CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 14 décembre 1987

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12033/86                       by Anders and Maria FREDIN                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 14 December 1987, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   J. CAMPINOS              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 5 March 1986 by Anders and Maria Fredin against Sweden and registered on 10 March 1986 under file N° 12033/86;           Having regard to:       _    the first report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure of the Commission;       _    the Commission's decision of 13 October 1986 to invite the         Government to submit written observations on the admissibility         and merits;       -    the Government's written observations dated 11 February 1987         and the applicants' observations in reply dated 28 April 1987;       -    the second report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure.             Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as they appear from the parties' submissions, may be summarised as follows.           The applicants are Mr.   Anders Fredin and his wife, Mrs.   Maria Fredin, born in 1944 and 1946 respectively.   They are Swedish citizens resident at Grödinge.   Mr.   Fredin is an agricultural engineer by profession.   The applicants are represented before the Commission by Mr.   Jan Axelsson, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.   The particular circumstances of the case           The applicants own a parcel of land called Ström 1:3 situated in the municipality of Botkyrka.   The piece of land has no economic value except as a gravel pit.   It has been exploited as such for more than one hundred years.   The present quantity of exploitable gravel is calculated at approximately 20 million tonnes with a total exploitable value of 30 million SEK.           On 11 December 1963 Mr.   Fredin's parents, who were then the owners of the property, were granted a permit to exploit gravel on the property.    The permit was required under the then applicable legislation and it was valid for a period of 30 years as from the date of its issue.   At that time, an owner of a gravel pit was entitled to compensation if a permit to exploit gravel from the property was refused.           The right to take gravel from the land was, at the time, let to a company.   The contract allowed the land-owners to take gravel for their own use.           Mr.   Anders Fredin acquired a fifth of the property on 4 September 1969 by gift from his mother, as did his sister and his brother.           By an Act (1973:311) which came into force on 1 July 1973 the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) was empowered to cancel permits more than ten years old.   By the same Act, the right to compensation was abolished.           On 31 July 1977, the applicants acquired the entire property in question.   The County Administrative Board was informed of the change in ownership.   The lease of the right to take gravel was still in force, but it ceased on 1 October 1979.   On 3 October 1979, the applicants reported to the County Administrative Board that they possessed the gravel exploitation rights and they asked for the permit to take gravel to be formally transferred to them.           On 30 May 1980, the County Administrative Board issued a permit allowing Mr.   Fredin to install shiploading equipment on the seashore adjacent to the gravel pit.   Mr.   Fredin built a quay with equipment at a cost of 1 million SEK.           On 1 June 1981, the County Administrative Board asked the applicants to pledge a financial security.           On 14 April 1983 the County Administrative Board of the Stockholm County transferred the exploitation permit to the applicants.           On 19 December 1984 the County Administrative Board, in view of the damages on the land and the environment, ordered that the exploitation of the gravel should cease as soon as possible.   The Board found however that a closing down period of three years was reasonable, and it fixed the permit to be valid until the end of 1987. It was stated that all the works on the gravel should be terminated and the area in question should be restored by the end of 1987.   The Board also ordered that the applicants should deposit a security of 200,000 SEK to safeguard restoration costs.           The applicants appealed to the Government.   In a decision of 12 December 1985 the Government rejected the appeal stating that they concurred with the County Administrative Board's assessment that the exploitation of the gravel at issue should be terminated and the gravel pit restored.   The Government ordered that the permit should be valid until 1 June 1988 and that the security for costs should be submitted to the County Administrative Board at the latest on 1 March 1986.   Relevant domestic law           The basic regulations on the protection of nature are laid down in the 1964 Nature Conservation Act (naturvårdslag).           It appears from Section 1 of the Act that the legislation is based on the Swedish legal principle that nature is accessible to everybody by virtue of the right of common access (allemansrätten) and that everybody must show due regard and circumspection in their dealings with nature.           Section 1 para. 3 provides that, if damage to nature is bound to result from an enterprise or in any other way, the necessary measures shall be taken to limit or counteract the damage.           Section 3 provides that, when deciding on questions relating to nature conservation, other public and private interests must be duly considered.           According to Section 18 of the Act, extraction of gravel (grustäkt) for other purposes than the domestic needs of the landowner may not be carried out without a permit (täkttillstånd) from the County Administrative Board.   The Board may require a party applying for an extraction permit to submit material showing the need for the exploitation as well as a properly detailed extraction plan (täktplan).           