CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 12 décembre 1988

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }      Application No. 11932/86     Joseph GRANGER     against   the UNITED KINGDOM                       REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 12 December 1988)     TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                             page   I.       INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-13)                             1           A.   The application (paras. 2-4)                       1           B.   The proceedings (paras. 5-9)                       1           C.   The present Report (paras. 10-13)                  2     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 14-30)              4           A.   Particular circumstances of the case               4             (paras. 14-22)           B.   Relevant domestic law (paras. 23-30)               6               a)   Appeals against conviction or sentence by      6                 persons convicted on indictment                 (paras. 23-25)               b)   Lord Advocate's references (para. 26)          7               c)   Legal aid for criminal appeals                 7                 (paras. 27-30)   III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES (paras. 31-41)              9           A.   The applicant (paras. 31-35)                       9               a)   Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the            9                 Convention (paras. 31-34)               b)   Other complaints (para. 35)                    9           B.   The Government (paras. 36-41)                     10   IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 42-67)              11           A.   Points at issue (para. 42)                        11           B.   Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention           11             (paras. 43-53)           C.   Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention               13             (paras. 54-56)           D.   Article 5 of the Convention                       13             (paras. 57-59)           E.   Article 8 of the Convention                       14             (paras. 60-62)           F.   Article 13 of the Convention (paras. 63-66)       14           G.   Recapitulation (para. 67)                         15     APPENDIX I       History of the proceedings                    16   APPENDIX II      Decision on the admissibility                 17                 of the application   I.       INTRODUCTION     1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.     A.       The application   2.       The applicant is Joseph Granger, a British citizen born in 1960 and resident in Glasgow.   The applicant is represented before the Commission by Mr.   John Carroll, a solicitor practising in Glasgow.   3.       The Government are represented by their Agent, Mr.   Michael Wood of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London.   4.       The case relates to the refusal of legal aid to the applicant to pay for legal representation at his appeal against his conviction for perjury.   The applicant consequently presented his appeal in person, while the Solicitor General of Scotland, accompanied by junior counsel and at least one member of the Crown Office, appeared on behalf of the prosecution.   The application raises issues under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.     B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced on 5 December 1985 and registered on 13 January 1986.           On 1 December 1986 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, that notice of the application should be given to the respondent Government and that they should be invited to present before 6 April 1987 their written observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaint that he was refused free legal aid for his appeal and the issues which might arise from that refusal under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.           The Government sent their written observations on 30 March 1987, after an extension of the time-limit for their submission had been granted by the President of the Commission.   The applicant's representative submitted the applicant's written observations in reply on 29 April 1987.           On 9 December 1987 the Commission decided, pursuant to Rule 42 para. 3 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to invite the parties to make further oral submissions at a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaints under Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention.         At the hearing, which was held on 9 May 1988, the applicant was represented by Mr.   John Carroll.   The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr.   Michael Wood, Mr.   Peter Fraser Q.C., Solicitor General for Scotland, and Mr.   Alan Rodger Q.C., with Mrs.   Margaret MacDonald (Scottish Office), Mr.   William Howat (Scottish Office) and Mr.   Graham Buchanan (Crown Office) as advisers.   6.       On 9 May 1988 the Commission declared the application admissible.   The parties were then invited to submit any additional observations on the merits of the application.   7.       On 2 June 1988, the applicant was granted legal aid under the Addendum to the Commission's Rules of Procedure.   8.       On 8 October 1988, the Commission considered the state of proceedings of the case.   On 12 December 1988, the Commission deliberated on the merits of the application and took the final votes in the case.   9.       