CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 mars 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12805/87                       by Ewa and Katarzyna NOWACKA                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 13 March 1989, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 24 January 1987 by Ewa and Katarzyna Nowacka against Sweden and registered on 19 March 1987 under file No. 12805/87;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.           The first applicant is a Polish citizen, born in 1954 and resident at Alvesta, Sweden.   She is a factory worker by profession. The second applicant is the first applicant's daughter, Katarzyna, born on 28 August 1982.   She is also a Polish citizen.   Since 13 June 1986 she has been living with foster parents at Färgelanda, Sweden. Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mrs.   Siv Westerberg, a laywer practising at Gothenburg.           In May 1985 the applicants came to Sweden from Poland. They settled down in Alvesta with the first applicant's fiancé, Jan Kuczynski.           On 16 August 1985 the Chairman of the Social Council (socialnämnden) of Alvesta decided to take Katarzyna into public care on a provisional basis under Section 6 of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga).   It was suspected that Katarzyna, who had been taken to hospital by the first applicant and Jan Kuczynski on 14 August 1985 as she was feverish and sick, had been maltreated.   Dr. U.L., who examined her at the hospital, observed several bruises on her body and, as he suspected maltreatment, made a report to the social authorities.           The provisional care order was confirmed by the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of Kronoberg County on 27 August 1985.           The Social Council applied to the County Administrative Court for a decision that Katarzyna be taken into public care pursuant to Section 1 second paragraph 1 of the 1980 Act.   After having held a hearing in the case on 23 September 1985, the Court on 8 October 1985 removed the case from its list of cases, as the Social Council had withdrawn its action before the Court due to an agreement with the first applicant that the care be carried out on a voluntary basis. The provisional care decision was thereby revoked.           After further injuries had been discovered in a medical examination of the girl the Chairman of the Social Council on 31 October 1985 again decided to take Katarzyna into care on a provisional basis.   The same day Katarzyna was placed at the Children's Medical Clinic at the hospital of Växjö.   On 13 November 1985 the County Administrative Court upheld the provisional care order.           On 25 November 1985 the Social Council decided to apply to the County Administrative Court for a decision that Katarzyna be taken into public care pursuant to Section 1 second paragraph 1 of the 1980 Act.   It also decided to place the girl at the Arabo Children's Home awaiting a transfer to a suitable foster home.    It prohibited Jan Kuczynski from meeting Katarzyna and restricted the first applicant's right of access to her to a couple of hours two or three times a week under the supervision of personnel from the Children's Home or the social authority.   The latter decison was taken under Section 16 of the 1980 Act.   The first applicant and Jan Kuczynski were present and assisted by counsel at the meeting in the Social Council at which these decisions were taken after a discussion of the issues.   The second applicant was represented by counsel appointed ex officio.           The County Administrative Court held a hearing during which the Social Council pointed out, inter alia, that it appeared from its investigation that Katarzyna during the period from August until November 1985 had suffered a number of injuries, the gravity of which varied.   The doctor who treated her considered one of the injuries to be very grave.   In medical examinations on 14 August and 2 November 1985 many bruises were discovered on Katarzyna's body.   Psychiatric and psychological assessments of the girl had confirmed that the physical injuries she had suffered had affected her mental health. The Council argued that Katarzyna had been injured while in the care of her mother and Jan Kuczynski and that it was obvious that they did not have the ability to provide the care she needed and secure living conditions.   Her life, health and development were endangered.   The first applicant and Jan Kuczynski, who were present at the hearing and assisted by counsel, maintained that neither of them had in any way harmed Katarzyna.   They maintained that she was a lively child who bruised herself easily and that her injuries were normal for a child of her age.   The first applicant was opposed to public care being provided for Katarzyna and together with Jan Kuczynski she appealed against the Social Council's decision on access.   Katarzyna was represented by officially appointed counsel before the Court.   He supported the request for public care.           The Social Council submitted the following documents to the Court:   a report of the Social Council, two medical certificates signed by Dr.   