CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 19 janvier 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial } .s23A41E03 { width:36pt; display:inline-block } .s6814D082 { width:33.64pt; display:inline-block }  Application No. 9310/81 Richard POWELL   and   Michael RAYNER   against   the UNITED KINGDOM   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 19 January 1989)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                       page   I.       INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-17) ............................    1-3           A.   The application (paras. 2-4) ......................     1           B.   The proceedings (paras. 5-12) .....................    1-3           C.   The present Report (paras. 13-17) .................     3     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 18-30) .............    4-6           A.   The particular circumstances of the case             (paras. 18-21) ....................................     4           B.   The relevant domestic law and practice             (paras. 22-30) ....................................    4-6     III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES (paras. 31-43) .............    7-10           A.   The applicants (paras. 31-38) .....................    7-8           B.   The Government (paras. 39-43) .....................    9-10     IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 44-66) ..............    11-17           A.   Points at issue (para. 44) ........................     11           B.   General considerations (paras. 45-47) .............    11-13           C.   The present case (paras. 48-62) ...................    13-17               a) Article 13 of the Convention as regards the                claim under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1                (paras. 51-52) .................................     14                  Conclusion (para. 52) ..........................     14               b) Article 13 of the Convention as regards the                claim under Article 6 para. 1 (paras. 53-55) ...    14-15                  Conclusion (para. 55) ..........................     15               c) Article 13 of the Convention as regards the                claim under Article 8 (paras. 56-62) ...........    15-17     - ii -   9310/81                                                                         page                    aa)   The first applicant (paras. 56-57) ........     15                       Conclusion (para. 57) .....................     15                  bb)   The second applicant (paras. 58-62) .......    15-17                       Conclusion (para. 62) .....................     17           D.   Recapitulation (paras. 63-66) .....................     17     Dissenting opinion of Mr.   Danelius joined by MM. Jörundsson and Weitzel and Mrs.   Liddy ..................     18         APPENDIX I       History of the proceedings                 before the Commission .........................    19-20   APPENDIX II      Decision on the admissibility                 of Mr.   Powell's application ...................    21-37   APPENDIX III     Decision on the admissibility                 of Mr.   Rayner's application ...................    38-57   I.       INTRODUCTION     1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights and of the procedure before the Commission.     A.       The application   2.       The applicants, Mr.   R. Powell and Mr.   M. Rayner, are United Kingdom citizens, born in 1928 and 1938 respectively.   The first applicant is a businessman who lives in Esher, Surrey.   The second applicant is a farmer who lives and farms in Colnbrook, Slough, Berkshire.   They are committee members of the Federation of Heathrow Anti-Noise Groups, whose aim is to contain and improve the noise environment at Heathrow Airport, which is near the homes of both applicants.   3.       The applicants were represented before the Commission by Miss F. Hampson, LL.B., who succeeded Mr.   N.C. Walsh, Solicitor, Messrs. Blaker, Son and Young, Solicitors, Lewes, East Sussex.   The Government were represented by their Agents, Mrs.   A. Glover, succeeded by Miss E.S. Wilmshurst and Mr.   M.C. Wood, all of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.   4.       The application was originally lodged together with two other parties, the Federation of Heathrow Anti-Noise Groups, and Mr.   F. Baggs. All the applicants complained originally of the excessive noise levels generated by landing or departing aircraft at Heathrow Airport and alleged violations of Articles 6 para. 1, 8 and 13 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   The Commission rejected the case of the Federation in a partial decision of 15 March 1984.   The part of the case brought by Mr.   Baggs was settled between the parties, resulting in a Report of the Commission pursuant to Article 30 of the Convention, adopted on 8 July 1987.   The complaints of MM. Powell and Rayner concerning Articles 6 para. 1 and 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 were rejected in the Commission's decisions on admissibility dated 17 October 1985 and 16 July 1986 respectively.   In those latter decisions the Commission also declared admissible the applicants' identical complaint under Article 13 of the Convention, namely, that they had no effective remedy at their disposal for their substantive grievance about the noise nuisance created by Heathrow Airport and its effects on the environment of their homes nearby.   This is the subject of the present Report.     B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced on 31 December 1980 and registered on 23 March 1981.   6.       On 20 September 1982 the Rapporteur, pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, requested further information from the applicants concerning factual circumstances.   This information was submitted on 11 October and 30 November 1982.   On 15 March 1984 the Commission decided, in accordance with Rule 42 para.   2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure, to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.       The Government submitted their observations on 21 September 1984.   The applicants replied on 18 February 1985.   On 13 May 1985 the Commission decided to deal separately with the applicants and to adjourn its consideration of the circumstances of MM. Powell and Rayner, pending its examination of Mr.   