CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 décembre 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12750/87                       by Nicolas PHILIS                       against Greece           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 7 December 1988, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 5 January 1987 by Nicholas Philis against Greece and registered on 24 February 1987 under file No. 12750/87;           Having regard to:   -        the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;   -        the written observations of the respondent Government of 31 May 1988 and the applicant's observations in reply contained in his letters of 4 April 1988, 13 July 1988 and 4 August 1988;   -        the parties' oral submissions at the hearing on 7 December 1988;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows:           The applicant is a Greek citizen, born in 1937, and is a private consultant engineer, having had a technical bureau in Athens since 1970.           In 1971 a State institution, OEK (Organismos Ergatikis Katoikias), entrusted with housing labourers' families responsible to the Greek Ministry of Labour, entered into agreements with the applicant for him to carry out design projects for and to supervise work on its electro-mechanical installations for the period 1971-1975 and subsequently entered into further similar agreements for the period 1976 - 1978.           In March 1978 the OEK terminated its agreements with the applicant and refused to pay him the remuneration provided for by law.     I.           The applicant instituted proceedings against the OEK before the Court of Athens (Protodikeio Athinon), claiming the remuneration for the supervision projects.    To this end he lodged 13 actions with the Court of Athens between 30 October 1978 and 23 December 1982 *.           Actions against the OEK were also brought by the Technical Chamber of Greece (TEE) which, according to the Royal Decree (Vassiliko Diatagma) 30/1956 modified by the Royal Decree 188/1966, is exclusively authorised to claim design projects' remuneration in substitution for the engineer.   The TEE lodged seven actions with the Court of Athens in the period between 16 December 1977 and 24 December 1982 *.   The applicant was a third party in these proceedings.           The main litigious matter in these proceedings was to find out what sort of contract existed between the applicant and the OEK, a contract of service or a contract for services.   In the first case the applicant would have elaborated design projects for the OEK as an employee and should therefore receive no remuneration since he had been paid a salary.   In the second case, his remuneration claims would have been well-founded.           Five of these actions were brought before the Court of Cassation (Areios Pagos), after the Court of Athens and the Athens Court of Appeal (Efeteio Athinon) had given decisions either accepting or rejecting the claims.   At that stage of the proceedings the OEK requested the cases to be adjourned in view of settlement negotiations.     ----------      *     The dates of introduction of each action and the dates on         which decisions were given in these actions by the competent         Greek courts appear on pages 5 to 6 of this decision.         In the meantime a law introduced by the Minister of Labour was passed by Parliament affecting OEK agreements with engineers, whose provisions were also to be applied to cases pending before the courts.   According to these provisions (Article 29 para. 5 of the law (Nomos) 1346/83) the remuneration due to engineers was not the remuneration provided in the previous law but the agreed one.   Article 29 para. 5 reads:           "Contracts for the execution of design, supervision and         control projects ... contracted between the OEK and         private engineers ... or engineers employed by the State         or moral persons of public law, prior to the day of         publication of the present law, are deemed to be in         accordance with the law notwithstanding any other         provisions of law and regardless of whether they are         contracts of service or contracts for services and         whether they are permanent or temporary contracts.           The above mentioned engineers ... are entitled to the         remuneration as agreed in the contract.   In this         respect the provisions of the law BD 19/21.2.38 ...         ND 696/1974 and N 716/1977 do not apply.           The provisions of this paragraph apply also to cases         pending before all courts."           After the new law came into force, on 13 April 1983, the OEK refused to settle the case.           The applicant considered the passing of the law to be an interference "by the executive authorities - through the legislative authorities" with his cases pending before the courts and requested the Court of Cassation not to apply the new law.           The Court of Cassation rejected the applicant's complaints, considering that the new law applied to all engineers and did not therefore violate the principle of equality.   It also stated that the legislative authorities are not prevented from re-adjusting civil rights by voting new civil laws, provided the principle of equality is not violated.   Consequently it rejected the appeals as ill-founded, since the claims were based on the old law provisions which were no longer in force.           Following these decisions the applicant and the TEE discontinued all of the original court actions still pending before the courts and re-introduced them before the Court of Athens basing the claims on the new law (second cycle of proceedings). *           These actions, re-introduced in the period between 27 March 1984 and 27 May 1986, are still pending either before the Court of Athens, the Athens Court of Appeal or the Court of Cassation.     ----------   *   The dates of introduction of each action and the dates on which    decisions were given on these actions by the competent Greek    courts appear on pages 5 to 6 of this decision.         On 15 November 1985 the Court of Athens gave two decisions (Apofaseis 384/1985 and 385/1985) by which it accepted that TEE's actions for declaratory judgments (anagnoristikes agoges) to which it related were well-founded.   However, two other decisions of another chamber of the same court rejected the TEE's actions (decisions - apofaseis 326/85 of 16 September 1985 and 274/86 of 27 May 1986).   In these decisions the Court of Athens found that the applicant's claims were prescribed under Greek law "since the period between the end of the financial year in which the claim was created and a respective action could be brought before courts and the date of the introduction of the action exceeded five years".           The TEE had submitted that the claims were not prescribed, since it had lodged its original actions with the competent court within the five year time limit.   However the Court found that these original actions should not be taken into consideration since, having a different legal basis, they were not identical with the actions it was seized with and might not therefore interrupt the course of the period of limitation.           Appeals (efeseis) against the above decisions of the Court of Athens were pursued by the OEK and the applicant.   The TEE refused to pursue any remedies since it thought they did not offer any chance of success.   In its decisions 8671 of 15 October 1986, 9908 of 19 November 1986 and 10040 of 24 November 1986 the Athens Court of Appeal confirmed that the claims had been prescribed.           The applicant appealed (anaireseis) on 15 April and 17 June 1987 against the decisions of the Athens Court of Appeal.   He presented 15 to 18 appeal grounds invoking inter alia the provisions of the Convention.           The Court of Cassation decided to hold a hearing on the applicant's appeals on 28 April 1988.   The judge-rapporteur presented his reports on the cases on 13 April 1988.   In the hearing of 28 April 1988 the applicant requested the Court of Cassation to adjourn examination of the cases in order to permit him to reply to the reports.   The Court of Cassation adjourned until 1 November 1988.   On that date the Court held a hearing.   No decision has so far been given.           The dates of introduction of each single action and the dates on which decisions were given by the competent courts in the proceedings referred to under this part of THE FACTS are indicated hereafter by the letters i and d respectively.   The actions introduced by the applicant are indicated as a1 to a13, for the first cycle of proceedings and A1 to A13 for the second cycle.   The TEE's actions are indicated as t1 to t7, for the first cycle, and as T1 to T7 for the second cycle of proceedings.                   First Cycle                          Second Cycle           Court       Athens      Court              Court     Athens     Court         of          Court of    of                 of        Court of   of         Athens      Appeal      Cassation          Athens    Appeal     Cassation ____________________________________________________________________________   a1   i:   30.10.78    18.05.79    3.11.81    A1   i:   26.02.86    /           /     d:   31.03.79    29.01.81    3.02.84 ____________________________________________________________________________   a2   i:   10.11.79    16.03.81    17.05.82   A2   i:   26.02.86     d:   31.05.80    30.10.81    22.06.84 ____________________________________________________________________________   a3   i:   13.02.80     2.07.80    29.10.81   A3   i:   26.02.86     d:   19.05.80    17.06.81    17.01.84 ____________________________________________________________________________   a4   i:   05.05.80                         A4   i:   17.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a5   i:   21.05.80    17.11.81              A5   i:   17.02.86     d:   11.05.81    25.10.82 ____________________________________________________________________________   a6   i:   17.09.80                         A6   i:   17.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a7   i:   28.12.80                         A7   i:   17.02.86     d:   31.08.81 ____________________________________________________________________________   a8   i:    1.04.81                         A8   i:   26.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a9   i:    1.04.82                         A9   i:   17.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a10 i:   26.10.82                         A10 i:   17.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a11 i:   13.12.82                         A11 i:   13.03.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a12 i:   13.12.82                         A12 i:   26.02.86     d: ____________________________________________________________________________   a13 i:   23.12.82                         A13 i:   26.02.86     d:                   First Cycle                          Second Cycle           Court       Athens      Court              Court     Athens     Court         of          Court of    of                 of        Court of   of         Athens      Appeal      Cassation          Athens    Appeal     Cassation ____________________________________________________________________________   t1   i:   23.12.77     2.11.78     3.09.79    T1 i:   26.02.86    7.10.86     d:   30.08.78     9.06.79     8.06.84       d:   27.05.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t2   i:   16.12.78                          T2 i:   26.02.86    7.10.86     d:   31.08.81                             d:   27.05.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t3   i:   12.01.80     4.07.80    10.02.82    T3 i:   26.02.86    7.10.86     d:   30.05.80    26.06.81    25.05.84       d:   27.05.