CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 10 mars 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .sECC8F45 { width:24.18pt; display:inline-block }        Application No. 11688/85       Hannes MLYNEK     against     AUSTRIA             REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 10 March 1988)               TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                   Page   I.       INTRODUCTION         (paras. 1-13). .........................................    1           A.       The application                 (paras. 2-4). ..................................    1           B.       The proceedings                 (paras. 5-8). ..................................    1           C.       The present Report                 (paras. 9-13). .................................    2     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS         (paras. 14-30). ........................................    3           A.       The particular circumstances of the case                 (paras. 14-28)..................................    3           B.       Relevant domestic law                 (paras. 29-30)..................................    6   III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES         (paras. 31-55)..........................................    8           A.       The applicant                 (paras. 32-43)..................................    8           B.       The Government                 (paras. 44-55)..................................   10     IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION         (paras. 56-93).........................................    13           A.       Point at issue                 (para. 56)......................................   13           B.       Applicability of Article 6 para. 1                 (paras. 57-58)..................................   13           C.       Issue of being a victim                 (paras. 59-62)..................................   13           D.       Compliance with Article 6 para. 1                 (paras. 63-92)................................     14                   1.   Period to be considered                     (paras. 64-68).............................    14                   2.   Relevant criteria                     (paras. 69-71).............................   15                   3.   Complexity of the case                     (paras. 72-77).............................   15                   4.   Conduct of the applicant                     (para. 79).................................   16                   5.   Conduct of the authorities                     (paras. 80-92).............................   16           E.       Conclusion                 (para. 93).....................................   19     APPENDIX I:    HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ......................   20   APPENDIX II:   DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ...................   21           I.     INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.       The application&_   2.       The applicant, born in 1943, is an Austrian citizen living in Vienna where he is working as a lawyer.           The application is directed against Austria whose Government were represented by their Agent, Ambassador Helmut Türk, Head of the International Law Department at the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   3.       The application relates to criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant on 21 March 1980.   On 30 May 1984 the Vienna Regional Court convicted the applicant of the misappropriation of funds and fraud and sentenced him to six years' imprisonment.   The decision containing the written reasons was served on the applicant on 4 July 1986.   Upon the applicant's plea of nullity, the Supreme Court, on 30 January 1987, quashed the decision of the Regional Court and ordered a new trial and decision by that Court.   4.       The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention of the undue length of the proceedings, in particular that he did not receive the written reasons of the judgment until 25 months after it was pronounced.   The applicant also alleges a violation of his right, under Article 6 para. 1, to a hearing before a tribunal established by law.   B.     The proceedings&_   5.       The application was introduced on 2 May 1985 and registered on 9 August 1985.   On 21 October 1985 the Rapporteur, acting under Rule 40 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, requested information from the respondent Government.   The information was provided by the Government on 15 November 1985.   The applicant submitted his reply thereto on 18 December 1985.   6.       On 3 March 1986 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present before 16 May 1986 their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   The Government's observations of 20 May 1986 were received on 21 May 1986.   The applicant's reply thereto of 6 June 1986 was received on 12 June 1986.   The Government submitted further information on 29 July 1986.   The applicant replied thereto on 11 August 1986.   7.       On 16 October 1986 the Commission declared admissible the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the proceedings.   The remainder of the application was declared inadmissible.     8.      After declaring the application in part admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   Consultations with the parties took place between 19 November 1986 and 28 October 1987.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement can be effected.     C.       The present Report&S   9.       