CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 4 juillet 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 11580/85                       by Rupert SCHREIBER                       against the Federal Republic of Germany             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 4 July 1988, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 17 April 1985 by Rupert Schreiber against the Federal Republic of Germany and registered on 17 June 1985 under file No. 11580/85;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:     THE FACTS           The facts of the case as they appear from the applicant's statements and the documents submitted by him may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a German citizen, born in 1929, who resides in Cologne.   Together with others he submitted an earlier application (No. 8387/78) which concerned his activities as trustee for thalidomide victims.   The Commission rejected that application on 4 March 1980 (D.R. 19 p. 233).   The present case, which concerns the applicant's dismissal from a university post, is not related to his earlier application.           In February 1966 the law faculty of the University of Cologne accepted the applicant's post-doctoral thesis (Habilitation) qualifying him as a university lecturer (Dozent) for legal philosophy, civil and commercial law.   On 24 May 1966 he was appointed to a lecturer's post as temporary civil servant (Beamter auf Widerruf). He remained in that same post until his dismissal in 1977 of which he now complains.           During his tenure of the post, the applicant apparently received only one offer of a professorship in a Hamburg academy in 1969.   However, the applicant did not accept it.           Subsequently, the applicant made attempts to change his status in Cologne.   In August 1971 he wrote to the Minister for Science and Research (Minister für Wissenschaft und Forschung) of North Rhine- Westphalia asking for an appointment as extraordinary professor (ausserplanmässiger Professor) at the law faculty.   The Minister replied that such an appointment required a proposal by the university.   The applicant accordingly requested the law faculty to make such a proposal.   However, in January 1972 the faculty rejected the request, without considering the applicant's scientific qualification, on the ground that he had insulted the faculty and its individual members in a letter.   In a decision (Widerspruchsbescheid) of 15 October 1972 the faculty again confirmed the opinion that, when making a proposal for an appointment as extraordinary professor, regard must be had not only to the scientific qualification of the person concerned, but also to his personal aptitude ("Würdigkeit"), which was denied in this case.           Thereupon the applicant instituted proceedings before the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgericht) of Cologne claiming that the Minister should appoint him as extraordinary professor without a faculty proposal or that the faculty should propose his appointment. However, both claims were rejected.   The Administrative Court held on 10 June 1974 that the faculty's opinion was, in principle, justified but that the negative assessment of the applicant's personal aptitude did not justify a permanent refusal of his appointment.           It appears that in the subsequent appeal proceedings before the Administrative Court of Appeal (Oberverwaltungsgericht) of Münster attempts were made to reach a settlement of the matter.   In this context the applicant again applied to the faculty in November 1975 that it should propose his appointment as extraordinary professor.           During the proceedings the applicant disclosed his dispute with the law faculty to the students' representatives (Vertreter der Studentenschaft).   This led to polemic publications of the students in February 1976.   There was also a confrontation between the applicant and the faculty concerning a ceremony for a criminal law professor on the occasion of the latter's 70th birthday.   In reply to the invitation to take part in the ceremony, the applicant, in a letter to all members of the faculty, stated the following:   (German)           "Ich finde es nicht richtig, einen Kommentator nationalsozialistischer Unrechtsgesetze, mit denen unschuldige Menschen gemordet und gequält wurden, in dieser Weise zu ehren und damit als Muster eines Professors der Rechtswissenschaft vorzustellen."   (English translation)           "I regard it as inappropriate to honour in this way a person who has published commentaries on immoral Nazi statutes on the basis of which innocent people have been murdered and maltreated, and thereby to set him up as a model law professor."           The applicant alleges that the professor in question had, inter alia, written a commentary on the National Socialist Act for the Protection of Aryan Blood (Blutschutzgesetz) and the Ordinance against People's Parasites (Volksschädlingsverordnung).   He had further pleaded in favour of punishment in accordance with "sound popular opinion" ("gesundes Volksempfinden") even before this concept was introduced into Nazi legislation.   He had finally suggested imposition of the death penalty on the basis of "guilt by person" ("Täterschuld").           The faculty's dean reported these facts to the Administrative Court of Appeal in a letter of 11 May 1976.   He stated that the faculty maintained its view that personal aptitude was a criterion to be considered when making proposals for a university appointment. Having regard to the Administrative Court's opinion, the faculty had made a move towards the applicant, inviting him to subscribe an undertaking that he would, in future, abstain from allegations that faculty members deliberately sought to cause him damage.   The applicant had refused to do so, and this in itself prejudiced the necessary co-operation in the faculty.   