When issuing a permit, the Board shall prescribe the conditions required to restrict or counteract harmful effects of the enterprise upon the natural environment.   In order to ensure that the conditions prescribed will actually be fulfilled, the validity of a permit shall, in the absence of reasons to the contrary, be made conditional upon the pledging of a financial security.           If ten years have passed from the day on which an extraction permit acquired legal force, the Board may, according to Section 18 para. 4 of the Act, revoke the permit completely or in part or may combine it with revised conditions.   This provision was introduced by an amendment to the Act on 1 July 1973.   According to the transitional provisions, in respect of extraction permits existing at the time the amendment entered into force, i.e. on 1 July 1973, the ten years period was to be calculated as from that date.   By the same amendment, then existing provisions were also abolished, according to which a landowner, under certain circumstances, could be granted compensation in case he was refused an extraction permit.           Section 18 of the Act reads as follows:   (Swedish)   "Täkt av sten, grus, sand, lera, jord, torv eller andra jordarter för annat ändamål än markinnehavarens husbehov får ej ske utan länsstyrelsens tillstånd.   Vad nu sagts avser dock ej   ... .   Länsstyrelsen får förelägga den som söker täkttillstånd att, vid äventyr att ansökningen avvisas, lägga fram utredning som belyser behovet av täkten samt en täktplan av erforderlig omfattning.   Tillståndet skall förenas med de villkor som behövs för att begränsa eller motverka företagets menliga inverkan på naturmiljön.   Om ej särskilda skäl föranleder annat, skall tillstånd för sin giltighet göras beroende av att säkerhet ställs för sålunda föreskrivna villkor.   Visar sig sådan säkerhet otillräcklig, får länsstyrelsen föreskriva att tillståndet skall gälla endast om ytterligare säkerhet ställs.   Om fullgörandet av föreskriven åtgärd ankommer på annan än markens innehavare, är innehavaren skyldig tåla att åtgärden vidtages.   Har tio år förflutit från det täkttillstånd har vunnit laga kraft, får länsstyrelesen upphäva tillståndet helt eller delvis eller förena tillståndet med ändrade villkor.   Visar det sig att föreskrivna villkor inte i den utsträckning som behövs begränsar eller motverkar företagets menliga inverkan på naturmiljön, får länsstyrelsen före utgången av den angivna tiden förena tillståndet med de ytterligare villkor som behövs."   (English translation)   "Quarrying of stone, extraction of gravel, sand, clay, top soil, peat, or other types of earth for other purposes than domestic needs of the landowner may not be carried out without a permit from the County Administrative Board. The aforesaid shall not apply to ... .     The County Administrative Board may require a party applying for a quarrying or extraction permit to submit, on pain of the application being rejected, material showing the need for the quarrying or extraction and a properly detailed quarrying or extraction plan.   The permit shall be combined with the conditions necessary to restrict or counteract harmful effects of the enterprise upon the natural environment.   In the absence of special reasons to the contrary, the validity of a permit shall be conditional upon the pledging of a financial security, so as to ensure that the conditions prescribed are actually fulfilled.   If the security given proves to be inadequate, the County Administrative Board may order that the permit will become effective only if additional security is pledged.   If the fulfilment of a prescribed condition is incumbent on another party than the landowner, the latter must tolerate the measure being taken.   If ten years have passed from the day on which a quarrying or extraction permit acquired legal force, the County Administrative Board may revoke the permit completely or in part or may combine its renewal with revised conditions. If it becomes apparent that the conditions set do not sufficiently restrict or counteract the damaging effects that the activities may have on the natural environment, the County Administrative Board may, before the expiry of the stated period, make the permit subject to such additional conditions as may be necessary."           From Section 40 para. 2 of the Act, it appears that a decision taken by the County Administrative Board may be appealed to the Government.   No appeal lies against a decision of the Government.     COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants submit that the decision of the County Administrative Board, as upheld by the Government, constitutes an infringement of the applicants' rights to peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.   Since the property was made totally worthless by the cancellation of the exploitation permit, the order is tantamount to a deprivation of property rights, not the mere control of the use of that property.   In the applicants' opinion the order constitutes a deprivation of all fruitful and gainful use of the property without any compensation.   They allege a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   2.       The applicants submit that the right to take gravel from their property is a civil right and the obligation to deposit a bank guarantee is a civil obligation.   Since their only right of appeal was to the Government the applicants submit that they have been denied the right to a hearing by an independent tribunal as guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention.   3.       In their written observations of 28 April 1987 the applicants have further submitted that they were the victims of discrimination since the County Administrative Board treated their case differently from other cases concerning gravel pits in the region, allegedly on the ground that the applicants are the only independent operators in this area.   The applicants invoke Article 14 of the Convention together with Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 5 March 1986 and registered on 10 March 1986.           