CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 14 juillet 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF     Application No.12763/87 by Terence LAWLOR against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 14 July 1988, the following members being present:                   MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                      J.A. FROWEIN                      S. TRECHSEL                      F. ERMACORA                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      A. WEITZEL                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      G. BATLINER                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                   Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 10 February 1987 by Terence LAWLOR against the United Kingdom and registered on 3 March 1987 under file No. 12763/87;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts as they have been submitted on behalf of the applicant by his legal representative, P. William Ackroyd, solicitor of London, may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a British citizen living in London.   He is a retired consultant psychiatrist.           The applicant is the father of two daughters, A and B both living in London.   Since 1976 B, the younger daughter, has exhibited disturbing behaviour and has been unable to live an independent life.           A daughter was born to B on 29 October 1981.   The father of the child is not married to B, and he takes no interest in her care and has not seen her since shortly after her birth.           Following the child's birth, the child lived at home with the applicant and his wife, her grandparents, together with A and B.   B was unable to contribute in any substantial way to the care of her child and the applicant, his wife and A assisted in the care of the child.           On 21 January 1985, B was admitted to hospital and since that date has largely been living away from home.           On 3 April 1985 the applicant's wife died and on 12 April 1985, with the consent of the applicant, the child was received into care on a voluntary basis by the Social Services Department of the local authority under Section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980.           Between 12 April 1985 and 19 July 1985 the child was placed with short-term foster parents, and the applicant and A had frequent and unlimited access to the child.   The applicant states that he saw the child approximately five times a week and that A saw her three to four times a week.           After consultation with, inter alia, the applicant at a meeting, the local authority decided on 10 July 1985 to transfer the child to temporary foster parents.   It was envisaged that a period of 18 months would be involved in this placement.           On 19 July 1985 the child was moved to live with another foster parent.   Following this, the applicant's access to the child was reduced to once a week, and A's access to the child was reduced to twice a week.   The applicant accepted that for the immediately foreseeable future, the child could not be cared for by her own family, and that it was necessary that she be placed in the care of an alternative family.   The applicant, however, remained dissatisfied with the access which was granted to him, and the approach of the local authority to the question of access and to his complaints in relation to it.           There passed between the applicant and the local authority a certain amount of correspondence and there were a number of meetings. In a letter dated 15 July 1985 the social worker for the local authority, referring to a meeting held with the applicant the previous week, commented:           "Although (the child) has progressed very well, I think         that we all agree that she has still some catching up to         do and this is going to take time and effort from both         (the child) and her foster parent.   Whilst we accept the         importance of the family contact, it is necessary in order         to prevent confusion for (the child), and also that her         future can be concentrated upon, that visiting is now less         frequent.   I would suggest that you visit once a week, which         should be negotiated with (the foster parent)."           In a reply dated 17 July 1985 the applicant stated that once a week was too little to keep contact between his family and the child and that he could not accept that the frequency of his visits could cause confusion.   A meeting took place on 23 August 1985 to discuss the case and the applicant attended, with a representative from the Family Rights Group.   The applicant expressed his desire to have his access increased but no decision was taken to do so.   On 1 October 1985 a case conference took place involving the applicant, the purpose of which was to review the future plans for the child bearing in mind the mother B's inability and reluctance to look after the child.   The applicant again requested increased access, which was refused.           Following this meeting the applicant, assisted by a social worker with the Family Rights Group, made enquiries of the local authority by letter dated 7 October 1985 as to his right of appeal against the local authority's decision concerning his right to access to the child.   He was initially informed by the local authority that he had no right of appeal against the local authority's decision. Following an exchange of correspondence, the local authority amended their previous statement concerning the lack of any appeal procedure and informed the applicant by letter dated 22 January 1986 that an aggrieved person could write to the Director of Social Services setting out the basis of his complaint.   The Director would then investigate the matter.   The local authority commented that there was no formal procedure for appealing against decisions concerning access, although a formal procedure had been prepared and was awaiting final comments before being implemented.           On 20 February 1986, A attended a meeting with the local authority and agreed that adoption was in the best interests of the child and that she wished to have continued access to the child.           On 14 March 1986 the social worker with the Family Rights Group wrote to the local authority expressing concern that plans were being made for the child's future without there being any discussion with the applicant.   