U.L., Head of the Children's Medical Clinic at the Växjö hospital and the doctor who reported to the Social Council that he suspected that Katarzyna had been maltreated, and an opinion issued by Chief Doctor T.G. and the psychologist B.S., both of the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Växjö.           The first applicant submitted a certificate issued by the Deputy Chief Doctor P.G.N. and referred to statements made by the psychologists G.L. and A. L-C.           The County Administrative Court also considered an opinion given by Dr.   G.S. of the Lund Institute of Forensic Medicine, a medical opinion issued by Dr.   S.L. of the X-ray department of the Lund hospital, a medical certificate issued by Dr.   E.B. of the department for coagulation diseases at the Malmö hospital, medical case-books concerning Katarzyna, photographs taken of her on 14 August and 2 November 1985 and minutes from interrogations.           The County Administrative Court heard as witnesses Dr.   U.L., Chief Doctor T.G. and Mr.   J.M., a friend of the first applicant and Jan Kuczynski.   The Court also heard the first applicant.           On 17 December 1985 the County Administrative Court granted the Social Council's application and revoked the Council's decision on access insofar as it concerned the first applicant.   The Court did not examine Jan Kuczynski's appeal against the decision to restrict his access to Katarzyna, no legal provision giving the Court the competence to do so, as Jan Kuczynski was not Katarzyna's parent or her custodian.   The Court stated, inter alia, the following in its reasons: "During a period of three months Katarzyna has suffered a number of injuries the gravity of which has varied and she has received several bruises.   Since 14 October 1985 Katarzyna has spent only 17 days at home.   During this period she has suffered several injuries and bruises.   After she was taken into care on 31 October 1985 she has not suffered any injuries.   The bruises subsequently observed were on her arms and legs.   The doctor of forensic medecine G.S. has stated that certain specific circumstances strongly tell against the theory that all the injuries were self-inflicted (accidents).   The Head of Clinic, Dr.   U.L., has expressed his strong suspicion that Katarzyna has been maltreated. The same idea is expressed in the opinion given by the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic.   Ewa Nowacka has maintained that Katarzyna bruises easily.   The analysis of a blood sample shows that Katarzyna's blood coagulates normally.   The defect caused by stretching must have occurred before 31 October 1985.   Katarzyna has suffered these injuries and bruises in her home environment.   The County Administrative Court finds strong reasons to believe that she has been maltreated.   It concludes that the conditions in the home entail a danger to Katarzyna's health and development.   The necessary care cannot be provided with Ewa Nowacka's consent.   The Social Council's request is therefore granted.   As regards the right to access Dr.   U.L. and Dr.   T.G. have underlined the importance of maintaining contact between Ewa Nowacka and Katarzyna.   The same opinion has been expressed in the psychological certificates referred to by Ewa Nowacka.   Katarzyna is at present staying at Arabo and it is not envisaged to place her somewhere else.   Considering Katarzyna's age and the fact that she does not speak Swedish it is important that Ewa Nowacka has an unrestricted right of access.   The Social Council's decision to restrict her access is therefore revoked."           The first applicant appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Jönköping.   The Court held a hearing, at which the first applicant was present and the applicants were represented in the same way as in the County Administrative Court.   The applicant stated she did not object to care being provided for Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.   She could live together with Katarzyna at the Arabo Children's Home.   She referred to a certificate issued by the psychiatrist R.S. on 5 February 1986 concerning Jan Kuczynski.   The Social Council and Katarzyna's official counsel maintained the position they had adopted in the lower court.           At the request of the first applicant seven witnesses were heard by the Administrative Court of Appeal.   Among them were Mr. A.K., her counsel in the County Administrative Court, Jan Kuczynski's ex-wife, the first applicant's aunt, Mr.   J.M., who used to stay with Jan Kuczynski, and J.B., a Polish doctor.   At the request of the Social Council the social welfare officer A.S. was heard as a witness. Dr.   U.L. and Dr.   T.G. were heard as expert witnesses by the Court.         After the hearing the Administrative Court of Appeal decided on 11 February 1986 to obtain the opinion of the Legal, Social and Medical Council of the National Board of Health and Welfare (Socialstyrelsens råd för vissa rättsliga, sociala och medicinska frågor).   The Council's opinion, dated 30 April 1986, was drafted by the Board's council on children's surgery, composed of an Associate Judge of Appeal, O.S., an expert on forensic medicine, G.V., and Dr. R.G. The first applicant, Katarzyna's officially appointed counsel and the Social Council were invited to comment on the opinion.           