On 13 October 1986 the Commission decided to invite the respondent Government to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           The Government's observations were received by letter of 11 February 1987 after an extension of the time-limit for reply until 16 February 1987 and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 28 April 1987 after an extension of the time-limit until 30 April 1987.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.       The Government   1.       The facts           The Government recall that the extraction permit was granted to the then owners of the property and, accordingly, not the applicants.   By a decision of the County Administrative Board on 14 April 1983, the permit was transferred to the applicants and also made conditional upon the pledging of a financial security to the amount of 75.000 SEK. Furthermore, by the same decision the applicants were notified, among other things, that in the course of 1983 the Board intended to reconsider the extraction permit and consider the cessation of the exploitation in view of the amendment of 1 July 1973 to the Nature Conservation Act.           On 25 August 1983 the Board notified the applicants that, due to the interest of preserving nature in the area and, in addition, since there was no need for pursuing the exploitation, it intended to reconsider the extraction permit.   The applicants were accordingly ordered to provide a revised extraction plan, and certain instructions were given as to the cessation of the exploitation.           During the autumn of 1983, an inspection on the spot was made of the applicants' exploitation enterprise.   According to the minutes of the inspection, dated 26 October 1983, some of the instructions mentioned above had not been complied with.           In a memorandum issued on 14 May 1984, the County Administrative Board presented two possible alternatives for the cessation of the applicants' exploitation enterprise.   According to one of the alternatives, the extraction was to be discontinued as soon as possible.   The other alternative envisaged the exploitation to continue for another couple of years.   The first applicant, Mr.   Fredin, and the National Environment Protection Board (naturvårdsverket), among others, were given an opportunity of commenting on the memorandum.   In its comments of 18 September 1984, the National Environment Protection Board, being responsible on the national level for the supervision of nature conservation, stated that, in view of the harmful effects of the enterprise upon the natural environment, the exploitation should be discontinued as soon as possible.   Despite this opinion, which was also the view held by the County Administrative Board itself, the Board decided, referring to, among other things, the view of the applicants, that they should be granted another three years in order to afford them reasonable time for the winding up of the enterprise.   2.       The admissibility           The Government have no objection to make as far as the domestic remedies rule and the six months rule of Article 26 of the Convention are concerned.           However, the Government submit that the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the Convention for falling outside the scope of the Convention and that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 should be rejected for being manifestly ill-founded.   The reasons are set out below.   3.       The merits           3.1   Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           When acceding to the Convention, the Government were convinced that proceedings, like the present ones, in the field of public or administrative law, which are dominated by considerations of public interest and determined principally by considerations of policy, would not come within the scope of Article 6 para. 1.   In the Government's view such an interpretation is well in line with the wording of the text and is also supported by the travaux préparatoires.   Furthermore, in view of the legal systems of many States Party to the Convention, there are good reasons for assuming that Article 6 para. 1 was not intended to encompass proceedings of the kind now considered.           However, the majority of the members of the Court has taken a different view.   By gradually widening the scope of Article 6 para. 1, this majority has construed wide areas of what has traditionally been recognised as public or administrative law to involve the "determination of civil rights".   In the course of this development, the Court has been faced with a number of cases that have concerned activities entirely or partly carried on in the private sector although carefully regulated and supervised by the State in the public interest.   Although this development has yielded a few guidelines for the interpretation of the concept of "the determination of civil rights", the Court has not yet laid down a general and all-encompassing definition of the concept.   Instead, the Court has solved the issues presented on a case-by-case basis, essentially by considering the particulars of each case in view of a few vague and generally phrased principles and, on occasions, by engaging in an over-all evaluation of the relative cogency of the features of public law and private law present in the case.           In the Government's opinion, the Court's approach has left the Contracting States with a considerable uncertainty as to what will ultimately be the scope of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           The Government are well aware that precedents could easily be referred to which at first glance would seem to suggest that also the present case would come within the scope of Article 6 para. 1.   It may suffice to refer to the Court's reasoning in the Benthem case (Eur. Court H.R., Benthem judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A no. 97). However, having considered the particulars of the present case in the light of previous case-law, the Government have come to the conclusion that the facts of the case warrant a different outcome, i.e. that Article 6, para. 1 be found not to be applicable.           