Baggs' part of the application. A hearing on admissibility and merits was held in Mr.   Baggs' case on 16 October 1985.   The Commission declared his case partially admissible, following which, on 17 October 1985, Mr.   Powell's application concerning his complaint under Article 13 of the Convention was declared admissible, the remainder of his complaints being rejected.   That same day the Commission also decided to request further information, pursuant to Rule 42 para. 3 (a) of its Rules of Procedure, from the Government and Mr.   Rayner concerning his case.   The Government submitted their further observations and comments about Mr. Rayner's case on 27 November 1985, 29 January 1986 and 2 July 1986, which were exchanged with the responses of Mr.   Rayner's representative in letters dated 9 December 1985, 7 January 1986 and 22 and 24 April 1986.   The Commission further considered the admissibility of Mr. Rayner's case on 16 July 1986 and declared it admissible as regards his Article 13 complaint, the remainder of his claims being rejected.   8.       In the meantime, on 1 April 1986 the parties were sent the text of the Commission's decision on admissibility in Mr.   Powell's case and invited, pursuant to Rule 45 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure, to submit any additional observations they wished to make on its merits.   The Government submitted their further observations on 29 July 1986, to which the applicants' representative replied on 1 September 1986 and 9 March 1987, the latter in respect of both Mr. Rayner's and Mr.   Powell's claims.   9.       During these proceedings negotiations for a friendly settlement of Mr.   Baggs' part of the case were successfully conducted, resulting in the adoption of a Report in accordance with Article 30 of the Convention on 8 July 1987.   10.      The Commission examined the merits of MM. Powell's and Rayner's part of the application on 10 October 1987 and decided to adjourn the matter pending the outcome of the case of Boyle and Rice v. the United Kingdom, which had been referred to the European Court of Human Rights on 18 July 1986, and concerned complex issues under Article 13 of the Convention, albeit in relation to prison conditions.   The Court gave its judgment in that case on 27 April 1988.   On 18 May 1988 the applicants were invited to submit any comments they had on the relevance of this judgment to their case.   These comments were submitted on 17 August and 28 October 1988.   The Government responded to the first of these submissions on 4 October 1988.   11.      On 18 January 1989 the Commission again examined the merits of the remaining case and took their final votes.   On 19 January 1989 the Commission adopted the text of the Report.   12.      After declaring the case of MM. Powell and Rayner admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. b of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement can be reached.     C.       The present Report   13.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:                   MM.   J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      A. WEITZEL                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      G. BATLINER                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY   14.      The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on 20 January 1989 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   15.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is           1)   to establish the facts, and           2)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found             disclose a breach by the State concerned of its             obligations under the Convention.   16.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decisions on the admissibility of the application as Appendices II and III.   17.      The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission. II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS     A.       The particular circumstances of the case   18.      The first applicant bought his house in Esher, Surrey, in 1957.   The house is several miles from Heathrow Airport, but as of 1972 the area in which the house is situated became one of the flight departure routes from Heathrow in operation about one third of the year, particularly in the summer.   In respect of aircraft noise nuisance zones, the applicant's property is just within the 35 NNI contour, considered to be a low noise nuisance rating.   Half a million other people live within this contour area.   19.      NNI signifies the Noise and Number Index based on such factors as the number of aircraft flights heard above a certain noise level (80 PNdB, perceived noise decibels), flying in daytime during the busy summer months.   The NNI is part of the criteria applied in planning controls, so that land within the 35-39 NNI contours may be used for residential development, planning permission not being refused on noise grounds alone.   However land within the 40-50 NNI contours (moderate noise annoyance zone) will not be given over to development except for the infilling of existing built up areas, on condition that the appropriate sound insulation is used.   No development whatsoever is permitted for land falling within the 60 NNI and over contours (rated high noise nuisance zones).   It is to be noted that the NNI calculation reflects a logarithmic element in the PNdB scale, with the result that every increase of 10 in that scale represents approximately a doubling of the loudness.   20.      In 1961 the second applicant took up residence of his home and farm in Colnbrook, Slough, Berkshire.   It is about one and a third miles west of and in a direct line with Heathrow Airport's northern runway.   This property is within the 60 NNI contour, i.e. an area of high noise annoyance for residents, and is regularly overflown during daytime and to a more limited extent at night.   About 1500 people around Heathrow Airport experience a noise exposure equal to or more than that of the second applicant.   21.      Heathrow Airport has undergone major development and expansion since the 1950's and the inauguration of jet aircraft.   It now has four terminals and is the leading United Kingdom airport, making an important contribution to the country's economy.   