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t4   i:   23.12.82                          T4 i:   26.02.86    7.10.86     d:                                       d:   27.05.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t5   i:   24.12.82                          T5 i:   27.03.84    5.02.86   17.06.87     d:                                       d:   15.11.85   19.11.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t6   i:   24.12.82                          T6 i:   2.04.84    24.01.86   15.04.87     d:                                       d: 16.09.85    15.10.86 ____________________________________________________________________________   t7   i:   24.12.82                          T7 i: 27.03.84     5.02.86   17.06.87     d:                                       d: 15.11.85    24.11.86 ____________________________________________________________________________         II.           On 13 April 1981 the TEE in substitution for the applicant introduced an action against the OEK before the Court of Athens requesting remuneration for design projects he had executed for the OEK after 1977.           On 30 November 1981 the Court of Athens gave judgment in favour of TEE and ordered the OEK to pay 898.697 Drachmas in respect of the money claimed.   On 23 January 1982 the OEK appealed against the above decision.   On 26 February 1987 the applicant joined as respondent.   The case was brought before the Athens Court of Appeal on 7 April 1987 (five years and three months after its introduction).           On 23 May 1987 the Court of Appeal gave its decision rejecting the OEK's appeal.   The Court of Appeal found that the applicant's relations with the OEK after 1977 were not based on any contract for services or contract of service.   It found that the applicant had executed design projects for the OEK after such projects had been assigned to him as an independent engineer, within the meaning of the law No. 716/1977 concerning projects assignment and execution. Therefore the claims were founded on that law and the provisions of the new law No. 1346/83 did not apply.           On 7 July 1987 the OEK appealed (anairesi) against the above decision.   The Court of Cassation held a hearing on that case on 11 October 1988.   No decision has so far been given.           On 2 July 1987 the applicant requested the TEE to lodge a subsidiary action with the purpose of capitalising the interest due on his accepted claim since 8 April 1981 pursuant to Article 296 of the Greek Civil Code (Astikos Kodix).   On 24 September 1987 the TEE informed the applicant that it did not intend to act in the way the applicant wished.     III.           The applicant considered that, while the above civil proceedings were pending, OEK officials had been engaged in activities aimed at the extinction or limitation of his rights.           On 8 September 1979, 16 January and 18 April 1980 and 15 April and 19 June 1981 he lodged criminal complaints against OEK officials with the Athens and Volos Prosecutors.   The above motions ended with discharge orders.   The applicant's appeals against these orders have been declared inadmissible by the competent Chamber of the Court of Appeal (Symvoulio Efeton) for lack of the applicant's locus standi.           On the applicant's motion of 7 October 1982 the Athens Prosecutor ordered investigations for the purpose of examining whether OEK officials should be charged with contempt of court for using falsified documents in the civil proceedings.   A discharge order issued on 4 June 1984 was delivered to the applicant on 7 May 1985, 11 months after its issue.           The applicant's appeal against the above discharge order was rejected as inadmissible by the Chamber of the Athens Court of Appeal.   The applicant appealed again before the Chamber of the Court of Cassation, which on 5 March 1986 found in favour of the applicant and sent the case back to the Chamber of the Athens Court of Appeal.           On 8 May 1986 the Chamber of the Athens Court of Appeal rejected once more the applicant's appeal and the latter appealed again before the Court of Cassation, requesting "legal protection" and invoking, inter alia, Article 13 of the Convention.           In a decision of 25 July 1986 the Chamber of the Court of Cassation again allowed the applicant's appeal and revoked the decisions of the Chamber of the Athens Court of Appeal and the discharge order of the Athens Prosecutor, deciding however at the same time that the offence was prescribed under national law. IV.           While these proceedings were taking place, the Prosecutor of the Athens Court of Appeal charged the applicant with insulting the authorities on the ground that a letter, sent by him to the Chamber of the Athens Court of Appeal on 14 April 1986, stated that the proceedings followed by the competent authorities in his various legal actions "leave no doubt as to the existence of bias in favour of OEK officials", and, that "the clear purpose of the delay in the proceedings was to ensure that the crimes would be prescribed".           The applicant was summoned to appear before the Investigating Judge on 15 October 1986 and again on 2 June 1987.   On 12 October 1988 the applicant was sentenced to six months' imprisonment by the First Instance Criminal Court of Athens (Trimeles Plimmeliodikeio Athinon).   The case is now pending before the Athens Court of Appeal.     COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicant complains of the passing of the new law.   He alleges that the courts dealing with his cases were not independent or impartial, since they had to apply a law drafted and passed by his adversary and invokes Article 6 of the Convention.   Moreover, considering his remuneration claims as possessions within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicant alleges that the new law led to a deprivation of his property.   