The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberation and votes, the following members being present:                       MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                         S. TRECHSEL                         F. ERMACORA                         G. SPERDUTI                         E. BUSUTTIL                         A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                         A. WEITZEL                         J.C. SOYER                         H. DANELIUS                         G. BATLINER                         H. VANDENBERGHE                    Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                    Sir   Basil HALL                    MM.   F. MARTINEZ                         C.L. ROZAKIS                    Mrs.   J. LIDDY   10.     The text of this Report was adopted on 10 March 1988 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   11.     The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is:   i)       to establish the facts, and   ii)      to state an opinion as to whether the facts found         disclose a breach by the respondent Government of         its obligations under the Convention.   12.       A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   13.       The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.       II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case&_   14.      On 21 May 1981 criminal investigations were instituted against the applicant and other persons in respect of various economic offences alleged to have been committed in connection with the bankruptcy of the K-T company.   In particular, Dr.   K, the chairman of the board of directors of the E Union AG, was charged with the misappropriation of funds (Untreue) on the occasion of a participation in the share capital increase of the K-T company amounting to 32.2 million AS. Messrs.   T and S as well as the applicant were charged with participation in this offence, moreover Messrs.   T and S with extricating a loan of 25 million AS from a bank and Dr.   K and the applicant with participating in this offence.   The applicant was thereupon detained on remand from 1 July until 20 July 1982 on the ground of a danger of collusion.   15.      On 20 April 1983 the applicant, Dr.   K and Mr.   S were indicted at the Vienna Regional Court sitting with lay judges (Landesgericht als Schöffengericht).   The bill of indictment counted 183 pages.   The proceedings in respect of Mr.   T were separated after he had been released from custody and had absconded.   16.      The trial (Hauptverhandlung) before the Vienna Regional Court lasted from 2 December 1983 until 30 May 1984.   During this period of time, 55 hearings (Verhandlungstage) were conducted.   Up to the trial the case-file consisted of 63 volumes, thereafter of 81 volumes.   During the trial 120 witnesses were heard.   The minutes of the trial consisted of 7,150 pages.   In addition there were some 40 volumes of expert opinions and other evidence.   After the evidence proceedings were closed there followed the pleadings of the parties lasting eight days, and the deliberations of the Court lasting four days.   17.      On 30 May 1984, at its fifty-fifth hearing, the Vienna Regional Court publicly pronounced its judgment.   The bench was composed of two professional and two lay judges.   The applicant was convicted of misappropriation of funds and fraud and sentenced to six years' imprisonment.   Dr.   K and Mr.   S were sentenced to six and eight years' imprisonment, respectively.   According to the minutes, the presiding judge also stated "the essential reasons of the judgment" (die wesentlichen Urteilsgründe).   The applicant who was present at the hearing announced that he would file a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) and an appeal (Berufung).   The minutes of the hearing on 30 May 1984 were served on 4 June 1984.           The written reasons of the judgment were eventually served on the applicant on 4 July 1986.   18.      Also on 30 May 1984 the applicant was detained on remand on the ground of a danger of absconding.   His detention lasted until 2 August 1984 when he was released on bail amounting to 2,5 million AS.   Bail was eventually reduced to 1 million AS and later waived altogether.     19.      With respect to the period after judgment was pronounced publicly on 30 May 1984, the Government have submitted a time chart which schedules the workload of the judge responsible for the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment and in particular the hearings she had to attend in other cases.   20.      As regards these hearings, it transpires from this chart that on 30 July 1984 the respective judge sat alone in several hearings. In November 1984 she sat in four hearings.   In 1985 she sat in approximately 80 hearings lasting between ten minutes and seven hours and on average four hours each.   Between 7 January and 9 April 1986 the judge again sat in 31 hearings.   21.      As regards the case-list of the judge concerned, the chart submitted by the Government indicates that, as head of the department 3 (d) of the Vienna Regional Court, the judge was exempted from new business in view of the conduct of the present proceedings from 1 July 1983 until 31 December 1984.   Until 30 June 1983, she was allocated a total of 119 new cases.   In 1984, there were eight additional proceedings, resulting from appeal proceedings, the resumption of a case, or the separation from older proceedings.   22.      As from 1 January 1985, the judge was put in charge of the newly established economic crimes department 12 (b).   From 5 March 1985 to 31 December 1985, she was also exempted from new business there on account of an economic criminal prosecution, the so-called "WBO-case".   