The applicant was then invited to a meeting with the local authority on 18 April 1986 in which the following proposal was going to be made:           "We are proposing to recommend to our Adoption and Fostering         Panel that adoption by a substitute family is in (the child's)         best interests with access by her aunt (A).   The case for this         will be presented at the first opportunity to the Panel for         its approval."           A meeting took place on 18 April 1986 at which both the applicant and A were present and the Minutes of the meeting recorded: /87           "The Social Services' representatives could see no exceptional         reasons for (the applicant) to have access to (the child) in         the way described for (A).   The closeness and significance of         (the child)'s relationship with her aunt (A) was emphasised,         and overall it was felt that (the child) should only have         access to one close person in her natural family, and in this         case, it should be (A)."           At that meeting the applicant, who was accompanied by a representative of the Family Rights Group, was given the opportunity to put forward his views, although it appears that at that time his views were not acceptable to the local authority, who considered that it would not be in the child's best interests that there should be continuing access for the applicant.   The local authority subsequently took a different view and were prepared to recommend that the applicant be allowed some access to the child.   The Adoption and Fostering Panel decided on 16 June 1986 that an adoptive family should be sought who would be willing to allow access to both A and the applicant.           The applicant was, however, concerned as to the possibility of a change in the local authority's attitude and sought to ensure that there should be some lasting contact between himself and the child. He therefore instituted wardship proceedings on 20 May 1986 against the local authority.   The applicant, in these proceedings, sought long-term arrangements for his own and A's contact with the child and to provide for the child's care and control.   The local authority however submitted that the court had no power to review the decision made by the local authority.   The local authority cited A v.   The Liverpool City Council (1982) A.C. 363 as the relevant authority for their proposition that the court had no power to review the local authority's decision.   The local authority referred to Section 2 subsection 2 of the Child Care Act 1980 which provides that a child taken into voluntary care shall be kept in the care of the local authority so long as it appears to them that the child's welfare requires it and the child has not attained the age of 18.           The local authority cited the following passage from A v. The Liverpool City Council concerning whether or not the High Court has the jurisdiction to review the decision of the local authority:           "This leads to the next and decisive question: given that         both the High Court and the local authority have         responsibilities for the welfare of the child, what is         the relationship, or the dividing line, between them?           I think that there is no doubt that the appellant, the         child's mother, is arguing for a general reviewing         power in the court over the local authority's discretionary         decision; she is, in reality, asking the court to review         the local authority's decision as to access and substitute         its own opinion on that matter.   Access itself is undoubtedly         a matter within the discretionary power of the local authority.         In my opinion the court has no such reviewing power.   Parliament         has by statute entrusted to the local authority the power and         the duty to make decisions as to the welfare of children without         any reservation of reviewing power to the courts."           Judgment was given in the wardship proceedings on 14 August 1986 in which the judge accepted the local authority's argument that the court had no jurisdiction to intervene.   The judge considered whether there was any basis on which the local authority's decision could be questioned under the Wednesbury principle and concluded that it could not be said that the local authority had taken anything into account which they ought not to have taken into account, or had not taken into account matters which they should have taken into account. The judge therefore discharged the wardship.           Following 14 August 1986, the applicant and A continued to have access to the child, and the local authority sought an adoptive family with whom to place the child, who would agree to allow the applicant and A to have access.   Following a meeting on 19 January 1987 Social Services decided that it was best for the child for access by the applicant and A to be reduced from weekly to fortnightly in order to effect the transfer from the foster parents to the prospective adoptive parents.   A discussion of this change was held with the applicant and A on 19 January 1987 at the foster parents' home.           The Adoption Panel met on 26 February 1987 and proposed access from the applicant and A on a roughly two-monthly basis.   It also decided to recommend a Mr. and Mrs.   R as prospective adopters.           The applicant and A were involved in the preparation of the child for the move.   They met the prospective adopters before the child went to live with them and continued access for the applicant and A was discussed with Mr. and Mrs.   R, who appeared favourable. Access from the applicant and A has continued since then.   On 9 April 1987, the child moved to live with Mr. and Mrs.   R.           An application for an order to free the child for adoption was made to the court on 28 August 1987 and the matter was heard on 9 December 1987.   The applicant was represented at the hearing and was made a party to the proceedings.   The applicant consented to the freeing order.           The applicant states that he has no right to question the decisions of the local authority if they decide to seek a family who refuses access to himself and A, and that decision will not be subject to any judicial review.   