CEDH · CASELAW;JUDGMENTS;CHAMBER;ENG — 29 novembre 1988

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text-indent:-17pt } .s26FF04E7 { margin-top:0pt; margin-left:17.3pt; margin-bottom:0pt } .s9FF10068 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt } .sFDE7661F { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s40F41F73 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; text-align:right } .sA918FEC8 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-indent:14.4pt } .s523616E0 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center; font-size:14pt } .s662121A1 { margin-top:12pt; margin-bottom:12pt; text-align:center } .s9671CAED { margin-top:6pt; margin-bottom:6pt; text-indent:14.2pt } .s33165EBA { font-family:Arial; font-size:8pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 } .sF6A12959 { width:33%; height:1px; text-align:left } .s2EB42ED2 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; font-size:10pt } .s653E6C45 { font-family:Arial; font-size:6.67pt; vertical-align:super; color:#0069d6 }       COURT (PLENARY)             CASE OF BROGAN AND OTHERS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM   (Application no. 11209/84; 11234/84; 11266/84; 11386/85)             JUDGMENT       STRASBOURG   29 November 1988 In the case of Brogan and Others [] , The European Court of Human Rights, taking its decision in plenary session in pursuance of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court and composed of the following judges:   Mr   R. Ryssdal , President   Mr   J. Cremona ,   Mr   Thór Vilhjálmsson ,   Mrs   D. Bindschedler-Robert ,   Mr   F. Gölcüklü ,   Mr   F. Matscher ,   Mr   J. Pinheiro Farinha ,   Mr   L.-E. Pettiti ,   Mr   B. Walsh ,   Sir   Vincent Evans ,   Mr   R. Macdonald ,   Mr   C. Russo ,   Mr   R. Bernhardt ,   Mr   A. Spielmann ,   Mr   J. De Meyer ,   Mr   J. A. Carrillo Salcedo ,   Mr   N. Valticos ,   Mr   S. K. Martens ,   Mrs   E. Palm , and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen , Registrar , and Mr H. Petzold , Deputy Registrar , Having deliberated in private on 27 May and 28 October 1988, Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date: PROCEDURE 1.    The case was brought before the Court on 15 July 1987 by the European Commission of Human Rights ("the Commission") and on 3 August 1987 by the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland ("the Government") within the period of three months laid down by Article 32 para. 1 and Article 47 (art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). The case originated in four applications (nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84 and 11386/85) against the United Kingdom lodged with the Commission under Article 25 (art. 25) on 18 October 1984, 22 October 1984, 22 November 1984 and 8 February 1985 respectively by Mr Terence Brogan, Mr Dermot Coyle, Mr William McFadden and Mr Michael Tracey, who are British citizens. 2.    The Commission’s request referred to Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44, art. 48) and to the declaration whereby the United Kingdom recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court (Article 46) (art. 46). The object of the request and of the Government’s application was to obtain a decision as to whether or not the facts of the case disclosed a breach by the respondent State of its obligations under Article 5 (art. 5) and, as far as the request was concerned, Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention. 3.    In response to the inquiry made in accordance with Rule 33 para. 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, each applicant stated that he wished to participate in the proceedings pending before the Court and designated the lawyer who would represent him (Rule 30). 4.    The Chamber to be constituted included, as ex officio members, Sir Vincent Evans, the elected judge of British nationality (Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43), and Mr R. Ryssdal, the President of the Court (Rule 21 para. 3 (b)). On 27 August 1987, the Vice-President of the Court, acting by delegation of the President of the Court, drew by lot, in the presence of the Registrar, the names of the five other members, namely Mr B. Walsh, Mr A. Spielmann, Mr A. Donner, Mr J. De Meyer and Mr J.A. Carrillo Salcedo (Article 43 in fine of the Convention and Rule 21 para. 4) (art. 43). Subsequently, Mr J. Pinheiro Farinha, substitute judge, replaced Mr Donner, who was prevented from taking part in the Chamber’s consideration of the case (Rules 22 para. 1 and 24 para. 1). 5.    Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of President of the Chamber (Rule 21 para. 5). He ascertained, through the Registrar, the views of the Agent of the Government, the Delegate of the Commission and the lawyer for the applicants regarding the need for a written procedure (Rule 37 para. 1). Thereafter, in accordance with the Orders and directions of the President of the Chamber, the memorial of the Government was lodged at the registry on 14 December 1987 and the memorial of the applicants on 18 January 1988. The Secretary to the Commission informed the Registrar on 14 March 1988 that the Delegate would submit his observations at the hearing. Further documents were lodged at the registry on 24 February and 18 March 1988 by the Agent of the Government and the applicants’ representatives respectively. 6.    By letter received on 23 November 1987, the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights, Belfast, sought leave to submit written comments (Rule 37 para. 2). On 2 December 1987, the President granted leave subject to certain conditions. The comments were filed at the registry on 19 January 1988. 