Finally, he alleges that he has been a victim of discrimination, since the new legislative provisions mainly affected his cases and submits that his name has been expressly reported in the Parliament's records.   2.       The applicant also complains that the length of the proceedings exceeded the reasonable time required by Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   He alleges that actions originally introduced between 13 December 1977 and 24 December 1982 are still pending before the courts.   3.       Moreover, he alleges that he has not been given a right to a tribunal, since the TEE has been compulsorily substituted for him with regard to design project remuneration claims and invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   4.       He also complains of not being given any effective remedy before a national authority with regard to OEK officials' criminal activities and invokes Article 13 of the Convention.   5.       Finally, the applicant complains of being charged with insulting judicial authorities for having invoked his right to an independent and impartial tribunal.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 5 January 1987.   On 12 December 1987 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the complaints concerning access to court and length of the proceedings referred to under Part II of THE FACTS.           The Government submitted their observations on 31 May 1988. The applicant's observations in reply are contained in his letters of 4 April, 13 July and 4 August 1988.           On 11 October 1988 the Commission decided to invite the parties to appear before it at a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the complaint concerning the applicant's access to a court.           The hearing was held on 7 December 1988.   At the hearing the parties were represented as follows:   The Government   Mr.   C. Economides                Head of the Legal Department of the                                 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Agent                                 of the Government   Mr.   V. Theofilou                 Lawyer, Adviser   Mrs.   M. Vondicaki Telalian       Secretary of the Legal Department of                                 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Adviser     The Applicant appeared in person.     SUMMARY OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF THE PARTIES   1.       The Government           The Government observe in limine that proceedings referred to in the application are still pending before the courts and that expected decisions can be decisive for the applicant's complaints. They conclude that the applicant has not complied with the requirements of Article 26 of the Convention, e.g. that domestic remedies are not exhausted at this stage of the proceedings.           On the applicant's access to court           The Government admit that according to the provisions of Royal Decrees 30/1956 and 188/1966 the TEE is exclusively authorised to sue the debtors of engineers claiming fees for design projects executed by them.   They submit, however, that engineers are not deprived of guarantees against a possible refusal of the TEE to institute proceedings in substitution for them.           They first observe that engineers have, pursuant to Article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the possibility of suing directly the TEE's debtors in case of negligence on the part of TEE by introducing an "oblique action" (plagiastiki agogi).   Article 72 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that a creditor may apply for judicial protection exercising the rights of his debtor, in cases where the latter does not exercise them, unless these rights are exclusively personal.   As to the effectiveness of such actions, the Government refer to a decision given on 6 June 1988 by the Athens Court of Appeal (apofasi 7892/1988).   It would then have been possible for the applicant to introduce such an action against the OEK asking that the latter pay the fees claimed to the TEE.           The Government also make it clear that, pursuant to Article 914 of the Civil Code the applicant can introduce an action claiming indemnity for the damages allegedly caused by the TEE's refusal to institute proceedings.           The Government also submit that according to the provisions of RD 30/1956 the applicant is entitled to introduce an ancillary interpleader action (prostheti paremvasi) and join as co-plaintiff or co-defendant.   This interpleader action would furthermore be "autonomous" (autotelis) pursuant to Article 83 of the Code of Civil Procedure.   In this respect the Government submit that the interpleader engineer would have the rights of a full party in the proceedings.           Finally, the Government note that the TEE's substitution for the engineer system has been functioning successfully since its institution and that the Court of Cassation has found this system in accordance with the provisions of the Greek Constitution.           As to the length of the proceedings         referred to under Part II of the FACTS           The Government first observe that the proceedings concerned are governed by the principle of the conduct of the litigation by the parties.   They moreover note that proceedings concerning engineers' remuneration claims are dealt with by the courts according to the provisions of Articles 677-681 of the Code of Civil Procedure. These provisions institute a particular procedure comparable to that applied to labour litigations and aim at safeguarding an expeditious trial:   -        Evidence must be submitted until the first hearing of the         case.   -        Decisions should be taken, as far as possible, after a single         hearing.   -        Witnesses are to be examined in open court during the hearing.           