Various measures have been taken to meet the big increase in air traffic and its resultant noise nuisance.   These measures include improvement of the aircraft themselves, restrictions on night jet movements, continual noise monitoring, the designation of minimum noise routes and the creation of noise insulation grants.     B.       The relevant domestic law and practice   22.      It is agreed between the parties that the remedies available under English law to the applicants for their complaints about airport noise nuisance are limited.   23.      Compensation for loss of value of houses and land from airport noise is envisaged by the Land Compensation Act 1973 to meet problems created by the environmental impact of new or altered public works. However such compensation is tied to new or altered public works first brought into use after 16 October 1969.   Intensification of an   existing use (i.e. from works which had been first brought into use before this date) is not compensateable.   Consequently there is, for example, no right under English law to limit the flow of traffic on established roads or the use of other similar public facilities.   Those who live alongside existing facilities must expect the facility to be used one day to its full extent.   Thus the applicants would have no claim for compensation under the Land Compensation Act 1973, there being no relevant new or altered development in the case of Heathrow Airport.   24.      After the completion of the fourth Terminal at Heathrow, Heathrow Airport Ltd (a subsidiary of the successor company, BAA plc, to the British Airport Authority) drew up a Scheme for the purchase of noise blighted properties close to Heathrow Airport.   By this Scheme the company was able to buy property severely affected by aircraft noise at Heathrow (within the 65 NNI contour) where the owner had acquired the property before 17 October 1969 and where he wished to move but could not do so except at a deflated price.   Claims had to be made between 1 January 1987 and 31 December 1988.   By virtue of the contour limitation the applicants' property is excluded from the Scheme.   25.      The Noise Abatement Act 1960 specifically exempts aircraft noise from its protection.   The liability of aircraft operators in respect of actions for trespass and nuisance is further limited by section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982.   Section 76(1) of the 1982 Act provides as follows:           "No action shall lie in respect of trespass or in respect         of nuisance, by reason only of the flight of an aircraft         over any property at a height above the ground which,         having regard to wind, weather and all the circumstances         of the case is reasonable, or the ordinary incidents of         such flight, so long as the provisions of any Air         Navigation Order or of any Orders under section 62 above         have been duly complied with and there has been no breach         of section 81 below."   26.      Section 76(2) of the 1982 Act goes on to provide for strict liability (i.e. liability without proof of negligence or intention) where material loss or damage to any person or property on land or water is caused by, inter alia, an aircraft in flight or an object falling from an aircraft.   27.      The provisions of section 76 are directly comparable to those in the Rome Convention on Damage Caused by Foreign Aircraft to Third Parties on the Surface 1952 ("the Rome Convention").   Article 1 of the Rome Convention (the parties to which include Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Spain as well as many other countries outside Europe) provides as follows:           "Any person who suffers damage on the surface shall,         upon proof only that damage was caused by an aircraft         in flight or by any person or thing falling therefrom,         be entitled to compensation as provided by this         Convention.   Nevertheless there shall be no right to         compensation if the damage is not a direct consequence         of the incident giving rise thereto, or if the damage           results from the mere fact of passage of the aircraft         through the airspace in conformity with existing air         traffic regulations."   28.      However section 76(1) does not exclude all liability on the part of aircraft operators for trespass and nuisance caused by aircraft in flight.   In the first place, the exemption only applies in respect of aircraft flying at a reasonable height above the ground. What is reasonable is a question of fact depending on all the relevant circumstances which would include not merely the factors of weather specifically referred to in the section, but such matters as the size, speed and noise of the aircraft in question.   Secondly, before the exemption applies, there must be compliance with the statutory provisions referred to in section 76(1) itself.   In practice, this means the provisions of the Air Navigation Order 1980, the Air Navigation (General) Regulations 1981, the Rules of the Air and Air Traffic Control Regulations 1981 and, especially important in the present context, the Air Navigation (Noise Certification) Order 1979. Thus, if, for example, an aircraft flies overloaded or otherwise than in accordance with a relevant Noise Certificate, its operator will not be entitled to rely upon the section as a defence to any action for trespass or nuisance.   29.      In other words, if the applicants were able to show that a particular airline operator had flown at an height that was unreasonable in all the circumstances, or had flown in breach of the provisions of any air navigation order, they might have a remedy against that operator in civil court proceedings based on nuisance and/or trespass.   The remedy might take the form of an action for damages or, in the event of repeated infringements, an injunction to restrain the operator from continuing to fly in such a manner.   The applicants have no remedy for noise nuisance emanating from flights observing a reasonable height and other aviation regulations.   30.      Finally, in the event that the applicants were able to show that the Secretary of State had failed to enforce the statutory requirements imposed by him under the Civil Aviation Act to reduce and control aircraft noise a possible action might lie in mandamus to compel the Secretary of State to ensure compliance with those requirements.   