7.    After consulting, through the Registrar, those who would be appearing before the Court, the President directed on 15 March 1988 that the oral proceedings should open on 25 May 1988 (Rule 38). 8.    On 23 March 1988, the Chamber relinquished jurisdiction in favour of the plenary Court (Rule 50). 9.    The hearing took place in public at the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on the appointed day. Immediately prior to its opening, the Court had held a preparatory meeting. There appeared before the Court: - for the Government   Mr M. Wood , Legal Counsellor,     Foreign and Commonwealth Office,   Agent ,   Sir Nicholas Lyell , Q.C., Solicitor-General,   Mr A. Campbell , Q.C.,   Mr N. Bratza , Q.C.,   Counsel ; - for the Commission   Mr H. Danelius ,   Delegate ; - for the applicants   Mr R. Charles Hill , Q.C.,   Mr S. Treacy , Barrister-at-Law,   Counsel ,   Mr J. Christopher Napier , Solicitor. 10.    The Court heard addresses by Sir Nicholas Lyell for the Government, by Mr Danelius for the Commission and by Mr Hill for the applicants. The Government filed their replies to the Court’s questions and to the questions put by one of the judges on 25 May and 24 June 1988 respectively. AS TO THE FACTS I.    PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE A. Terence Patrick Brogan 11.    The first applicant, Mr Terence Patrick Brogan, was born in 1961. He is a farmer and lives in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. 12.    He was arrested at his home at 6.15 a.m. on 17 September 1984 by police officers under section 12 of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 ("the 1984 Act"). He was then taken to Gough Barracks, Armagh, where he was detained until his release at 5.20 p.m. on 22 September 1984, that is a period of detention of five days and eleven hours. 13.    Within a few hours of his arrest, he was questioned about his suspected involvement in an attack on a police mobile patrol which occurred on 11 August 1984 in County Tyrone and resulted in the death of a police sergeant and serious injuries to another police officer. He was also interrogated concerning his suspected membership of the Provisional Irish Republican Army ("IRA"), a proscribed organisation for the purposes of the 1984 Act. He maintained total silence and refused to answer any questions put to him. In addition, he turned away from his questioners and stared at the floor, ceiling or wall and periodically stood to attention. He was visited by his solicitor on 19 and 21 September 1984. B. Dermot Coyle 14.    The second applicant, Mr Dermot Coyle, was born in 1953. He is at present unemployed and lives in County Tyrone, Northern Ireland. 15.    He was arrested at his home by police officers at 6.35 a.m. on 1 October 1984 under section 12 of the 1984 Act. He was then taken to Gough Barracks, Armagh, where he was detained until his release at 11.05 p.m. on 7 October 1984, that is a period of detention of six days and sixteen and a half hours. 16.    Within a few hours of his arrest, he was questioned about the planting of a land-mine intended to kill members of the security forces on 23 February 1984 and a blast incendiary bomb attack on 13 July 1984, both of which occurred in County Tyrone. He was also interrogated about his suspected provision of firearms and about his suspected membership of the Provisional IRA. He maintained complete silence apart from one occasion when he asked for his cigarettes. In one interview, he spat several times on the floor and across the table in the interview room. He was visited by his solicitor on 3 and 4 October 1984. C. William McFadden 17.    The third applicant, Mr William McFadden, was born in 1959. He is at present unemployed and lives in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. 18.    He was arrested at his home at 7.00 a.m. on 1 October 1984 by a police officer under section 12 of the 1984 Act. He was then taken to Castlereagh Police Holding Centre, Belfast, where he was detained until his release at 1.00 p.m. on 5 October 1984, that is a period of four days and six hours. 19.    Within a few hours of his arrest, he was questioned about the murder of a soldier in a bomb attack in Londonderry on 15 October 1983 and the murder of another soldier during a petrol bomb and gunfire attack in Londonderry on 23 April 1984. He was also interrogated about his suspected membership of the Provisional IRA. Apart from one interview when he answered questions of a general nature, he refused to answer any questions put to him. In addition, he periodically stood up or sat on the floor of the interview room. He was visited by his solicitor on 3 October 1984. D. Michael Tracey 20.    The fourth applicant, Mr Michael Tracey, was born in 1962. He is an apprentice joiner and lives in Londonderry, Northern Ireland. 21.    He was arrested at his home at 7.04 a.m. on 1 October 1984 by police officers under section 12 of the 1984 Act. He was then taken to Castlereagh Royal Ulster Constabulary ("RUC") Station, Belfast, where he was detained until his release at 6.00 p.m. on 5 October 1984, that is a detention period of four days and eleven hours. 22.    Within a few hours of his arrest, he was questioned about the armed robbery of post offices in Londonderry on 3 March 1984 and 29 May 1984 and a conspiracy to murder members of the security forces. He was also interrogated concerning his suspected membership of the Irish National Liberation Army ("INLA"), a proscribed terrorist organisation. He remained silent in response to all questions except certain questions of a general nature and sought to disrupt the interviews by rapping on heating pipes in the interview room, singing, whistling and banging his chair against the walls and on the floor. He was visited by his solicitor on 3 October 1984. E. Facts common to all four applicants 23.    