The applicant states that he could have appealed against the decision of 14 August 1986 on a matter of law to the Court of Appeal and the House of Lords, but it was clear that he had no grounds for appeal in law against the said decision. Furthermore the applicant states that if the local authority acted in breach of its administrative responsibilities, the applicant could apply for judicial review.   Such procedure would not however deal with the merits of the decision, but merely with the method by which that decision was arrived at.   The courts have made it clear that they are not willing to interfere with the way in which local authorities make decisions about children in their care.           Relevant domestic law and practice           Voluntary care           Section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980 (the 1980 Act) provides:           "(1) Where it appears to a local authority with respect to         a child in their area appearing to them to be under the age         of 17 -              (a) that he has neither parents nor guardian or has been                and remains abandoned by his parents or guardian or                is lost; or,              (b) that his parents or guardian are, for the time being                or permanently, prevented by reason of mental or bodily                disease or infirmity or other incapacity or any other                circumstances from providing for his proper                accommodation, maintenance and upbringing; and              (c) in either case, that the intervention of the local                authority under this section is necessary in the                interests of the welfare of the child,           it shall be the duty of local authority to receive the child         into their care under this section.           (2) Where a local authority have received a child into their         care under this section, it shall, subject to the provisions         of this part of this Act, be their duty to keep the child in         their care so long as the welfare of the child appears to them         to require it and the child has not attained the age of 18.           (3) Nothing in this section shall authorise a local authority         to keep a child in their care under this section if any parent         or guardian desires to take over the care of the child, and         the local authority shall, in all cases where it appears to         them consistent with the welfare of the child so to do,         endeavour to secure that the care of the child is taken over         either -              (a) by a parent or guardian of his; or              (b) by a relative or friend of his, being, where possible,                a person of the same religious persuasion as the child                or who gives an undertaking that the child will be                brought up in that religious persuasion."           Section 87(1) of the 1980 Act defines "relative" so as to include inter alia a grandparent or aunt.           The right of any parent or guardian to resume caring for a child in care under Section 2 of the 1980 Act is restricted by Section 13 in cases where the child has been in care for six months under Section 2.   Section 13(2) requires (in effect) that the parent or guardian shall obtain the consent of the local authority to the resumption of possession, or that 28 days' notice of intention to resume care should be given, in such a case.           However, if a parent requests the return of the child, the authority are not compelled to comply regardless of the child's welfare (Lewisham London Borough Council v.   Lewisham Juvenile Court Justices <1979> 2 All ER 297).   If they then consider the transfer of care to the parent to be inconsistent with that welfare they may either pass a parental rights resolution or apply to make the child a Ward of Court.   There was no request for the return of the child in the present case (the mother being incapacitated by illness and favourably disposed to fostering and adoption and the father having apparently abandoned any interest in the child), and therefore no parental rights resolution was passed.   The provision of the 1980 Act for the assumption by a local authority of parental rights and duties is, so far as it may be relevant, as follows:           "Subject to the provisions of this part of this act, if         it appears to a local authority in relation to any child who         is in their care under Section 2 of this act -           <Then there follows a list of the circumstances which         entitle the local authority to act>           the local authority may resolve that there shall vest in         them the parental rights and duties with respect to that         child, and, if the rights and duties were vested in the         parent on whose account the resolution was passed jointly         with another person, they shall also be vested in the         local authority jointly with that other person."           Until a parental rights resolution is passed or wardship proceedings are started, all the rights and duties of parenthood remain vested in the parents regardless of any incapacity or other circumstance preventing them from exercising those rights and duties. The exercise of its functions by a local authority under Section 2 of the 1980 Act is done in loco parentis and the duties thereunder are duties which cannot lawfully be exercised in the face of parental disagreement.   Where there is disagreement with the parents a local authority may take the steps outlined above (a parental rights resolution or the institution of wardship proceedings).           In the present case the mother was incapacitated and the father had abandoned the child.   The role of the mother was at the material time being discharged by A until the child was taken into care.   Insofar as there were parental rights however, these remained in the mother not in A, nor in the applicant.           Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care           Section 12G of the 1980 Act (added by amendment in 1983) obliged the Secretary of State to prepare, and from time to time to revise, a code of practice with regard to access to children in care.           The Code of Practice on Access to Children in Care was duly laid before Parliament and has been in force since 30 January 1984. Paragraphs 28 to 31 of the Code of Practice deal with cases of disagreement on matters of access involving parents and other relatives and state as follows:           "Local authorities should ensure that they have clear         procedures which will enable parents to pursue complaints         about access and ask for decisions to be reviewed.   