CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 8 mars 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 11450/85                       by Christer WALLIN                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 8 March 1988, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 30 November 1984 by Christer Wallin against Sweden and registered on 18 March 1985 under file N° 11450/85;             Having regard to;     -      the first report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure of the Convention;     -      the Commission's decision of 5 May 1986 to adjourn the         examination of the case;     -      the second report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure;     -      the Commission's decision of 16 July 1986 to communicate the         application to the respondent Government for written observations         on the admissibility and merits;     -      the Government's observations dated 16 October 1986;     -      the applicant's observations dated 9 December 1986;     -      the third report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of         Procedure.           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1943 and resident at Uppsala.   He is an electrician by profession.           Particular facts of the case           The applicant was employed by a company in Uppsala from 1974 to 31 May 1976 when he was dismissed.   The applicant did not find the dismissal fair and proceedings against the company were brought on his behalf by his trade union.           In a decision of 8 November 1976 the Labour Court (arbetsdomstolen) ordered that the applicant should be considered as employed by the company until the final decision had been given. This decision was followed by a judgment of 4 January 1977 in which the Court declared that the dismissal of the applicant was null and void.           However, the company refused to reinstate the applicant in his employment.   Following negotiations a friendly settlement was achieved on 10 January 1977 according to which the applicant was paid 90,000 SEK in compensation as full and final settlement of the matter.           On 22 October 1979 the applicant submitted a request to the Social Insurance Office (allmänna försäkringskassan) that his income qualifying for sickness benefits (sjukpenninggrundande inkomst, hereinafter, "SGI") be raised from 64.800 SEK to 85.920 SEK as if he had still been employed as an electrician.   The Office obtained information from the applicant's former employer and further observations from the applicant.   Such information was submitted on 8 November 1979 and 13 March 1980.           On 8 May 1980 the Social Insurance Office of Uppsala decided that the applicant should remain insured for a SGI of 64,800 SEK.   The decision contained a notice of appeal.   It stated that any appeal should be made in writing and within a time-limit of two months from receipt of the decision.   The letter of appeal should be sent to the Social Insurance Office, which was to transmit it to the Social Insurance Court.           On 19 May 1980 the applicant requested, over the telephone, that the Social Insurance Office reconsider the decision of 8 May 1980. He stated that he intended to prove that information submitted by his former employer was incorrect.   On 22 May the applicant appeared at the office and delivered certain documents and gave some oral information concerning his case.           On 30 June 1980 the Social Insurance Office amended the SGI to 77,500 SEK as from 21 November 1979 in application of the special provisions concerning correction of previous decisions laid down in Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act (lagen om allmän försäkring).           On 11 July 1980 the applicant appealed to the Social Insurance Court for Central Sweden (försäkringsrätten för mellansverige).   The letter of appeal was filed with the Social Insurance Office on 14 July 1980.   The Office submitted its opinion to the Court in a letter dated 5 September 1980, together with the appeal.   In the letter the Office stated that it had examined the applicant's appeal under Chapter 20 Sections 10 and 11 of the Social Insurance Act, but found no reason to amend its previous decision.   The Office proposed that the appeal be rejected.   The appeal reached the Court on 11 September 1980.           On 17 October 1980, the Court transmitted the letter from the Social Insurance Office to the applicant for comments.   The applicant submitted his comments by a letter of 29 October 1980.           On 18 January 1983 the Social Insurance Court examined the applicant's appeal.   It decided to obtain information from three different sources.   By a letter of 21 January 1983 the Social Insurance Court asked the Social Insurance Office for details about the applicant's sick leave between May 1976 and June 1980.   This request was answered by a letter of 27 January 1983.   The Court also obtained information from the Employment Office (arbetsförmedlingen) of Uppsala.   The reply of the Office was dated 2 February 1983.   The Court finally requested information from the Swedish Factory Workers Union (svenska fabriksarbetareförbundet) which replied by letter of 10 February 1983.           By letter of 14 February 1983 the Court transmitted the three last-mentioned replies to the applicant for comments.   The applicant submitted his comments by a letter of 23 February 1983.           In a judgment of 19 May 1983 the Social Insurance Court rejected the applicant's appeal stating that the conditions laid down in Chapter 20 Section 10, for correction of the previous decision of the Social Insurance Office, were not fulfilled.   