All of the applicants were informed by the arresting officer that they were being arrested under section 12 of the 1984 Act and that there were reasonable grounds for suspecting them to have been involved in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland. They were cautioned that they need not say anything, but that anything they did say might be used in evidence. 24.    On the day following his arrest, each applicant was informed by police officers that the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland had agreed to extend his detention by a further five days under section 12(4) of the 1984 Act. None of the applicants was brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power, nor were any of them charged after their release.   II.    RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE A. Introduction 25.    The emergency situation in Northern Ireland in the early 1970s and the attendant level of terrorist activity form the background to the introduction of the Prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1974 ("the 1974 Act"). Between 1972 and 1983, over two thousand deaths were attributable to terrorism in Northern Ireland as compared with about one hundred in Great Britain. In the mid 1980s, the number of deaths was significantly lower than in the early 1970s but organised terrorism continued to thrive. 26.    The 1974 Act came into force on 29 November 1974. The Act proscribed the IRA and made it an offence to display support in public for that organisation in Great Britain. The IRA was already a proscribed organisation in Northern Ireland. The Act also conferred special powers of arrest and detention on the police so that they could deal more effectively with the threat of terrorism (see paragraphs 30-33 below). 27.    The 1974 Act was subject to renewal every six months by Parliament so that, inter alia, the need for the continued use of the special powers could be monitored. The Act was thus renewed until March 1976 when it was re-enacted with certain amendments. Under section 17 of the 1976 Act, the special powers were subject to parliamentary renewal every twelve months. The 1976 Act was in turn renewed annually until 1984, when it was re-enacted with certain amendments. The 1984 Act, which came into force in March 1984, proscribed the INLA as well as the IRA. It has been renewed every year but will expire in March 1989, when the Government intend to introduce permanent legislation. 28.    The 1976 Act was reviewed by Lord Shackleton in a report published in July 1978 and subsequently by Lord Jellicoe in a report published in January 1983. Annual reports on the 1984 Act have been presented to Parliament by Sir Cyril Philips (for 1984 and 1985) and Viscount Colville (for 1986 and 1987), who also completed in 1987 a wider-scale review of the operation of the 1984 Act. 29.    These reviews were commissioned by the Government and presented to Parliament to assist consideration of the continued need for the legislation. The authors of these reviews concluded in particular that in view of the problems inherent in the prevention and investigation of terrorism, the continued use of the special powers of arrest and detention was indispensable. The suggestion that decisions extending detention should be taken by the courts was rejected, notably because the information grounding those decisions was highly sensitive and could not be disclosed to the persons in detention or their legal advisers. For various reasons, the decisions fell properly within the sphere of the executive. B. Power to arrest without warrant under the 1984 and other Acts 30.    The relevant provisions of section 12 of the 1984 Act, substantially the same as those of the 1974 and 1976 Acts, are as follows: "12 (1) [A] constable may arrest without warrant a person whom he has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be   ... (b) a person who is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism to which this Part of this Act applies;   ... (3) The acts of terrorism to which this Part of this Act applies are (a) acts of terrorism connected with the affairs of Northern Ireland;   ... (4) A person arrested under this section shall not be detained in right of the arrest for more than forty-eight hours after his arrest; but the Secretary of State may, in any particular case, extend the period of forty-eight hours by a period or periods specified by him. (5) Any such further period or periods shall not exceed five days in all. (6) The following provisions (requirement to bring accused person before the court after his arrest) shall not apply to a person detained in right of the arrest   ... (d) Article 131 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981;   ... (8) The provisions of this section are without prejudice to any power of arrest exercisable apart from this section." 31.    According to the definition given in section 14 (1) of the 1984 Act, terrorism "means the use of violence for political ends, and includes any use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear". An identical definition of terrorism in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 was held to be "in wide terms" by the House of Lords, which rejected an interpretation of the word "terrorist" that would have been "in narrower terms than popular usage of the word ‘terrorist’ might connote to a police officer or a layman" (McKee v. Chief Constable for Northern Ireland [1985] 1 All England Law Reports 1 at 3-4, per Lord Roskill). 