CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 14 juillet 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }    AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF     Application No. 12402/86 by Angela and Rodney PRICE against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 14 July 1988, the following members being present:                   MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                      J.A. FROWEIN                      S. TRECHSEL                      F. ERMACORA                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      A. WEITZEL                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      G. BATLINER                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                   Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 18 September 1986 by Angela and Rodney PRICE against the United Kingdom and registered on 22 September 1986 under file No. 12402/86;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicants are both British citizens, born respectively in 1939 and 1952.   The first applicant is a district nurse; the second applicant is a market trader by profession.   They are represented by Ms.   Mary Ryan, solicitor, of the Family Rights Group, London.   The facts as they have been submitted on behalf of the parties may be summarised as follows.           The applicants are the adoptive paternal grandparents of a child, D., born on 24 July 1984.   D. is the son of the applicants' adopted son and daughter-in-law.   The first applicant adopted her son during her first marriage, and following the first applicant's marriage to the second applicant, the second applicant also adopted her son.   The applicants visited D. regularly after his birth and were concerned that he did not seem to be very well.   In particular it appeared that he had difficulty feeding.           On 4 September 1984 D. was admitted to hospital with serious injuries, including a fractured skull and fractures in the legs.   The local authority was not satisfied with the explanations offered in respect of the injuries and suspected they were non-accidental.   At this time, the social services department of the local authority obtained a place of safety order in respect of D. under Section 28(1) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.   D. was in hospital for three weeks, during which time both applicants visited him daily, the first applicant often staying for several hours.   Both applicants were very concerned about their grandson.           On 21 September 1984 the social services department of the local authority placed D. with short-term foster parents, where the applicants were refused the opportunity to visit him despite their request.   On 7 November 1984 the Wigan Juvenile Court granted a care order in respect of D. to the social services department of the local authority under Section 1(2)(a) of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.   The applicants were not legally entitled to be parties to those proceedings, or to make representations or any application in respect of their grandson.           The local authority from the outset had decided on pursuing the course of rehabilitating D. with his parents.   The programme of rehabilitation began at the end of November 1984 when the child began to spend days at home.   The applicants were then able to visit him at his parents' home.   As the rehabilitation programme developed, so contact with the applicants also increased.   On 1 March 1985 the child returned to the care of his parents on a full-time basis and the applicants saw him about twice a week.           On 12 June 1985 the child was admitted to hospital with bruises under his eyes.   The applicants visited the child in hospital every day until his discharge on 21 June.   The local authority considered these injuries to be non-accidental and when he was discharged from hospital placed him with foster parents.   The applicants asked for access, which was initially refused.   Subsequently the social services department of the local authority allowed the first applicant to visit the child with the child's mother once a week, but refused to make arrangements for both applicants to visit the child together.           In August 1985 the applicants consulted their current representative, and on 9 August 1985 their representative wrote to the social services department of the local authority, in part in the following terms:           "Unfortunately <the applicants'> concern, which arises         from their natural love of their grandchild, has been         interpreted by your department as interference in the         case and they have had great difficulty in communicating         with your department and in making arrangements to have         access to [the child] while he has been living with         foster parents.   [The applicants] have therefore sought         my assistance in opening up communications with your         department."           The letter requested further access to the child, if possible at the applicants' home at weekends, and referred to paragraph 8 of the Statutory Code of Practice on Access issued by the Department of Health and Social Security which stresses the importance of considering the wider family when making arrangements for access to a child in care.   The letter then added that, if the decision was taken by the local authority not to continue to attempt to rehabilitate the child with his parents, the grandparents offered themselves as potential long-term carers for the child.           The social services department of the local authority continued to refuse to make any fuller arrangements for access for the applicants but did agree to consider the applicants' offer of a home for D.           On 8 November 1985, a case conference held by the social services department of the local authority decided to rehabilitate D. with his parents.   