In a judgment of 19 June 1986 the Administrative Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the County Administrative Court.   It stated as follows:   "Katarzyna, who is a girl of almost four years, has been ill on several occasions during three months in the autumn of 1985, inter alia with attacks of vomiting and with a grave inflammation of the pancreas, and has suffered various injuries such as a fractured arm, bruises and other injuries of the skin.   The vomiting cannot be considered to have been connected with the subsequent inflammation of the pancreas, but can have had several causes and have been of a kind that any child could be affected of.   On the other hand it is established that the inflammation of the pancreas had traumatic causes.   It has not been established what kind of violence injured the pancreas.   The explanation given by Ewa Nowacka, i.e. that Katarzyna fell in the forest and hurt the pancreas, is not very probable.   On the other hand it cannot be excluded, but must be accepted, that the dislocation of the arm, which is something that mainly affects children of Katarzyna's age and cannot be considered to have been serious, occurred in the way and in the circumstances Ewa Nowacka has stated.   During medical examinations in the period August-November 1985 Katarzyna had a large number of bruises on her body, arms, legs and head.   Ewa Nowacka's explanation that Katarzyna hurts herself easily - an explanation that is extremely frequent in cases like the present one - has been refuted by statements of experts based on chemical analyses. Katarzyna must therefore be considered to bruise herself like other children of her age.   Children of her age often have bruises.   Bruises have been found on Katarzyna's body also when she was staying at Arabo.   They were, however, considerably less numerous and situated mainly on her legs. The bruises that were found during the autumn of 1985 when Katarzyna was in the care of Ewa Nowacka had a frequency and were found in such places on Katarzyna's body that they cannot have been inflicted while she was playing but must mainly be considered not to have been self-inflicted.   The fact that the bruises are to be found on "different levels" supports this opinion.           The wound on Katarzyna's foot, which has left a scar, as far as the investigation shows, cannot have been caused by clothes or shoes galling the skin, but is more profound.   Even if inflicted in the way Ewa Nowacka contends, its character can only be explained by insufficient care.           It appears clearly from the investigation that Katarzyna's right arm was dislocated before 31 October 1985. It has never been alleged that the dislocation was caused by maltreatment.   However, if the girl was insufficiently looked after this could have contributed to causing the injury and when the dislocation had occurred Ewa Nowacka did not notice it.           Katarzyna has consequently in a few months been injured on several occasions.   There might be a plausible explanation for each injury, but the large number of injuries, some of them grave, that Katarzyna has suffered during a relatively short period, have given the Social Council a justified reason to investigate the conditions of Katarzyna's home.           The question in this case has mainly been whether or not Katarzyna has been maltreated.   The parties differ on this.   The expert witnesses of the Court are convinced that she was maltreated, whereas a doctor called by Ewa Nowacka to give evidence has maintained the opposite, as well as the other witnesses heard at Ewa Nowacka's request.           Clearly the assessment made when assault is to be established is different from the assessment in a case under the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons.   In the former case the question is whether it has been proven that a certain person intentionally has caused an injury to another person.   In a case under the 1980 Act, which is an Act the purpose of which is to provide the necessary protection for the child, another assessment must be made.   It is of no importance to the child whether it can be established that a certain person intentionally maltreated it.   The danger to the child's health and development is the same, if this had been the case, if a stranger caused the injuries or if they occurred as a consequence of the custodian not looking after the child sufficiently.   It is therefore in the present case without importance that the police investigation concerning maltreatment of Katarzyna, as has been pointed out by Ewa Nowacka, has been discontinued.           The Administrative Court of Appeal finds that the injuries suffered by Katarzyna occurred during a period when she was in the care of Ewa Nowacka.   Ewa Nowacka has accordingly cared insufficiently for Katarzyna and has, on account of the nature and the extent of her injuries, caused a danger to Katarzyna's health and development.   Katarzyna is therefore in need of supervised care organised by the State. Ewa Nowacka has previously interrupted care organised for Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.   