In the applicant's cases, however, the complexity of the questions put to the courts and in particular the serious contestation as regards the nature of the contractual relations between the applicant and the OEK required a deep examination of the elements of the cases and consequently prolonged the proceedings.           The Government note moreover that unjustified delays on the part of a court when dealing with a case would expose the judges to disciplinary penalties.   Furthermore, a special action provided by Article 99 of the Constitution and law 693/77 gives the party injured due to the fault of the judiciary a right to sue the judge at fault before a special court and claim reparation of the prejudice (agogi kadodikias).           Finally, turning to the present case, the Government observe that the applicant could have expedited the proceedings concerned by joining as co-defendant before the Court of Appeal pursuant to the provisions of RD 30/1956 and of the Code of Civil Procedure long before 26 February 1987.   He could then have asked the Court of Appeal to fix a date for a hearing in the months following his intervention. Having failed to proceed in that way, the applicant has contributed to the prolongation of the appeal proceedings.           Conclusion           The Government conclude that the application should be rejected for lack of compliance with the exhaustion of domestic remedies requirement set forth in Article 26 of the Convention, or as manifestly ill-founded.   2.       The applicant           The applicant submits that the actions referred to in the Government's observations as possible steps he could have taken in order to ensure his right of access to a court or to a fair hearing within a reasonable time may not be regarded as effective in the present case.   He moreover submits that the Court of Cassation has declared on several occasions that the substitution system provided by the Royal Decrees 30/1956 and 188/1966 is in accordance with the constitution and that, therefore, as regards this complaint, he cannot be reasonably considered as not having exhausted the domestic remedies according to the generally recognised principles of international law within the meaning of Article 26 of the Convention.           On access to a court           The applicant first submits that the substitution system essentially deprives him of his right to secure the effective drawing up of the actions, the lodging of the actions in time, and the legal assistance of his own choosing.           The applicant further submits that the TEE refused on several occasions to lodge subsidiary actions against the OEK.   In particular the TEE refused to lodge actions for the purpose of capitalising the interest due on his claims pursuant to Article 296 of the Civil Code. This refusal concerned the actions referred to as T5, T6 and T7 and the action referred to under Part II of THE FACTS.           TEE also refused to lodge subsidiary actions for the purpose of readjustment of his claims in relation to inflation rates pursuant to Article 12 para. 10 of Royal Decree 13/1938 and Article 105 para. 4 of Presidential Decree 696/1974 in conjunction with the jurisprudence of the Court of Cassation (decision 443/81).   This refusal concerned actions T5, T6, T7 and the action referred to under Part II of THE FACTS.           The TEE also converted actions T1, T2, T3, T4, T5 and T7 to actions for declaratory judgments (anagnoristikes agoges).   The applicant observes in this respect that in case he wins these proceedings, he will be obliged to re-introduce the same action before the courts in order to obtain a title for the enforcement of the courts' decisions.           The applicant contends, moreover, that the interpleader action he is entitled to introduce before the courts is not "autonomous" and refers to the case-law of the Court of Cassation (Decision 407/79).   He submits that the "oblique action" is only theoretically available in his cases and observes that compensation actions against the TEE would lead to a new cycle of proceedings.   The applicant concludes that the procedural steps or remedies indicated by the Government cannot be considered as securing for him effective and sufficient access to a court.           As to the length of the proceedings referred to         under Part II of THE FACTS           The applicant submits that he did not need to become a party in the appeal proceedings because in his view they concerned a first instance decision which had been anyway revoked and corrected by the Court of Athens in a subsequent decision.   He found therefore that he had no interest in joining as a third party.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant first complains of the passing of the new law which entered into force on 13 April 1983.   He alleges that he suffered discrimination by the interference of the legislative authorities with his cases pending before the competent courts and that his property was seriously affected by these new law provisions. He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) and Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).           The Commission observes that according to the declaration by Greece under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention the competence of the Commission under that article extends only to applications whereby a person claims to be a victim of a violation of the Convention in relation to matters occurring after 19 November 1985.   The Commission notes in this respect that this complaint does not relate to the new law as such but to the effect it had on the applicant's then existing remuneration claims on its coming into force on 13 April 1983.   That having taken place before the 19 November 1985, it follows that this part of the application is outside the competence of the Commission ratione temporis and must be declared inadmissible in accordance with Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.         