At the outset, the Government observe that Article 6 para. 1 does not apply to the determination of civil rights and obligations which are not recognised under domestic law.   Consequently, it does not offer any guarantee as to the content of such rights and obligations in the substantive law of the Contracting States, and it does not require that there be a national court with competence to invalidate or override national law (see Eur.   Court H.R., James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 46, para. 81). Accordingly, in case of the taking of property or the imposition of restrictions on the use of property, Article 6 para. 1 does not require a court review of the very entitlement to take the property or to restrict the use of it in so far as the taking and the restrictions are in conformity with the national legislation.           Furthermore, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently held that for a case to come within the scope of Article 6 para. 1, it has to involve a "contestation" (dispute) within the meaning of that Article.   The dispute must concern "civil rights and obligations", i.e. such rights and obligations "must be the object - or one of the objects - of the dispute", "a tenuous connection" being insufficient.   Furthermore, the dispute must be "genuine and of a serious nature" and may concern "questions of fact" or "questions of law" (see e.g. the Benthem case, loc. cit., p. 15, para. 32).   While further clarification would seem desirable as to the requirements that "civil rights and obligations (be) the object - or one of the objects - of the dispute" and that the dispute be "genuine and of a serious nature", the meaning of the requirement that the dispute concern "questions of fact" or "questions of law" would seem to be reasonably clear.   In the Government's opinion, this could only mean that, for Article 6 to be applicable, at least one of two conditions need to be met:   either there has to be a disagreement as to the facts on which the disputed decision is based, or there has to be a disagreement concerning the legal basis for the decision.           Consistent with this conclusion, where the Court has not found such a disagreement on questions of fact or questions of law to be present, it has held Article 6 para. 1 not to be applicable (see Eur. Court H.R., van Marle and Others judgment of 26 June 1986, pp. 11-12, paras. 33 - 37).   Furthermore, when considering the character of the disagreements involved, i.e.   whether they concern "questions of fact" or "questions of law", only such disagreements which are explicitly invoked before the Convention institutions would appear to be relevant.           In the present case, the complaint under Article 6 of the Convention is based on mere statements that "the right to take gravel from (the) property is a civil right" and "the obligation to deposit a bank guarantee is a civil obligation".   Furthermore, the only facts invoked in respect of the disputed decision are the legislation that entered into force on 1 July 1973 and the orders that the exploitation be discontinued and that a bank guarantee be pledged.           Accordingly, it does not appear from the application whether it is based on an assumption that Article 6 para. 1 guarantees a right to have any infringement on the right of property examined by a court, regardless of the national legislation, or if the applicants consider the orders that the exploitation be discontinued and a bank guarantee be pledged unjustified under Swedish law.           If the application is based on the first assumption, the Government submit that it falls outside the scope of this provision, since the scope of this provision extends only to disputes over rights and obligations which are recognised under domestic law.   To take another view would in the Government's opinion lead to unreasonable consequences.   Thus, the justification of any legal provision affecting in one way or another the right of use of property would need to be subject to court review.   No such requirement could be read into Article 6 para. 1.           Also in case the complaint is viewed as being based on the other line of reasoning indicated above, the Government take the position that it falls outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1.   For a case to come within the scope of this provision, it has to involve a dispute concerning "questions of fact" or "questions of law". Furthermore, this dispute has to be "genuine and of a serious nature", and "civil rights and obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the dispute".   As follows from what has been said above, no "dispute" appears to have been invoked in the complaint as submitted to the Commission.   Moreover, even if one were to assume the existence of a "dispute", there is nothing in the complaint brought before the Commission that would justify the conclusion that this "dispute" concerns "questions of fact" or "questions of law", that it is "genuine and of a serious nature" and that "civil rights and obligations are the object - or one of the objects - of the dispute". Admittedly, in the disputed decision by the Government of 12 December 1985, there is an indication as to the existence of disagreements on questions of law in respect of "certain instructions" contained in the decision of the County Administrative Board of 19 December 1984. However, these points are not pursued before the Commission and, therefore, should not be of any relevance for the consideration of the present issue.   Besides, there is nothing in the Government's decision as such, or in any other document submitted to the Commission, which could yield any conclusion as to whether the dispute was "genuine and of a serious nature" as required under Article 6 para. 1.   