After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In the light of the parties' reactions, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which a friendly settlement can be effected.     C.       The present Report   10.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:                MM.   C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              M.    C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY           The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on 12 December 1988 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   11.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is           1)   to establish the facts, and         2)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.   12.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as APPENDIX I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as APPENDIX II.   13.      The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission. II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS     A.       Particular circumstances of the case   14.      The applicant was a principal witness for the Crown in the prosecution of Thomas Lafferty and six others before the High Court of Justiciary at Glasgow in September 1984.   The charges against Lafferty and the other accused were serious and included, inter alia, a charge for the murder of six persons, members of the same family. Before the trial, the applicant had signed statements for the police as to his knowledge of and involvement in certain of the incidents which gave rise to the prosecution.   His evidence was considered by the Crown to be important, and steps were taken to ensure his safety until the trial.   The applicant claims that he was unlawfully induced by the police to sign false statements and at the trial he denied all knowledge of the matters contained in them.   15.      The applicant was arrested and prosecuted on indictment in the High Court of Justiciary for perjury in relation to the evidence which he had given at the Lafferty trial.   Another witness was similarly charged.   The charges against the applicant were five in number, a charge that, while giving evidence at the trial, he had untruthfully stated that marks on a sketch plan which he had drawn had been placed there by him on the instructions of the police rather than on his own initiative, two charges that he had untruthfully denied making two detailed statements, a charge that he had untruthfully claimed that he had been pressurised and assaulted by the police and forced to sign statements previously prepared by police officers, and a charge that he pretended that he had told his lawyer that he had been assaulted by police officers and forced to sign a statement against his will when he had not in fact told his lawyer so.   16.      The applicant received legal aid for the preparation of his defence by his solicitor and for representation at his trial by both senior and junior counsel.   The prosecution authorities considered the case important by reason of the effect which offences of the type charged might have on the administration of justice.   The indictment against the applicant and his co-accused was therefore prosecuted by the Solicitor General for Scotland, who is one of the two Law Officers for Scotland.   After a four week trial before the High Court at Glasgow, in February 1985, the applicant was convicted of three out of the five charges against him.   He was acquitted of one of the charges relating to the false denial of making a statement and of the charge relating to what he had told his lawyer.   The applicant was sentenced to five years' imprisonment and his co-accused was convicted and sentenced to four years in a Young Offenders Institution.   17.      Following the applicant's conviction, his solicitor lodged on his behalf an intimation of intention to appeal against the conviction. The legal aid which had been made available for the applicant's trial covered this work, as well as the solicitor's advising the applicant as to the prospects of an appeal being successful, obtaining the opinion of counsel, framing and lodging the grounds of appeal and applying for legal aid for the appeal.   The application for legal aid in relation to the appeal was lodged with the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee of the Law Society of Scotland on 6 June 1985.   With the application was lodged a memorandum, a copy note of appeal, a copy note of grounds of appeal and the charge given to the jury at the trial by the judge; later a copy of the indictment and a note of previous convictions were also lodged.   Thereafter the Committee asked his solicitor to submit a note by counsel acting for the applicant as to the prospects of success of an appeal.   Counsel advised against an appeal, but the solicitor disagreed and supported the appeal application.   The trial judge had certified the case as one of exceptional length, difficulty and complexity.   Moreover a psychiatrist had found the applicant to be of modest intelligence, but with a poor command of English and poor comprehension of written material.   Finally, on 11 July 1985, after consideration of all the material before them, the Committee decided that the application should be refused on the grounds that it did not appear to the Committee that the applicant had substantial grounds for taking appeal proceedings.   18.      