It was specifically concluded that if further non-accidental injury occurred rehabilitation would be terminated and consideration given to alternative placement for D. away from his parents.   On 17 December 1985 both sets of grandparents were seen by social workers concerning their involvement in the rehabilitation programme.   D. again started to spend days at the home of his parents, where the applicants were able to visit him.   Once again, with increasing time spent at home, the child's contact with the applicants increased.           On 1 February 1986 the first applicant's son telephoned the first applicant to say that the child had a bruise on his leg.   The first applicant advised him to contact the social services department, and on 4 February 1986 the child was again admitted to hospital where the first applicant visited him.   D. was found to have bruising on the thigh and buttocks.   Both injuries were unexplained and D.'s parents gave different reasons as to how the bruising could have been caused. On or about 6 February 1986 the child was placed with foster parents.           Following a case conference on 7 February 1986 and in line with the conclusions of the case conference on 8 November 1985, rehabilitation plans ceased and long-term placement away from his family was sought for D.   At the same time it was decided that access by members of the family was to cease.   The applicants have not been allowed to see D. since then.           On 11 February 1986 a social worker from the Family Rights Group advising the applicants wrote to the social services department of the local authority asking them for a meeting with the applicants, before any decisions were made to the child's future.   No reply was received to this letter, but on 25 March 1986 the applicants were invited to meet with the representatives of the social services department of the local authority.   They were told that on 7 February 1986 the social services department of the local authority had decided to place the child for adoption in a new family.   The applicants had not been informed of this decision and had not been invited to make representations about it.           On 19 February 1986 and 4 March 1986 case conferences concerning access to children in care had been held by the social services department of the local authority.   It was confirmed that the applicants should have no access to the child and found that they were not suitable to care for him full-time.   They had not been informed that these meetings were taking place, nor had they been asked to make any representations, and had not been informed of the decision prior to 25 March 1986.           At their meeting with the local authority on 25 March 1986 the applicants referred to the Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care issued by the Secretary of State under Section 12G of the Child Care Act 1980, and in particular to paragraph 28 of the Code of Practice which is in the following terms:   "Disagreement with parents   28.      Local authorities should ensure that they have clear procedures which will enable parents to pursue complaints about access and ask for decisions to be reviewed.   Local authorities should also be prepared to use these procedures to deal with complaints about access decisions from other relatives of children in care."           On 26 March 1986, the local authority sent a letter to the applicants explaining the local authority's decision concerning access and adoption.   On 2 April 1986, the applicants attended a meeting with the local authority to discuss this letter.           Subsequently, on 6 May 1986 the applicants attended another meeting of the social services committee of the local authority and presented their request for access to the child.   Their request was refused.           In May 1986 the first applicant's adopted son and daughter-in-law issued a summons in the Wigan Juvenile Court under Section 21(2) Children and Young Persons Act 1969, to discharge the care order in respect of their child.   The applicants had no locus standi in those proceedings and were not entitled to be represented or to make any applications on their own behalf.   The Juvenile Court also had no power to make any order in respect of the child's access to his grandparents.   In the meantime, on 12 May 1986, the applicants submitted a letter to the adoption panel of the local authority requesting that they be considered as prospective adopters for the child.   They pointed out in their letter that they considered that it would be very hard for the social workers who had been involved in the case up to date to examine their offer with the objectivity which was necessary.   They therefore suggested that an independent social worker should make an assessment of their suitability.           The child's parents' summons to discharge the care order and to request access came before the Juvenile Court on 22 October 1986 and lasted four days.   The application was refused.           The local authority placed D. for adoption.           Relevant domestic law and practice           Care proceedings under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969           By Section 1 of the 1969 Act the local authority may apply to the Juvenile Court, which is a specially constituted magistrates court, for the child to be placed in its care.   The local authority has a duty so to do under Section 2(2) of the 1969 Act.   The conditions to be satisfied following an application are set out in Section 1(2)(a)-(f): section 1(2)a provides for a (care) order in circumstances where           "(a) <the child's> proper development is being avoidably         prevented or neglected or his health is being avoidably         impaired or neglected or he is being ill treated...."           