Moreover, the applicant had not only informed the students of the objective facts of his case, but had shown them documents containing unjustified allegations against the faculty.   His discriminatory allegations against the criminal law professor were wholly unjustified as the professor in question had "shown a markedly reserved attitude vis-à-vis National Socialism and its legal concepts and had avoided any identification with the relevant views" ("eine betont distanzierte Haltung gegenüber dem Nationalsozialismus und dessen Rechtsanschauungen an den Tag gelegt und jede Identifizierung mit entsprechenden Anschauungen vermieden hat").           Defamatory behaviour of this kind was absolutely intolerable in a corporate body requiring a sense of collegiality.   Aptitude for teamwork was an essential requirement for appointment as extraordinary professor.   If appointed, the applicant would, by virtue of Section 211 of the Civil Servants Act (Landesbeamtengesetz), become a permanent university teacher exercising his main professional function within the faculty, in which case his activities would have to be co-ordinated with other colleagues on a much larger scale than if he were dismissed from his temporary civil servant's post and became a private lecturer (Privatdozent) with a weekly teaching obligation of two hours.   Moreover, a proposal to appoint the applicant as extraordinary professor would signal to the public that the faculty considered him apt in every respect to perform the functions of a university professor ("Lehrstuhlreife").   This involved a guarantee to other scientific institutions that the faculty considered him as qualified not only from the scientific, but also the personal point of view.   Accordingly such a decision was of importance for the reputation of the faculty as a whole.           In May 1976 the faculty decided also to examine the applicant's scientific qualification.   For this purpose it sought expert advice from four university teachers in the applicant's disciplines who were not attached to the university of Cologne. Only one recommended the applicant's appointment while the others expressed doubts that the applicant had sufficiently proved his scientific qualification since the submission of his post-doctoral thesis.   In November 1976 the faculty unanimously decided not to propose the applicant's appointment as extraordinary professor.           On 27 January 1977 the faculty further decided not to propose the applicant for any permanent post which might become vacant in future.           The attempts for settlement thus having failed, the Administrative Court of Appeal rejected the applicant's appeals in the proceedings against the Minister on 28 March 1980 and in the proceedings against the faculty on 20 January 1981.   Both judgments were subsequently confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court (Bundesverwaltungsgericht) which did not grant the applicant leave to appeal on points of law (Nichtzulassung der Revision).   The applicant did not lodge a constitutional complaint.           The University of Cologne, acting through its chancellor (Rektor), had in the meantime on 27 July 1977 terminated the applicant's appointment as temporary civil servant with effect from 30 September 1977. The decision was based on the ground that such appointments were by their nature of a temporary character and aimed at securing a livelihood to lecturers during an interim period until they found a permanent teaching post in a university.   They could not be transformed into permanent employment.   The applicant had occupied the post for eleven years, but had been unable to achieve the aim of a permanent appointment in another university although sufficient vacancies had existed in his disciplines.   A permanent appointment in Cologne was excluded because of the faculty's above decision of 27 January 1977 and because the applicant's attempts to be appointed or to be proposed for appointment as extraordinary professor had also failed.   In these circumstances it was not justified that the advantages connected with the post be reserved for the applicant and withheld from the many other qualified private lecturers for whom vacant lecturer posts were not available.           The applicant filed an objection (Widerspruch) claiming essentially that the termination of his appointment to the temporary civil servant's post in question lacked a legal basis.   It could be inferred from Section 212 of the Civil Servants Act that tenure of such a post was possible until reaching the age of retirement. Furthermore Section 211 provided that lecturers appointed as extraordinary professors could not be dismissed except under certain circumstances.   As he claimed to be entitled to an appointment as extraordinary professor, Section 211 should be applied in his case. The applicant finally complained that the real ground for dismissal - namely his refusal to participate in the celebration for the above-mentioned criminal law professor - had not been mentioned in the chancellor's decision nor discussed at the hearing (Anhörung) preceding his dismissal.           However, these objections were rejected by a decision (Widerspruchsbescheid) of the chancellor of 22 February 1978.           The applicant now challenged his dismissal before the Administrative Court.   He repeated his earlier submissions and further claimed that the (Federal) Act on Principles concerning the Organisation of Universities (Hochschulrahmengesetz) which had entered into force on 27 January 1976 had removed the earlier distinction betweeen university professors and lecturers, introducing a life tenure as professors for both.   The transitional provisions regulated the appointment of lecturers to new professorships. Nevertheless the chancellor had justified the applicant's dismissal by referring to his eleven years of tenure.   