The applicant appealed against conviction on 5 grounds:        1) that during cross-examination of a police-officer, the judge intervened with the comment that the line being taken by the defence was incompetent and irrelevant;        2) that the judge erred in admitting in evidence a statement of 23 May 1984 which the defence submitted was in the nature of a precognition;        3) that the judge also erred in repelling the objection to the admissibility of the statement of 23 May 1984 on the ground that the statement was evidence of crimes not charged and would lead to prejudice;        4) that the judge erred in directing the jury that it would not be unfair for a police officer to have told the applicant prior to obtaining the statement of 23 May 1984 and certain sketch plans that he would not be charged with any offence if he genuinely believed those in authority over him intended to use the applicant only as a witness;        5) that the judge erred in rejecting the submission by the defence that the evidence given by the applicant at the Lafferty trial was not material and could not form the basis of a charge of perjury.   19.      The applicant's appeal was heard by the High Court of Justiciary, consisting of three judges, on 27 September 1985.   The Crown was again represented by the Solicitor General, accompanied by junior counsel who had also attended the trial and at least one member of the Crown Office.   The applicant was unrepresented since solicitors have no right of audience before the appeal court, but the applicant was entitled to speak for himself.   To this end, his solicitors prepared a written speech for him which he was advised to follow strictly in view of his linguistic and comprehension difficulties.   He read it out to the court.   The speech elaborated on the submissions put forward in the written grounds of appeal.   The prosecution then put forward their arguments that the grounds of appeal were unfounded and addressed the court for at least 90 minutes.   20.      A principal point discussed at that hearing was whether the court could determine one particular ground of appeal (the second) without considering the notes of the evidence of the trial relevant to that ground.   The Solicitor General sought to persuade the court that they could deal with the second ground of appeal without examination of the notes of evidence, but the court decided that it could not do so.           It adjourned the hearing of the appeal to 6 March 1986 and ordered that the relevant evidence be extracted from the shorthand notes taken at the trial.   Again, the applicant had been provided by his solicitors with a speech.   It dealt not only with the second ground of appeal but with the other grounds.   The court pointed out to the applicant that the appeal had been continued only for the purpose of seeing the notes of evidence relevant to the applicant's second ground of appeal and, accordingly, wished to hear submissions on that ground of appeal alone.   The applicant, however, was not able to comprehend the legal niceties of the appeal, so the court allowed him to read out his speech in full, although informing him that only the second ground of appeal would be taken into consideration.   21.      The applicant's appeal against conviction heard on 6 June 1986 was refused on all grounds.   In his Opinion the Lord Justice Clerk, who presided, considered each of the five grounds of appeal, but was satisfied that none of them had substance and that there had been no miscarriage of justice.   22.      In the meantime, on 26 September 1985, the Lord Advocate presented a separate petition, under Section 263A of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1975, seeking the opinion of the High Court of Justiciary on two points of law which arose from the judge's directions to the jury at the applicant's trial concerning the charge on which the applicant was acquitted, namely whether in a trial for perjury it is of any relevance that a statement made by him and falsely denied under oath was allegedly obtained by unfair means and whether in a trial for perjury the materiality of the false evidence to the issue in the earlier trial is a prerequisite to conviction and a matter of fact to be left to the jury.   On 13 June 1986 the Court, presided over by the Lord Justice-General, heard submissions on the reference.   The applicant received legal aid for these proceedings and was represented by senior counsel.   The opinion of the Court, which was for the purpose of clarifying the law for the future and which had no effect on the applicant's conviction, was that these particular directions given by the trial judge had not been an accurate statement of the law.     B.       Relevant domestic law   a)       Appeals against conviction or sentence by persons         convicted on indictment   23.      Any person convicted on indictment may appeal to the High Court against conviction and/or sentence (Section 228(1) of the Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1975 - hereafter the "1975 Act"). There is no requirement of leave to appeal.   Pursuant to Section 228(2) of the 1975 Act, a person may bring under review of the High Court any alleged miscarriage of justice in the proceedings in which he was convicted.   The court is however not obliged to allow an appeal in every case in which it holds that there has been a miscarriage of justice.   An appeal will not be allowed when the court determines, in its discretion, that the miscarriage of justice is not such as to warrant the quashing of the conviction.   24.      A person who wishes to appeal must lodge written intimation of intention to appeal within two weeks of the final determination of the proceedings against him.   Thereafter, in the case of an appeal against conviction, within six weeks of lodging that intimation, he may lodge a written note of appeal containing a full statement of the grounds on which he appeals.   