CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 12 décembre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12639/87                       by John VAUGHAN                       against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 12 December 1987, the following members being present:                MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission,              assisted by Mr.   J.P. Gardner           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 15 October 1986 by John Vaughan against the United Kingdom and registered on 30 December 1986 under file No. 12639/87;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts as they have been submitted by the applicant, a British citizen, born in 1949, currently unemployed and living in Liverpool, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant was married but is now divorced.   There are two children from that marriage: A, a boy, and B, a girl, born in about 1977 and 1978 respectively.           In the decree of divorce the applicant's wife was granted custody of the children and the applicant was accorded reasonable access to them.   By agreement, the children normally stay with the applicant each weekend.   It appears that there is, however, in force an injunction prohibiting the applicant from approaching his former wife's home and a requirement, that, whenever the children are delivered to or collected from her, this be done by a third party.   In order to collect the children, the applicant either sends a taxi for them or arranges for another adult to collect them and bring them by bus to his home and pays the attendant travel fares.   The distance between the two houses is approximately seven miles.   The applicant states that he is always responsible for making the travel arrangements and obtaining an independent person to accompany the children and that he receives no assistance in this from his former wife.   He states that it is clear from the various court orders made following the breakdown of his marriage that the court cannot make any further provision to ease the access situation.           The applicant, as he is unemployed, receives Supplementary Benefit.   Under Section 1(1) of the Supplementary Benefits Act 1976, he is entitled to benefit to meet his requirements.   Requirements are divided into three categories: normal, additional and housing.   The applicant regularly receives a sum for maintaining and feeding the children each weekend.   The applicant does not however receive a sum in respect of the travel expenses in relation to his children's visits to his home at weekends.   The items classified as additional requirements include, in defined circumstances, fares for regular visits to another person in hospital, but they do not include payments for fares of children travelling between the homes of divorced parents.   Under Section 3(1) payment can be made of "... supplementary benefit by way of a single payment ... to meet an exceptional need".           Under the Supplementary Benefit (Single Payments) Regulations 1981, a single payment can be made in respect of travelling expenses arising from a "domestic crisis" (Regulation 22(1)) and also a single payment may be made to meet an exceptional need where not otherwise provided for, if such payment "is the only means by which serious damage or serious risks to the health or safety of any member of the assessment unit may be prevented" (Regulation 30).           On 14 November 1984 the applicant made a claim to be paid the cost of fares for conveying his children to and from his home as an additional requirement.   This claim was rejected as it did not come within the items classified as additional requirements.           The Adjudication Officer also considered whether a series of payments could be made in respect of these fares under Section 3 of the 1976 Act and the Supplementary Benefit (Single Payments) Regulations 1981, but decided that they could not.           The applicant appealed against this decision to a Social Security Appeal Tribunal and thereafter to a Social Security Commissioner.   In both instances his appeal was turned down.   The applicant then appealed to the Court of Appeal.           Before the Court of Appeal the applicant submitted a statement from the Merseyside Chief Probation Officer, who made the following comments:           "(The applicant) is keen to have regular access to his         son and daughter, for whom he has a deep attachment.   (He)         has for several years been in receipt of DHSS benefit -         thus is of limited financial means.   In order to conform         with the access conditions imposed by the High Court he         sought assistance from Social Services and the Probation         Service - but neither were able to assist financially or by         providing transport for the children.   So (the applicant)         has been obliged to use a taxi to pick up and return the         children - at a weekly cost of some £6 now.   This factor -         bearing in mind his limited financial means - inevitably         places constraints on his capacity to enjoy legal access to         his children as allowed by the High Court...           I would support (the applicant) because I believe that he         has drawn attention to a major problem which needs rectifying.         It is vital that parents be enabled to enjoy legal access to         their children as permitted by the High Court - and it is         vital that limited financial means should not stand in the         way of this access.   The problem which (the applicant) is         highlighting is likely to increase as more and more parents         become unemployed and dependent on state benefits.           It would, therefore, be of great benefit to (the applicant)         and his children - and then to a great many other families         in similar circumstances - if the Court of Appeal were to         determine in favour of (him)."             The Court of Appeal, in examining the regulations which may have been relevant, rejected the applicant's contention that the words "exceptional need" covered the applicant's situation.   The Court of Appeal went on to state:           "In my judgment the phraseology 'single payment to meet an         exceptional need' makes it clear that an exceptional need is         to be distinguished from a regular, recurring need.   An         exceptional need may involve expenditure on a single         occasion - as on the purchase of bedding, or for fares for         a single journey - or may cover expenditure on several         occasions over a limited period to time, - e.g. for fares         for several journeys to visit a child who is with the other         parent pending a decision by the Court as to custody of         the child (Regulation 22(1)(c)).   But if the need does         involve expenditure on several occasions, it must be a need         which will come to an end after a limited, temporary period         if it is to satisfy the wording of the Act."             The Court of Appeal dismissed the applicant's appeal on 16 July 1986.   The applicant states that leave to appeal to the House of Lords was refused.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that as an unemployed person in receipt of Supplementary Benefit he is unable to recover the cost of travelling expenses incurred in picking up and delivering his children from and to his former wife's house.   He complains that the expenses incurred are unavoidable as there is in force an injunction preventing him from approaching his former wife's house and he states that the court cannot make any further orders to ease the access situation.   He complains that the courts have stated that it is in the children's best interest to maintain a relationship with both parents but that the State denies him the means by which he can afford the travel for his children.           The applicant further complains that he is discriminated against by comparison to those persons who seek reimbursement for regular visits to another person in hospital and also by comparison to the families of prisoners who receive assistance for access every 28 days in appropriate circumstances.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant's main complaint concerns the fact that, as an unemployed person in receipt of Supplementary Benefit, he is unable to recover as part of his Supplementary Benefit entitlement the cost of travelling expenses arising from his children's access visits.   He states that the courts have held that it is in the children's best interest to maintain a relationship with both parents, but that the State denies him the means by which he can afford the travel for his children.           The Commission however recalls that, under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-2) of the Convention, it is only the alleged violation of one of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention that can be the subject of an application.   The right to the reimbursement of travelling expenses as part of a social security entitlement is not as such included in the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.           Insofar as the applicant complains that there has been a violation of his right to respect for family life under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, the Commission considers that the right to respect for family life does not impose an obligation on States to provide financial assistance for the purpose of ensuring that individuals can enjoy family life to the fullest.           It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       Insofar as the applicant complains that he has been discriminated against contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, the Commission recalls that Article 14 (Art. 14) provides, so far as material:           "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth         in this Convention shall be secured without discrimination         on any ground such as ... property, birth or other status."             The Commission has already found that the right claimed by the applicant that he should be entitled to reimbursement of travelling expenses arising from his children's access visits is not one which is, as such, included among the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Convention.           The discrimination of which the applicant complains does not therefore concern the enjoyment of any of the rights and freedoms set forth in the Convention and no issue arises under Article 14 (Art. 14).           It follows that this part of the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       Secretary to the Commission               President of the Commission               (H.C. KRÜGER)                             (C.A. NØRGAARD)