CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 5 mai 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF     Application No. 12736/87 by Antonio MAGGIULLI against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 5 May 1988, the following members being present:                   MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                      J.A. FROWEIN                      S. TRECHSEL                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      A. WEITZEL                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      G. BATLINER                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                   Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 1 August 1986 by Antonio MAGGIULLI against the United Kingdom and registered on 17 February 1987 under file No. 12736/87;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:     THE FACTS           The applicant is an Italian citizen born in 1931 and resident in London.   He is represented by Jennifer Home, a barrister practising in London.   The facts as submitted by the applicant may be summarised as follows.           The applicant was owner of premises at 21 High Road London N15 and let rooms in the property from time to time.   He apparently retained a ground floor room in the house for his own use.   By letter dated 16 May 1983, the London Borough of Haringey ("Haringey") informed the applicant that the property was below certain minimum standards and in need of substantial repair and scheduled a list of necessary works to be done.   The applicant replied with certain proposals as to the work and Haringey replied on 17 August 1983 warning the applicant that resort might be had to powers of compulsory purchase if progress towards effecting the necessary repairs was unsatisfactory.   Subsequently, on 5 December 1984, Haringey issued a compulsory purchase order, to which the applicant made formal objection.           The applicant succeeded in obtaining planning permission to carry out the necessary improvements and had applied for a grant from Haringey to finance them.   Haringey however informed the applicant that a grant could not be forthcoming until the three persons occupying the property had vacated the premises.   (The status of these three occupiers as tenants or licensees was unclear.)   The applicant offered the three occupants alternative accommodation in another of his properties but they refused to leave.   The applicant instituted proceedings against the three occupiers to obtain vacant possession.           On 10 April 1985 a public local enquiry was held in respect of the compulsory purchase order.   By letter dated 15 April 1985 Haringey issued an undertaking that if the applicant commenced the works on the property within six months and completed them within twelve months, they would not implement the compulsory purchase order, if confirmed. The undertaking was issued on the basis that the time-limit would not be rigidly applied if there were good reasons for allowing extra time and that the owner would take reasonable steps to obtain vacant possession before starting the work.           The Inspector who presided over the enquiry found that the property had a history of action by the environmental health department and non-compliance with statutory notices, and was in a state of substantial disrepair.   He recommended that the order be confirmed and made reference to the undertaking by the local authority.   He concluded as follows:           "The owner has demonstrated his willingness to carry out         the works of conversion to 4 self-contained flats and         should be given the opportunity to do so.   I appreciate         his desire to occupy one of the flats himself.           Assuming vacant possession he should have little difficulty         in meeting the target dates referred to in the council's         undertaking in the event of the order being confirmed.           Much hinges upon the decision of the Edmonton County Court         as to the status of the 3 occupants.   If the court decides         in favour of the owner, upon obtaining vacant possession         which date cannot be predicted with any certainty, the         owner will be in a position to proceed with the conversion         works.   Should the decision of the court be unfavourable         to him, failing confirmation of the order the eventual         outcome would be much less certain.           The council's explanation that the times referred to in         their undertaking are not intended to be applied inflexibly         is important because they will need to take into account         time taken up outside the owner's control in obtaining         vacant possession.           In its present unsatisfactory condition 21 High Road         conflicts with the objectives of the housing action area,         and this situation could be remedied by implementation of         the council's proposals following confirmation of the order.           It seems to me that the council's undertaking safeguards the         owner's position in the event of the court deciding in his         favour and otherwise offers him reasonable scope for carrying         the works into effect.   In these circumstances, bearing in         mind the desirability of ensuring that the existing         unsatisfactory conditions do not continue indefinitely,         in my opinion it would be appropriate to confirm the order."           The Secretary of State confirmed the order on 11 June 1985.           On 2 August 1985, the applicant's claim for possession against the three occupiers was dismissed by the County Court on the ground that they were tenants.   The applicant issued fresh proceedings on, inter alia, grounds of non-payment of rent but on 12 November 1985 the action was adjourned in order for the tenants to seek legal aid.           By letter dated 1 November 1985, Haringey notified the applicant that, since six months had expired since the enquiry without any commencement of work and since there were no good reasons for allowing the applicant further time, they intended to implement the compulsory purchase order.           On 13 November 1985, Haringey issued a Notice of Entry and on 17 January 1986 took possession of the property.           The applicant made an application for leave for judicial review alleging inter alia that Haringey had wrongly exercised their statutory powers in implementing the compulsory purchase order.   Leave was refused by a single judge of the High Court on 8 January 1986 and a renewed application before the Divisional Court refused on 23 January 1986.   The applicant appealed to the Court of Appeal but his appeal was dismissed on 14 April 1986.           The applicant will receive compensation for the compulsory purchase of the property, although his counsel advises that he will receive less since the property is encumbered with tenants and is in disrepair.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that his rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention have been infringed by the implementation of the compulsory purchase order.   He complains that he did everything possible to obtain vacant possession in order to begin work on the property and that Haringey acted unreasonably and in bad faith in implementing the compulsory purchase order.   He complains that the principle of proportionality has not been observed in the case.   