It is not in general competent for an appellant to found any aspect of his appeal on a ground which is not contained in the note of appeal which has been lodged by him (Sections 231 and 233 of the 1975 Act).   25.      The procedure at an appeal hearing is that the appellant makes submissions to the court in support of the grounds of appeal (and the legislation entitles him to make the submissions in writing rather than orally if he prefers, although in practice this is unusual) and that the court is thereafter addressed by the Crown.   b)       Lord Advocate's references   26.      Under Section 263A(1) of the 1975 Act, where a person tried on indictment is acquitted of a charge the Lord Advocate may refer a point of law which has arisen in relation to that charge to the High Court for their opinion.   The person concerned and the solicitor who acted for him at his trial receive intimation of the reference and the date of its hearing; the person may elect to appear personally or to be represented by counsel at the hearing.   If he does not desire to be so represented, the High Court (in order that there may be a contradictor) appoints counsel to act at the hearing as amicus curiae. The costs of representation or of the appointment of counsel as amicus curiae are paid by the Lord Advocate.   The purpose of a reference under Section 263A is to clarify the law for the future and the opinion of the Court has no effect on the acquittal of the person at whose trial the point arose.   The reference arising out of the applicant's case is the second time the Lord Advocate has referred a point of law to the High Court for their opinion.   Such a reference is heard by three judges of the High Court.   c)       Legal aid for criminal appeals   27.      The availability of legal aid for a criminal appeal was governed by the provisions of the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1967 at the material time.   From 1 April 1987, that Act was repealed and replaced by the Legal Aid (Scotland) Act 1986.   The following paragraphs describe the law as it stood at the time relevant to the facts of the present application:   28.      Legal aid, which has been made available for a trial on indictment, extends, where the accused person is convicted, to include advice by the solicitor who acted for him on the question of appeal. The solicitor may prepare and lodge the statutory intimation of intention to appeal or note of appeal and, where appropriate, arrange for the opinion of counsel as to the prospects of the appeal to be obtained and for grounds of appeal to be framed and lodged.   Where it is thereafter intended to proceed with an appeal, legal aid may be sought, the solicitor completing and submitting the necessary application.   29.      Applications for legal aid for criminal appeals were determined by the Supreme Court Legal Aid Committee of the Law Society of Scotland, whose members were advocates and solicitors with experience of court practice.   Section 1(7)(b) of the 1967 Act provided that a person should not be given legal aid in connection with proceedings by way of appeal against conviction or sentence "... unless it appears to the Committee that he has substantial grounds for taking those proceedings, and that it is reasonable that he should receive legal aid in the particular circumstances of the case".   The Committee would normally have reached their decision on the basis of the documents before them, which would have included copies of the note of appeal, and the note of grounds of appeal and the judge's charge to the jury, and in the light of the views expressed by the applicant's solicitor and counsel.   30.      The decision of the Committee on the merits of an application for criminal legal aid for an appeal was declared by the Legal Aid (Scotland) (Criminal Proceedings) Scheme 1975 to be final. III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES     A.       The applicant   a)       Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention   31.      The applicant complains of the refusal of legal aid for his appeal.   He submits that the appeal raised important matters concerning civil liberties and involved complex matters of law.   The importance of the proceedings was indicated by the Crown's separate application for an Attorney General's reference concerning the charge which was found not proven and the fact that the Solicitor General, accompanied by junior counsel and at least one member of the Crown Office, represented the prosecution at the appeal.   While the applicant had been provided with a written speech to read, the applicant argues that this was of limited assistance, since he was unable to understand or respond to the arguments raised by the Crown during the proceedings in regard to previous case-law or other matters.   32.      The applicant submits that the case of Monnell and Morris (Eur.   Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 115) can be clearly distinguished on the facts from the present case.   In that case, there was a written procedure and neither the prosecution nor the defence were called to make oral submissions before the appeal court.   The applicant contends that the appeal was one of substance.   At the trial, the trial judge had certified the case as one of exceptional length, difficulty and complexity and the appeal court required a transcript of part of the trial in order to deal with one of the grounds of appeal.   Further, the prosecution's responses to the applicant's appeal lasted 90 minutes.   Not only counsel's opinion, but also the legal argument at the trial and the Lord Advocate's reference, demonstrate the difficult legal questions involved, which concerned, inter alia, the concepts of materiality and fairness.   