsory school age (within the meaning of the Education Act of 1944) and is not receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability and aptitude.           In the application before the court the local education authority has to show:   a.       that the child is of compulsory school age (within the meaning of the Education Act of 1944) and is not receiving efficient full-time education suitable to his ability, age and aptitude.   By virtue of Section 2(8)(b) of the CYPA 1969 this condition is deemed to be met if it is proved that the child is a registered pupil at a school which he is not attending regularly within the meaning of Section 39 of the Education Act of 1944 and it is not proved he is receiving the education mentioned in Section 1(2)(e);   b.       that he is also in need of care and control and that he is unlikely to receive it unless one of the orders mentioned in Section 1(3) of the CYPA 1969 is made.           Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act of 1933 provides that every court in care proceedings shall in a proper case take steps to remove children from undesirable surroundings and to secure that proper provision is made for their education and training.           The effect of a care order under Section 1(3)(c) of the CYPA 1969 is that the rights of the parents except the right to agree to adoption and the right to influence the child's religious beliefs are taken from the parents and vested in the local authority.   The powers and duties of local authorities with respect to children and young persons committed to their care are contained in Section 10 of the Child Care Act of 1980.           The care proceedings are, unless ground (f) in Section 1 of the CYPA 1969 is alleged, civil proceedings and are governed by the Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules 1970 (S.I.1970/1972) and the law of evidence in civil cases applies to such proceedings.           The parties to the proceedings are the local authority and the child.   Subject to his means the child is entitled to legal aid and to be represented (Section 28(3) of the Legal Aid Act of 1974).   It is open to the child to have his parent conduct his case on his behalf either directly or indirectly through a lawyer in which case the parent can apply for legal aid on the child's behalf (Section 40(2) of the Legal Aid Act of 1974).   The child being of sufficient competence, may decide that he wishes to be separately represented.   Where a court thinks there may be a conflict of interest between the child and the parent, the court may make a legal aid order and appoint a solicitor to act on the child's behalf.   In that case the parent may be granted legal aid.   Legal aid will be granted if the interests of justice require.           When the parent is not acting on behalf of the child he has the right to attend the hearing and to give or call evidence challenging allegations made against him by the local authority.   In practice the court would also allow the parent to cross-examine witnesses on behalf of the local authority and to have separate legal representation.   The position has since May 1984 been clarified, without prejudice to the court's inherent jurisdiction, as a result of amendments to the Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules 1970 (S.I.1970/1972).           The child or parent on behalf of the child (except where the parent has not represented the child in the Juvenile Court) may appeal against the order to the Crown Court under Section 2(12) of the CYPA 1969.   The Crown Court reviews the decision by way of a rehearing of the case.   The local authority has no general right of appeal where no order is made under Section 1(3), or where the order made was not the one sought, except on a point of law to the Divisional Court of the High Court.           After a care order has been made, the child and the parent on his behalf have a right under Section 21 of the CYPA 1969 to seek at intervals of three months or, with the consent of the court, more frequently, the discharge of the order or its variation to a supervision order.   A supervision order, which is dealt with in Sections 11 to 19 of the CYPA 1969, will enable the child to live with his parents but the child may be required by the order to comply with instructions, for example to participate in certain activities, given from time to time by the local authority which is the supervisor.   The parent and child have a right to appeal to the Crown Court against a refusal of any application to discharge or vary a care order.   Further appeal lies to the Divisional Court by case stated with leave of that court.   If the point at issue is a point of law the parent and child may go directly from the Juvenile Court to the Divisional Court and thereafter to the Court of Appeal and in very rare cases and on a point of law of general public importance to the House of Lords.   The same provisions as to separate representation and legal aid apply as in relation to the original proceedings.   Termination or refusal of access in respect of a child placed in care           In reaching any decision relating to the child in their care a local authority have to give, by virtue of Section 18 of the Child Care Act of 1980, first consideration to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood and have so far as practicable to ascertain the wishes of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration to them having regard to his age and understanding.           Since 30 January 1984, under the provisions of Section 12A to D of the Child Care Act of 1980, a local authority may not terminate or refuse to make arrangements for access to a child in their care pursuant to (inter alia) a care order unless they give notice of the termination or refusal to the parent in accordance with the Notice of Termination and of Refusal Order 1983 (S.I.1983/1680).   This notice must inform the parent of his right to apply to the Juvenile Court for an access order.   The parent may then make a complaint to the Juvenile Court, which may make such order as to access, subject to such conditions with regard to commencement, frequency, duration or place of access or to any other matter for which it appears to the court that provision ought to be made in connection with the requirement to allow access (Section 12C(3) of the Child Care Act of 1980).   Appeal from any such decision lies to the High Court (Section 12C(5)).   