He also complains that he will receive less compensation than he would have if the property had been unoccupied.           The applicant also complains that his rights under Article 8 of the Convention have been infringed since he was owner-occupier of the property, which constituted his main residence.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains of the implementation of the compulsory purchase order on his property.   He invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which provides:           "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful         enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of         his possessions except in the public interest and subject         to the conditions provided for by law and by the general         principles of international law.           The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way         impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it         deems necessary to control the use of property in         accordance with the general interest or to secure the         payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."           The Commission finds that the implementation of the compulsory purchase order in respect of the applicant's property prima facie falls within the second sentence of the above provision, as constituting a "deprivation" of possessions.   The Commission must therefore determine whether on the facts of this particular case the applicant was deprived of his property in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law.           The Commission finds first of all that the compulsory purchase order was issued and confirmed pursuant to the relevant legislation. Though the applicant sought to challenge the implementation of the order through judicial review, his application was dismissed by the High Court and Divisional Court and the Commission finds no evidence that the compulsory purchase was not effected subject to the conditions provided for by law.           The question remains whether the compulsory purchase complied with the requirement of "public interest".   The Commission recalls that because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle better placed to appreciate what is in "the public interest" and accordingly here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the Convention extend, the national authorities enjoy a certain margin of appreciation; moreover, the notion of "public interest" is necessarily extensive (Eur.   Court H.R., James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 32 para. 46).   The Commission notes that Haringey sought the compulsory purchase order as part of its policy in improving the local accommodation and in eradicating unsatisfactory housing in its area.           The Commission is satisfied in these circumstances that the policy of Haringey pursued a legitimate aim in the "public interest" in the improvement of housing.   However, the case-law of the Commission and the Court establish that not only must a measure depriving a person of his property pursue a legitimate aim, but there must also be a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised (James and Others judgment loc. cit. p. 67 para. 135).   In the case of Sporrong and Lönnroth (Eur.   Court H.R., Sporrong and Lönnroth judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A no. 52) the Court stated with regard to Article 1 (Art. 1), first sentence that a fair balance must be struck between the demands of public interest of the community and the requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights (loc. cit. p. 26 para. 69).   This balance would not be found where the person concerned had to bear an individual and excessive burden (loc. cit. p. 28 para. 73).           The Commission recalls that in the present case the applicant's property was in substantial disrepair and that it had already been the subject of numerous statutory notices.   The applicant was informed by letter of 16 May 1983 that his property was below certain minimum standards and that improvements had to be done.   He was also warned by letter dated 17 August 1983 that a compulsory purchase order might be sought if progress was unsatisfactory.   The Commission recalls that over a year elapsed before on 5 December 1984 Haringey issued a compulsory purchase order.   At the local enquiry held on 10 April 1985, it appeared that Haringey were willing to allow the applicant a further six months to commence works on the property but that, on a continued lack of progress, Haringay implemented the compulsory purchase order on 13 November 1985.           The Commission notes that the applicant faced significant obstacles in effecting the necessary repairs, including in particular the problem of the three tenants who refused to move and in respect of whom the applicant had instituted two sets of legal proceedings.   The Commission is satisfied however that these mitigating circumstances were taken into account by the planning inspector and Haringey in reaching their decision and that reasonable allowance was made to the applicant in balancing his interests against the requirements of housing policy.   However, in view of the continued delays, which showed no sign of coming to an end in the near future, the Commission finds that, in deciding not to adjourn further the implementation of the compulsory purchase order, the local authority did not infringe the principle of proportionality as stated above.           In these circumstances, the Commission finds no appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant also complains that his rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention have been violated since he was owner-occupier of the expropriated property.           Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides that:           "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private         and family life, his home and his correspondence.           2.   There shall be no interference by a public authority         with the exercise of this right except such as is in         accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic         society in the interests of national security, public safety         or the economic well-being of the country, for the         prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of         health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and         freedoms of others."           The Commission recalls that the applicant apparently retained a ground floor room in the property for his use and that the applicant had the intention of occupying one of the flats when the property had been converted.   In light of these circumstances, the Commission is not satisfied that the applicant has established that the property in question constituted his home.   However, even assuming that it did so, the Commission has already considered the conformity of the expropriation with the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and concludes that any interference would be justified as being in accordance with law and as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of health and the rights of others, within the meaning of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2).           It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.           Secretary to the Commission           President of the Commission                     (H.C. KRÜGER)                       (C.A. NØRGAARD)