At the same time, she remained in charge of other past or future proceedings connected with this case.           In this Court department, the judge had to deal with a total of 18 criminal cases between 1 January and 4 March 1985, and a total of 24 between 1 January and 31 March 1986.   23.      In the jury department 20 (v), which has been headed by the judge concerned since 1 July 1983, there were four new cases in 1983, four new cases in 1984, five new cases in 1985 and one new case until March 1986.   Of these, two were terminated in 1983, four in 1984, and six in 1985, so that the only unsettled jury case is the one of 1986.   24.      The Government have also indicated the steps taken by the competent supervisory authority in order to attain the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment.   Thus, the supervisory panel (Personalsenat) of the Vienna Regional Court ordered that no new cases were to be referred to the head of the department 3 (d).   The preparation of the written reasons of the judgment was then initially monitored only on the basis of monthly reports.   25.      Subsequently, the preparation of the written reasons was checked in the course of an administrative supervision procedure. Thereby, the judge concerned stated in her reports to the President of the Court of Appeal that preparation of the written reasons was progressing steadily and would be completed soon.   As the judge did not keep the deadlines set for her, the President eventually filed a disciplinary action (Disziplinaranzeige) against the judge in early November 1985.   Moreover, the supervisory panel decided on 21 April 1986 to appoint as of 1 May 1986, until further notice, another judge as deputy head of the economic crimes department 12 (b).     26.   On 26 July 1986 the judge transmitted the decision with the written reasons to the Vienna Regional Court.   They were communicated to the applicant on 4 July 1986.   The decision numbered 1196 pages and consisted to a substantial extent of photocopies of other documents.   27.      On 18 July 1986 the applicant filed a plea of nullity and an appeal.   Therein he complained, inter alia, that the Regional Court had in its judgment committed many errors and ignored various decisive elements of evidence.   He further complained that the judgment consisted largely of photocopies of other documents and that it was therefore impossible to determine which part of the decision actually stemmed from the Court.   The applicant also complained of the incorrect application of various legal provisions and of the sentence.   28.      On 30 January 1987 the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof), having obtained the opinion of the Attorney General (General- prokurator), granted the plea of nullity, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and sent the case back to that Court for a new trial and decision.   The Supreme Court, which quoted extensively from the Attorney General's opinion, found, inter alia, that the decision of the Regional Court only insufficiently discussed certain points which in fact contradicted its conclusions and that the Regional Court had incorrectly assessed the conduct of the accused.   The Supreme Court continued:   <German>   "Die in rund 1190 Seiten dargelegten Entscheidungsgründe widersprechen nach Form und Inhalt eklatant der Bestimmung des § 270 Abs. 2 Z. 5 StPO ...   Es mag sich im Einzelfall bei der Erfüllung dieses Gesetzesauftrages durchaus als sinnvoll erweisen, den Inhalt von Aussagen oder Schriftstücken wortgetreu (wenn dem Verständnis besser dienlich, auch in Form von Fotokopien) in die Urteilsbegründung zu übernehmen. Mit dem Gebot einer gedrängten Darstellung ist es aber unvereinbar, anstelle eigenständiger Formulierung des für erwiesen erachteten Sachverhaltes viele hundert Seiten von Schriftstücken aus den Akten zu fotokopieren und dem Urteil einzuverleiben, wie dies im vorliegenden Fall gehandhabt wurde.   Noch dazu, wenn - wie hier - sich aus solcher blosser Zusammenstellung von Beweismaterial ergebende Widersprüche und Ungereimtheiten nicht nach Massgabe des § 270 Abs. 2 Z. 5 StPO wertend erörtert, vielmehr Beweisergebnisse (vor allem Aussagen von Zeugen) weitgehend durch Zuordnung zu bestimmten Gruppen abgetan werden, denen pauschal und ohne auf individuelle Umstände näher einzugehen, Glaubwürdigkeit zuerkannt oder abgesprochen wird."   <Translation>   "The reasons for the decision which have been given on approximately 1190 pages starkly contradict in form and content the provision of Section 270 para. 2 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure ....   It may well be reasonable in an individual case, when complying with this order of the law, to take over verbatim the content of statements or documents into the reasons of the decision (also by means of photocopies, if this enhances the understanding).   It is not compatible with the requirements of a compressed presentation, however, to photocopy as in the present case many hundreds of pages from documents of the file and to insert them into the judgment instead of independently formulating the facts which are regarded as established. This is all the more so if - as here - the decision does not evaluate, according to Section 270 para. 2 (5) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, contradictions and irregularities which result from the mere compilation of the evidence. Instead, the decision rather deals with the results of the taking of evidence (in particular witnesses' testimony) largely by attributing the results to certain groups, in respect of which credibility has been granted, or not granted, collectively without considering the individual circumstances."   B.     Relevant domestic law&_   29.      