Local         authorities should also be prepared to use these procedures         to deal with the complaints about access decisions from         other relatives of children in care.           Schemes of delegation should provide for difficult         situations to be brought to the notice of senior officers.         Arrangements should be made for parents to discuss their         anxieties and dissatisfactions with such officers, if         they feel they have reached an impasse with their social         worker; and for their situation to be reviewed, if         necessary, by the Director of Social Services.           Local authorities will also need to provide arrangements         for Members to consider cases where the Director has found         that he cannot satisfy the complaint of a parent.   Such         cases of difficulty may include, for example, those where         access has been restricted to intervals which parents         consider provide insufficient opportunity to maintain         their links with a child."           Wardship           Wardship jurisdiction is exercised by the Family Division of the High Court or, since 28 April 1986, to a limited extent by County Courts.   It is a prerogative jurisdiction at common law and is largely independent of statutory provisions.   When a child becomes a ward of court a court assumes responsibility for all aspects of his welfare. It may, for example, make orders as to where the child has to live, with whom, who may have access to him, and as to his religion, education and marriage if under 18.   In determining what orders to make, the High Court is required by Section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971 to have regard to the child's welfare as the first and paramount consideration.   A court may grant care and control of the child to a person or body, for example a local authority, but that person or body may only act in accordance with the court's directions.   The court may also give care and control to one person or body and make a supervision order, at its own discretion or under Section 7(4) of the Family Law Reform Act 1969, in favour of another person or body.   A child remains a ward of court until either he has attained his majority or the court orders that he shall cease to be a ward of court.   No important step can be taken in the child's life without the court's consent (Re S (1967) 1 All ER 202 at 209).           Anyone, not merely a parent or a local authority, who can show an appropriate interest in a child's welfare can apply for a child to be made a ward of court.   Section 41(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 provides that no child may be made a ward of court other than by a court order.   The application for the order must be made by originating summons in the High Court.   The procedure is set out in Order 90 of the Rules of Supreme Court.   The child becomes a ward of court immediately the originating summons is issued.   However, unless an appointment for the hearing of the summons is made within 21 days, the wardship automatically lapses.   The appointment will generally be before a registrar who gives directions as to what is to be done before the case may be heard before a judge.   He may also make an order as to access if the person with the physical custody of the child agrees.   The registrar may also decide if any other interested parties to the proceedings should be so joined.   Any party dissatisfied with the decision of the registrar may appeal to a judge in chambers.   When the proceedings are heard before the judge he either confirms the wardship or makes an order terminating wardship.           There is a right of appeal from the judge in chambers to the Court of Appeal, and thereafter (with leave) to the House of Lords. In exceptional circumstances an appeal may be direct to the House of Lords.   Interested persons with insufficient means are able under Section 7 of the Legal Aid Act 1974 to obtain legal aid for the representation of their interests in wardship proceedings.           Once a child has become a ward of court, it remains open to any party to bring the case back to the court for a variation of the original order granting wardship or for directions on matters such as access or education.           The courts have emphasised that the wardship jurisdiction is not an alternative form of appeal from the decision of a juvenile court concerning the care of a child under the 1969 Act.   The relationship between the responsibilities for the care of children given by statute to local authorities and those exercised by the High Court under wardship jurisdiction was explained in the leading judgment of Lord Wilberforce in the House of Lords case A v.   Liverpool City Council (1981) 2 All ER 385 in particular at pages 388-9 in which it was stated that wardship jurisdiction could not be exercised by the courts to review the merits of local authorities decisions within the field of discretion committed by statute to the local authority.           Adoption legislation           Before a child can be placed for adoption, the Adoption Agencies Regulations 1983 which govern pre-placement procedure require a full investigation of each case where adoption is under consideration.   Before a local authority can make adoption placement decisions they must receive their Adoption Panel's recommendations. Adoption orders can only be made after consideration by the adoption court of the question of whether the parents agree to the making of an adoption order or the court dispenses with their agreement in accordance with Section 12 of the Children Act 1975, or the child is free for adoption (see below).   The proceedings would generally include the prospective adopters, the local authority and the child's parents.   The court may include any other person (including grandparents) as it may at any time direct (rule 15(3) of the Adoption Rules 1984).   The court will have before it, in addition to any other evidence which any of the parties may wish to introduce, a report from the local authority as the placing agency covering the matters specified in Schedule 2 to those rules.           Section 8(7) of the Children Act 1975 allows an adoption order to contain such terms and conditions as the court thinks fit.   