The order is subject to variation and discharge (Section 12D).   A parent applying for an access order is eligible to receive legal aid in respect of representation.           Section 12G requires that the Secretary of State should prepare and lay before Parliament a code of practice with regard to access to children in care.   The Secretary of State for Social Security laid before Parliament such a code on 16 December 1983.           The code sets out "the basic principles on which local authorities and other agencies should operate in promoting and sustaining access and in the handling of decisions to restrict and terminate access where that becomes necessary".   Paragraph 11 of the code reiterates the local authority's duty to give due consideration to the child's wishes and feelings having regard to his age and understanding and indicates that where a child is openly unwilling to see his parents local authority staff should help resolve the difficulties, but where these cannot be resolved the local authority may have to conclude that a child cannot be forced unwillingly into seeing a parent and that access has to be terminated.           Paragraph 13 of the code requires that access arrangements should be kept under review and discussed with parents.   Paragraph 15 requires that decisions on access should be explained to parents and discussed with them.           As the regulation of access in respect of a child committed to its care under Section 1 of the CYPA 1969 is a matter which has been vested in the local authority by statute, the actions of the local authority can be challenged by way of judicial review in the High Court, if it acts improperly in the regulation of access.   The practice laid down in the statutory code as well as any special extenuating circumstances would be matters for the High Court to take into consideration in such review.         The relevant parts of the new legislation reads as follows:   "12A. Children to whom Part 1A applies   (I)      Subject to sub-section (2) below, this Part of this Act applies to any child in the care of a local authority in consequence -           (a)      of a care order (including an interim order);           (b)      of an order under Section 2(I) of the Matrimonial                 Proceedings (Magistrates' Courts) Act 1960;           (c)      of committal under Section 23(I) of the Children                 and Young Persons Act 1969;           (d)      of an order under Section 2(2)(b) of the Guardianship                 Act 1973;           (e)      of an order under Section 17(I)(b) of the Children                 Act 1975 or Section 26(I)(b) of the Adoption Act                 1976 (order on refusal of adoption order);           (f)      of an order under Section 36(2) or 3(a) of the                 Children Act 1975 (order on revocation of                 custodianship order);           (g)      of an order under Section 10(I) of the Domestic                 Proceedings and Magistrates' Court Act 1978; or           (h)      of a resolution under Section 3 above.   (2)      This Part of this Act does not apply to a child in the care of a local authority in consequence of an order made by the High Court.   12B.   Termination of access   (I)      A local authority may not terminate arrangements for access to a child to whom this Part of this Act applies by its parent, guardian or custodian, or refuse to make such arrangements unless they have first given the parent, guardian or custodian notice of termination or refusal in a form prescribed by order made by the Secretary of State.   (2)      A notice under this Section shall contain a statement that the parent, guardian or custodian has a right to apply to a court for an order under Section 12C below.   (3)      A notice terminating access shall state that access will be terminated as from the date of service of the notice.   (4)      A local authority are not to be taken to terminate access for the purpose of this Section in a case where they propose to substitute new arrangements for access for existing arrangements.   (5)      A local authority are not to be taken to refuse to make arrangements for the access for the purposes of this Section in a case where they postpone access for such reasonable period as appears to them to be necessary to enable them to consider what arrangements for access (if any) are to be made.   (6)      A notice under this Section may be served on a parent, guardian or custodian either by delivering it to him or by leaving it at his proper address or by sending it by post.   (7)      For the purposes of this Section, and of Section 7 of the Interpretation Act 1978 in its application to this Section the proper address of a person shall be his last known address.   12C.   Access orders - general   (I)      A parent, guardian or custodian on whom a notice under Section 12B above is served may apply for an order under this Section (in this Part of this Act referred to as an 'access order').   (2)      An application under sub-section (I) above shall be made by way of complaint to an appropriate juvenile court.   (3)      An access order shall be an order requiring the authority to allow the child's parent, guardian or custodian access to the child subject to such conditions as the order may specify with regard to commencement, frequency, duration or place of access or to any other matter for which it appears to the court that provision ought to be made in connection with the requirement to allow access.   (4)      A juvenile court is an appropriate juvenile court for the purposes of this Part of the Act if it has jurisdiction in the area of the authority serving the notice under Section 12B above.   (5)      An appeal shall lie to the High Court against any decision of a juvenile court under this Part of this Act.   12D.   Variation and discharge of access orders   (I)      Where an access order has been made -           (a)      the parent, guardian or custodian named in the order;                 or           (b)      the local authority,           may apply for the variation or discharge of the order.   (2)      An application under this Section shall be made by way of complaint to an appropriate juvenile court.   12E.   Emergency orders   (I)      A qualified justice of the peace may make an order under this sub-section where he is satisfied that continued access to a child by its parent, guardian or custodian in accordance with the terms of an access order will put the child's welfare seriously at risk.   (2)      Subject to sub-section (3) below, an order under sub-section (I) above shall be an order suspending the operation of the access order for 7 days beginning with the date of the order under sub-section (I) above, or for such shorter period beginning with that date as may be specified in that order.   (3)      If during that period for which the operation of the access order is suspended the local authority make an application for its variation or discharge to an appropriate juvenile court, its operation shall be suspended until the date on which the application to vary or discharge is determined or abandoned.   (4)      An application for an order under sub-section (I) above may be made ex parte.   (5)       A justice of the peace is a qualified justice of the peace for the purposes of this Section if he is a member of a juvenile court panel formed under Schedule 2 to the Children and Young Persons Act 1933.   12F.   Safeguarding of interests of child   (I)      A court -           (a)      to which an application for an access order or                 any other application under this Part of this Act                 is made; or           (b)      to which an appeal under this Part of this Act                 is brought,           shall regard the welfare of the child as the first and paramount consideration in determining the matter.   (2)      In any proceedings before a court under this Part of this Act the court may, where it considers necessary in order to safeguard the interests of the child, by order make the child a party of the proceedings.   (3)      If the court makes the child a party to the proceedings, it shall in accordance with rules of court appoint a guardian ad litem of the child for the purposes of the proceedings unless it is satisfied that to do so it is not necessary for safeguarding the interests of the child.   (4)      A guardian ad litem appointed in pursuance of this Section shall be under a duty to safeguard the interests of the child in the manner prescribed by rules of court.   12G.   Code of practice   (I)      The Secretary of State shall prepare, and from time to time revise, a code of practice with regard to access to children in care.   (2)      Before preparing the code or making any alteration in it the Secretary of State shall consult such bodies as appear to him to be concerned.   (3)      The Secretary of State shall lay copies of the code and of any alteration in the code before Parliament; and if either House of Parliament passes a resolution requiring the code or any alteration in it to be withdrawn the Secretary of State shall withdraw the code or alteration and, where he withdraws the code, shall prepare a code in substitution for the one which is withdrawn.   (4)      No resolution shall be passed by either House of Parliament under sub-section (3) above in respect of a code or alteration after the expiration of the period of 40 days beginning with the day on which a copy of the code or alteration was laid before that House; but for the purposes of this sub-section no account shall be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which both Houses are adjourned for more than four days.   (5)      The Secretary of State shall publish the code as for the time being in force."           The above legislation, except the new Child Care Act 1980, Section 12F(3) and (4), was brought into force on 30 January 1984, and those provisions were brought into force on 27 May 1984 by the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudiciations Act 1983 (Commencement No. 2) Order 1983, SI 1983 No. 1862, made under 32(2), ante.           The above Section 12 inserts a new Part IA in the Child Care Act 1980, Vol 50(I), p 1054 which implements proposals made by the Government to provide natural parents and others with parental duties with statutory rights of access to children who are in local authority care, but, at the same time, enable authorities to exercise their existing legal responsibilities towards children in their care.   The new provisions apply to all children in care with the exception, firstly, of those who are there as a result of a High Court order (in such cases the court already has power to make an access order) (Section 12A(2) of the Act of 1980) and, secondly, in cases where children are in voluntary care by virtue of Section 2 of the Act of 1980, Vol 50(I), p 1058 (where the child can be removed from care, and where the authority has not got unrestricted power to terminate access).   In the latter case, however, the provisions may apply where the child concerned, though originally in care on a voluntary basis under Section 2, is subsequently the subject of a resolution under Section 3 of the Act of 1980, Vol 50(I), p 1061, whereupon the authority assumes parental rights and duties (Section 12A(I)(h) of the Act).         The main features of these provisions may be summarised as follows:           (i)      existing arrangements for access may not be                 terminated, and initial arrangements for access may                 not be refused, unless notice of termination or                 refusal has first been given to the child's parent,                 guardian or custodian: termination of access does                 not occur, for these purposes, if the authority                 substitutes new access arrangements for the existing                 arrangements (Section 12B(I), (4));           (ii)     upon receipt of a notice terminating or refusing                 access, the parent may apply to a juvenile court for                 an "access order" (Section 12C(I), (2)).   The order,                 if granted, will require the authority to allow access                 to the child and specify the frequency of visits                 and other relevant conditions (Section 12C(3)): an                 appeal lies to the High Court (Section 12C(5));           (iii)    either a parent or the authority may apply to a                 juvenile court for variation or discharge of an                 order (Section 12D);           (iv)     provision is made for the suspension of an access                 order if continued access would put the child's                 welfare seriously at risk (Section 12E);           (v)      the court considering the application for an access                 order or on appeal is to regard the welfare of the                 child as the first and paramount consideration in                 determining the matter (Section 12F(I));           (vi)     the Secretary of State is required to prepare and                 periodically revise a code of practice with regard                 to access to children in care, and publish that code                 (Section 12G).     