The proceedings instituted against the applicant fall under the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure.   Sections 257 to 270 of the Code concern the judgment of the first instance Court, its pronouncement and the preparations of the written reasons. Section 270 states, insofar as it is relevant for the present case:   <German>   "(1) Jedes Urteil muss binnen vierzehn Tagen vom Tage der Verkündung schriftlich ausgefertigt und vom Vorsitzenden sowie vom Schriftführer unterschrieben werden.   (2) Die Urteilsausfertigung muss enthalten:     ...   5.   die Entscheidungsgründe.   In diesen muss in gedrängter Darstellung, aber mit voller Bestimmtheit angegeben sein, welche Tatsachen und aus welchen Gründen der Gerichtshof sie als erwiesen oder als nicht erwiesen angenommen hat, von welchen Erwägungen er bei der Entscheidung der Rechtsfragen und bei Beseitigung der vorgebrachten Einwendungen geleitet wurde und, im Fall einer Verurteilung, welche Erschwerungs- und Milderungsumstände er gefunden hat."     <Translation>     "(1) The written reasons for every judgment shall be prepared within fourteen days from the date of the pronouncement and shall be signed by the president as well as the reporter.       (2)   The written reasons of the judgment shall contain:     ...   5.    the grounds for the decision.   Therein shall be mentioned in a compressed presentation, but with full precision, which facts are regarded as established, or not established, by the Court, and the reasons therefor;   the considerations which guided the Court when deciding the legal issues and when rejecting the objections made;   and, in the case of a conviction, which aggravating or mitigating circumstances the Court has found."             As regards in particular the time-limit stated in Section 270 para. 1, its breach does not according to Austrian doctrine lead to the nullity of the decision (see E. Foregger/E. Serini, Die öster- reichische Strafprozessordnung, Vienna 1982, p. 318 N. II).   30.      Sections 280 to 296 of the Code of Criminal Procedure concern the remedies available against a judgment.   Section 284 which concerns the procedure in the case of a plea of nullity states in its para. 1 that, if the accused was present at the hearing, the plea of nullity must be filed within three days after the Court of first instance has pronounced its judgment.   Section 285 para. 1 states, insofar as it is relevant for the present case:   <German>           "(1) Der Beschwerdeführer hat das Recht, binnen vierzehn         Tagen nach der Anmeldung der Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde, wenn         ihm eine Urteilsabschrift aber erst nach der Anmeldung des         Rechtsmittels zugestellt wurde, binnen vierzehn Tagen nach         der Zustellung eine Ausführung seiner Beschwerdegründe beim         Gericht in zweifacher Ausfertigung zu überreichen..."   <Translation>           "(1) The applicant has the right to submit with the Court         in duplicate the written reasons for his plea of nullity         within fourteen days after he has filed his plea of nullity         or, if the copy of the decision is served on him only after         the remedy was filed, within fourteen days after the decision         is served ..."     III.   SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   31.      The following is an outline of the parties' main arguments on the merits of the applicant's admitted complaint under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention concerning the length of the criminal proceedings.   A.     The applicant&_   32.      The applicant submits that he did not receive the reasons of the judgment of the Regional Court, pronounced on 30 May 1984, until 25 months later, on 4 July 1986.   Section 270 para. 1 of the Austrian Code of Criminal Procedure has thus not been complied with.   Moreover, an essential part of the Court proceedings was therefore not terminated within a reasonable time acording to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   In fact a breach of Section 270 para. 1 itself constitutes a violation of the Convention when a time-limit is exceeded which makes the delay in stating written reasons for the judgment appear unreasonable as part of the overall length of the proceedings.   33.      As regards the complexity of the present case, the Regional Court actually investigated facts which had nothing to do with the charges.   Moreover, the Government argue that the applicant's conduct has to be seen, not in isolation, but in the context of the offences committed by the other accused.   However, this ignores the fact that, although 40 persons were involved in the preliminary investigations, only three accused were left once proceedings against a certain Mr.   T were discontinued who had been released from detention on remand and then absconded.   34.      It is hard to assess, on the basis of the time schedule supplied by the Government (see paras. 19 ff. above), the actual workload of the judge concerned.   It is clear, however, that a series of hearings lasting 10 - 30 minutes was held up to July 1985, whereas the various proceedings in the "WBO-case" began in August 1985.   At any rate, the judge's workload was not particularly heavy in early 1985.   Later she had a period of more than one year, during which exemption from new cases and a clearly reduced workload would have given her time to prepare the written reasons.   The judge's repeated promises to the parties to prepare the written reasons clearly indicate that she considered that this could be done.   35.      It has been argued that delays may be justified under the Convention if the Courts are overburdened, and that the State cannot be held responsible when a particularly heavy workload prevents a judge from doing his work rapidly.   