32.    Article 131 of the Magistrates’ Courts (Northern Ireland) Order 1981, declared inapplicable by section 12(6)(d) of the 1984 Act (see paragraph 30 above), provides that where a person arrested without warrant is not within twenty-four hours released from custody, he must be brought before a Magistrates’ Court as soon as practicable thereafter but not later than forty-eight hours after his arrest. 33.    The Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 also conferred special powers of arrest without warrant. Section 11 provided that a constable could arrest without warrant any person whom he suspected of being a terrorist. Such a person could be detained for up to seventy-two hours without being brought before a court. The 1978 Act has been amended by the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1987, which came into force on 15 June 1987. The powers of arrest under the 1978 Act have been replaced by a power to enter and search premises for the purpose of arresting a suspected terrorist under section 12 of the 1984 Act. C. Exercise of the power to make an arrest under section 12 (1)(b) of the 1984 Act 34.    In order to make a lawful arrest under section 12(1)(b) of the 1984 Act, the arresting officer must have a reasonable suspicion that the person being arrested is or has been concerned in the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism. In addition, an arrest without warrant is subject to the applicable common law rules laid down by the House of Lords in the case of Christie v. Leachinsky [1947] Appeal Cases 573 at 587 and 600. The person being arrested must in ordinary circumstances be informed of the true ground of his arrest at the time he is taken into custody or, if special circumstances exist which excuse this, as soon thereafter as it is reasonably practicable to inform him. This does not require technical or precise language to be used provided the person being arrested knows in substance why. In the case of Ex parte Lynch [1980] Northern Ireland Reports 126 at 131, in which the arrested person sought a writ of habeas corpus, the High Court of Northern Ireland discussed section 12(1)(b). The arresting officer had told the applicant that he was arresting him under section 12 of the 1976 Act as he suspected him of being involved in terrorist activities. The High Court held that the officer had communicated the true ground of arrest and had done what was reasonable in the circumstances to convey to the applicant the nature of his suspicion, namely that the applicant was involved in terrorist activities. Accordingly, the High Court found that the lawfulness of the arrest could not be impugned in this respect. 35.    The arresting officer’s suspicion must be reasonable in the circumstances and to decide this the court must be told something about the sources and grounds of the suspicion (per Higgins J. in Van Hout v. Chief Constable of the RUC and the Northern Ireland Office, decision of Northern Ireland High Court, 28 June 1984). D. Purpose of arrest and detention under section 12 of the 1984 Act 36.    Under ordinary law, there is no power to arrest and detain a person merely to make enquiries about him. The questioning of a suspect on the ground of a reasonable suspicion that he has committed an arrestable offence is a legitimate cause for arrest and detention without warrant where the purpose of such questioning is to dispel or confirm such a reasonable suspicion, provided he is brought before a court as soon as practicable (R. v. Houghton [1979] 68 Criminal Appeal Reports 197 at 205 and Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke [1984] 1 All England Law Reports 1054 at 1059). On the other hand, Lord Lowry LCJ held in the case of Ex parte Lynch (loc. cit. at 131) that under the 1984 Act no specific crime need be suspected to ground a proper arrest under section 12 (1)(b). He added (ibid.): "... [I]t is further to be noted that an arrest under section 12(1) leads ... to a permitted period of detention without preferring a charge. No charge may follow at all; thus an arrest is not necessarily ... the first step in a criminal proceeding against a suspected person on a charge which was intended to be judicially investigated." E. Extension of period of detention 37.    In Northern Ireland, applications for extended detention beyond the initial forty-eight-hour period are processed at senior police level in Belfast and then forwarded to the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland for approval by him or, if he is not available, a junior minister. There are no criteria in the 1984 Act (or its predecessors) governing decisions to extend the initial period of detention, though strict criteria that have been developed in practice are listed in the reports and reviews appended to the Government’s memorial. According to statistics quoted by the Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights in its written submissions (see paragraph 6 above), just over 2% of police requests for extended detention in Northern Ireland between the entry into force of the 1984 Act in March 1984 and June 1987 were refused by the Secretary of State.   F. Remedies 38.    The principal remedies available to persons detained under the 1984 Act are an application for a writ of habeas corpus and a civil action claiming damages for false imprisonment. 1. Habeas corpus 39.    