The dismissal constituted a serious abuse of discretionary powers by the chancellor.   The true ground was the applicant's justified refusal to participate in a ceremony in honour of a criminal law professor who had written commentaries on immoral Nazi statutes.   The chancellor had told the applicant it was irrelevant that the law faculty might also have been prompted by this incident to seek the applicant's dismissal.   He had further told the applicant that the dismissal was based on general considerations related to the temporary nature of his post, and not on personal grounds.   However, he had, on the other hand, assured representatives of the lecturers that the applicant's dismissal was based on personal grounds, that it therefore was an individual case and that they must not fear that other lecturers would be dismissed because of excessive length of tenure.   Neither in the university of Cologne nor elsewhere had an appointment to a lecturer's post ever been terminated on the ground of excessive length of tenure, although there were cases where it had lasted up to eighteen years.           The university's chancellor replied to the applicant's action on 19 April 1978.   He stated, inter alia, that already since April 1975 the Minister had made repeated inquiries about the university's intentions concerning the continued employment of the applicant as a temporary or permanent civil servant.   This was based on general guidelines issued in 1966 for junior staff ("Mittelbau") of the universities, according to which a review should be carried out after eight years of tenure.   As a consequence of the university's negative reactions concerning a permanent appointment of the applicant, the Minister had on 21 March 1977 proposed the termination of the applicant's temporary appointment.   The dismissal was thus based on general considerations relating to the nature of a temporary civil servant's appointment which, under Section 35 of the Civil Servants Act, could be revoked at any time.   The applicant's case was a special one in this respect as there were no longer any prospects for his permanent appointment.   He could not invoke Sections 211 or 212 of the Act which contained special provisions for particular situations. However, the applicant's case came under the general rule that a temporary appointment could, in principle, be revoked, and he must also have been aware of that.   The grounds which the applicant suspected to be the true reasons behind his dismissal had not been relevant to the decision terminating his appointment.   The chancellor's decision had been exclusively based on objective reasons and not on considerations concerning the applicant personally.   The faculty's decision not to propose him for appointment to a permanent post resulted from an examination of his scientific qualification. The statements in the faculty's letter of 11 May 1976 concerning the applicant's personal behaviour were irrelevant in this context.   They had been submitted in proceedings relating to a wholly different matter, namely the faculty's earlier decision to refuse a proposal for an appointment as extraordinary professor on the ground that the applicant lacked personal aptitude for such a post.           The proceedings were then adjourned pending the outcome of the litigation concerning the appointment as extraordinary professor. They were resumed on 8 April 1981.           On 15 July 1981 the Administrative Court dismissed the applicant's action on the following grounds: The relevant provisions of the Civil Servants Act gave the university's chancellor discretion to terminate a temporary appointment.   Sections 34 and 35 of the Act had been complied with.   The chancellor furthermore had not overstepped the limits of his discretionary powers nor used them in a manner which was incompatible with their aim.           Termination of the applicant's appointment was justified under Section 35 by objective reasons related to the specific nature of the applicant's post.   The 1966 guidelines showed that continued tenure of such a post was regarded as unjustified if, after eight years, the university did not intend to offer permanent employment to the person concerned.   The applicant had not obtained a permanent post in another university and the law faculty of Cologne had denied the applicant's scientific qualification for an appointment as university professor. The Administrative Court of Appeal had confirmed the lawfulness of this decision.   It was therefore manifest that the applicant could no expect to obtain a permanent post.   The applicant had not proved that other cases of long tenure up to eighteen years were comparable to his case.   He was in a special situation in that he definitely could not longer achieve the aim connected with a lecturer's post, while the situation of other lecturers with a tenure of eleven or more years might be different in this respect.           Finally, the applicant could not rely on the Federal Act on Principles concerning the Organisation of Universities.   The chancellor was not bound to maintain the applicant's temporary appointment with a view to giving him a chance to apply for appointment to a new professorship under the transitional provisions. Such transfer was not mandatory in all cases, and in any event it also required an appropriate qualification (Section 75 paras. 3 and 5 of the Federal Act).   As the lack of qualification was manifest in the applicant's case, the chancellor's discretion could not be restricted in this respect.           In view of the finding that the termination of the applicant's temporary appointment was justified because he had no longer any chance to be appointed permanently, there was no need to consider the applicant's submissions regarding the allegedly true reasons behind the chancellor's decision and the Administrative Tribunal was only required to review the facts on which this decision had actually been based.   