Since it cannot be assumed that the necessary care can be provided for Katarzyna with Ewa Nowacka's consent, care must be provided under the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons."         The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten).   She requested that the public care of Katarzyna be terminated, that the Court appoint Dr. P.G.F-F. as an expert witness and that it hold an oral hearing in the case.   She maintained that the expert witness of the Administrative Court of Appeal, Dr.   U.L., was biased as he was the doctor who reported to the Social Council that he suspected maltreatment.           Katarzyna's officially appointed counsel requested that the Court obtain a medical opinion from the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Vänersborg.           Before granting leave to appeal the Supreme Administrative Court on 16 October 1986 decided to obtain an opinion from the National Board of Health and Welfare.   The opinion was to be submitted before 24 November 1986, a time-limit that subsequently, at the request of the Board, was extended to 16 February 1987.           The Supreme Administrative Court delivered its judgment on 22 December 1987.   It found that Dr.   U.L. could not be considered to be biased and that his certificate and statements were valid evidence. The Court furthermore found that the investigation was comprehensive and sufficient for a decision.   It therefore rejected the parties' requests for further investigation as well as the request for a hearing.   One of the judges dissented and considered that the Court should request an opinion from Dr.   U.L. on the character of Katarzyna's bruises in order to establish if they could have been caused by the inflammation of the pancreas.           The Court unanimously rejected the appeal.   In its judgment it dealt in detail with the injuries inflicted on Katarzyna and the expert opinions given on them.   The Court referred to an opinion of 23 March 1987 given by Dr.   G.B., formerly the Head of the Children's Medical Clinic of Paris (Clinique Médicale Infantile) and submitted by the first applicant.   It furthermore considered American and Australian investigations concerning complications that can appear after an inflammation of the pancreas, such as changes of the skeleton as well as changes of the dermis that look like bruises.   The first applicant had quoted medical publications in which the results of these investigations were published.           The Supreme Administrative Court concluded in the reasons for its judgment:   "It appears from the above that Katarzyna, during a period in which she was in Ewa Nowacka's care, has suffered various injuries.   She received the injuries partly during a period of a few weeks prior to 14 August 1985, partly during the leaves from hospital referred to above and partly during a period of not quite three weeks prior to 31 October 1985.   One of the injuries, the inflammation of the pancreas, could have been fatal.   The bruises were numerous and unusually located on her body, namely on the trunk, the upper part of the thighs and on the throat.   It is unlikely that the bruises were caused in the way Ewa Nowacka has maintained.   Ewa Nowacka has explained that she did not notice that Katarzyna in October 1985 broke her right upper arm, in spite of the fact that the fracture must have caused Katarzyna pains during several days.   After public care had been provided for Katarzyna under the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons she has only been bruised in the way children do when they play or fall normally.   Dr.   U.L. is convinced that Katarzyna has been maltreated.   Also the two psychiatrists that examined Katarzyna consider that she has been maltrated.   Dr.   B.T. is of the same opinion.   Making an overall assessment the Supreme Administrative Court finds that Katarzyna, during the period she was in the care of Ewa Nowacka, has been maltreated or otherwise subjected to physical violence.   Only a few of Katarzyna's injuries can be related to accidents or conditions which Ewa Nowacka could not prevent.   This shows that Ewa Nowacka's care for Katarzyna has been insufficient.   Also the fact that Ewa Nowacka did not notice the fracture of the arm and did not provide for any treatment shows a serious neglect. The Court finds the established insufficiencies in the care of Katarzyna so serious that they entail a danger to Katarzyna's health and development.   It appears from the case-file that in the beginning of October 1985 the Social Council started co-operating with Ewa Nowacka in order to provide the necessary care for Katarzyna on a voluntary basis.   However, Ewa Nowacka discontinued the co-operation after a few days.   As a consequence of the subsequent events the Social Council could not rely on Ewa Nowacka's consent to provide Katarzyna with the care she needs.   On account of this the Supreme Administrative Court finds that the prerequisites for providing care for Katarzyna, under Section 1 first paragraph and second paragraph first sentence of the Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons, were fulfilled at the time of the judgments of the lower courts.   