CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 décembre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12328/86                       by Clements McCARTNEY                       against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 12 December 1987, the following members being present:                MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission,           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 6 August 1986 by Clements McCartney against the United Kingdom and registered on 10 August 1986 under file No. 12328/86;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts as they have been submitted on behalf of the applicant, a British citizen born in 1946 and living in Co. Londonderry, by his representatives, Messrs.   Johns Elliott Wallace & Co., solicitors of Belfast, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant's father opened an account with the Larne branch of the Belfast Savings Bank on the applicant's behalf in 1946.   At the time of lodging his application he applicant had a current account, a notice account, and an investment account with the Coleraine branch of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland, a successor to the Belfast Savings Bank.           In 1985 the United Kingdom Government introduced legislation whereby the various Trustee Savings Banks throughout the country would be established on a new legal footing, permitting the floatation of the newly created holding company on the stockmarket.           The Trustee Savings Banks Act 1985 came into force on 25 September 1985.   By virtue of Section 3 of that Act, on the vesting day, all the property rights, liabilities and obligations of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland were transferred to a new holding company established for that purpose, called Trustee Savings Bank Group PLC.   The vesting day is defined in Section 1(1)(d) of that Act as meaning the day appointed for the transfer by virtue of Section 3 of the same Act of the assets and liabilities of any of the bodies comprising the existing Trustee Savings Bank Group to any of the bodies comprising the new Trustee Savings Bank Group.   Under the further provisions of that Act, members of the public PLC would be invited to subscribe for shares in the new limited company Trustee Savings Bank Group PLC.           The applicant contends that he was an ultimate beneficiary and owner, along with other depositors, of the assets of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland and that the implementation of the Trustee Savings Bank Act 1985 would thereby deprive him of his property rights and entitlements as such ultimate beneficiary and owner.           The applicant's claim to be an ultimate beneficiary and owner along with other depositors of the assets of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland, derives from the fact that, in his contention, that bank is an unincorporated association, whose members are those persons who deposit money with the bank.   By virtue of such membership, the applicant claims, with other depositors who are members, to own the whole assets of the bank, including the whole surplus assets remaining after deposits and interest have been paid to those entitled to them. These contentions were the subject of litigation in Scotland (Ross v. the Lord Advocate) and in England (Vincent v. the Trustee Savings Bank Central Board and Others) in proceedings which were consolidated and resulted in an ultimate appeal to the House of Lords, in respect of which the judgment of the Court was made available to the public on 31 July 1986.   The applicant was not a party to the litigation.           The House of Lords held that the Trustee Savings Banks were regulated by the Trustee Savings Banks Act 1981 and that depositors with any one of the banks comprising the Trustee Savings Banks could have no rights other than such as were conferred upon them by the Act, by the rules of the banks, and by virtue of their contract with the bank with which they had a deposit.   Having construed the relevant Act and rules and examined the contractual relationship in the cases before it, the House of Lords concluded that the depositors had no proprietory interest in the surplus assets of the banks and could not therefore complain of the transfer of those assets to the Trustee Savings Bank Group PLC.           In the course of his judgment, Lord Templeman held that the assets of the Trustee Savings Banks belonged to the State, subject to the contractual right of depositors to the return of their deposits and interest thereon and subject to the powers and duties from time to time conferred and imposed by Parliament or the National Debt Commission and the Trustee Savings Banks Central Board, the latter two institutions both being institutions of the State.           The applicant contends that the opinion of Lord Templeman that the assets of the Trustee Savings Bank belong to the State failed to give any definition of that word, which could arguably include all citizens of the United Kingdom, including the applicant and his fellow depositors in the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland.   The applicant contends that, in the absence of a clear definition by the House of Lords in the above litigation of the expression "the State", the question as to the precise legal ownership of the assets of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland is left uncertain.   Further, and alternatively, the applicant contends that the decision of the House of Lords is wrong in law.           The applicant has not taken legal proceedings in Northern Ireland in relation to his complaints, because he states that "it is believed that the said decisions of the House of Lords in the cases mentioned above are for practical purposes likely to be effective in so far as the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland is concerned".     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that he is deprived of his possessions by virtue of the provisions of the Trustee Savings Banks Act 1985, and that that Act is discriminatory against him and other depositors with the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland.   The applicant contends that his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, and Articles 6 para. 1, and Articles 13, 14, 17 and 18 of the Convention have been violated.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains first that his rights under the Convention have been violated by virtue of the implementation of the Trustee Savings Bank Act 1985, whereby the assets of inter alia the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland have been transferred to Trustee Savings Bank Group PLC, a company subsequently quoted on the Stock Exchange.   The applicant contends that as a depositor with the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland he was an owner of the assets of the bank.   He therefore contends that the transfer of the assets and liabilities of the bank under the provisions of the Trustee Savings Banks Act 1985 is contrary to a variety of provisions, including Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), which protects the peaceful enjoyment of one's possessions.           However, the Commission notes that, following the judgment of the House of Lords in the cases of Ross v. the Lord Advocate and Vincent v. the Trustee Savings Banks Central Board and Others, it was held that depositors with the various Trustee Savings Banks in the United Kingdom did not own the assets and liabilities of those banks, which belonged to the State.   The applicant contends that the judgment of the House of Lords is either wrong in law on this point, or that the words "the State" should be interpreted so as to include, inter alia, the applicant, with the result that his property rights were interfered with by the operation of the Trustee Savings Banks Act 1985.           The Commission recalls that in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its task is to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Contracting Parties in the Convention.   Accordingly, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of domestic law have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might hve involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.   The Commission refers, on this point, to its constant case-law (see e.g.   No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).   In the present case the Convention provides no reason to put in doubt the finding of English law that the bank in question was owned by the State.   It follows that this aspect of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       In addition, however, the Commission notes that the applicant contends that the effect of the judgment of the House of Lords may, on one interpretation, provide the applicant - as a member of the State - with property interests in the assets of the Trustee Savings Bank Northern Ireland beyond his deposit with that bank.   In this respect, the Commission recalls that in accordance with Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the rules of international law.           The applicant has not taken any proceedings to vindicate his claim.   In these circumstances he has failed to satisfy the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   It follows that this aspect of the complaint must be rejected in accordance with Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       Secretary to the Commission          President of the Commission                (H.C. KRÜGER)                        (C.A. NØRGAARD)