33.      It also cannot be said that the present application is similar to the aforementioned Monnell and Morris case, since the applicant's appeal in this case could not have been assessed as having "no objective likelihood of success".   34.      The applicant accordingly submits that both the principle of equality of arms and interests of justice required that the applicant be represented at his appeal.   b)       Other complaints   35.      The applicant also complains that a false promise of immunity from prosecution was given to procure evidence from him.   When, as a witness in the Lafferty trial, he contradicted the statements made by him and complained of police conduct and the way they obtained his signature to statements, he was promptly arrested and detained pending trial for perjury.   Evidence (i.e. the statements allegedly made to the police under improper inducement) obtained in such a fashion should not form the basis of a prosecution for perjury and the applicant submits such a prosecution could not be said to be just or fair.   He also complains that he had no way of securing any remedy for these complaints.         The applicant accordingly invokes Articles 5, 8 and 13 of the Convention in this context.     B.       The Government   36.      The Government refer to the Monnell and Morris judgment (loc. cit., pp. 21-22, 25, paras. 53, 56 and 67), in particular the proposition that Article 6 para. 3 (c) does not guarantee an automatic right to free legal aid in every case and that it is often sufficient in the interests of justice that the accused receives extensive legal aid at his trial together with advice, after conviction, as to any arguable grounds of appeal.   37.      In the present case, as in that of Monnell and Morris, although the applicant had insufficient means to appeal, the interests of justice did not require legal aid for representation on appeal, given the expertise of the Legal Aid Committee in assessing such cases and the opinion of the applicant's counsel against any appeal. Counsel's opinion was borne out by the High Court's dismissal of the appeal.   38.      The Government emphasise that the applicant had full legal aid for his trial and advice as to the prospects of success of an appeal. The applicant was given every opportunity by the appeal court to put forward his grounds of appeal even to the extent of allowing him to read out lengthy prepared speeches, parts of which were not relevant to the points upon which the court wished to hear arguments.   However, as the applicant was unrepresented, he was afforded a broad latitude by the court as regards his submissions.   The presence of the Solicitor General only occurred because he had represented the Crown at the trial and was familiar with the case.   Junior counsel also attended in case the Solicitor General was called out of court in relation to his other duties.   39.      The Government contend that this application is the same as Monnell and Morris in that the appeal had "no objective likelihood of success" and hence the interests of justice did not require the grant of free legal aid for the oral stage of the proceedings (Monnell and Morris judgment loc. cit., p. 25, para. 67).   The Government conclude that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention.   40.      The Government submit that no separate issue arises in the present case under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the equality of arms principle not adding anything to the lex specialis of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Pakelli v.   Federal Republic of Germany, Comm. Report 12.12.81, para. 93, Eur.   Court H.R., Series B no. 53, p. 29).   41.      Although the prosecution was represented by the Solicitor General and junior counsel in this case and the applicant unrepresented, the interests of justice cannot be taken to require legal representation for the appellant just because the prosecution is represented by a legally qualified person.   The prosecutor is invariably represented in the Scottish system.   Of itself this cannot amount to a violation of Article 6 para. 1, the equality of arms principle being only one aspect of the notion of fairness under Article 6 para. 1. IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.       Points at issue   42.      The principal issues to be determined are:        -   whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art.6-3-c) of the Convention as a result of the refusal of legal aid to the applicant for legal representation at his appeal;        -   whether there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention;        -   whether there has been a violation of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention;        -   whether there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention;        -   whether there has been a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.     B.       Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention   43.      The applicant complains of a violation of Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) (Art. 6-1, 6-3-c) as a result of the refusal of legal aid for his appeal.   He submits that in the circumstances of his case the interests of justice required that legal aid be granted and that the presence of the Solicitor General, with junior counsel and at least one member of the Crown Office to present the case for the prosecution, offended the principle of equality of arms.   