III.     SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES     A.       The applicants   31.      The applicants complain in relation to Article 13 of the Convention that they consider themselves to be victims of excessive noise levels emanating from Heathrow Airport which seriously interfere with their private and family lives, ensured by Article 8 of the Convention.   However there is no domestic forum capable of providing a remedy to the alleged violation of their Article 8 rights.   Nor is there any domestic authority satisfying Article 13 of the Convention which can deal with the applicants' claim under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that they are denied access to court in respect of their civil rights.   32.      The applicants refer to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Boyle and Rice confirming its earlier case-law that "the existence of an actual breach of another provision of the Convention (a "substantive provision") is not a prerequisite for the application" of Article 13 of the Convention.   However an applicant must show that he has an arguable claim of a violation of such a substantive provision before he can challenge the absence of remedies under Article 13.   The Court has declined to lay down any criteria as to what may be an arguable claim.   Such a claim is not simply a matter falling within the scope of a substantive Article, nor must it necessarily be a prima facie, admissible issue, for, as the Court made it clear, arguable "does not mean ... that the Court must hold a claim to be excluded from the operation of Article 13 if the Commission has previously declared it manifestly ill-founded under the substantive Article".   Nevertheless, the Commission's Decision on Admissibility provides "significant pointers as to the arguable character of the claims for the purposes of Article 13".   Thus whether a claim is arguable depends on the "particular facts and the nature of the legal issue or issues raised" (Eur.   Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, paras. 52-55).   33.      Following this approach of the Court the applicants submit that they have arguable claims under Articles 8 and 6 para. 1 of the Convention, for which no remedy was available, contrary to Article 13 of the Convention.   34.      As regards their claim under Article 8 of the Convention, the applicants point out that the Commission examined in some depth the justification for the alleged interference with the applicants' private lives and homes caused by airport noise nuisance.   In the Rayner case, in particular, the Commission found a clear interference with the applicant's Article 8 rights which necessitated a careful examination of these issues under Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention. The applicants submit that they have an arguable claim that the interference with their private lives and homes was not justified: The applicants were established in their homes before 1961, after which the noise nuisance from Heathrow Airport dramatically increased with the construction of Terminals 3 and 4.   Noise insulation grants are an ineffective way of mitigating noise nuisance, particularly for people like Mr.   Rayner living within the 60 NNI contour, who are still   disturbed by aircraft noise despite such insulation.   Furthermore the Government's setting of PNdB levels and flight quotas is also ineffective because the Government do not enforce them and they are regularly exceeded.   35.      As regards the applicants' claim under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the applicants submit that the Commission's Decisions on Admissibility are misconceived.   They aver that compensation for damage caused by noise nuisance is a matter of civil rights and obligations falling within the scope of this provision of the Convention, but access to this civil suit is barred in respect of aircraft noise nuisance by section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982. The applicants contend that, arguably, this limitation on noise nuisance claims reduces their "right to a court", having regard to the rule of law in a democratic society, to such an extent as to impair the very essence of their normal civil rights against noise nuisance (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Ashingdane judgment of 28 May 1985, Series A no. 93, p. 24, para. 57).   But for the statute bar of section 76 of the 1982 Act Mr.   Powell would have an arguable case in nuisance and/or trespass against the Heathrow Airport authorities that the noise levels caused by aircraft are unreasonable, depending on the definition given by domestic courts to the notion of reasonable.   Mr. Rayner would have near certain success in such a suit because he can show that the Government do not enforce their own PNdB and quota limitations for night take-offs and landings.   The applicants submit, therefore, that they have established an arguable case of a denial of their right of access to court by virtue of the statute bar which does not pursue a legitimate aim, or represent a proportionate pursuit of whatever aim the Government might put forward.   36.      Having established that they have arguable claims that their rights under Articles 8 and 6 have been violated, the applicants contend that Article 13 is, therefore, applicable to their complaints.   As the Commission acknowledged in the Decision on Admissibility of Mr.   Rayner's case, no specific remedy exists under British law for these complaints.   The Government have all but conceded this fact.   Accordingly the applicants conclude that there is a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in their case.   37.      In sum, it is submitted on behalf of the applicants that Mr. Rayner clearly has an arguable claim that he is the victim of violations of Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention.   There is no national authority before which he can bring such a claim, this in itself representing a violation of Article 13.   The same arguments apply to the case of Mr.   Powell, but the degree of interference in his right to respect for his private life is less than that suffered by Mr.   Rayner, and the chance of his being able to sue successfully in nuisance and/or trespass, in the absence of the statute bar, is also less.   