In the application before the Juvenile Court the local authority has to show the existence of one of the conditions in Section 1(2)(a)-(f) and show that the child is in need of care or control which he will not receive unless one of the orders specified in Section 1(3) is made.   It is provided by Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933, as amended by the Children and Young Persons Act 1969, that every court in care proceedings shall have regard to the welfare of the child in question and shall in a proper case take steps for removing him from undesirable surroundings or for securing that proper provision is made for his education and training.           One of the orders under Section 1(3) of the 1969 Act is a care order.   The effect of a care order is that the rights of the parents, except the rights to agree to adoption and to influence the child's religious beliefs, are taken from them and given to the local authority.   The powers and duties of local authorities with respect to children and young persons committed to their care are contained in Section 10 and Part III of the Child Care Act 1980.   The local authority have "the same powers and duties with respect to a person in their care by virtue of a care order ... as his parents or guardian would have apart from the order ..." (Section 10 of the 1980 Act). They also have power to keep the child in their care notwithstanding any claim by his parent or guardian while the order is in force. Where a child is committed to the care of a local authority that authority has the right to control access by other persons to that child.   In consequence of the child being in the care of a local authority the local authority are required to give first consideration to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of that child throughout his childhood (Section 18 of the Child Care Act 1980).   Thus the local authority must apply this test in relation to decisions concerning access to the child.           The care proceedings are, unless ground (f) is alleged, civil proceedings; they are governed by the Magistrates' Courts (Children and Young Persons) Rules 1970 (S.I.1970/1792) ("the 1970 Rules") as amended and the law of evidence in civil cases applies.   The parties to the proceedings are the local authority and the child.   It is open to the child to have his parent or guardian to conduct his case on his behalf either directly or indirectly through a lawyer in which case the parent or guardian can apply for legal aid on the child's behalf (Section 40(2) of the Legal Aid Act 1974).   Where the court thinks there may be a conflict of interest between the child and the parent or guardian, the court may make an order that those interests be separately represented (Section 32A of the 1969 Act as inserted by Section 64 of the Children Act 1975).   In that case legal aid will be available for the child and separately for the parent or guardian (Section 28(6A) of the Legal Aid Act 1974 as amended by Section 65 of the Children Act 1975).           Under Section 2(12) of the 1969 Act, appeals from a juvenile court decision in care proceedings lie to the Crown Court.   The Crown Court reviews the decision by way of rehearing.   The local authority has no direct right of appeal where no order is made under Section 1(3) or where the one made was not the order sought.   Appeal on a point of law lies to the Divisional Court of the High Court.           Judicial review           A person affected by the decision of an administrative body may apply to have that decision set aside on the ground that the body has acted in excess of its legal authority or that the decision taken is one which nobody acting reasonably could have taken.           Wardship           Wardship jurisdiction is exercised by the Family Division of the High Court or, since 28 April 1986, to a limited extent by County Courts.   It is a prerogative jurisdiction at common law and is largely independent of statutory provisions.   When a child becomes a ward of court a court assumes responsibility for all aspects of his welfare. It may, for example, make orders as to where the child has to live, with whom, who may have access to him, and as to his religion, education and marriage if under 18.   In determining what orders to make, the High Court is required by Section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 to have regard to the child's welfare as the first and paramount consideration.   A court may grant care and control of the child to a person or body, for example a local authority, but that person or body may only act in accordance with the court's directions. The court may also give care and control to one person or body and make a supervision order, at its own discretion or under Section 7(4) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, in favour of another person or body.   A child remains a ward of court until either he has attained his majority or the court orders that he shall cease to be a ward of court.   No important step can be taken in the child's life without the court's consent (Re S (1967) 1 All ER 202 at 209).           Anyone, not merely a parent or a local authority, who can show an appropriate interest in a child's welfare can apply for a child to be made a ward of court.   Section 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides that no child may be made a ward of court other than by a court order.   The application for the order must be made by originating summons in the High Court.   The procedure is set out in Order 90 of the Rules of Supreme Court.   The child becomes a ward of court immediately the originating summons is issued.   However, unless an appointment for the hearing of the summons is made within 21 days, the wardship automatically lapses.   The appointment will generally be before a registrar who gives directions as to what is to be done before the case may be heard before a judge.   He may also make an order as to access if the person with the physical custody of the child agrees.   