The Court of Appeal has held that a condition in an adoption order giving a right of access to the child to its natural parent would only be made in unusual and exceptional circumstances, and that although the court could impose such a condition as to access, such access would ultimately depend on the adopters' agreement (Re M (A Minor) (Adoption Order: Access) <1986> IFLR 51 and Re V (A Minor) (Adoption: Consent) <1986> 1 All ER 752).           Freeing for adoption           Section 14 of the Children Act 1975 gives power to the court to free a child for adoption where, on an application by an adoption agency, the court is satisfied in the case of each parent or guardian of the child that she/he freely, and with full understanding of what is involved, agrees generally and unconditionally to the making of an adoption order, or that his/her agreement to the making of an adoption order should be dispensed with on a ground specified in Section 12(2) of the Act.   A grandparent can apply to be made a party to these proceedings, under rule 4(3) of the Adoption Rules 1984.           Grandparents and grandchildren           Under domestic legislation grandparents generally do not have legal rights over their grandchildren.   Any rights which may exist over children are normally vested jointly in the children's parents if they are married.   In considering the award of custody of a child to any person or an issue relating to a child's upbringing such as access a court must give first and paramount consideration to the welfare of the child (Section 1 of the Guardianship of Minors Act 1971).   Where a child is in the care of a local authority by virtue of a compulsory care order a grandparent of that child does not have a right to apply for custody or access but must rely on the local authority's discretion to afford contact with the child (which could include access or the child living with the grandparents) where this would be in the child's best interests.   Section 18 of the Child Care Act 1980 requires the local authority to give first consideration to safeguarding and promoting the welfare of the child throughout his childhood and such contact with the grandparents would therefore have to be consistent with the child's welfare.           Under domestic legislation grandparents may be parties to or involved in the following proceedings in relation to their grandchildren:     (i)     Pursuant to Section 14A of the Guardianship of Minors Act         1971, where, under Section 9(1) of the Act, an order giving         access or custody to the father or mother is in force, the         Court may, on application of a grandparent of the minor,         make an order requiring access to the minor to be given         to the grandparent.     (ii)    Grandparents may commence wardship proceedings, or apply to         be joined as parties to wardship proceedings commenced by         any other person, and may ask for any order which is in         the interest of their grandchild.   However, as stated above,         wardship proceedings cannot be used to challenge the decisions         of local authorities taken under their statutory powers.     (iii)   Where the child concerned is living with the grandparents         they may apply for a custodianship order in respect of him         under the Children Act 1975.   This provision is applicable to         any relative of the child with whom the child has been living         for the preceding three months where the person with legal         custody of the child gives his consent.   The provision also         applies to any person with whom the child has been living         for a period of 12 months (including the preceding three         months) where the person with legal custody consents.   (iv)     In cases where the child is living with the grandparents         and various statutory requirements have been satisfied         grandparents may apply for an adoption order.   These         requirements apply to any prospective adopter.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant contends that his right to apply for access to his grandchild is a civil right and that he has no such right under English law because his grandchild is subject to a care order under Section 2 of the Child Care Act 1980.   The applicant also states that he has no right to make an application in respect of his grandchild in wardship proceedings in view of the decision of the House of Lords in A v.   The Liverpool City Council (1982 A.C. 363).   The applicant complains that in the determination of his civil rights he has no access to an independent and impartial tribunal established by law from which he could obtain a fair hearing pursuant to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           The applicant also complains that there has been a violation of his right to respect for family life under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   He alleges that the legislation and application of legislation as set out in decided cases by the courts in relation to children in the care of local authorities is in breach of Article 8 (Art. 8) and that the law is not necessary in a democratic society.           He furthermore complains that he has no effective remedy before a national authority in violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 10 February 1987 and registered on 3 March 1987.   The Commission decided on 14 July 1987 to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit observations on its admissibility and merits.           The Government's observations were submitted on 16 December 1987, after a three week extension of the time-limit.   The applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 28 March 1988, after a one month extension of the time-limit.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES        A. The respondent Government        1. The facts           Merton Social Services first became aware of the problems facing the family of the applicant as a result of the disturbed state of the child's mother in June 1984.   Contact was made with the applicant and A, and A, concerned that there was no-one to care for the child during the day (she was at work and the applicant's wife was ill), arranged for a daily minder.   On 11 April 1985, after the death of the applicant's wife, A visited the Social Services and discussed the question of the child's reception into care.   The applicant also visited the Social Services the same day and discussed the same question.   