This overlooks that the State is necessarily responsible for the conduct of its representatives, particularly since it is not merely negligence by the judge in question which is at issue.   36.      According to the schedule provided by the Government, the judge in question was put in charge of the new economic crimes department 12 (b) of the Vienna Regional Court on 1 January 1985.   This means that she was appointed at a time when the delay in preparing the written reasons already lasted seven months and was thus exceptional to start with (the first date promised by the judge to the defence counsel in the case for the written reasons was October 1984).   Subsequently, and although the case was particularly complex, nothing was done to help the judge to conclude her work on the written judgment, for example by granting her exemption from new cases.   On the contrary, she was given additional work.   37.      As a result, the judge's workload was not excessively increased by major cases until August 1985, when the reasonable time for preparing the written reasons of the judgment had long since expired.   The action taken to remedy this situation came too late and to some extent, instead of decreasing, it actually increased the workload of the judge who, although she had already fallen behind, was given responsibility for a new department on 1 January 1985.   38.      It may well be that the President of the Court of Appeal filed a disciplinary action against the judge in early November 1985. However, it must be noted that the authorities waited one and a half years before taking this action.   This makes it impossible to accept that all possible measures were taken to expedite the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment.   Disciplinary supervision clearly had no effect.   The judge was insufficiently exempted from new cases and she herself was relieved on 1 May 1986 as head of the economic crimes department 12 (b) to which she had been appointed - clearly on the basis of an inaccurate assessment of her workload and capacity for work on 1 January 1985, at a time when the applicant had already been waiting seven months for the written reasons.   39.      The applicant contends that, while in theory he still had to be considered innocent, in fact he suffered considerable disadvantages in respect of his economic situation and his honour on account of this delay in the preparation of the written reasons.   40.      Thus, prior to judgment, the applicant was manager of the firm which he is alleged to have defrauded in collusion with the chairman of the board.   The firm did not participate as a private party in the criminal proceedings against the applicant and took no disciplinary action against him, but continued to employ him as it had before the K-T company collapsed.   The relevant S.s of the firm do not therefore regard the applicant as having caused them any damage, which would have been necessary to make the applicant an accessory to the misappropriation of funds.   41.      However, the fact that these accusations were made in a judgment which was pronounced publicly caused the applicant considerable damage since, quite apart from the merely human aspects and the effects on his family's reputation, his employers have also suspended him without pay until the case has been cleared up.   Even so they have not chosen to dismiss the applicant without notice.   The applicant has also had to suffer during this period of more than two years all the disadvantages of being largely debarred from practising his profession, since in practice the presumption of innocence by no means applies to a person who has not been finally convicted and is trying to work in business or the law.   This state of uncertainty, which will last until the case has been finally decided, is clearly to     42.      If it is argued that the delay in the preparation of the written reasons actually benefited the applicant since he did not have to begin to serve his prison sentence, this obviously assumes that the applicant will definitely be convicted and sentenced to imprisonment.   However, such an assumption is contrary to the presumption of innocence enshrined in Article 6 para. 2 of the Convention.   43.      The applicant concludes that the undue length of the criminal proceedings in which he was involved, in particular the delay in the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment, constituted a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   B.     The Government&_   44.      The respondent Government submit that, in accordance with the constant practice of the Convention organs, the following criteria have to be used to judge the appropriateness of the length of the criminal proceedings:   the complexity of the case;   the applicant's conduct; and the conduct of the competent authority.   45.      The present proceedings, instituted against the applicant and other persons, involve economic offences and are based on very complex and comprehensive facts.   In this regard, reference is made to the great number of files, hearings and witnesses.   For instance, at the time of the preparation of the written judgment, the case-file included 81 files.   The trial was conducted over 55 hearings, and the trial minutes extended to 7150 pages.   The objection raised by the applicant, namely that within the framework of the prosecution against himself investigations were carried out involving more than 40 persons, cannot disprove the argument of the complexity of the case. Rather, the objection reflects the great variety of intricate business implications which the competent judge had to review and to assess within the framework of the proceedings instituted against the applicant.   