Nothing has emerged in the case which could make the Supreme Administrative Court assess Katarzyna's need for care differently."           Parallel to the proceedings concerning the public care of Katarzyna there have been several court proceedings concerning the first applicant's right of access to her daugther.   The first applicant was represented by counsel throughout all these proceedings.           Katarzyna was placed at the Arabo Children's Home on 12 November 1985, after having been taken into care, and stayed there until 13 June 1986 when she was placed in a foster home.   The first applicant stayed with Katarzyna at the Children's Home from 10 February to 15 May 1986.   Thereafter she was refused permission to stay in the Home and to see Katarzyna.   On 11 June 1986 the Working Committee of the Social Council, in connection with the transfer of Katarzyna from the Children's Home to a foster home, prohibited the first applicant from seeing her and decided to keep her place of residence secret to the first applicant.   The decision was taken under Section 16 of the 1980 Act and the Working Committee stated that it intended to reconsider it approximately three months after Katarzyna had been placed in the foster home.           The first applicant appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court, which held a hearing and heard two witnesses and an expert witness.   The first applicant was also heard.   The evidence submitted to the Court consisted inter alia of opinions given by two doctors and a psychologist, of Ewa Nowacka's diary and of notes made by the personnel of the Children's Home.   According to the medical opinions and the statement of the expert witness Katarzyna's mental state was bad because of the maltreatment she had been subjected to. One of the doctors and the psychologist considered that Katarzyna should be allowed to meet her mother regularly but under supervision. In its judgment of 1 July 1986 the Court revoked the decision of the Social Council.   After the Social Council had appealed against the judgment, the Administrative Court of Appeal, on 2 July 1986, confirmed the County Administrative Court's decision that there was no reason to keep Katarzyna's place of residence secret to the first applicant and decided to restrict the first applicant's right of access to her daughter to three hours once a week during a period of three months, to be counted from mid-June until mid-September.   The reason given for the restriction was Katarzyna's need for tranquillity and security during the period in which she was to adapt to the foster home.           The first applicant appealed against this judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court, which on 14 August 1986 refused leave to appeal.           On 20 August 1986 a social welfare officer M.E. decided to prohibit the first applicant from seeing her daughter pending the meeting of the Social Council of 17 September 1986.   The reason for this was a bruise that the first applicant had allegedly inflicted on her daughter during a visit to the foster home.   The decision was revoked by the County Administrative Court by a provisional decision of 22 August 1986 on appeal from the first applicant.   The Court decided that, awaiting a final decision, the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal of 2 July 1986 should be followed.   The Court subsequently held a hearing and in a judgment of 15 September 1986 revoked the decision of the Social Council.   The judgment states, inter alia, as follows:   "In its judgment of 2 July the Administrative Court of Appeal considered that Ewa Nowacka should have access to her daughter.   What has occurred in the case shows that those who decided on access did not have sufficient reasons to restrict the right of access.   The Administrative Court of Appeal restricted the access during a transitional period until mid-September.   There are no sufficient reasons to assume that the conditions on which the restriction was based still exist.   The revocation of the Social Council's decision shall therefore not be combined with any restrictions on the right of access."           Two days after the judgment of the County Administrative Court, the Working Committee of the Social Council decided to restrict the first applicant's right of access to her daughter to one day every second month, in the foster home, in the presence of the foster parents.   The decision was to be reconsidered on 31 October 1987.           The first applicant appealed against the decision to the County Administrative Court, which, after a hearing, revoked the decision on 24 September 1986.   The reason was that no new circumstances had been presented in the case since the Court's previous judgment.   It was ordered that the judgment be immediately enforceable.           After the judgment had been delivered the first applicant made a request to meet her daughter.   On 26 September 1986 she got a letter from the social welfare officer in charge of her case stating as follows:   "Interpretation of the judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24 September 1986.   