Under the 1984 Act, a person may be arrested and detained in right of arrest for a total period of seven days (section 12 (4) and (5) - see paragraph 30 above). Paragraph 5 (2) of Schedule 3 to the 1984 Act provides that a person detained pursuant to an arrest under section 12 of the Act "shall be deemed to be in legal custody when he is so detained". However, the remedy of habeas corpus is not precluded by paragraph 5 (2) cited above. If the initial arrest is unlawful, so also is the detention grounded upon that arrest (per Higgins J. in the Van Hout case, loc. cit., at 18). 40.    Habeas corpus is a procedure whereby a detained person may make an urgent application for release from custody on the basis that his detention is unlawful. The court hearing the application does not sit as a court of appeal to consider the merits of the detention: it is confined to a review of the lawfulness of the detention. The scope of this review is not uniform and depends on the context of the particular case and, where appropriate, the terms of the relevant statute under which the power of detention is exercised. The review will encompass compliance with the technical requirements of such a statute and may extend, inter alia, to an inquiry into the reasonableness of the suspicion grounding the arrest (ex parte Lynch, loc. cit., and Van Hout, loc. cit.). A detention that is technically legal may also be reviewed on the basis of an alleged misuse of power in that the authorities may have acted in bad faith, capriciously or for an unlawful purpose (R v. Governor of Brixton Prison, ex parte Sarno [1916] 2 King’s Bench Reports 742 and R v. Brixton Prison (Governor), ex parte Soblen [1962] 3 All England Law Reports 641). The burden of proof is on the respondent authorities which must justify the legality of the decision to detain, provided that the person applying for a writ of habeas corpus has firstly established a prima facie case (Khawaja v. Secretary of State [1983] 1 All England Law Reports 765). 2. False imprisonment 41.    A person claiming that he has been unlawfully arrested and detained may in addition bring an action seeking damages for false imprisonment. Where the lawfulness of the arrest depends upon reasonable cause for suspicion, it is for the defendant authority to prove the existence of such reasonable cause (Dallison v. Caffrey [1965] 1 Queen’s Bench Reports 348 and Van Hout, loc. cit., at 15). In false imprisonment proceedings, the reasonableness of an arrest may be examined on the basis of the well-established principles of judicial review of the exercise of executive discretion (see Holgate-Mohammed v. Duke, loc. cit.). PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION 42.    The applicants applied to the Commission on 18 October 1984, 22 October 1984, 22 November 1984 and 8 February 1985 respectively (applications nos. 11209/84, 11234/84, 11266/84 and 11386/85). They claimed that their arrest and detention were not justified under Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention and that there had also been breaches of paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 5 of that Article (art. 5-2, art. 5-3, art. 5-4, art. 5-5). They also alleged that, contrary to Article 13 (art. 13), they had no effective remedy in respect of their other complaints. The complaint under Article 5 para. 2 (art. 5-2) was subsequently withdrawn. 43.    On 10 July 1986, the Commission ordered the joinder of the applications in pursuance of Rule 29 of its Rules of Procedure and, on the following day, it declared the applications admissible. In its report of 14 May 1987 (drawn up in accordance with Article 31) (art. 31), the Commission concluded that there had been a breach of paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article 5 (art. 5-3, art. 5-5) in respect of Mr Brogan and Mr Coyle (by ten votes to two for paragraph 3 (art. 5-3), and nine votes to three for paragraph 5 (art. 5-5)), but not in respect of Mr McFadden and Mr Tracey (by eight votes to four for both paragraphs (art. 5-3, art. 5-5)). It also concluded that there had been no breach of paragraphs 1 and 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-4) (unanimously for paragraph 1 (art. 5-1), and by ten votes to two for paragraph 4 (art. 5-4)) and finally that no separate issue arose under Article 13 (art. 13) (unanimously). The full text of the Commission’s opinion and of the dissenting opinions contained in the report is reproduced as an annex to this judgment. FINAL SUBMISSIONS MADE TO THE COURT BY THE GOVERNMENT 44.    At the public hearing on 25 May 1988, the Government maintained in substance the concluding submissions set out in their memorial, whereby they requested the Court to decide "(1) that the facts disclose no breach of paragraphs 1, 3, 4 or 5 of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-3, art. 5-4, art. 5-5) of the Convention; (2) that the facts disclose no breach of Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention, alternatively that no separate issue arises under Article 13 (art. 13) of the Convention". In addition, the Government requested the Court not to entertain the complaint raised under Article 5 para. 2 (art. 5-2). AS TO THE LAW I.    SCOPE OF THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT 45.    In their original petitions to the Commission, the applicants alleged breach of paragraph 2 of Article 5 (art. 5-2), which provides: "Everyone who is arrested shall be informed promptly, in a language which he understands, of the reasons for his arrest and of any charge against him." However, they subsequently withdrew the claim, and the Commission noted in its admissibility decision that the applicants were no longer complaining under paragraph 2 (art. 5-2). In a letter filed in the registry on 17 May 1988, the applicants sought the leave of the Court to reinstate the complaint. In their oral pleadings both the respondent Government and the Commission objected to the applicants’ request. 