He therefore has an arguable claim under both Articles 8 and 6 but it is "less arguable" than that of Mr.   Rayner.   38.      Consequently the applicants would ask the Commission to find that either or both has an arguable claim that their rights under Articles 8 and 6 of the Convention have been violated.   They repeat that the lack of any national authority before which they can bring such an arguable claim itself represents a violation of Article 13.   B.       The Government   39.      The Government submit, first, that Article 13 is not applicable to the applicants' claim of a breach of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   Secondly, the applicants have no arguable claim to be victims of a violation of the rights set out in Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention and, thirdly, in any event, the aggregate of remedies provided for under domestic law satisfies the requirements of Article 13 in the present case.   40.      As regards the first submission, the Government state that since the Commission rejected the applicants' Article 6 claim of a denial of access to court, no separate issue arises under Article 13 of the Convention whose requirements are less strict and are absorbed by the former (Eur.   Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 41, para. 110).   Alternatively, the applicants have no arguable claim under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention or are unable to claim an Article 13 remedy against legislation (i.e. section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982) which is allegedly not in conformity with the Convention (loc. cit. para. 113 and Eur.   Court H.R., James and Others judgment of 21 February 1986, Series A no. 98, p. 47, para. 85).   41.      As regards the second submission, the Government contend that the applicants have no arguable claim under Article 8 of the Convention since any interference with their rights under the provision was in the circumstances of their case fully justified under paragraph 2 of the Article for the following reasons:   The construction of Heathrow Airport was lawful; it serves the economic interests of the country and is necessary in a democratic society.   Any interference with the applicants' rights was proportionate to the legitimate aim connected with running an airport and in Mr.   Powell's case, in particular, such interference was minimal as he lives in a low noise nuisance area.   As regards the claim under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the applicants have no arguable claim that the noise nuisance affected their property rights, for example, by diminishing the value of their homes.   42.      It is significant that the Commission declared the applicants' complaints under Articles 6 and 8 and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, particularly in Mr. Powell's case, where, as regards Article 8 of the Convention, for example, the first applicant was unable to establish a clear interference with his rights.   The Government rely on the Court's judgment in the case of Boyle and Rice, in which it was stated that "on the ordinary meaning of words, it is difficult to conceive how a claim that is 'manifestly ill-founded' can nevertheless be 'arguable', and vice versa".   Nevertheless, if the Commission's decision is not decisive on this point, it provides "significant pointers as to the arguable character of the claims for the purposes of Article 13" (Eur. Court H.R., Boyle and Rice judgment of 27 April 1988, para. 54).   In these circumstances the Government consider that the applicants' claims cannot be described as arguable and that, therefore, no violation of Article 13 of the Convention has occurred in their case.   43.      Finally, as regards the third submission, the Government submit that, in any event, an aggregate of remedies exists which satisfies Article 13 of the Convention in respect of the applicants' claims: an action will lie in nuisance for aircraft flying in breach of altitude and other aviation regulations when the defence provided by section 76 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 will not apply; a right to compensation in certain circumstances exists under the Land Compensation Act 1973 for loss of value of houses and land from airport noise; there also exists a statutory scheme for the provision of grants for the sound insulation of dwellings and there are statutory requirements imposed and enforced by the Secretary of State to reduce and control, and to mitigate the effect of, noise from aircraft using Heathrow Airport.   IV.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION     A.       Points at issue   44.      The following are the points at issue in the present application:         - whether the applicants had an effective remedy, pursuant to         Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, in respect of their complaint         that there has been an unjustified interference with their         property rights ensured by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to         the Convention;         - whether the applicants had an effective remedy, pursuant to         Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, in respect of their complaint         of a denial of access to court in the determination of their         civil rights, which access is inherently guaranteed by Article         6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention;         - whether the applicants had an effective remedy, pursuant to         Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, in respect of their   complaint of an unjustified interference with the right to   respect for private life and home, ensured by Article 8 (Art. 8) of   the Convention.     B.       General considerations   45.      Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention provides as follows:           "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in         this Convention are violated shall have an effective         remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that         the violation has been committed by persons acting in an         official capacity."   46.      