It is thus not possible to consider the conduct of the applicant in isolation, as it is above all the context of the offences committed by the other accused from which the illegality of the applicant's conduct results.   46.      The conduct of the applicant may be disregarded in the present case as he could not influence the motivation of the judgment.   47.      As regards the conduct of the competent authority, in particular the judge who was preparing the written reasons of the judgment, the Government have submitted for the period after the judgment was pronounced publicly on 30 May 1984 a chart scheduling the judge's workload (see paras. 19 ff. above).   In this respect reference is made to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights which has decided that delays may be justified if the Courts become overburdened by a sharp increase in business (Eur.   Court H.R., Guincho judgment of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81, p. 16 paras. 37 f).   Such delays, however, would have to be kept as short as possible by the State.           In the present case, the judge concerned was exempted, as head of department 3 (d), from new business until the end of 1984.   As head of the new economic crimes department 12 (b) she was exempted from new business not concerning the spectacular WBO-case from 5 March 1985 until 31 December 1985.   There was also a gradual reduction of work for the department 20 (v).   48.      On the part of the competent supervisory authority, various steps were taken in order to attain the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment at issue.   In view of the extraordinary extent of the proceedings and the fact that the supervisory panel ordered that no new cases were to be referred to the head of department 3 (d), the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment was initially monitored only on the basis of the respective monthly reports.   Later on, the motivation was checked in the course of an administrative supervision procedure.   As the judge did not keep the deadlines set for her, the President of the Court of Appeal filed a disciplinary action against her in early November 1985.           Furthermore, the supervisory panel decided on 21 April 1986 to appoint as of 1 May 1986, until further notice, another judge as deputy head of the economic crimes department 12 (b) in order to end the delay in the preparation of the written reasons.   As a result, the competent judge promised the written reasons by the end of June 1986.   49.      According to the European Court of Human Rights, delays will not entail a State's responsibility if the latter takes immediate appropriate remedial action (see judgment of Zimmermann and Steiner of 13 July 1983, Series A no. 66, p. 12 para. 29).   The Government submit that in the present case the delay that has occurred is a result of the complexity of the case and that the competent authorities took all possible measures to expedite the preparation of the written reasons of the judgment, for instance, exemption from new business; monitoring by the supervisory authority;   filing a disciplinary action;   as well as relieving the judge as head of the department 12 (b).   50.      However, considering the constitutionally ensured principle of the independence of judges, guaranteed by the rules of irremovability and intransferability, as well as the resulting principle of the fixed allocation of business, delays may occur in the interest of the certainty of law as long as, in exceptional cases, judges who do not satisfy the requirements which they are expected to meet may be transferred within the framework of disciplinary proceedings.   Another judge can then be appointed as head of the department.   51.      Realistically speaking, there is always the possibility that a certain judge is not able to cope with particularly complex proceedings.   In such a case, however, the State can be made responsible under the Convention only insofar as arrangements have to be made that lead to the preparation of the written reasons.   In the present case, this has been done as the above explanations show.   52.      The Government submit further that a violation of Section 270 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure cannot constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   Reference is made in this respect to the case of Crociani and others which was based on similar facts and, insofar as it concerns the present case, was declared inadmissible by the European Commission of Human rights (Nos. 8603/79, 8722/79, 8723/79, 8729/79, Dec. 18.12.1980, D.R. 22 p. 147). In another decision of the Commission it was stated that a violation of Section 270 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure did not constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, even if the written reasons of the judgment were not available eight months after its pronouncement (No. 4459/70, Dec. 3.4.71, Kaiser v.   Austria, Collection 38 p. 44).   53.      Moreover, the applicant suffered no disadvantage from the fact that the written reasons of the judgment were not prepared sooner.   At the hearing of 30 May 1984, the decision was pronounced publicly and an explanation of the essential underlying reasons was given.   There existed then already a draft version of the judgment of some 80 pages.   54.       The applicant was already informed of the essentials of the judgment.   The fact that the written reasons were served on him only on 4 July 1986, implies that the applicant did not have to commence serving his sentence of six years' imprisonment since the judgment had not acquired legal force.   As a result, the applicant may rather have enjoyed an advantage from the delay.   55.      