In the reasons the Court stated inter alia:   "Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act in its wording before 1 April 1982 provided that the Social Insurance Office should amend a decision by the Office, which had not been examined by the Social Insurance Court, inter alia if the decision had become incorrect as a result of obvious misapplication of the law or other similar reason.   In the preparatory works to the said provision the responsible Minister stated (Government Bill No. 1977/78:95) that an amendment on this basis could be made also when the Office in its decision had made a mistake concerning case-law, provided that it was a question of settled case-law.     ...   In view of the above the Social Insurance Court finds that the Social Insurance Office's decisions to let (the applicant) keep his SGI of 64,800 SEK, following the information given by (the applicant) concerning his income during 1976-1978, have not become incorrect as a result of an obvious misapplication of the law or other similar reason.   Moreover, the Court considers that there is no other basis in Chapter 20 Section 10 ... to fix (the applicant's) SGI at a higher amount than 64,800 SEK before 21 November 1979.   As regards the determination of the (the applicant's) SGI following the income report which was submitted to the Insurance Office on 22 October 1979, it is true that the information supplied by the Swedish Factory Workers Union supports the assumption that (the applicant's) SGI from 21 November 1979 ought to have been fixed at a higher amount than 77,500 SEK.   However, the Court finds that, in this respect, there is no error as required for an amendment under (Chapter 20 Section 10)."           The applicant appealed to the Supreme Insurance Court (försäkringsöverdomstolen), which on 12 June 1984 refused to grant leave to appeal.           The applicant then submitted a request to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) for review (resning) of the above decision of the Supreme Insurance Court.   On 21 February 1986 the Supreme Administrative Court decided not to grant the applicant's request.           Relevant legal provisions           The most significant forms of social insurance schemes are the health insurance scheme (sjukförsäkring), the basic pension scheme (folkpensionering) and the supplementary pension scheme (tilläggspensionering).   These are governed by the 1962 Social Insurance Act which, insofar as relevant to the present case, contained the following provisions.           According to Chapter 1 Section 2 of the Act, the national insurance scheme is administered by the National Social Insurance Board (riksförsäkringsverket), the Social Insurance Offices and local authorities to be designated by the Government.   The National Social Insurance Board, which supervises the implementation of the scheme, is a central Government authority.   As regards the organisational structure and the decision-making process of the Social Insurance Offices, the following may be noted.           There shall be an Office for every County Council district (landstingsområde) and for every Municipality (kommun) not represented on a County Council.   A board of management is charged with the duty of deciding on any matter with which the Social Insurance Office is required to deal.   The board of management shall consist of a chairman and a vice-chairman, appointed by the Government, and four additional members, appointed by the County Council (landsting) or, in case of an office the jurisdiction of which embraces only one Municipality, by the Municipal Council (kommunfullmäktige).   Any person may be appointed member of the board of management, provided only that he is a Swedish national and that he is not a minor and has not been declared lacking legal capacity.   The board of management may delegate to a member of the board or an officer of the office the power to take decisions on behalf of the board.   The officers are appointed by the National Social Insurance Board or by the office itself.           According to Chapter 1 Section 4 every person insured under the Act is to be registered with a Social Insurance Office by the month at which he or she reaches the age of 16.   Everyone thus registered is entitled to sickness benefits under the insurance scheme provided that his income qualifying for sickness benefits amounts to a minimum of 6,000 SEK, or that he or she is married and lives permanently together with his or her spouse, or that he or she lives permanently together with a child under the age of 16 of his or her own, of his or her spouse, or of someone else to whom he or she has been married or with whom he or she has had a child.           The concept of income qualifying for sickness benefits (SGI) is defined in Chapter 3 Section 2 of the Act.   In principle, this income is supposed to correspond to the annual income, including certain non-monetary benefits, expected to be earned by the insured person from his own work as an employee or otherwise.   According to the same Section, the SGI is to be determined by the Social Insurance Office. Unless the relevant facts are known to the Office, this determination is based on information procured from, among other sources, the insured person himself or his employer.   The determination is made when the insured person is registered with the Office and is from then on reconsidered any time the insured person's income undergoes changes affecting his right to such benefits.           According to Chapter 3 Section 4 sickness benefits are calculated on the basis of the SGI and are, in principle, supposed to correspond to 90 percent of that income.   As for persons not having such SGI the same Section provides for benefits in the form of a fixed amount per day.           Sickness benefits may affect other benefits provided for in the Act.   Thus, supplementary pension is calculated on the basis of the concept of pensionable income (pensionsgrundande inkomst), which income by definition includes sickness benefits.           