Moreover, there is nothing that points to the relation between the disagreements indicated and the rights and obligations invoked before the Commission. In other words, in the Government's opinion there is no basis for concluding that the rights and obligations referred to in the complaint were indeed "the object - or one of the objects -" of the disagreements as is required under Article 6 para. 1.           In this context the Government add that the complaint would in their opinion seem to concern, in essence, what the applicants consider to be an incorrect assessment of the interest of preserving nature at the expense of their own interests.   Such an assessment is closely intertwined with and, moreover, directly dependent on policy considerations as regards, among other things, the future location of for instance residential areas, industrial plants and parks or other facilities for outdoor recreation activities of the public.   Although an assessment of this kind may also touch on questions of fact and of law susceptible of judicial scrutiny, there is in the Government's opinion nothing to indicate that this is so in the present case.   This being so, the Government submit that the assessment made by the authorities in this case is as "far removed from the exercise of the normal judicial function" as was the assessment involved in the case of van Marle and Others, and disagreements which the European Court found not to be covered by the safeguards of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           To sum up, the Government submit that this part of the complaint falls outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention since it does not involve any "contestation" (dispute) over "civil rights and obligations" within the meaning of this provision.           In case the Commission would consider Article 6 para. 1 to be applicable, the Government admit that the applicants did not have the benefit of a procedure meeting the requirements of this provision.           3.2   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1           The Government admit that the disputed decision amounted to an interference with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their property.   The legislation applied and the measures taken constitute in the Government's view a control of the use of property within the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 1.   The Government do not share the applicants' view that the second sentence of the first paragraph is applicable, i.e. that the applicants were deprived of the property.   The Court has explicitly found the scope of that provision to be limited to the situation where someone is "deprived of ownership" (see Eur.   Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 29, para. 62).   Furthermore, the Court found the second paragraph, but not the second sentence of the first paragraph, applicable in a situation involving a deprivation of property since the deprivation "formed a constituent element of the procedure for the control of the use" of the property (Eur.   Court H.R., Agosi judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 17, para. 51).           In the present case it is clear that the relevant legislation was enacted for the only purpose of controlling the use of property and also that no other reasons were behind the measures actually taken.   Accordingly, the only issue before the Commission is whether the measures taken are justified under the second paragraph as construed in light of the general principle of the peaceful enjoyment of possessions contained in the first sentence of the first paragraph.           Under the second paragraph, a State is entitled to "enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest".   This paragraph, unlike a number of other provisions of the Convention, sets the Contracting States up as sole judges of the "necessity" for an interference (see e.g. the Handyside judgment, loc. cit., p. 29, para. 62).   Thus, in respect of the second paragraph, the only questions to be considered by the Commission are whether the measures taken constituted law enforcement and, if so, whether the law enforced was dictated by "the general interest".   The disputed measures were taken in accordance with Section 18 of the Nature Conservation Act and, furthermore, the policy goal underlying the Act is to preserve nature in the interest of the public.   In view of this, the Government maintain that both questions have to be answered in the affirmative.   The Government also observe that no other opinion seems to have been expressed by the applicants before the Commission.           The requirement that the second paragraph be construed in the light of the general principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property has been construed by the Court to mean that there must also exist "a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised" (Agosi judgment, loc. cit., p. 18, para. 52).   In other words, an interference will not be found justified unless a "fair balance" has been struck between the demands of the general interest at stake and the interest of the individual or individuals concerned.           When considering the requirement of a "fair balance" in the context of the deprivation of property, the Court has construed it to mean that any interference, in order to be justified under the second sentence of the first paragraph, need to be "both appropriate for achieving its aim and not disproportionate thereto" and that, accordingly, the balance will not be found in case the individual concerned would have to bear "an individual and excessive burden" (James and Others judgment, loc. cit., p. 34, para. 50).   In the Government's opinion this reasoning would seem to be relevant also in respect of the concept of "the general interest", at least in the sense that the State should not be afforded less latitude to control the use of an individual's property than to take it away from him.   As for the present case, this would appear to call for an examination of, firstly, whether the measures taken in themselves were appropriate in view of the aim sought to be achieved and, secondly, whether the interest of the applicants was sufficiently taken into account.           