The letter of the dean of the law faculty of 11 May 1976 was irrelevant in this context as it had been submitted in other proceedings relating exclusively to the faculty's refusal to propose the applicant's appointment as extraordinary professor because he lacked the required personal aptitude.           The applicant's appeal (Berufung) against this decision was dismissed by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 2 September 1983 after it had rejected a challenge of the judges and also the applicant's requests for evidence.   The Court held that the applicant's right to be heard had not been violated.   Even if the question of the applicant's lack of chances for a permanent appointment had not been sufficiently discussed at first instance, he had had an opportunity to raise it in the appeal proceedings.   The Administrative Court had rightly dismissed the action; in particular it had correctly held that an appointment to a temporary civil servant's post as lecturer could be terminated on the basis of objective reasons.   The applicant could not rely on the Act on Principles concerning the Organisation of Universities or related statutes nor on the allegation that no other lecturer's appointment had ever been terminated.   As the university had submitted, this was due to the fact that a need for termination against the will of the person concerned had never arisen.   In the present case the dismissal had been based on an objective ground related to the nature and purpose of a lecturer's post, because at the time of the chancellor's decision there had been no prospect for the applicant's appointment within a reasonable time to a permanent post either in Cologne or elsewhere.           It was also justified to consider the interests of other lecturers for whom no temporary post was available at that time. The alleged assurances given by the chancellor to other lecturers that they would not be dismissed for excessive length of tenure provided no argument to the applicant that he had been discriminated against contrary to Article 3 of the Basic Law.   He overlooked that in his case it was not only the length of tenure, but also the lack of chances for a permanent appointment which justified the termination of his temporary appointment.   In this respect the applicant's situation was apparently different from that of other lecturers with a comparative length of tenure.   For the same reason he could not criticise that no general instructions had been given to terminate appointments after a certain length of tenure, and that the university had only terminated his appointment.           It was true that the faculty was responsible for facts which had led to the termination of his appointment in that it had refused to propose his appointment as extraordinary professor and had decided not to consider him for any other permanent civil servant's post.   In this context the faculty had stated certain reasons in its letter of 11 May 1976.   However, the chancellor of the university had to take into account only the actual consequences of the faculty's decisions, i.e. the lack of prospects for a permanent appointment, without considering the circumstances under which these decisions had been taken.   Accordingly the faculty's letter of 11 May 1976 could not be regarded as relevant.   Finally, it was also irrelevant that the university's representative had stated at the hearing before the Administrative Court of Appeal: "Since the dismissal had to be pronounced it was necessary to think about the reasons on which to base the dismissal." ("Nachdem die Entlassung ausgesprochen werden musste, musste man sich Gedanken machen, weshalb die Entlassung ausgesprochen werden musste.")           The Court refused leave to appeal on points of law to the Federal Administrative Court.   This decision was confirmed by the Federal Administrative Court on 5 July 1984.   The Federal Administrative Court considered that none of the grounds invoked by the applicant as justifying the admission of an appeal on points of law had been established.   It could not be challenged that the Court had refused to take evidence on certain facts which it considered as irrelevant.   This was so even if the Court's views concerning the relevance of those facts was doubtful from a legal point of view.   The Administrative Court of Appeal had regarded as irrelevant that no general instructions had been given to terminate temporary appointments after a certain length of tenure, as it had considered the termination of the applicant's appointment as lawful in the individual case.   That case had been considered as showing a specific feature, namely a lack of chances to be appointed to a permanent post within a reasonable period.   In substance the applicant thus only sought to challenge the Court's assessment of the facts.   A complaint of procedural defects in the establishment of the facts could not be based on such an argument.   Finally, it did not violate fundamental procedural principles that the Court had not discussed the applicant's refusal to take part in a ceremony in honour of a criminal law professor.   The Court was only required to set out the reasons which it considered as relevant for its judgment.   It had stated that the university's chancellor was bound to take into account the consequences of the faculty's decision, namely the lack of chances for a permanent appointment of the applicant, while he could disregard the reasons which had led to the faculty's decision.   On this basis the Court had considered the faculty's letter of 11 May 1976 irrelevant for its judgment.   In these circumstances there was no necessity for the Court to deal with the applicant's confrontation with the faculty in 1976.           The applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint (Verfassungsbeschwerde) in which he invoked, in particular, the freedom of expression and freedom of science (Article 5 of the Basic Law), the constitutional principles governing the status of civil servants (Article 33 of the Basic Law), the principle of equality (Article 3 of the Basic Law) and the right to be heard (Article 103 of the Basic Law).   However, on 30 October 1984 a three-judge commission of the Federal Constitutional Court (Bundesverfassungsgericht) refused to accept the complaint, finding that it had insufficient prospects of success.   It stated that the termination of the applicant's appointment was primarily an issue of the application of ordinary law by the competent Administrative Courts.   A review by the Federal Constitutional Court was possible only within narrow limits if the decisions of these courts showed disregard for the principles of the constitution or arbitrariness.   However, there was no appearance of arbitrariness or of the violation of specific constitutional guarantees.   In particular, there was no violation of the principle of equality because even the applicant failed to cite a comparable case where a lecturer had been maintained in a temporary post despite a lack of any chance to be permanently appointed.   Nor was there a violation of the authority's duty to protect the interests of its temporary civil servant (Fürsorgepflicht des Dienstherrn) as the applicant had been given sufficient opportunities after his qualification as lecturer to find an adequate position.   There was no constitutional obligation to maintain him in his post even having regard to the specific circumstances of the case, in particular the age of the applicant.   There was no room to apply Article 5 of the Basic Law.   The judicial decisions were exclusively based on the consideration that the length of tenure and the manifest lack of chances for a permanent appointment justified the termination of the applicant's temporary appointment.   Constitutional principles had not been disregarded.   Article 5 para. 3 of the Basic Law did not stipulate any right of persons exercising scientific functions in the universities to remain in office without restrictions or time-limits. The application of the general civil servants statutes to these persons remained unaffected by Article 5 para. 3.           Finally, there was no violation of Article 103 para. 1 of the Basic Law.   The applicant had been given an opportunity to be heard on all aspects of his case before the Administrative Court of Appeal. Any shortcomings concerning the right to be heard at first instance had been cured in this way.   There was no constitutional obligation of the courts to give hints or discuss specific matters if only the right to be heard had been respected.   Nor did Article 103 protect against court decisions in which certain facts or pieces of evidence were not discussed due to provisions of formal or substantive law.    Finally, Article 103 could, in principle, not be violated by court decisions in respect of which it was alleged that they contained wrong assessments of the facts or that the importance of certain facts was not reflected in the legal conclusions.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant now alleges that his rights under Articles 6, 9 and 10 (Art. 6, Art. 9, Art. 10) of the Convention have been violated.           As regards Article 6 (Art. 6), the applicant claims that he has not had a "fair hearing" because the courts based their decisions on arguments which had not been discussed in the proceedings and because they refused to take any evidence on the relevant facts.   The applicant further complains that the proceedings lasted seven years and thus were not conducted within "reasonable time".           As regards his complaints under Articles 9 and 10 (Art. 9, Art. 10) of the Convention, the applicant submits that he must, in principle, be free to express his opinions and ideas concerning judicial murder by the Nazis, including the view that he disapproves of a ceremony of the law faculty in honour of a person who had written commentaries on immoral Nazi statutes. However, because of this action he lost his post as a university lecturer. This sanction was much more serious than that considered in application No. 9251/81, G. v.   Federal Republic of Germany (Dec. 16.12.82, unpublished), because he was not only refused access to a civil servant's post, but lost his income after eleven years of teaching at the university at the age of 55, when it was practically impossible for him to start a new professional career. Moreover, he was not only sanctioned for having expressed his opinion, but he was also prevented from expressing ideas.   While he could continue some teaching and research activities, he was forced to find another source of income, which necessarily implied a practical reduction of his academic activities. Moreover, his reputation had been seriously damaged by the discriminatory revocation of his university appointment.           The applicant claims that the restriction imposed on the exercise of his freedom of expression is not justified by Article 10 para. 2 (Art. 10-2).   It is not unlawful to disapprove of a ceremony in honour of a person who had been involved in Nazi crimes.   A democratic society must allow criticism of Nazi political murderers and, in his view, it amounts to a mockery of Nazi victims if a ceremony is held in honour of such a person.   He had done nothing but disapprove of such an action.           As his attitude was prompted by fundamental ethical orientations, the applicant must be entitled to invoke his freedom of conscience.   On this basis he claims that there has also been a breach of Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant submits that the termination of his appointment as temporary civil servant, following refusals of permanent appointment, was a sanction for his having expressed disapproval of a university ceremony held in 1976 in honour of a professor who allegedly had published commentaries on immoral Nazi statutes.   