The health insurance scheme is financed out of Government subsidies and charges levied not on any employee in his capacity of insured under the scheme but on employers in general.   The charges are levied in accordance with legal provisions regulating the financing of not only the health insurance scheme but also a variety of other social services, such as for instance basic pensions and child care. The assessment and collection of the charges are administered by the tax authorities under essentially the same legal framework as that governing the collection of taxes.   The public authorities charged with the implementation of the health insurance scheme are not concerned with the financing of the scheme.   Failures in the fulfilment of obligations related to the financing do not affect the rights of those entitled to benefits under the scheme.           The Social Insurance Office's determination of SGI may, according to Chapter 20 Section 11 of the Act, be appealed to a Social Insurance Court.   The appeal, which has to be made in writing, is to be lodged with the Social Insurance Office within two months from the receipt of the decision.           In case an appeal is lodged by a private party the Social Insurance Office shall, before the case is brought before the Social Insurance Court, reconsider the decision appealed against and may change it, provided this be done fully in accordance with what has been requested by the complainant (Chapter 20 Section 11).   If such a change is made, the appeal shall be dismissed.   Otherwise the appeal shall be brought before the Social Insurance Court together with a statement of opinion by the Social Insurance Office.           Section 11 reads:   "An appeal against a decision of a Social Insurance Office or the National Social Insurance Board may be lodged with the Social Insurance Court.     ...   When an appeal has been lodged by an individual, the Office shall reconsider the decision concerned even if there is not such a reason for a change of the decision as indicated in Section 10 first paragraph.   Any amendment of the decision may only be made if it conforms with the applicant's claim. If such an amendment is made, the appeal should be considered to have become invalid.   Otherwise, the Office should transmit the appeal to the Social Insurance Court together with a statement of its opinion on the appeal."           A decision taken by the Social Insurance Court may, according to provisions in the 1971 Act on Administrative Court Procedure (förvaltningsprocesslagen), be appealed to the Supreme Social Insurance Court.           In addition to an ordinary appeal the Social Insurance Act provides, in Chapter 20 Section 10, that the Social Insurance Office may change a previous decision of its own for the purpose of correcting certain specified, obvious defects of the previous decision.           Chapter 20 Section 10 paras. 1 and 2 of the Social Insurance Act in its wording before 1 April 1982 reads as follows:           "A Social Insurance Office shall amend a decision in a         matter of insurance according to this Act which has been         taken by the Social Insurance Office and has not been examined         by a Social Insurance Court,           1.       if, on account of a writing error, a miscalculation         or other similar inadvertence, the decision contains an obvious         mistake,           2.       if the decision has become incorrect as a result         of being based on an obviously wrong or incomplete         foundation,           3.       if the decision has become incorrect as a result         of an obvious misapplication of the law or other similar         reason,           (The Office may decide not to amend the decision) if the         incorrectness of the decision is of a minor importance."           The question of changing a decision under this provision should, in principle, be raised within two years from the day the decision was taken.   However, if it only appears after the two years have elapsed that the decision was taken on the basis of material obviously incorrect or incomplete, or if other extraordinary reasons call for a change, a decision may be changed without regard to any such time limit.   The amendment of a decision under this provision is an action to be taken ex officio by the Social Insurance Office, although, of course, a private party may draw the Office's attention to a defect calling for such an action.   A decision taken in accordance with this provision may be appealed against as outlined above.           The rules governing the procedure in the Social Insurance Court are laid down mainly in the Act on Administrative Court Procedure.           Section 9 para. 1 provides that the proceedings should be conducted in writing.   However, according to the second paragraph an oral hearing may be held regarding a particular issue if this would be advantageous to the examination or would further a speedy determination of the case.   Moreover, under the third paragraph, such a hearing is mandatory in proceedings before the Social Insurance Court when requested by a private party, provided only that the hearing is not unnecessary and that there are no particular reasons against holding an oral hearing.           Before a case is finally decided upon, each party shall have been informed of all material presented in the case by anyone else than the party himself and have been given an opportunity to comment on it.           The principle of general access to official documents is laid down in Chapter 2 Section 1 of the 1949 Freedom of the Press Act (tryckfrihetsförordning).   Under this principle, everyone shall as a general rule have free access to official documents kept by Swedish authorities and courts.   Exceptions to this rule are contained in the 1980 Secrecy Act (sekretesslag).   