The Government submit that the application is the same as Morris and Monnell in that the appeal had no objective likelihood of success and hence the interests of justice did not require the grant of legal aid (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Monnell and Morris judgment of 2 March 1987, Series A no. 115, p. 25, para. 67). They submit that there has been no violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) and that no separate issue arises under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   44.      The Commission has first considered the case under Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention which provides:           "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following         minimum rights:           ...           (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance         of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to         pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the         interests of justice so require;"   45.      It is not disputed that Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention applied to the proceedings before the High Court whereby it determined the applicant's appeal against conviction.   The Commission finds that, in accordance with established case-law (cf.   Monnell and Morris judgment, loc. cit., p. 21, para. 54 and references therein), Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention was applicable to those proceedings. 46.      Paragraph 3 of Article 6 (Art. 6-3) contains an enumeration of specific rights of the defence.   They exemplify the notion of fair trial in respect of typical procedural situations which arise in criminal cases, but their intrinsic aim is always to ensure, or contribute to ensuring, the fairness of the criminal proceedings as a whole.   The guarantees enshrined in Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) must accordingly be interpreted in the light of the function which they have in the overall context of the proceedings (cf.   Can v.   Austria, Comm.   Rep. 12.7.84, para. 48, Eur.   Court H.R., Series A no. 96, p. 15).   47.      The right to free legal assistance guaranteed by Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) is subject to two conditions; that the individual concerned does not have sufficient means to pay for legal assistance and that "the interests of justice" require it.   It is not in dispute that the first condition was satisfied in the present case.   The only issue is whether "the interests of justice" required that the applicant be granted legal aid before the High Court.   48.      In the Monnell and Morris judgment (loc. cit., p. 25, para. 67) the European Court stated as follows:           "The interests of justice cannot ... be taken to require         an automatic grant of legal aid whenever a convicted         person, with no objective likelihood of success, wishes to         appeal after having received a fair trial at first instance         in accordance with Article 6 (Art. 6).   Each applicant, it is to be         noted, benefitted from free legal assistance both at his         trial and in being advised as to whether he had any arguable         grounds of appeal ...".   49.      The Government argue that the present case is similar to that of Monnell and Morris (loc. cit.).   The Commission however finds the cases clearly distinguishable, in particular since in Monnell and Morris the proceedings concerned applications for leave to appeal dealt with by written procedure in which the prosecution played no part, whereas in the present case the proceedings took the form of a full oral appeal hearing before the High Court at which the prosecution was present in some strength.   50.      When determining whether "the interests of justice" required legal representation, the Commission must examine each case on its facts.   While the likelihood of success and the availability of legal assistance at other stages of the proceedings are significant factors to be taken into account, they are not the sole criteria. Other factors in assessing the requirements of "the interests of justice" include the importance of what is at stake for the applicant, e.g. the severity of the sentence; the personal ability of the applicant and the nature of the proceedings e.g. complexity or importance of the issues or procedures involved (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Artico judgment of 13 May 1980, Series A no. 37 and Pakelli judgment of 25 April 1983, Series A no. 64).   51.      In the present case, while the Commission recalls that the applicant's appeal was in fact dismissed and counsel had advised against an appeal, it also appears that the case was considered to be of considerable importance in the area of the administration of justice and to raise serious issues in regard to the law of perjury. The Commission recalls in this respect the fact that the Solicitor General appeared for the Crown at the trial and on appeal and the Lord Advocate's reference arising out of aspects of the trial judge's direction to the jury.   Further, the Commission recalls that the trial judge had certified the case as one of exceptional length, difficulty and complexity and that the applicant's solicitor had disagreed with counsel's unfavourable opinion.   The Commission has also had regard to the limited abilities of the applicant and to the severity of the sentence imposed on conviction, namely, five years' imprisonment.   52.      The Commission finds therefore that the appeal could not be said to be frivolous or without substance but that it raised legal issues, which the applicant could not be expected either to comprehend or to present to the court.   