The applicant also complains about the length of the proceedings and invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, which guarantees a fair hearing within a reasonable time in the determination of civil rights and obligations.           The Commission observes that the applicant's and the TEE's actions initially introduced on 23 December 1977 (t1), 30 October 1978 (a1), 10 November 1979 (a2), 12 January 1980 (t3) and 13 February 1980 (a3) have been terminated by final judgments of the Court of Cassation on 8 June 1984, 3 February 1984, 22 June 1984, 25 May 1984 and 17 January 1984 respectively.   It also observes that the TEE's actions introduced on 24 December 1982 (t5, t6, t7) have been terminated by TEE withdrawals on 27 March and 2 April 1984.   These proceedings began and ended before 19 November 1985 and it follows that the complaint concerning their length is excluded from the competence of the Commission ratione temporis for the reasons already stated above.   3.       With regard to the other actions of the first cycle of proceedings which were discontinued by the applicant or the TEE, the Commission observes that the respective proceedings have been terminated by the applicant's or the TEE's withdrawals on 17 February (a4, a5, a6, a7, a9, a10), 26 February (a8, a12, a13, t2, t4) and 13 March 1986 (a11).           The Commission recalls that according to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention it "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken".           In the present case the proceedings of which the applicant complains ended on 17, 26 February and 13 March 1986, which dates fall to be regarded as the dates of final decisions in the respective proceedings within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26).   However, the application was submitted to the Commission on 5 January 1987, that is more than six months after the end of the above proceedings. Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.           It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   4.       With regard to the proceedings instituted by the TEE on 13 April 1981 (cf.   Part II of THE FACTS) and with regard to the second cycle of the proceedings concerning the TEE's actions T5 and T7, which commenced on 27 March 1984, and T6, which commenced on 2 April 1984, the Commission observes that these proceedings are now pending before the Court of Cassation.   As far as the length of these proceedings is concerned, the Commission observes that the period it is competent ratione temporis to consider begins on 20 November 1985, when recognition by Greece of the right of individual petition took effect. However in assessing the reasonableness of the time that elapsed after 20 November 1985 account must be taken of the then state of proceedings (cf.   Eur.   Court of H.R., Foti and others judgment of 10 December 1982, Series A no. 56; pp. 18-19, para. 53)           The proceedings concerning the applicant's actions A1 to A13 and the TEE's actions T1 to T4 commenced after 20 November 1985 and fall therefore entirely within the Commission's competence ratione temporis.           The Commission observes furthermore that the applicant is now a third party in the proceedings instituted by the TEE.   Moreover, it appears from the parties' submissions that it is his own right to remuneration which is to be determined by the competent courts.   The Commission finds, therefore, that the applicant can complain under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the length of these proceedings.           The respondent Government have submitted that the actions concerned by the proceedings the applicant complains of are still pending before the Greek courts and that therefore the applicant has not complied with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies set forth in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   The Commission notes, however, that the Government have not shown in what way the decisions which will be given by the Greek courts can effectively remedy the situation complained of rather than prolonging the allegedly already lengthy proceedings.           In order to determine whether the length of these proceedings may be regarded as "reasonable" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the Commission refers to the particular circumstances of the case.   It has in particular regard to the criteria put forward by the jurisprudence of the Court (cf. for example Eur.   Court H.R., König judgment of 28 June 1978, Series A no. 27, p. 34, para. 99;   Eckle judgment of 15 July 1982, Series A no. 51, p. 35 para. 80), i.e. the complexity of the case, the conduct of the applicant and the conduct of the judicial authorities.           The Commission has first examined the proceedings instituted by the TEE's action of 13 April 1981.   It finds that the only point of concern appears with regard to the proceedings before the Athens Court of Appeal which have lasted more than five years.           It appears however clearly from the parties' submissions that the case was adjourned upon request of the parties after notice of appeal was given.   The proceedings were taken up only five years later at the request of the TEE.   Only then did the applicant join as a third party.           The Commission recalls that the fact that the proceedings concerned are governed by the principle of the conduct of the litigation by the parties does not dispense the judicial authorities from ensuring the trial of the action expeditiously as required by Article 6 (Art. 6) (Eur.   Court H.R. Buchholz judgment of 6 May 1981, Series A No. 42 p. 16 para. 50).   However, the Government have submitted that the applicant could have joined as a third party immediately after the introduction of the OEK's appeal and request the court to fix a hearing in the following months.   The applicant does not contest that he had such a possibility.   He submits however that he had no interest in joining.           Th