CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 8 septembre 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 13613/88                       by D. T. W. FORSYTH                       against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 8 September 1988, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   G. BATLINER                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 11 June 1987 by D. T. W. Forsyth against the United Kingdom and registered on 15 February 1988 under file No. 13613/88;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant, Douglas T. W. Forsyth, is a citizen of the United Kingdom who was born in Reading in 1919.   He is a retired farmer and resides in the United Kingdom.   The facts of the case, as submitted by him, may be summarised as follows:           In 1930, the applicant's father had purchased a villa in Heliopolis, near Cairo.   This property was forcibly taken over and occupied by the Egyptian army in 1956 as part of a series of reprisals for the British military attack at Suez.   On 28 February 1959, an Agreement was entered into between the Governments of the United Kingdom and Egypt (United Arab Republic) with a view to re-establishing normal commercial relations which included in its Article III an undertaking by the Government of Egypt to "return all British Property ... to the owners thereof in accordance with the provisions of Annex B" of the said Agreement.   Annex B referred specifically to the "handing over" of property by the Sequestrator General to the owner or his agents.           The British Foreign Office subsequently encouraged British nationals whose property had been sequestrated to reassume possession of such property and the applicant's father returned to Cairo for this purpose in 1960.   However, the Egyptian occupants, who had entered into a monthly tenancy contract with the Sequestrator General for a "peppercorn" rent in 1957, declined to vacate the property.   At this time, the applicant's father was informed by both the Egyptian and British authorities that, notwithstanding the terms of the 1959 Agreement, the restoration of vacant possession of the property to him was impossible.           In 1963, following advice from a lawyer of professed experience in such matters in both Egypt and the United Kingdom, the applicant's father accepted a payment in the sum of £2434 under the Foreign Compensation (Egypt)(Determination and Registration of Claims) Order 1962 and renounced all further claims in respect of his property.   This sum, described as a payment for capital depreciation in the value of his property occasioned by the fact that it had remained subject to a lease at a low rent and had not been returned to him with vacant possession, was paid out of monies (£27.5 million) provided by the Egyptian Government under Article IV of the 1959 Agreement in full and final discharge of certain property claims.           The applicant is the heir to his father's Egyptian estate. In 1974, no rent having been paid in respect of the property since 1960, the applicant applied to the Egyptian courts for an Eviction Order against the remaining occupants.   The case was finally decided against him, after undergoing some sixty adjournments, on 29 March 1986.   An appeal is still pending.   An appeal is also pending before the Supreme Court of Appeal in respect of an inheritance tax of approximately £E 50,000 which the applicant alleges was unjustly levied by the Egyptian authorities on his father's private bank account following his death.           In response to protests by the applicant at the repeated delays and alleged obstruction and bias of the Egyptian authorities, the respondent Government commenced diplomatic representations to the Government of Egypt in late 1975 with the purpose of hastening a setlement of the dispute.   The applicant accepts that the respondent Government have been kept closely informed with regard to the said proceedings in Egypt and that they have made diplomatic representations at various times in respect of his claims.   He nevertheless maintains that these approaches have always been of a superficial and token nature.           Since 1985 the applicant has therefore sought to be further compensated by the respondent Government for the loss of possession and enjoyment of his property in Egypt.   In this respect, he has argued that the compensation paid to his father in 1963 related solely to capital depreciation of the property, and that the reununciation of all further claims signed by his father at that time did not have the effect of exonerating the Government from its obligation to recover vacant possession of the villa in accordance with the terms of the 1959 Agreement.   The respondent Government dispute this contention, and have replied to the applicant that should he fail in his current action before the Egyptian courts, he retains the option to sell the property without vacant possession.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicant complains that the United Kingdom Government have failed to discharge their international obligations to protect his property rights:           a)   in respect of his villa under the 1959 Agreement, and           b)   in respect of the inheritance tax levied by the Egyptian             authorities under general international law.           As a result, he has been deprived of the peaceful enjoyment of his property in a manner contrary to Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1.   2.       The applicant also complains that his grievances are not justiciable within the courts of the United Kingdom and that he is therefore being denied a fair and public hearing of his claims, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.       The applicant has complained under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) that the Untied Kingdom have   failed to perform their international obligations under the 1959 Agreement and under general international law to protect his property rights.   He submits that the diplomatic representations made by the respondent Government were of a token nature.           Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) states, inter alia, that           "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful         enjoyment of his possessions ..."           The Commission notes that there has been no direct interference with the applicant's possessions by the United Kingdom authorities.   The alleged expropriation of his property in Egypt is attributed to the Egyptian authorities and therefore, in itself, is not a matter for which the United Kingdom is responsible under the Convention.   The applicant maintains however that the United Kingdom is obliged to take measures against Egypt to assert and protect his property rights.           The Commission recalls that the Convention does not contain a right which requires a High Contracting Party to espouse the applicant's complaints under international law or otherwise intervene with the authorities of another State on his behalf (Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation Limited v.   United Kingdom, No. 7597/76, Dec. 2.5.78, D.R. 14 p. 117 at 123, 124;   see also Kapas v.   United Kingdom, No. 12822/87, Dec. 9.12.87, to be published in D.R.).   The Commission has also held that there is no such right which can be inferred from Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention (ibid.).           In the present case the Commission notes that there is no indication that the 1959 Agreement relied on by the applicant extends the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom for purposes of Article 1 (Art. 1) of the Convention or creates an individual property right vis-à-vis the United Kingdom.   In any event the Commission notes that diplomatic representations have been made in respect of the property in question and compensation for capital depreciation of the property was made in 1963 following which the applicant's father renounced all further claims under the 1962 Order.           The Commission therefore considers that the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) must be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant has also complained that the United Kingdom courts will not entertain an action to enforce either the 1959 Agreement or the applicant's other claims to entitlement to protection under international law, and that he is therefore being denied a fair and public hearing of his claims, contrary to Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) states, inter alia, that:   "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations   ... everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ..."           The Commission recalls that this provision only applies where there exists a "contestation" (dispute) over such civil rights and obligations.   In this connection, it is well established that the expression "contestations sur (des) droits et obligations de caractère civil" (disputes over civil rights and obligations) covers all proceedings the result of which is decisive for such rights and obligations.   However, a tenuous connection or remote consequences do not suffice for Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1):   civil rights and obligations must be the object - or one of the objects - of the "contestation" (dispute) and the result of the proceedings must be directly decisive for such a right (e.g.   Eur.   Court H.R., Pudas judgment of 22 October 1987, Series A no. 125, pp. 9-10, at para. 31).           In the present case the applicant seeks to enforce what he claims to be the obligations of the respondent State under the 1959 Agreement or otherwise to compel the United Kingdom to make diplomatic representations concerning his property in Egypt.           However, the Commission considers that such proceedings, although they would have as their object his alleged property rights, could not be described as being directly decisive for these rights.   At best they could only give rise to official representations in respect of his property interests.   The Commission therefore finds that the "contestation" (dispute) in the present case is not such as to bring Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention into application.           In these circumstances, it follows that the applicant's complaint under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) must also be rejected as incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.        Deputy Secretary to the Commission     President of the Commission               (J. RAYMOND)                         (C. A. NØRGAARD)