Under Chapter 7 Section 7 of that Act secrecy shall apply within any Social Insurance Office and any Social Insurance Court in respect of any information about an individual's condition of health or other personal circumstances, if it can be assumed that the individual whom the information concerns or a person closely related to him would be harmed should the information be disclosed.   However, according to Chapter 14 Section 4 of the same Act, secrecy for the protection of a private individual shall not apply in relation to the individual himself and may in relation to others be waived by him.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant states that following the judgment of the Labour Court it was established that he was to be regarded as employed in his previous work.   Nevertheless, when the Social Insurance Office determined the SGI he was treated as if he had been dismissed on 31 May 1976.   The applicant complains that, consequently, the Social Insurance Office denied him a right recognised by the judgment of the Labour Court.           The applicant complains that his case has been dealt with by the Insurance Courts in a manner which is contrary to Article 6 of the Convention.   In particular, the proceedings were not public and the tribunals not impartial.   Furthermore, his case was not determined within a "reasonable time".   The applicant also invokes Article 13 of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 30 November 1984 and registered on 18 March 1985.           On 5 May 1986 the Commission, after having examined the admissibility of the application, decided to adjourn its examination of the case.           On 16 July 1986 the Commission decided pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits.           The Government's observations were dated 16 October 1986 and the applicant's observations in reply were dated 9 December 1986.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.       The Government   1.       The facts           The Government point out that no appeal was ever brought against the decision of the Social Insurance Office of 8 May 1980. The only appeal brought by the applicant, i.e. the appeal filed with the Office on 14 July 1980, did explicitly and exclusively refer to the "decision of the Social Insurance Office of Uppsala of 30 June 1980 concerning the changing of income qualifying for sickness benefits". Moreover, the scope of the proceedings initiated by that appeal was limited to the issue of whether the extraordinary reasons for changing a decision contained in Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act were at hand.   Finally, at no time during the proceedings before the Social Insurance Court did the applicant request an oral hearing.   2.       The admissibility           The Government have no objection to make as far as the six months rule laid down in Article 26 of the Convention is concerned.           However, the Government submit that the complaint should be declared inadmissible on the ground that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 of the Convention. Alternatively, the Government maintain that the complaint in respect 11450/85   of Article 6 para. 1 should be rejected as being incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention, or for being manifestly ill-founded, and that the complaint under Article 13 should be rejected for falling outside the scope of the Convention.           They submit that the applicant's dissatisfaction concerns the determination of his SGI.   It was determined by the Social Insurance Office of Uppsala by its decision of 8 May 1980.   This decision could have been appealed within two months to the Social Insurance Court for Central Sweden and, ultimately, to the Supreme Social Insurance Court. However, no such appeal was brought by the applicant.   Under these circumstances the Government maintain that the applicant has failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 of the Convention.           In view of the fact that the decision of 8 May 1980 was later reconsidered by the Social Insurance Office and that a subsequent decision was taken on 30 June 1980, the following observations are added.   The Office's reconsideration of its previous decision was made exclusively on the basis of the provisions contained in Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act.   Accordingly, this reconsideration did not include, and could not have included, an ordinary review of the merits of the case.   The only question which was considered, and which could have been considered, was whether the decision as such was afflicted with any of the obvious defects referred to in the said provisions.   The proceedings did not in any way affect the applicant's right to bring an ordinary appeal against the decision of 8 May 1980.   Such an appeal would have been the only possible way to have the scope of the reconsideration widened to include an ordinary review of the merits of the case.   When served with the decision of 8 May 1980, the applicant was also notified in writing that such an appeal was to be brought in writing and within two months.   Under these circumstances the Government submit that neither the decision of 30 June 1980, nor the proceedings initiated by the appeal brought against it, could be of any relevance when considering whether, in respect of the determination of his SGI, the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies available to him.   3.       The merits   3.1      Aritcle 6 para. 1 of the Convention   3.1.1    Applicability of Article 6           The complaint concerns proceedings resulting in the final decision of the Supreme Insurance Court of 12 June 1984.   The scope of these proceedings was limited to the issue of whether the extraordinary reasons for changing a decision contained in Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act were present.   