The Government firstly observe that the interest of preserving nature as a national asset is commonly recognised in all Contracting States.   Evidently, such a policy could scarcely be pursued without imposing appropriate restrictions on the use of property. The framing and administration of such restrictions naturally offers a variety of possible measures to be taken, some of which necessarily imply even serious interferences with the individual's right to property.           As regards the choice between such possible measures, the concept "in accordance with the general interest" clearly suggests that the discretion afforded to the States is considerably wider in scope than under other similar provisions of the Convention, for instance Articles 8 - 10, employing the notion "necessary in a democratic society".   The Court has also explicitly recognised that in respect of such choices the Contracting States enjoy "a wide margin of appreciation" (Agosi judgment, loc. cit., p. 18, para. 52).           Given the wide discretion thus afforded to the Contracting States as regards the particular measures to be taken in order to implement legitimate policy goals, it could not, in the Government's opinion, reasonably be questioned that the measures taken in the present case were not appropriate in view of the goals sought to be achieved.           What remains to be considered is the question whether the measures taken could be considered disproportionate in view of the policy goals sought to be achieved or, in other words, whether in the circumstances the interest of the applicants was insufficiently taken into account.   For the following reasons, the Government maintain that this was not the case.           The implementation of policy goals such as those now in question is bound almost by necessity to affect in one way or another individuals' rights to their property and on occasions even place considerable restrictions on their right to use their property.   Also in this respect, the Court has granted the State concerned "a wide margin of appreciation" in ascertaining whether such restrictions are justified in view of the general interest concerned (Agosi judgment, loc. cit., p. 18, para. 52).   Again, in the Government's opinion, the Court's reasoning in dealing with the concept of "the public interest", referred to in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1, is relevant also in the present context.   In construing that concept, the Court has recognised that it is for the national legislator to take the policy decision as to what burdens should ultimately be placed on its citizens for the benefit of society at large, and also that this implies that on occasions some "anomalies" must be accepted.   Against this background the Court has viewed its function as being limited merely to reassuring that the measures taken will not be "so unreasonable as to be outside the State's margin of appreciation" (James and Others judgment, loc. cit., p. 42, para. 69).           The Government maintain that, given the general interest at stake, the measures taken are justified under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   In particular, the Government point to the extent to which the interest of the individual has been taken into account both in the legislation as such and in its application to the present case.   The provision according to which a permit could be revoked, if ten years had passed from the day on which it acquired legal force, entered into force on 1 July 1973.   However, those holding a permit at that time were already by the legislator given a transitional period of ten years during which they could make use of the permit.   Furthermore, when deciding on 19 December 1984 that the exploitation on the applicants' property was to cease, the County Administrative Board fixed the permit to expire by the end of 1987, a date subsequently changed by the Government to 1 June 1988, although in the Board's opinion, which was shared by the National Environment Protection Board, it would have been preferable in view of the interest of preserving nature to have the exploitation discontinued in accordance with the more speedy alternative considered.           In the Government's opinion what has been said above demonstrates the justification of the measures taken under the terms of the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   The Government add that, when considering whether the interest of the individual has sufficiently been taken into account, due weight should also be placed on the reasonable and legitimate expectations of the individual in respect of the future use of his property.   It almost goes without saying that in order for such expectations to be "reasonable and legitimate", they have to be the result of considerations not only of the actual potential of the property as such and the interest of the individual himself, but also of the relevant legislation and the interest of others.           In the present case, the relevant legislation had been in force for several years when the applicants acquired the property. Accordingly, they could not have been unaware of the uncertainty as to whether they would be allowed to continue the exploitation subsequent to the expiration of the transitional period.   Furthermore, when the permit was transferred to them, only some two months remained of that period, and they were promptly notified that within a short time the holding of the permit was to be reconsidered.   Under these circumstances, the Government maintain that the measures taken by the authorities can- not be considered to have frustrated any reasonable and legitimate expectations of the applicants in respect of the future use of the property.           The Government submit for these reasons that the interference was justified under the conditions laid down in the second paragraph of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.   