The situation which in fact developed in the course of the two hearings in his appeal was that the applicant, who stood alone, had in apparent opposition to him the Solicitor General and counsel, supported by a representative of the Crown Office.   He read two speeches which were unintelligible to him, as in all probability was the long speech of the prosecution in reply.   The technical discussion which followed would also have been beyond his comprehension.   Consequently, the Commission finds that the interests of justice required that the applicant be granted free legal aid for representation at his appeal.           Conclusion   53.      The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) of the Convention.     C.       Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   54.      Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention provides:           "In the determination ... of any criminal charge against         him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing         within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial         tribunal established by law."   55.      Since Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6-3-c) provides a specific guarantee, which at the same time reflects the general principle of fairness provided for in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1), the Commission finds it unnecessary to decide whether the facts of the situation also disclose a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Pakelli judgment of 25.4.83, Series A no. 64, p. 18, para. 42).   56.      Conclusion           The Commission concludes, by 11 votes to 1, that no separate issue arises under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.     D.       Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention   57.      The applicant also complains that he was given a false promise of immunity from prosecution by the police to induce him to give evidence.   He complains that when he contradicted the statements made by him, he was arrested and tried for perjury.   He contends that evidence obtained improperly should not form the basis of a prosecution for perjury.   The applicant invokes Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention, which provides that everyone has the right to liberty and security of person and that no one should be deprived of his liberty save in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law and in the cases expressly set out in sub-paragraphs (a)-(f) of Article 5 para. 1 (Art. 5-1-a, 5-1-f) .   58.      The Commission finds no indication however that the applicant was not lawfully detained after conviction by a competent court within the meaning of Article 5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention or that his arrest prior to trial was not lawful or effected for one or more of the purposes set out in Article 5 para. 1 (c) (Art. 5-1-c)of the Convention.           Conclusion   59.      The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention.     E.       Article 8 of the Convention   60.      The applicant has also, with regard to the facts set out in para. 57, invoked Article 8 of the Convention which guarantees to everyone the right to respect for his private life and family life, his home and his correspondence.   61.      The Commission finds that the applicant has not shown that any of the facts complained of constituted an interference with his rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           Conclusion   62.      The Commission concludes, unanimously, that there has been no violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.     F.       Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention   63.      The applicant finally complains of the absence of an effective remedy in respect of his complaints.   He invokes Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention which provides as follows:           "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in         this Convention are violated shall have an effective         remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that         the violation has been committed by persons acting in an         official capacity."   64.      Insofar as the applicant complains of the absence of a remedy for his complaints under Articles 5 and 8 (Art. 5, 8) of the Convention, the Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13) does not require a remedy under domestic law in respect of any alleged violation of the Convention. It only applies if the individual can be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of the Convention (Eur.   Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, Series A No. 131, para. 52).   The Commission notes that it has found no indication that the applicant was deprived of his liberty contrary to Article 5 (Art. 5) of the Convention and that it has also found no indication of an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   In these circumstances, the Commission considers that the applicant cannot be said to have an "arguable claim" of a violation of Articles 5 or 8 (Art. 5, 8) of the Convention.   Consequently, the Commission finds that Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention does not require an effective remedy in respect of these complaints.   65.      Insofar as the applicant complains of the absence of a remedy in respect of his complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6), the Commission recalls that Article 13 (Art. 13), as a more general guarantee, is not applicable in cases where the more specific guarantees of Article 6 (Art. 6) apply, Article 6 (Art. 6) being the lex specialis in relation to Article 13.   Its requirements are less strict and accordingly absorbed by Article 6 (Art. 6).   The Commissio