The Government submit that Article 6 does not guarantee any rights in respect of this kind of extraordinary proceedings and that, consequently, the complaint falls outside the scope of this provision.           In case the Commission would find that the proceedings complained of did, nevertheless, involve the determination of the applicant's SGI, the question arises whether this amounts to a determination of his "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   In response to this question, the Government submit the following.           When acceding to the Convention, the Government were convinced that proceedings, like the present ones, in the field of public or administrative law which are dominated by considerations of public interest and determined principally by considerations of policy would not come within the socpe of Article 6 para. 1.   In the Government's view such an interpretation is well in line with the wording of the text and is also supported by the travaux préparatoires.   Furthermore, in view of the legal systems of many States Party to the Convention, there are good reasons for assuming that Article 6 para. 1 was not intended to encompass proceedings of the kind now considered.   In line with this, Governments as well as members of the Commission and the Court have consistently advocated an interpretation that would exclude such proceedings from the scope of Article 6 para. 1.           However, the majority of the members of the Court has taken a different view and, by gradually widening the scope of Article 6 para. 1, construed wide areas of what has traditionally been recognised as public or administrative law to involve the determination of "civil rights".   Of particular interest in this context are the two judgments in the Deumeland case (Eur.   Court H.R., Deumeland judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 100) and the Feldbrugge case (Eur.   Court H.R., Feldbrugge judgment of 29 May 1986, Series A no. 99) in which the Court found certain social security benefits to be "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.   In considering the issue, the Court identified a number of relevant factors typically found in the field of social security and thought to be capable of clarifying and amplifying the principles previously laid down for the interpretation of the concept of "civil rights".   Having then evaluated the relative cogency of features of public law and features of private law, the Court found the latter to be predominant.           By employing the same approach, the Government have considered the present case in view of the Court's reasoning in the said cases. In doing so the Government have reached the conclusion that the facts of the present case, although in some respects similar to those in the Feldbrugge case in particular, nevertheless warrant a different outcome, i.e. that the disputed right should not be considered as a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.           The Government firstly observe that the general character of the relevant legislation as well as the nature of the insurance scheme strongly suggest that the present dispute be considered as one falling within the sphere of public law and, accordingly, not involving the determination of "civil rights".   Thus, the legal provisions governing the insurance scheme form an integral part of a comprehensive social insurance system containing also such public services as for instance basic pension benefits.   Furthermore, health insurance cover is compulsory not only in the sense that the individuals concerned are under an obligation to be insured under the scheme but also as they automatically become entitled to the benefits flowing from the scheme regardless of whether they have in any manner contributed to the financing of it.   Thus, viewed in its context, the scheme is clearly not a matter of the State taking on or regulating an insurance activity equally capable of being carried on in the private sector but rather one of performing the State's duty to protect the health and welfare of its citizens.   In the Government's opinion such a scheme would certainly need to embrace significant features of an undisputably private-law nature in order for benefits under the scheme to be considered as "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.   Apart from the fact that the applicant was claiming a right in his personal capacity as a private individual, the Government maintain that in the present case no such features could be found.   In view of the Court's reasoning in the Feldbrugge case, the Government emphasise the following circumstances, which in their opinion distinguish the present insurance scheme from that considered in the Feldbrugge case.           In that case, the insurance scheme considered was managed jointly by the State, by employers and by employees, the State's engagement being confined to establishing the legal framework of the scheme and to seeing to co-ordination.   The occupational associations responsible for the implementation of the legislation in question were semi-public institutions operating like private insurance companies. The supervision of the proper implementation of the legislation was entrusted to a Social Insurance Board comprising representatives not only of the State but also of employers and employees.           By contrast, in the present case, the State alone has assumed the responsibility of organising and implementing the scheme.   Every aspect of the scheme, such as the categories of beneficiaries, the protection afforded and the financing of the system, as well as the organisation and decision-making process of the bodies involved in the management of the scheme, are laid down in detail in the relevant legislation.   The management is carried out by bodies, none of which comprises any representative of any particular category of individuals such as for instance employers, employees or insured persons.   