This provision has been interpreted in the following way by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Silver and Others:           "(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be         the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the         Convention, he should have a remedy before a national         authority in order both to have his claim decided and,         if appropriate, to obtain redress (see the ...   Klass and         others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 29, para. 64);           (b)   the authority referred to in Article 13 (Art. 13) may not         necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is not,         its powers and the guarantees which it affords are         relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is         effective (ibid., p. 30, para. 67);           (c)   although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy         the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13), the aggregate of remedies         provided for under domestic law may do so (see, mutatis         mutandis, ...   X v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A         no. 46, p. 26, para. 60 and the Van Droogenbroeck judgment         of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 32, para. 56);           (d)   neither Article 13 (Art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays         down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring         within their internal law the effective implementation of any         of the provisions of the Convention - for example, by         incorporating the Convention into domestic law (see the         Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of 6 February 1976,         Series A no. 20, p. 18, para. 50).           It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the         application of Article 13 (Art. 13) in a given case will depend         upon the manner in which the Contracting State concerned         has chosen to discharge its obligation under Article 1         (Art. 1) directly to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the         rights and freedoms set out in section I (see ...   Ireland         v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 25, p. 91,         para. 239)."         (Eur.   Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March         1983, Series A no. 61, p. 42, para. 113)   47.      In the present case the Commission has declared inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded the applicants' claims under Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 6, 8) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), but declared admissible their complaint of an absence of any effective domestic remedy for these claims pursuant to Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention. The European Court of Human Rights in the case of Boyle and Rice considered the relationship between a complaint which is manifestly ill-founded, within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention, and the notion of an arguable claim for the purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention as follows:           "Notwithstanding the terms of Article 13 (Art. 13) read literally, the         existence of an actual breach of another provision of the         Convention (a 'substantive' provision) is not a prerequisite         for the application of the Article (see the Klass and Others         judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 29, para.         64).   Article 13 (Art. 13) guarantees the availability of a remedy at         national level to enforce - and hence to allege non-compliance         with - the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms         in whatever form they may happen to be secured in the domestic         legal order (see the Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July         1986, Series A no. 102, p. 74, para. 205, and the authorities         cited there).           However, Article 13 (Art. 13) cannot reasonably be interpreted so as to         require a remedy in domestic law in respect of any supposed   grievance under the Convention that an individual may have, no matter     how unmeritorious his complaint may be:   the grievance must be an   arguable one in terms of the Convention (see, as the most recent   authority, the Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p.   29, para. 77 (a)) ...           As the Court pointed out in its Airey judgment of 9 October         1979, rejection of a complaint as 'manifestly ill-founded'         amounts to a decision that 'there is not even a prima facie         case against the respondent State' (Series A no. 32, p. 10,         para. 18).   On the ordinary meaning of the words, it is         difficult to conceive how a claim that is 'manifestly         ill-founded' can nevertheless be 'arguable', and vice versa.           This does not mean, however, that the Court must hold a         claim to be excluded from the operation of Article 13 (Art. 13) if         the Commission has previously declared it manifestly         ill-founded under the substantive Article.   The Commission's         decision declaring an application admissible determines the         scope of the case brought before the Court (see the Ireland         v. the United Kingdom judgment of 18 January 1978, Series A         no. 25, p. 63, para. 157).   The Court is precluded from         reviewing on their merits under the relevant Article the         complaints rejected as manifestly ill-founded, but empowered         to entertain those complaints which the Commission has         declared admissible and which have been duly referred to         it.   The Court is thus competent to take cognisance of all         questions of fact and of law arising in the context of the         complaints before it under Article 13 (Art. 13) (ibid.), including the         arguability or not of the claims of violation of the         substantive provisions.   In this connection, the Commission's         decision on the admissibility of the underlying claims and         the reasoning therein, whilst not being decisive, provide         significant pointers as to the arguable character of the         claims for the purposes of Article 13 (Art. 13).           The Court does not think that it should give an abstract         definition of the notion of arguability.   Rather it must         be determined, in the light of the particular f