The registrar may also decide if any other interested parties to the proceedings should be so joined.   Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the registrar may appeal to a judge in chambers.   When the proceedings are heard before the judge he either confirms the wardship or makes an order terminating wardship.           There is a right of appeal from the judge in chambers to the Court of Appeal, and thereafter (with leave) to the House of Lords. In exceptional circumstances an appeal may be direct to the House of Lords.   Interested persons with insufficient means are able under Section 7 of the Legal Aid Act 1974 to obtain legal aid for the representation of their interests in wardship proceedings.           Once a child has become a ward of court, it remains open to any party to bring the case back to the court for a variation of the original order granting wardship or for directions on matters such as access or education.           The courts have emphasised that the wardship jurisdiction is not an alternative form of appeal from the decision of a juvenile court concerning the care of a child under the 1969 Act.   The relationship between the responsibilities for the care of children given by statute to local authorities and those exercised by the High Court under wardship jurisdiction was explained in the leading judgment of Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords case A v.   Liverpool City Council (1981) 2 All ER 385 in particular at pages 388-9 in which it was stated that wardship jurisdiction could not be exercised by the courts to review the merits of local authorities decisions within the field of discretion committed by statute to the local authority.           Code of Practice on Access           The Code of Practice on Access is a statutory code issued under Section 12G of the Child Care Act 1980.   Particular emphasis is placed on the need for local authorities to make provision for contact to be maintained, where this is consistent with the welfare of children, with the wider members of the family in addition to the child's parents (paras. 8 and 9 of the Code).   The Code also requires local authorities to ensure that they have clear procedures to enable complaints about access to be pursued and for decisions to be reviewed where relatives are concerned as well as parents.   The provisions introduced by the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983 which provide a court procedure giving parents a right to apply for access where a child is subject to a care order do not apply to grandparent applications.   Thus domestic legislation does not recognise that grandparents have a right to access or a right to apply for access to a child when that child is in the care of a local authority under a compulsory care order.           Grandparents and grandchildren           Under domestic legislation grandparents generally do not have legal rights over their grandchildren.   Any rights which may exist over children are normally vested jointly in the children's parents if they are married.   In considering the award of custody of a child to any person or an issue relating to a child's upbringing such as access a court must give first and paramount consideration to the welfare of the child (Section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971).   Where a child is in the care of a local authority by virtue of a compulsory care order a grandparent of that child does not have a right to apply for custody or access but must rely on the local authority's discretion to afford contact with the child (which could include access or the child living with the grandparents) where this would be in the child's best interests.   Section 18 of the Child Care Act 1980 requires the local authority to give first consideration to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the child throughout his childhood and such contact with the grandparents would therefore have to be consistent with the child's welfare.           Under domestic legislation grandparents may be parties to or involved in the following proceedings in relation to their grandchildren:     (i)     Pursuant to Section 14A of the Guardianship of Minors Act         1971, where, under Section 9(1) of the Act, an order giving         access or custody to the father or mother is in force, the         Court may, on application of a grandparent of the minor,         make an order requiring access to the minor to be given         to the grandparent.     (ii)    Grandparents may commence wardship proceedings, or apply to         be joined as parties to wardship proceedings commenced by         any other person, and may ask for any order which is in         the interest of their grandchild.   However, as stated above,         wardship proceedings cannot be used to challenge the decisions         of local authorities taken under their statutory powers.     (iii)   Where the child concerned is living with the grandparents         they may apply for a custodianship order in respect of him         under the Children Act 1975.   This provision is applicable to         any relative of the child with whom the child has been living         for the preceding three months where the person with legal         custody of the child gives his consent.   The provision also         applies to any person with whom the child has been living         for a period of 12 months (including the preceding three         months) where the person with legal custody consents.   (iv)     In cases where the child is living with the grandparents         and various statutory requirements have been satisfied         grandparents may apply for an adoption order.   These         requirements apply to any prospective adopter.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants complain of a violation of their rights under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention.   