In consultation with the Chairman of the Social Council, I.A., the Deputy Chairman, B.O., the Head of the social authority, H.G., the district superintendant and the undersigned it was decided that you may visit Katarzyna once a week for approximately three hours, on a day that you and the Stenbäck family agree upon.   In addition you might (if it is accepted by the Stenbäcks, if the interpreter can come, if there is a suitable train and so on) be able to visit Katarzyna during a weekend, either on a Saturday or on a Sunday, in October.   An interpreter will be present during your visits.   Yours faithfully,   M.E."           The Social Council appealed against the County Administrative Court's judgments of 15 and 24 September 1986 to the Administrative Court of Appeal.   The Court held a hearing at which the first applicant claimed her full right of access and argued, inter alia, that the Social Council, by not letting a catholic priest visit the girl in the foster home, obstructed her efforts to give her daughter a catholic education.   She also pointed out that the social authorities, in restricting her access, refused to comply with the judgment of the County Administrative Court.   At the hearing the Court heard an expert witness, a social welfare officer and the foster father.   They were all of the opinion that the first applicant should have access to Katarzyna, but that it should be restricted.   The foster father stated, inter alia, that neither he nor his wife interfered with Katarzyna's religious education and that they were not opposed to a catholic priest visiting Katarzyna.         The Administrative Court of Appeal, in a judgment of 28 November 1986, decided to allow the first applicant to see her daughter in the foster home every third week, alternately during one day from 10 a.m. until 6 p.m. and during two days, the first day from 10 a.m. until 8 p.m. and the second day from 9 a.m. until 4 p.m.   This should apply until further notice, but no longer than till 1 June 1987.   In its reasons the Court stated, inter alia, that the first applicant, during the longer meetings with Katarzyna, could assist her at night when she went to bed and participate in her evening prayers. The Court referred to the above interpretation by the Social Council of the judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24 September 1986.   The reason the Court gave for the restriction of the right of access was Katarzyna's need for tranquillity and security in the foster home.   The Court also referred to the foster parents' possibilities of providing successful care.           The first applicant appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court, which on 29 January 1987 refused to grant leave to appeal.           The first applicant reported the social welfare officer, M.E., who had produced the "interpretation" of the County Administrative Court's judgment of 24 September 1986, to the police.   The criminal investigation led to an indictment by the Regional Prosecutor (statsåklagaren) of Kalmar on a charge of misuse of office or, alternatively, negligence in office.   The applicants joined in the prosecutor's action and claimed damages.   The social welfare officer was convicted for negligence in office on 22 December 1987 by the District Court of Växjö (Växjö tingsrätt) and sentenced to a fine.   The second applicant's action was dismissed, however, as the Court considered that the social welfare officer had only caused her minor inconvenience.   It was decided that the applicants' claim for damages should be examined separately in accordance with the procedure provided for civil cases.           The social welfare officer appealed against the judgment to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt) which on 26 October 1988 confirmed the judgment of the District Court.           The first applicant brought a request to the Legal Aid Board (rättshjälpsnämnden) of Malmö for legal aid for the purpose of bringing the present application to the European Commission of Human Rights.   The Board rejected the request on 15 January 1987.           The first applicant appealed to the Legal Aid Appeals Board (besvärsnämnden för rättshjälpen), which rejected the appeal on 13 April 1987.     COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants allege a breach of Article 8 of the Convention in that the decision taking the second applicant into public care was based on an incorrect medical diagnosis and in that the care was not immediately terminated after it had appeared that the diagnosis was incorrect.   They also complain that the restriction of the first applicant's access to the second applicant unjustifiedly interfered with their family life.     2.       The applicants complain that a social welfare officer, by interpreting a judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24 September 1986 providing that there be no restriction of the first applicant's right of access to the second applicant, has unjustifiedly restricted that right.   They further complain that they had no effective remedy against the social welfare officer's decision and invoke Article 13 of the Convention.   3.       The first applicant alleges a violation of her right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 6 of the Convention as the expert witness of the Courts, Dr.   