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that the decision of the local authority to restrict his contact with his son who is in their care, and the manner in which that decision was made, violated his right to respect for his family life guaranteed in Article 8 of the Convention.           He further complains that the procedure for deciding upon access to his son was not in conformity with Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           The applicant also complains that he did not have an effective remedy before a national authority, as required by Article 13 of the Convention, in respect of his complaint that the decision of the local authority interfered with his right to respect for his family life.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 9 August 1984 and registered on 13 November 1984.           The Commission decided on 1 July 1985 to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits.   Having been granted an extension of the time-limit the Government submitted their observations on 29 October 1985.           On 7 November 1985 the President, acting in accordance with Rule 7 of the Addendum to the Commission's Rules of Procedure, decided that legal aid should be granted to the applicant.           The applicant was invited to submit observations in reply to those of the respondent Government by 24 February 1986.   Having been granted an extension of this time-limit twice the applicant submitted his observations on 22 March 1986.           On 17 July 1986 the Commission decided to adjourn the examination of the case pending the outcome of the five child care cases brought before the European Court of Human Rights.   The Court pronounced its judgments in these cases on 8 July 1987 (Eur.   Court H.R., Series A no. 120).     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   The Government   Article 6 of the Convention           The present application discloses no issue arising under Article 6 para. 1 in respect of the proceedings before the Juvenile Court.   Article 6 para. 1 is only applicable to the present case if a parent's claim to access to his child constitutes a civil right within the meaning of that Article.   The jurisprudence of the Commission indicates that rights of access and custody may fall within Article 8 of the Convention - see eg.   No. 7911/77, Dec. 12.12.77, D.R. 12 p. 192 (193) where the Commission said: "in principle a parent always has a right of access to his or her child under paragraph 1 of Article 8 of the Convention".   This does not necessarily mean that such a right is "a civil right" for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 and the Government make no admission as to that.   But, even assuming that it can be a civil right for those purposes, it is not a right that has a separate continuing existence in a situation where the bundle of parental rights of which it forms part has been lawfully transferred to another party.           Thus in this case the local authority, following the care order made by the Juvenile Court under the CYPA 1969, stood in the shoes of the parents and was entitled to exercise the whole bundle of parental rights including the right to regulate and supervise the child's association with other persons in the interests of the child. It follows that the persons the local authority might wish to restrict having access to the child in its interests could include its natural parents.   This is likely to be necessary when visits by the natural parents prove to be disruptive to the child's welfare and, as in the present case, the child plainly indicates that he does not wish to see his parents.   The parents' rights of access cannot be considered in such cases as separable from the parental rights as a whole.           Support for this view can be drawn from the Commission's jurisprudence in relation to a parent's right to determine a child's education.   In Dec.   No. 7911/77 (cited above) the Commission decided that the applicant had lost his right to determine his child's education because that was "an integral part of the right to custody which in the present case has been removed from the applicant by the Swedish courts".   In a more recent case (No. 9867/82, Dec. 7.12.82, unpublished), where the applicant had complained that his former wife had been permitted to remove his children to South Africa to be brought up in a society to which he objected, the Commission reaffirmed the dictum in No. 7911/77 quoted above and went on to say:           "Similarly it is normally for the parent having custody to         determine more broadly the mode of the child's upbringing         and to assess the consequences of taking up residence in a         given society."           In just the same way the lawful transfer to the local authority of all the rights of a parent mean that the rights forming an integral part of the parental rights transferred, such as the rights to custody and access, are for the local authority as custodial parent to determine.   The transfer of all the parental rights may be challenged, and was so challenged in the present case in the proceedings for the care order under Section 1(2) of the CYPA 1969 and by the subsequent application for the discharge of that order under Section 21 of the CYPA 1969.           If, however, contrary to the view taken above, Article 6 para. 1 is applicable, the Government submit that no breach of the Article has occurred.   The hearing for which Article 6 provides was afforded in the opportunities, of which the applicant at least partly availed himself, for challenging the care order itself and seeking its revocation.   On both occasions when matters relating to the applicant's son were before the Court, that is the proceedings for a care order on 22 November 1982 and the proceedings for its discharge on 5 December 1983, there was a full hearing in which the applicant had the opportunity to participate.           As regards the applicant's opportunities to challenge the ac