They contend that their right to apply for custody of and/or access to their grandchild is a civil right, but that they do not have any right under English law to apply for custody or access because their grandchild is subject to a care order made under the Children and Young Persons Act 1969.   In the care proceedings the applicants have no locus standi and no right to apply for the discharge of the care order.   Similarly, the applicants have no right to make an application in respect of their grandchild in wardship proceedings in view of the decisions of the House of Lords in A v.   Liverpool City Council (1981) 2 All ER 385 and W and others v. Hertfordshire County Council (1985) 2 All ER 301.   Hence the applicants contend that they had no independent and impartial tribunal established by law from which they could obtain a fair hearing within a reasonable time in respect of the determination of their civil rights as regards their grandchild.   2.       The applicants also complain of a violation of their rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   They submit that they had substantial access to their grandchild from his birth in July 1984 until his final placement with foster parents in February 1986.           They complain that by restricting and ultimately terminating access and refusing to allow them custody of their grandchild, the social services department of the local authority have interfered with their right to respect for their family life.           They further contend that the process of decision-making within the social services department of the local authority provided insufficient safeguards and showed a total lack of respect for family life (*).   3.       The applicants lastly contend that they had no effective remedy before a national tribunal as required by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention since they had no standing in the care proceedings and wardship would have been ineffective.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 18 September 1986 and registered on 22 September 1986.           On 4 December 1986, the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on its admissibility and merits pursuant to Rule 42(2)b of the Rules of Procedure.           The observations of the respondent Government were submitted on 5 June 1987 after an extension in the time-limit and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants on 16 September 1987, also after an extension in the time-limit.   ----------   (*)   The applicants' complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) are set out in full      on pp. 9-10 of the Partial Decision on Admissibility.           The applicants were granted legal aid by the President of the Commission on 25 June 1987.           On 9 March 1988, the Commission declared the applicants' complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded in a partial decision on admissibility.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES        A. The respondent Government        1. The facts           Background           Following D.'s first hospitalisation, the local authority's records note that, in discussion with the health visitor on 7 September 1984, the first applicant mentioned that she was not surprised that there had been injuries on D.           From the outset, the local authority sought to rehabilitate D. with his parents as being in his best interests.   The efforts of the local authority therefore concentrated on the relationship between D. and his parents, and although this at times restricted the applicants' access to D., this was done for D.'s benefit.   It had been noted at case conferences on 11 September and 13 November 1984 that the first applicant tended to overshadow D.'s mother, thus providing an obstacle to the proposed rehabilitation of D. with his parents.           While the applicants were not entitled to be parties in the case proceedings on 7 November 1984, the Juvenile Court has an inherent discretion to allow persons such as the applicants to participate in the proceedings: indeed the first applicant did give evidence at the hearing.   Representations could have been made that the Court should make a supervision order with a condition attached that D. live with the applicants.           The applicants met with the local authority on 25 March 1986, 2 April 1986 and 6 May 1986 and the applicants were able to put their case for access.   Following full consideration, the request for access to D. by the applicants was refused.           In the proceedings before the Juvenile Court in October 1986, neither the applicants nor D.'s parents asked that a supervision order be made with a condition that D. reside with the applicants.   Both the guardian ad litem's reports of 20 and 22 October 1986 and the local authority's report of 16 October 1986, which were before the Court, considered and rejected the further contact between the applicants and D.   It is submitted that the Court had ample evidence before it to come to the conclusion that it did, namely that the care order should not be discharged and that there should be no access.   It was brought to the attention of the Court that the local authority's intention was to place D. for adoption.   This has now taken place.           It should also be noted that on 13 May 1986 a letter from the local ombudsman was received by the local authority enclosing a letter of complaint from the applicants concerning their treatment by the local authority.   This was investigated by the ombudsman and no evidence of maladministration was found.           Throughout this case the local authority social workers were concerned that not all the members of the family were being fully open with the various authorities as to how injuries to D. occurred.   As mentioned above the first applicant was recorded by a health visitor as saying that she was not surprised at the injuries which occurred to D. resulting in his admission to hospital on 4 September 1984.   