U.L., whose statement was of great importance for the outcome of the case, was biased, Dr.   U.L. being the doctor who made the incorrect diagnosis that led to the taking into care of the second applicant.           The applicants further allege a breach of Article 6 of the Convention in that their case was not determined by the Supreme Administrative Court "within a reasonable time" and in that they were not afforded a hearing before that court.   4.       The first applicant also complains that she has been denied the right to ensure that the second applicant is given a catholic education.   She contends that her daughter, who was placed in a protestant foster home, has not been allowed to receive visits from a catholic priest.   She invokes Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   5.       Finally, the applicants complain that their right to petition the Commission has been interfered with by the refusal of the Legal Aid Appeals Board on 13 April 1987 to grant the first applicant legal aid for this purpose.   They allege a breach of Article 25 of the Convention.       THE LAW   1.       The applicants have complained that their right to respect for their private and family life has been interfered with in a manner unjustifiable under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.   In particular they have pointed out that the second applicant was taken into public care by a decision based on an incorrect medical diagnosis and that the care was not immediately terminated after it had appeared that the diagnosis was incorrect.   The applicants furthermore contend that the restriction of the first applicant's right of access to the second applicant interferes with their rights under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) .           Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention reads as follows:           "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private         and family life, his home and his correspondence.           2.       There shall be no interference by a public authority         with the exercise of this right except such as is in         accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic         society in the interests of national security, public safety         or the economic well-being of the country, for the         prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of         health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and         freedoms of others."             The Commission finds that the decision to take the second applicant into care and to restrict the first applicant's right of access to the second applicant interfered with the applicants' right to respect for their family as ensured by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.           It must therefore be examined whether this interference was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2).   In this respect the Commission recalls that three conditions must be satisfied:   the interference must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those legitimate aims.           As regards the first condition, the Commission recalls its opinion in the case (Olsson v.   Sweden, Comm.   Rep. 2.12.86, para. 139) where it found that the text of the relevant provisions in the Swedish acts, although vague, could not be considered as not satisfying the requirements as to the quality of the law.   This view was confirmed by the European Court of Human Rights (Eur.   Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A No. 130, paras. 60-63).           Apart from the restrictions on access following the County Administrative Court's judgment of 24 September 1986 (see below under 2), the Commission finds no indication that the decisions taken in the present case were contrary to Swedish law.   The issue of taking the second applicant into care was examined by the competent administrative courts up to the Supreme Administrative Court and the issue of restricting the first applicant's right of access by two courts, the Supreme Administrative Court refusing to grant leave to appeal.           The Commission furthermore finds that the interference had a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) , namely the interests of the child, which in this case falls under the expression "for the protection of health or morals" and "for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others".           The Commission concludes that the decision to take the first applicant's child into care was taken "in accordance with the law" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention and that it had a legitimate aim (cf. also above-mentioned Olsson judgment, paras. 64-65).   The Commission considers that this also applies to the decisions to restrict the first applicant's access to her daughter. As regards the decision of the social welfare officer to restrict the first applicant's access, after the judgment of the County Administrative Court of 24 September 1986, the Commission refers to its examination under 2 below.           It remains to be determined whether the interference was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interests of the child.           