He claims that this sanction amounted to an unjustified interference with his freedom of expression (Article 10 of the Convention) (Art. 10) and his freedom of conscience (Article 9 of the Convention) (Art. 9).   a)       The Commission notes that the decision to terminate the applicant's temporary appointment was based on the ground that he had been unable to obtain permanent appointment.   It further notes that the refusal of permanent appointment as extraordinary professor was the subject of court proceedings which terminated in 1981 at the Federal Administrative Court.   Insofar as the applicant's above complaint that he was sanctioned for the expression of specific opinions concerning the above university ceremony is, in substance, directed against the refusal of permanent appointment as extraordinary professor, the Commission cannot deal with the matter.   The applicant failed to lodge a constitutional complaint in this respect and in any event did not complain to the Commission within a period of six months from the final domestic decision.   The applicant thus did not comply with the requirements of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention both as regards the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the time-limit.   This part of the application must accordingly be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   b)       Insofar as the applicant's above complaint is directed against the refusal to appoint him to another permanent university post, the Commission notes that the applicant did not take any remedies against the relevant faculty decision of 27 January 1977.   This part of the application must therefore again be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention for failure to exhaust domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26).     c)       Lastly, insofar as the applicant's above complaint is directed against the subsequent decision to terminate his temporary appointment, he has exhausted domestic remedies by lodging a constitutional complaint and has submitted his application within six months from the Federal Constitutional Court's decision of 30 0ctober 1984.   However, the applicant's dismissal was not by its terms based on the 1976 incident.   The university relied on the fact that the applicant had not been able to obtain a permanent appointment and had no prospects to obtain such an appointment.   This reason was found to be sufficient by the courts of all instances to justify the termination of the applicant's temporary appointment, and it was repeatedly confirmed that the grounds underlying the refusals of permanent appointment, including the statements made by the applicant in 1976, were irrelevant in this context.   It was pointed out that the said statements had been considered in different proceedings, namely those concerning the refusal of the applicant's permanent appointment as extraordinary professor, which had been concluded in 1981.           The applicant submits that, notwithstanding the reasons adduced by the university for the termination of his temporary appointment, the real reason behind this measure was the fact that he had expressed disapproval of the university ceremony in 1976.   However, this argument was expressly rejected by the domestic courts and the Commission finds no indication that this finding was arbitrary or unreasonable.   There is no indication in the file that the applicant's dismissal was in fact based on the expression of critical views concerning the said university ceremony.           The right to employment in the public service is not as such guaranteed by the Convention (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Glasenapp judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 104, pp. 25-26 paras. 48-49; Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, p. 20 paras. 34-35).   As it has not been established that in the present case the applicant's dismissal from the public service was based on an expression of opinion, there is no appearance of an interference with his rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention, which guarantees the freedom of expression.   Nor is there any appearance, in the decision terminating his employment, of an interference with his freedom of conscience as guaranteed by Article 9 (Art. 9) of the Convention.   It follows that the applicant's complaints in this respect are manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant finally complains that he did not have a fair hearing and that his case was not determined within a reasonable time. He invokes Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention in this respect.           However, Article 6 (Art. 6) is only applicable in cases which concern the determination of civil rights and obligations or of criminal charges.   In the present case there is no question of a criminal charge.   As regards "civil rights and obligations", it has been established in the Commission's case-law that litigation concerning access to, or dismissal from, a public appointment in the civil service falls outside the scope of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention (cf. e.g.   No. 9248/81, Leander v.   Sweden, Dec. 10.10.83, D.R. 34 p. 78, at p. 83; concerning a university lecturer No. 8963/80, X v. Federal Republic of Germany, Dec. 10.12.80, unpublished).   It follows that the applicant's procedural complaints are incompatible, ratione materiae, with the provisions of the Convention and must accordingly be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).             For these reasons, the Commission               &SDECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.&S           Deputy Secretary to the Commission           President of the Commission                   (J. RAYMOND)                              (C.A. NØRGAARD)