Consequently, the Government maintain that, viewed under this provision, the complaint is manifestly ill-founded.           In case the Commission would consider the second sentence of the first paragraph, rather than the second paragraph, of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to be applicable, the Government add the following.   The measures concerned have been taken in the public interest and subject to conditions provided for by law.   As in respect of the second paragraph, the European Court of Human Rights, when construing the second sentence of the first paragraph in the light of the general principle of the peaceful enjoyment of property, has concluded that an interference would not be found justified unless a "fair balance" has been struck between the demands of the public interest concerned and the requirements of protecting the individual's fundamental rights. In principle the same standards are to be applied when considering whether a fair balance has been struck in case of the deprivation of property as in the case of controlling the use of property.   It is for the national legislator to take the policy decision as to what burdens should ultimately be placed on its citizens for the benefit of society at large and, accordingly, the function of the Convention institutions is limited to ensuring that the measures taken will not be "so unreasonable as to be outside the State's margin of appreciation".   In view of this, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded even if considered on the basis of the conditions laid down in the second sentence of the first paragraph of Article 1.   4.       Conclusions           The position of the Government is           concerning the admissibility:           that the application should be declared inadmissible, in so far as it concerns Article 6 of the Convention, for falling outside the scope of the Convention, and in so far as it concerns Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, for being manifestly ill-founded, and           concerning the merits:           that there has been no violation of the Convention or of Protocol No. 1.   B.       The applicants           1.   The facts           The applicants observe that, before Swedish law introduced the obligation to obtain a permit in order to extract gravel, an owner of a property could not be prevented from taking gravel from his property as long as he did not dispose of his property or was deprived of it.           After the introduction of an obligation to obtain permit to extract gravel, the law was based on the principle that a refusal of such a permit implied a deprivation of a property right.   This is the reason for the provision that an owner was entitled to compensation for the loss of income, even prospective income, if a permit was refused.           However, a new approach was brought into Swedish legislation with regard to compensation in case of restrictions placed on the use of property or the taking of property.   A common feature of this new legislation was that, in principle, a land-owner should not be able to claim compensation for such value of his property as related exclusively to the prospects of future development or other changes in the use of land.   The applicants agree that it was in keeping with this new approach that the 1973 amendments to the Act abolished the right to compensation when a land-owner was refused a permit to start up a gravel pit.   Without expressing themselves on the question as to whether such a refusal of compensation is in compliance with the Convention, the applicants contend that the refusal of compensation in the case where a valid permit is revoked is a different matter.   The owner of the gravel pit does not regard "such value of his property as related exclusively to the prospects of future development or other changes in the use of land".   It is on the contrary a question of a loss of the value of investment already made and of income from an existing business enterprise into which he has already put that investment.   The applicants observe that, while reasons for not granting compensation to land-owners who had been refused a permit are elaborately stated in the Government's Bill, no corresponding reasons are stated with regard to the case where a valid permit is revoked, causing loss of investments and a going business enterprise.           On two occasions, on 8 October 1981 and 2 April 1982, the County Administrative Board made an inspection of the applicant's gravel pit.   At no time was there any mention of an intention to revoke the permit.           On 14 April 1983, the County Administrative Board changed the decision issuing the original permit making the applicants holders of the permit.   That meant that their parents were released from all responsibilities for the extraction of gravel and that the applicants could continue to take gravel without needing the consent of their parents as holders of the permit.   Up to the date of this decision, the applicants were able, without contravening the law, to exploit the gravel pit under the permit granted to their parents since the activity was carried out with their parents' consent.           In June 1983, the County Administrative Board advised the applicants about the installation of very expensive asphalt works. On 25 August 1983, the Board invited the applicants to comment on a letter stating for the first time during the procedure that the Board wanted the gravel pit to be closed down.           Since 1973, the applicants earn their living from their farm of Kagghamra.   Mr.   Fredin runs the farm, doing all the various kinds of farm work with the help of one employee and extra help in busy periods.   The gravel pit is run by Mr.   Fredin with three employees during the warm season, when the pit is running.   The investment by Mr.   Fredin in the gravel exploitation enterprise is about 4 million SEK.   More than 90 % is borrowed money.           2.   Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           The applicants object to the statement of the Government that the case-