The supervision of the proper implementation of the legislation is entrusted to a central government authority.           In the Feldbrugge case the insurance scheme was closely linked to a contract in the private-law sphere, i.e. a contract of employment, and the availability of benefits under the scheme was determined by reference to the terms of, and the legislation applicable to, that contract.   As the Court concluded, the insurance provisions were in a way grafted onto the contract of employment and, therefore, formed one of the constituents of the relationship between employer and employee. Individuals who were not parties to such contracts, for instance self-employed workers, could achieve a similar insurance cover only by taking out policies with private companies.           In the present case, there is no such link between the insurance cover as such and any contract of a private-law character. As follows from what has been said above, the insurance scheme covers not only the working population but also categories of individuals that are not, and may never have been, bound by a contract of employment or any other private-law contract.   Admittedly, as for salaried employees the rate of the benefits available under the scheme is calculated on the basis of the income normally earned.   However, in the Government's opinion the mere fact that the State, acting in the exercise of its discretionary powers, has resorted to such a technique for calculating the benefits available to one category of persons covered by the insurance scheme cannot suffice to bring the scheme within the sphere of private law.           In the Feldbrugge case the financing of the scheme was structured, and the collection of contributions carried out, in a manner showing close affinities with the techniques employed by private insurance companies.   The occupational associations operating the insurance scheme conducted their dealings, for example as regards the collection of contributions and the calculation of risks, in the same way as a private company providing insurance in the private-law sphere.   Those insured under the scheme participated directly in the financing of the scheme, inter alia by way of deductions at source from their salaries, the deductions thus establishing a close connection between the contributions called for and the benefits granted under the scheme.   The State, for its part, was not at all involved in the financing of the scheme.           In the present case, on the other hand, the links between the benefits available under the scheme and its financing are considerably more attenuated, if at all present.   The insurance is financed out of Government subsidies and charges not levied on any individual in his capacity as insured under the scheme.   The assessment and collection of these charges are administered by the tax authorities and are essentially governed by the same legal framework as that governing the collection of taxes.   Furthermore, there is no link between the right to benefits under the scheme and the proper fulfilment of an obligation to contribute to the financing of the scheme.   Thus, a right to benefits under the scheme may well exist although the beneficiary has not been obliged to contribute to the financing of the system, not even indirectly by paying taxes.   Also, a failure to fulfil their obligations by those obliged to contribute to the financing does not in any way affect the benefits available under the scheme.           Having thus considered the facts of the present case the Government reach the conclusion that the present case does not involve the determination of "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 of the Convention.   In view of this, the Government submit that the complaint falls outside the scope of this provision.   3.1.2    Compliance with Article 6           Assuming that the contested proceedings did involve the determination of his "civil rights", the applicant has questioned whether they were conducted publicly and impartially and also whether the case was decided upon within a reasonable time.   The Government fail to see that the facts could possibly raise any issue as to the impartiality of the tribunals involved.   In fact, the applicant seems to question their impartiality on the mere ground that they did not share his view on the issues presented.   In the Government's opinion this falls short of suggesting that the tribunals acted partially.   As regards the remaining issues raised by the applicant, the Government submit the following.           A fair and public hearing           The applicant seems to allege that the material on the basis of which the contested decision was taken was not available to the public or even to the applicant himself.   The Government maintain that this allegation is without merits.   They refer to the rule that before deciding on a matter all material must have been communicated to the parties concerned, and to the rules on general access to official documents.   They also observe that, on two occasions before delivering its judgment, the Social Insurance Court communicated with the applicant and that the applicant commented in writing on this material.   Moreover, under the principle of general access to official documents there is, in principle, full publicity about proceedings before Swedish authorities and courts even when there is no oral hearing.   Furthermore, in view of the facts of the present case it seems extremely unlikely that any of the limited number of exceptions provided for in the Secrecy Act could have been applied against the will of the applicant.   Under all circumstances, there could have been no material before the deciding bodies that was not available to the applicant.   