46.    The scope of the Court’s jurisdiction is determined by the Commission’s decision declaring the originating application admissible (see, inter alia, the Weeks judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 114, p. 21, para. 37). The Court considers that regard must be had in the instant case to the express withdrawal of the claim under paragraph 2 (art. 5-2). As a result, the Commission discontinued its examination of the admissibility of this complaint. To permit the applicants to resuscitate this complaint before the Court would be to circumvent the machinery established for the examination of petitions under the Convention. 47.    Consequently, the allegation that there has been a breach of Article 5 para. 2 (art. 5-2) cannot be entertained. II.    GENERAL APPROACH 48.    The Government have adverted extensively to the existence of particularly difficult circumstances in Northern Ireland, notably the threat posed by organised terrorism. The Court, having taken notice of the growth of terrorism in modern society, has already recognised the need, inherent in the Convention system, for a proper balance between the defence of the institutions of democracy in the common interest and the protection of individual rights (see the Klass and Others judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, pp. 23 and 27-28, paras. 48-49 and 59). The Government informed the Secretary General of the Council of Europe on 22 August 1984 that they were withdrawing a notice of derogation under Article 15 (art. 15) which had relied on an emergency situation in Northern Ireland (see Yearbook of the Convention, vol. 14, p. 32 [1971], vol. 16, pp. 26-28 [1973], vol. 18, p. 18 [1975], and vol. 21, p. 22 [1978], for communications giving notice of derogation, and Information Bulletin on Legal Activities within the Council of Europe and in Member States, vol. 21, p. 2 [July, 1985], for the withdrawal). The Government indicated accordingly that in their opinion "the provisions of the Convention are being fully executed". In any event, as they pointed out, the derogation did not apply to the area of law in issue in the present case. Consequently, there is no call in the present proceedings to consider whether any derogation from the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Convention might be permissible under Article 15 (art. 15) by reason of a terrorist campaign in Northern Ireland. Examination of the case must proceed on the basis that the Articles of the Convention in respect of which complaints have been made are fully applicable. This does not, however, preclude proper account being taken of the background circumstances of the case. In the context of Article 5 (art. 5), it is for the Court to determine the significance to be attached to those circumstances and to ascertain whether, in the instant case, the balance struck complied with the applicable provisions of that Article in the light of their particular wording and its overall object and purpose. III.   ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 5 PARA. 1 (art. 5-1) 49.    The applicants alleged breach of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1) of the Convention, which, in so far as relevant, provides: "Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:   ... (c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence ...;   ..." There was no dispute that the applicants’ arrest and detention were "lawful" under Northern Ireland law and, in particular, "in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law". The applicants argued that the deprivation of liberty they suffered by virtue of section 12 of the 1984 Act failed to comply with Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c), on the ground that they were not arrested on suspicion of an "offence", nor was the purpose of their arrest to bring them before the competent legal authority. 50.    Under the first head of argument, the applicants maintained that their arrest and detention were grounded on suspicion, not of having committed a specific offence, but rather of involvement in unspecified acts of terrorism, something which did not constitute a breach of the criminal law in Northern Ireland and could not be regarded as an "offence" under Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c). The Government have not disputed that the 1984 Act did not require an arrest to be based on suspicion of a specific offence but argued that the definition of terrorism in the Act was compatible with the concept of an offence and satisfied the requirements of paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) in this respect, as the Court’s case-law confirmed. In this connection, the Government pointed out that the applicants were not in fact suspected of involvement in terrorism in general, but of membership of a proscribed organisation and involvement in specific acts of terrorism, each of which constituted an offence under the law of Northern Ireland and each of which was expressly put to the applicants during the course of their interviews following their arrests. 51.    