The Government conclude that in the light of the above considerations the present case does not entail a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.     IV.    OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.     Point at issue&_   56.      The issue to be determined in the present application is whether, in the criminal proceedings which have been instituted against the applicant, his case was heard within a reasonable time, as required by Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   B.     Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)&_   57.      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), insofar as it is relevant, provides:           "In the determination ... of any criminal charge against him,         everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable         time ..."   58.      The applicability of this provision to the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant is not in dispute between the parties.   The Commission notes that in these proceedings the Courts concerned were determining criminal charges which had been brought against the applicant.   C.     Issue of being a victim&_   59.      The applicant has submitted that the undue length of the proceedings at issue, in particular the time required to prepare the written reasons of the judgment, has caused him considerable disadvantages in respect of his economic situation and his honour.   He submits that he must be considered innocent until the conviction, if any, has acquired legal force.   For this reason it cannot be argued that the delay in the preparation of the written reasons implied that he did not have to start serving his sentence earlier.   60.      The Government have submitted that the applicant suffered no disadvantages from the fact that the written reasons of the judgment were not prepared sooner.   Thus, at the hearing of 30 May 1984 the decision was pronounced publicly and the applicant was in fact aware of the essentials of the judgment.   The delay in the preparation of the written reasons only implied that the applicant did not have to commence serving his sentence of six years' imprisonment since the judgment had not yet acquired legal force.   The Government conclude that the applicant possibly rather enjoyed an advantage from the delay.   61.      The Commission did not accept this objection when declaring the application admissible.   In its opinion, the Government can be understood as contending that the applicant cannot claim to be a victim in the present case within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention, since he did not suffer any disadvantages.   Under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) , "the Commission may receive petitions ... from any person ... claiming to be the victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth in (the) Convention".   62.      According to the constant case-law of the Convention organs, the word "victim" in Article 25 (Art. 25) denotes the person directly affected by the act or omission at issue, in the present case as a result of the length of the proceedings.   In this respect a person can be considered to be a "victim" even in the absence of prejudice, since the latter is relevant only in the context of Article 50 (Art. 50) of the Convention (see e.g.   Eur.Court H.R., Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 30 para. 66; Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37, p. 15 f para 33).   In the present case, it is undeniable that the applicant was directly affected by the duration of the proceedings in question.   As a result, he can be considered a victim within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.   D.    Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)&_   63.      The Commission must, therefore, examine the length of the proceedings in this case according to the criteria established in the case-law of the Convention organs.   1.       Period to be considered   64.      In establishing the actual length of the proceedings at issue, it has first to be determined when the applicant was "charged" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   According to the Commission's constant case-law, a person is charged when his situation has been substantially affected as a result of the suspicion against him (see e.g.   No. 8130/78, H. and M. Eckle v. the Federal Republic of Germany, D.R. 16, p. 120, 128).   In the present case, it is not in dispute between the parties that criminal investigations were instituted against the applicant on 21 May 1981.   It is therefore as from this date that the period commenced which has to be examined under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   65.      As regards the end of the period, the terms "determination ... of any criminal charge" mean its final determination.   The time to be considered for the purpose of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) thus covers in principle the entirety of the proceedings, including the appeal proceedings.   In the present case, the Supreme Court, on 30 January 1987, quashed the judgment of the Regional Court and ordered a new trial and decision by that Court.   The proceedings before the Regional Court have been resumed and are currently pending.   The period to be considered under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention therefore runs to the present date.   66.      Accordingly, the proceedings have so far lasted approximately six years and nine months.   67.      While it is always the entire span of the proceedings which it must examine, the Commission observes that the main question of the present case concerns the time required, by the competent judge at the Vienna Regional Court, for the preparati