On 19 September 1984 the health authority records note that D.'s mother admitted holding D.'s face while winding him after a feed and that a "potty" and shampoo bottle had been thrown at him by   his sister. Following attempts to rehabilitate D. with his family when he was examined on 22 January 1985, 27 February 1985, 12 June 1985 and 4 February 1986 the explanations given by the various members of the family, including the applicants, for the injuries recorded were not accepted as satisfactory by the doctor who examined D.   In particular the explanations given by members of D.'s family for the injuries on 12 June 1985 were not consistent.   On the final occasion when rehabilitation was attempted not only was there concern among the local authority social workers that one of the applicants could have caused the injuries but again the explanations provided by D.'s parents and the second applicant were inconsistent.   From the second applicant's statement of 4 February 1986 it would appear that he could have caused the bruising to D.   According to the guardian ad litem's report of 20 October 1986 the doctor who examined D. said that the bruising on D.'s buttocks was due to an "extremely hard slap".   The local authority's letter of 26 June 1986 to the local ombudsman states on page 3:           "The officers felt it was difficult for them to find out         exactly and precisely how D. had been injured, which had         occurred on a number of occasions.   There seemed to be         conflicting stories being told or, to use the (applicants')         own phrase, a muddying of the picture.   This is called         collusion and it could have been created deliberately or         it could have been created unknowingly, without being         aware of the effect.           The officers genuinely felt and still feel that such a         smoke screen or muddying of the picture existed, hence,         the reference in the telephone conversation (to collusion).         That view is still felt and it is not appropriate to         apologise for using the phrase."           The local authority's version of events was accepted by the local ombudsman.           The view that members of the family had been less than fully open with the local authority is supported by the first applicant's comments (noted in the local authority's records on 27 March 1986) when she explained to a social worker that D.'s mother had injured D. If she had known this before she could presumably have come forward and discussed it openly with the local authority officials concerned.        2. Domestic law and practice           Adoption legislation           Before a child can be placed for adoption the Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983 which govern pre-placement procedure require a full investigation of each case where adoption is under consideration.   This will include consideration of the wider family. Before a local authority can make adoption placement decisions they must receive their Adoption Panel's recommendations.   Adoption orders can only be made after consideration by the adoption Court of the question of whether the parents agree to the making of an adoption order or the Court dispenses with their agreement in accordance with Section 12 of the Children Act 1975.   In a case such as the present one the parties to the proceedings would include the prospective adopters, the local authority and the child's parents and may include any other person (including grandparents) as the Court may at any time direct (Rule 15(3) of the Adoption Rules 1984).   The Court will have before it in addition to any other evidence which any of the parties may wish to introduce a report from the local authority as the placing agency covering the matters specified in Schedule 2 to those rules which will include relevant information concerning the grandparent. It should cover the nature of the relationship between the grandparents and the child and possible alternatives to adoption which have been or should be considered.   In considering whether to make an adoption order in any case the Court is required to have regard to all the circumstances, first consideration being given to the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of the child throughout his childhood, and shall so far as practicable ascertain the wishes and feelings of the child regarding the decision and give due consideration to them, having regard to his age and understanding (Section 3 of the Children Act 1975).           Children and Young Persons (Amendment) Act 1986           Since proceedings were taken in the present case the above Act has been passed.   It amends the 1969 Act to the effect that any grandparent of a child in respect of whom care proceedings are brought may make an application to the Court and the Court may in such circumstances as may be specified in rules of Court give leave for the grandparent to be made a party to the proceedings.   These provisions of the Act have not yet been brought into operation.   The Act does not affect the orders which the Court may make in care proceedings where the grandparent is a party.   Thus the Court cannot make a custody order or access order in favour of the grandparent.        3. Admissibility and merits           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention           The respondent Government do not accept that the applicants' civil rights were involved in the present case.   Grandparents do not under English law have any rights of access to their children.   At most, a child's grandparents have the right, in certain circumstances, to make an application to the courts in the hope that the courts might, in the exercise of their discretion, permit them access to their grandchild.   It is therefore submitted that there is no legal basis in English law for the proposition that grandparents have "rights" in relation to their grandchildren of a type to which Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention has any relevance.           