Section 14 of the 1984 Act defines terrorism as "the use of violence for political ends", which includes "the use of violence for the purpose of putting the public or any section of the public in fear" (see paragraph 31 above). The same definition of acts of terrorism - as contained in the Detention of Terrorists (Northern Ireland) Order 1972 and the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 - has already been found by the Court to be "well in keeping with the idea of an offence" (see the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, pp. 74-75, para. 196). In addition, all of the applicants were questioned within a few hours of their arrest about their suspected involvement in specific offences and their suspected membership of proscribed organisations (see paragraphs 13, 16, 19 and 22 above). Accordingly, the arrest and subsequent detention of the applicants were based on a reasonable suspicion of commission of an offence within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c). 52.    Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c) also requires that the purpose of the arrest or detention should be to bring the person concerned before the competent legal authority. The Government and the Commission have argued that such an intention was present and that if sufficient and usable evidence had been obtained during the police investigation that followed the applicants’ arrest, they would undoubtedly have been charged and brought to trial. The applicants contested these arguments and referred to the fact that they were neither charged nor brought before a court during their detention. No charge had necessarily to follow an arrest under section 12 of the 1984 Act and the requirement under the ordinary law to bring the person before a court had been made inapplicable to detention under this Act (see paragraphs 30 and 32 above). In the applicants’ contention, this was therefore a power of administrative detention exercised for the purpose of gathering information, as the use in practice of the special powers corroborated. 53.    The Court is not required to examine the impugned legislation in abstracto, but must confine itself to the circumstances of the case before it. The fact that the applicants were neither charged nor brought before a court does not necessarily mean that the purpose of their detention was not in accordance with Article 5 para. 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c). As the Government and the Commission have stated, the existence of such a purpose must be considered independently of its achievement and sub-paragraph (c) of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1-c) does not presuppose that the police should have obtained sufficient evidence to bring charges, either at the point of arrest or while the applicants were in custody. Such evidence may have been unobtainable or, in view of the nature of the suspected offences, impossible to produce in court without endangering the lives of others. There is no reason to believe that the police investigation in this case was not in good faith or that the detention of the applicants was not intended to further that investigation by way of confirming or dispelling the concrete suspicions which, as the Court has found, grounded their arrest (see paragraph 51 above). Had it been possible, the police would, it can be assumed, have laid charges and the applicants would have been brought before the competent legal authority. Their arrest and detention must therefore be taken to have been effected for the purpose specified in paragraph 1 (c) (art. 5-1-c). 54.    In conclusion, there has been no violation of Article 5 para. 1 (art. 5-1). IV.   ALLEGED BREACH OF ARTICLE 5 PARA. 3 (art. 5-3) 55.   Under the 1984 Act, a person arrested under section 12 on reasonable suspicion of involvement in acts of terrorism may be detained by police for an initial period of forty-eight hours, and, on the authorisation of the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, for a further period or periods of up to five days (see paragraphs 30-37 above). The applicants claimed, as a consequence of their arrest and detention under this legislation, to have been the victims of a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3), which provides: "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article (art. 5-1-c) shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial." The applicants noted that a person arrested under the ordinary law of Northern Ireland must be brought before a Magistrates’ Court within forty-eight hours (see paragraph 32 above); and that under the ordinary law in England and Wales (Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984) the maximum period of detention permitted without charge is four days, judicial approval being required at the thirty-six hour stage. In their submission, there was no plausible reason why a seven-day detention period was necessary, marking as it did such a radical departure from ordinary law and even from the three-day period permitted under the special powers of detention embodied in the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978 (see paragraph 33 above). Nor was there any justification for not entrusting such decisions to the judiciary of Northern Ireland. 56.    