It was agreed with both the applicant and A that the child should be taken into voluntary care.           The initial placement was with short-term foster parents who lived about a 20 minute car journey away from the applicant's house. In this context "short-term" is generally taken to be a period of about eight weeks, recognising the danger of delay in making decisions regarding very young children.   At this time it was believed that the child would be in care for a relatively short time before being returned to the family home.   The applicant and A therefore had regular and frequent access to the child during this period.   From the start it was apparent to the social worker that the child had a very strong relationship with A.   Her relationship with the applicant appeared to be less important to her.   From about the end of May 1985 onwards, however, it became increasingly a matter of doubt whether A would in fact be able to care for the child in the long term.   The views of A and the views of the applicant on this subject did not coincide.   A found living at home increasingly difficult, and, in fact, she moved out permanently on 28 June 1985 to an address which she kept secret from the applicant.           After the child was moved to a temporary foster parent on 19 July 1985, the applicant was asked to reduce his visits to once a week, in order to give everyone time to assess the situation regarding the child, and to give A time to consider whether she would indeed become the prime carer of the child.   The request was made at the meeting on 10 July 1985 and was notified in writing by the social worker's letter of 15 July 1985.   A was to visit twice a week and, in addition to his regular weekly visits, any unused visits could be taken up by the applicant if he wished.           Once A had moved away from the family home to her own accommodation, it became clear that the case had altered from being one of short-term care and rehabilitation with the natural family to one where it was probable that permanent substitute care would be required.   There was a reassessment of the contact between the family as a whole and the child.   At this point, both the applicant and A had some access to the child although less than hitherto.   The Social Services viewed access to the family as a whole (applicant and A) rather than to consider the applicant, or A, in isolation.   The views of the professional social workers concerned were that the interests of the child were better served by maintaining links with A, with whom she had a strong relationship, than with the applicant.           The applicant did not accept the reduction in access, the reasons for which were given in the social worker's letter of 15 July 1985.   He sought and was given an opportunity to discuss the matter with officers of the local authority, with the benefit for him of the attendance of a social worker from the Family Rights Group.   This meeting took place on 23 August 1985.   It was attended by the principal physician in child health for the District Health Authority.   It became apparent from this meeting that the applicant had remained under the impression that A was going to resume the care of the child, a mistaken belief which may well have influenced his opinion expressed above concerning the proposal to reduce access to the family.   He did not thereafter take immediate steps to pursue the matter of access further.   Nevertheless he still wished to have his access increased.           Shortly before the meeting on 23 August 1985, A had expressed the view to the social worker that the child's best interests would be served by adoption since she was unable to offer the right form of home.   Shortly after the meeting the same view was volunteered by the mother.   It was against this background that a case conference was held on 1 October 1985 for the express purpose of reviewing plans for the child and her mother.   The applicant was given notice of this case conference and attended it.   It is evident from the record of the conference that the child had made progress in overcoming a developmental delay which had previously been noticed, and that the applicant still harboured the thought that the child might be adopted by A, a view which she did not then share.   He sought more access at the case conference but was refused it.   Following an exchange of correspondence, the applicant was informed of the possibility to bring any complaints about decisions to the notice of the Director of Social Services.   The letter written to the Director of Social Services on 5 February 1986 by the Family Rights Group in response to that letter did not amount to a request for the Director to investigate a complaint on the applicant's behalf.   Rather it dealt with the issue of when an appeal procedure on access could be enforced, and what the procedure would be.   The result was that the applicant did not in fact pursue any grievance which he may have had concerning the limited amount of access afforded to him.           A finally decided that adoption was the best of the choices for the child in February 1986.   There had by then been extensive discussions as to whether she could take over the care of the child. The applicant was not a part of those discussions because contact between the applicant and A was extremely difficult at that time and separate confidential discussions between the various family members were necessary.   Although the applicant was not directly involved in the discussion, he was notified of the decision of A.   It is clear from the Family Rights Group letter of 14 March 1986 that he accepted it.   A statutory review of the case was held on 18 April 1986 which the applicant, A and the Family Rights Group attended.   An earlier discussion with the applicant could not take place because of the responsible social worker's illness.   The review considered what might happen should the child be adopted.   The Social Services representatives recognised the importance of A to the child but did not see any exceptional reasons for the applicant to have access to the child in the way described for A.   The applicant was given an opportunity to put forward his views.   The review did not curtail the applicant's access to the child but recommended to the Adoption and Fostering Panel that the child should be placed for adoption with access from A.           On 26 June 1986 the Adoption and Fostering Panel recommended adoption for the child with