This latter fact has also been recognised by the applicant, although in respect of certain documents he appears to have chosen not to deal with them.           In view of the fact that no oral hearing was held in the case, the Government observe that Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention does not necessarily call for a public hearing for the determination of civil rights and obligations.   Rather, it merely provides that everyone is entitled to such a hearing.   In the Government's opinion, this indicates that the right to proceedings in public could be waived.   The European Court of Human Rights has also adopted this view and, furthermore, recognised that the waiver could be tacit (see e.g., Eur.   Court H.R., Deweer judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 25, para. 49, and Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 43, p. 25, para. 59).           In the present case, the contested decision could be, and was in fact, brought before courts competent to review the matter in respect of questions of law as well as questions of fact.   The rules governing such appeal proceedings comprise provisions according to which an oral hearing may be held before the Social Insurance Court as well as the Supreme Insurance Court and, furthermore, as a general rule shall be held before the former Court when requested by a private party.   However, no request for such a hearing before the Social Insurance Court was made by the applicant, nor was there any indication that he, nevertheless, did expect a hearing to be held or that he in any possible way could be expected to benefit from a hearing.   The applicant seems to indicate that an oral hearing was requested before the Supreme Insurance Court.   The Government have not been able to verify that this was in fact done.   Be that as it may, the Government observe that the only question considered by this Court was whether to grant the applicant a leave to appeal and that in respect of such proceedings there is no requirement under the Convention that a hearing be held.           In view of these elements the Government submit that the requirement of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention of a fair and public hearing was satisfied and that this part of the complaint is manifestly ill-founded.           In case the Commission does not share this view, the Government question, even in case an oral hearing is requested by the party concerned, whether Article 6 of the Convention calls for oral proceedings regardless of the character of the issues involved. In the present case, the only issue brought before the courts was whether the extraordinary reasons for changing a decision contained in Chapter 20 Section 10 of the Social Insurance Act were present.   The Government maintain that in considering the possible existence of such an obvious defect, an oral hearing would be superfluous.           Determination "within a reasonable time"           The applicant's case was brought before the Social Insurance Office on 22 October 1979 and finally decided by the Supreme Insurance Court on 12 June 1984.   The period to be taken into consideration thus exceeds four and a half years.   Although such a lapse of time at first sight might seem considerable, the Government submit that it falls short of suggesting a violation of Article 6 of the Convention, given that during this time the case was considered by three instances and bearing in mind also that in view of the facts of the case no irreparable losses for the applicant could possibly have followed from the lapse of time.           However, the applicant's case was pending before the Social Insurance Court for more than two years and eight months, i.e. from 11 September 1980 to 19 May 1983, part of the time without any action apparently being taken in respect of the case.   In view of this, the Government submit the following.           The consideration of the reasonableness of the duration of proceedings coming within the scope of Article 6 para. 1 calls for an examination and assessment mainly of the complexity of the case and what is at stake for the person concerned as well as of the conduct of that person and the authorities involved.           As regards the complexity of the issues involved and the conduct of the applicant, there is nothing in the case that would reasonably justify an otherwise unacceptable delay in the examination of the case.   On the other hand, in respect of what was at stake for the applicant, there is also nothing in the case that would have called for the case to be handled more urgently than cases in general brought before a court of the kind here involved.           When considering the conduct of authorities, the European Court of Human Rights has consistently recognised that an otherwise unacceptable delay in the examination of a case is justified if caused by "a temporary backlog of business" provided that the state has "taken reasonably prompt remedial action to deal with an exceptional situation of this kind" (see e.g.   Eur.   Court H.R. Buchholz judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A no. 42, p. 16, para. 51, and Zimmermann and Steiner, judgment of 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66, p. 12, para. 29).           The Swedish Social Insurance Courts, and the Supreme Social Insurance Court, were established on 1 January 1979 in connection with a fundamental revision of the appeal proceedings in respect of decisions taken by, among other authorities, the Social Insurance Offices.   The Social Insurance Courts were organised and staffed in view of, among other things, an expected annual total case-load of approximately 12,000 cases.   Within a short time, this estimation turned out to be too optimistic.   Thus, in 1979 and 1980 the total number of cases filed with the courts amounted to more than 13,000 and 16,500 respectively.   By the end of 1980, the case-load pendin