The Government have argued that in view of the nature and extent of the terrorist threat and the resulting problems in obtaining evidence sufficient to bring charges, the maximum statutory period of detention of seven days was an indispensable part of the effort to combat that threat, as successive parliamentary debates and reviews of the legislation had confirmed (see paragraphs 26-29 above). In particular, they drew attention to the difficulty faced by the security forces in obtaining evidence which is both admissible and usable in consequence of training in anti-interrogation techniques adopted by those involved in terrorism. Time was also needed to undertake necessary scientific examinations, to correlate information from other detainees and to liaise with other security forces. The Government claimed that the need for a power of extension of the period of detention was borne out by statistics. For instance, in 1987 extensions were granted in Northern Ireland in respect of 365 persons. Some 83 were detained in excess of five days and of this number 39 were charged with serious terrorist offences during the extended period. As regards the suggestion that extensions of detention beyond the initial forty-eight-hour period should be controlled or even authorised by a judge, the Government pointed out the difficulty, in view of the acute sensitivity of some of the information on which the suspicion was based, of producing it in court. Not only would the court have to sit in camera but neither the detained person nor his legal advisers could be present or told any of the details. This would require a fundamental and undesirable change in the law and procedure of the United Kingdom under which an individual who is deprived of his liberty is entitled to be represented by his legal advisers at any proceedings before a court relating to his detention. If entrusted with the power to grant extensions of detention, the judges would be seen to be exercising an executive rather than a judicial function. It would add nothing to the safeguards against abuse which the present arrangements are designed to achieve and could lead to unanswerable criticism of the judiciary. In all the circumstances, the Secretary of State was better placed to take such decisions and to ensure a consistent approach. Moreover, the merits of each request to extend detention were personally scrutinised by the Secretary of State or, if he was unavailable, by another Minister (see paragraph 37 above). 57.    The Commission, in its report, cited its established case-law to the effect that a period of four days in cases concerning ordinary criminal offences and of five days in exceptional cases could be considered compatible with the requirement of promptness in Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3) (see respectively the admissibility decisions in application no. 2894/66, X v. the Netherlands, Yearbook of the Convention, vol. 9, p. 568 (1966), and in application no. 4960/71, X v. Belgium, Collection of Decisions, vol. 42, pp. 54-55 (1973)). In the Commission’s opinion, given the context in which the applicants were arrested and the special problems associated with the investigation of terrorist offences, a somewhat longer period of detention than in normal cases was justified. The Commission concluded that the periods of four days and six hours (Mr McFadden) and four days and eleven hours (Mr Tracey) did satisfy the requirement of promptness, whereas the periods of five days and eleven hours (Mr Brogan) and six days and sixteen and a half hours (Mr Coyle) did not. 58.    The fact that a detained person is not charged or brought before a court does not in itself amount to a violation of the first part of Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3). No violation of Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3) can arise if the arrested person is released "promptly" before any judicial control of his detention would have been feasible (see the de Jong, Baljet and van den Brink judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A no. 77, p. 25, para. 52). If the arrested person is not released promptly, he is entitled to a prompt appearance before a judge or judicial officer. The assessment of "promptness" has to be made in the light of the object and purpose of Article 5 (art. 5) (see paragraph 48 above). The Court has regard to the importance of this Article (art. 5) in the Convention system: it enshrines a fundamental human right, namely the protection of the individual against arbitrary interferences by the State with his right to liberty (see the Bozano judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 111, p. 23, para. 54). Judicial control of interferences by the executive with the individual’s right to liberty is an essential feature of the guarantee embodied in Article 5 para. 3 (art. 5-3), which is intended to minimise the risk of arbitrariness. Judicial control is implied by the rule of law, "one of the fundamental principles of a democratic society ..., which is expressly referred to in the Preamble to the Convention" (see, mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, pp. 25-26, para. 55) and "from which the whole Convention draws its inspiration" (see, mutatis mutandis, the Engel and Others judgment of 8 June 1976, Series A no. 22, p. 28, para. 69). 59.    The obligation expressed in English by the word "promptly" and in French by the word "aussitôt" is clearly distinguishable from the less strict requirement in the second part of paragraph 3 (art. 5-3) ("reasonable time"/"délai raisonnable") and even from that in paragraph 4 of Article 5 (art. 5-4) ("speedily"/"à bref délai"). The term "promptly" also occurs in the English text of paragraph 2 (art. 5-2), where the French text uses the words "dans le plus court délai". As indicated in the Ireland v. the United Kingdom judgment (18 January 1978, Series A no. 25, p. 76, para. 199), "promptly" in paragraph 3 (art. 5-3) may be understood as having a broader significance than "aussitôt", which literally means immediately. Thus confronted with versions of a law-making treaty which are equally authentic but not exactly the same, the Court must interpret them in a way that reconciles them a