According to the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   In determining whether an interference is "necessary in a democratic society" the Commission furthermore has to take into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (cf. above-mentioned Olsson judgment, para. 67).         However, the Convention organs' review is not limited to ascertaining whether a respondent State has exercised its discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith, and they cannot confine themselves to considering the relevant decisions in isolation but must look at them in the light of the case as a whole.   They must determine whether the reasons adduced to justify the interference at issue are "relevant and sufficient" (cf.   Olsson judgment, para. 68).           The Commission recalls that in the present case the applicants have alleged that the decision to take the second applicant into care was based on an incorrect medical diagnosis and that the care should have been terminated as soon as it had appeared that the diagnosis was incorrect.           Before considering the substance of this issue, the Commission recalls first of all that, subsequent to the taking into care of the first applicant's daughter on a provisional basis, the first applicant attended a meeting with the Social Council on 25 November 1985 when the question of maintaining the care order was discussed.   During that meeting the first applicant was assisted by counsel and the second applicant represented by officially appointed counsel.   Furthermore, the Commission recalls that both the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held oral hearings.   The first applicant was present at both hearings and assisted by a lawyer.   The second applicant was represented by officially appointed counsel.   The County Administrative Court heard as witnesses Dr.   U.L., the doctor who reported to the Social Council that he suspected that Katarzyna had been maltreated and whose diagnosis according to the applicants was incorrect, Chief Doctor T.G. of the Children's and Juveniles' Psychiatric Clinic of Växjö and Mr.   J.M., a friend of the first applicant and Jan Kuczynski.   The Court also heard the first applicant.   At the request of the first applicant seven witnesses were heard by the Administrative Court of Appeal.   Among them were Mr. A.K., the first applicant's counsel in the County Administrative Court, Jan Kuczynski's ex-wife, the first applicant's aunt, a Polish doctor and a man who used to stay with Jan Kuczynski.   The Supreme Administrative Court did not hold a hearing in the case, but, as appears from the judgment, carefully examined the first applicant's written submissions and the statements made by her in the lower courts, as well as the certificates and scientific material submitted by her.   Moreover, the first applicant was assisted by counsel on appeal.   Having regard to these facts, as well as to the reasons stated below in relation to Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention, the Commission finds that insofar as certain procedural requirements are implicit in Article 8 (Art. 8), these requirements were satisfied as regards the care issue since the first applicant was involved in the decision-making process to a degree sufficient to provide her with the requisite protection of her interests.           The Commission recalls that also in the proceedings relating to the restriction of the first applicant's right of access the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal held hearings, during which the first applicant was present and assisted by counsel, and at which witnesses were heard.   The Commission considers that also in these proceedings the procedural requirements of Article 8 (Art. 8) were satisfied.           As regards the taking into care the Commission recalls that all three courts that examined the case found that the injuries that had been inflicted on the second applicant, during a relatively short period in which she was in her mother's care, showed that the conditions in the home were such as to endanger her health and development.   This reason was clearly relevant to the decision to take her into care.           However, a decision to take a child into care must be supported by sufficiently sound and weighty considerations since such a decision is in any case a serious interference with the right protected under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1).   In order to determine whether in the present case the reasons can be considered "sufficient" for the purposes of Article 8, the Commission must further examine the evidence that was available to the courts.           In this respect the Commission recalls that a large number of medical certificates and opinions were available to the courts when they considered the care issue.   Although these certificates and opinions to some extent expressed different views on the question whether the second applicant had been maltreated, it was clear from them that the girl had suffered several injuries while in her mother's care and that she had been neglected.   Furthermore, the Commission recalls that the County Administrative Court and the Administrative Court of Appeal heard several expert witnesses who supported the findings of the written opinions submitte