Insofar as it is true to say that the grandparents had a hope or expectation that access might have been granted to them by the local authority, it is submitted that any such hope or expectation cannot be classed as a right and that the possibility that a discretion right be exercised in a certain way cannot be characterised as a right.           If, which is not accepted, the applicants' civil rights were involved it is submitted that they did have access to court for determination of that right.   Local authority action can be challenged in wardship proceedings in conjunction with proceedings for judicial review or in proceedings for judicial review alone.   If the local authority had acted improperly in restricting access to the applicants or in their refusal to grant access after 7 February 1986, it would have been open to the applicants to apply both for judicial review of the local authority's actions and to bring wardship proceedings at the same time.   If, for example, it could have been shown that the local authority did not take proper account of the applicants as possible carers for D. and persons who should have continued to be involved in D.'s life or if the local authority had failed to act in accordance with the principles set out in the Code of Practice on Access there would have been good grounds for such applications to have been made. In fact, the local authority went to considerable efforts to enable the applicants to put their case before a specially convened meeting of elected members in accordance with the procedures recommended under the Code of Practice and there were a number of meetings between the applicants and the local authority's social workers to discuss both access and the applicants' further involvement with D.           In the present case, any "right" to access which the applicants had stemmed from the possibility of the local authority exercising their discretion in the applicants' favour.   In such cases, the case-law of the Court and the Commission indicates that the possibility of judicial review of the exercise of such discretion satisfies the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   The recent case of Agosi (Eur.   Court H.R., Agosi judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A No. 108) indicates that the remedy of judicial review, which in this case could be used alone or supported by a wardship application, would be a satisfactory remedy having regard to the requirements of Article 6 (Art. 6).   The Government also refer to the case of Van Marle (Series A No. 101 para. 35) as indicating that the existence of such proceedings is relevant in particular when it is alleged that an authority has exercised its powers improperly.   The Government further rely on the Report of the Commission in Application No. 7598/76, Kaplan v. the United Kingdom (Comm.   Rep. 17.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 5),           It is submitted that the applicants could not show, on the facts, that they had a proper basis for challenging the actions of the local authority, as the local authority did not act improperly. However, if this is alleged, it is submitted that in this regard the applicants have failed to exhaust domestic remedies for the purposes of Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.           As regards the care proceedings, the applicants could have requested the Court, in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction, to allow them to make representations.   For example, they could have made representations, in conjunction with D.'s mother and her husband, that a supervision order be made with a requirement that D. be placed with the applicants.           Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention           If, contrary to the respondent Government's submission, the Commission is of the opinion that Article 6 (Art. 6) is applicable, the Government would submit that no separate issue arises under Article 13 (Art. 13).   The Government would refer to the constant case-law of the Convention organs to the effect that the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13) are less strict than and accordingly absorbed by Article 6 (Art. 6) (e.g. Eur. Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A No. 61 para. 110).           If the Commission are of the opinion that Article 6 (Art. 6) is not applicable, the respondent Government first suggest that the applicants do not have an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13).   In the case of Rice and Boyle (Applications Nos. 9658/82 and 9659/82, Comm.   Rep. 7.5.86) the Commission identified three elements of a claim which was "arguable": the claim should concern a right or freedom guaranteed by the Convention; the claim should not be wholly unsubstantiated on the facts; and the claim should give rise to a prima facie issue under the Convention.   The Commission did not amplify what it meant by the words "prima facie issue" in this context. However, it is noted that in respect of the two applicants' complaints in that case the Commission equated the concept of manifestly ill-founded with the absence of a prima facie issue; in particular, in paragraph 91 of its Report, the Commission held that, since the supervision of prisoners' correspondence was justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), the complaint did not give rise to a prima facie issue and thus to an arguable claim under the Convention.           In the present case, the Government argue that the applicants' claim under Article 8 (Art. 8) is manifestly ill-founded.   In these circumstances the Government submit that no issue under Article 13 (Art. 13) arises.           Alternatively, the applicants had an effective remedy before a national authority through the procedure adopted by the local authority in resp