CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 10 avril 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  Application No. 12794/87   Jutta HUBER     against     SWITZERLAND     REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 10 April 1989)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                                 Page     I.       INTRODUCTION         (paras. 1-12)   ....................................      1             A.       The application                 (paras. 2-4)   .............................      1           B.       The proceedings                 (paras. 5-7)   .............................      1           C.       The present Report                 (paras. 8-12)   ............................      2       II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS         (paras. 13-33)   ...................................      3             A.       The particular circumstances of the case                 (paras. 13-24)   ...........................      3           B.       Relevant domestic law                 (paras. 25-33)   ...........................      6       III.     OPINION OF THE COMMISSION         (paras. 34-49)   ...................................      8                   Conclusion                 (para. 49)   ...............................     10     CONCURRING OPINION OF Mr.   H. VANDENBERGHE .................     11     DISSENTING OPINION OF Mr.   F. MARTINEZ .....................     12     DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs.   J. LIDDY .......................     14     APPENDIX I:      HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS   ...............     15     APPENDIX II:     DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY   ............     16     I.     INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case, as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.       The application&_   2.       The applicant, born in 1958, is a Swiss citizen residing in Zurich.   Before the Commission, she is represented by Messrs.   E. Schönenberger and K. Mäder, lawyers practising in Zurich.           The application is directed against Switzerland whose Government are represented by their Agent, Mr.   O. Jacot-Guillarmod, Head of the Division of International Affairs of the Federal Office of Justice.   3.       The application relates to a warrant of arrest, issued against the applicant by the Zurich District Attorney (Bezirksanwalt) D.J., on suspicion of having taken part in a prostitute ring and having given false testimony.   A bill of indictment was subsequently issued against the applicant by D.J. on the ground, inter alia, of false testimony in court proceedings.   The applicant was subsequently acquitted by the Zurich District Court (Bezirksgericht), though the Zurich Court of Appeal eventually convicted her of attempted false testimony and sentenced her to a fine of 4,000 SFr.   4.       The applicant complains that, contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention, the same District Attorney decided on her detention and later indicted her.   Thus, the District Attorney could not be regarded as having been independent, as required by that provision.   B.     The proceedings&_   5.       The application was introduced on 27 February 1987 and registered on 13 March 1987.           On 7 October 1987 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   The Government submitted their observations on 18 December 1987, the applicant her reply on 13 April 1988.   6.       On 9 July 1988 the Commission declared the application admissible.           Further observations were submitted by the Government on 6 October 1988.   7.      After declaring the application admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   Consultations with the parties took place between 11 July and 5 October 1988.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a settlement can be effected.   C.       The present Report&S   8.       The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberation and votes, the following members being present:                  MM.   J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   S. TRECHSEL                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY   9.      The text of this Report was adopted on 10 April 1989 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   10.     The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is:   i)       to establish the facts, and   ii)      to state an opinion as to whether the facts found         disclose a breach by the State concerned of its         obligations under the Convention.   11.       A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   12.       The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.     II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case&_   13.      In connection with criminal investigations against one Mr.   K. in Hamburg and one Mr.   B. in Zurich concerning procuring (Zuhälterei) and pandering (Kuppelei), the Zurich District Attorney's Office (Bezirksanwaltschaft) issued an order against the applicant to appear on 8 August 1983 as witness (Vorführungsbefehl).   The order was signed by the District Attorney D.J.   14.      On 11 August 1983 the applicant was brought by the Zurich Town Police before the District Attorney's Office where she was interrogated by District Attorney D.J.   Thereby she admitted having lived of the proceeds of prostitution.   However, she stated that she had known Messrs.   K. and B. only by name and that she did not hand over to anybody part of her income as a prostitute.   As a result, the District Attorney D.J. remanded the applicant in custody on the same day.   15.      According to the warrant of arrest (Verhaftsverfügung) signed on 11 August 1983 by the District Attorney D.J., there was the urgent suspicion that members of the group "Hell's Angels" of Zurich and Hamburg had brought German prostitutes to Zurich.   There, in return for payment, some had married Swiss men.   These women had been urged, partly under threat, to commit professional prostitution whereby the "Hell's Angels" had protected the women who in turn had given them part of the proceeds.   The applicant was urgently suspected of having been one of these women.           The warrant of arrest stated that as a witness and under threat of punishment on account of false testimony she had denied any connection with the "Hell's Angels".   The warrant referred in particular to a danger of collusion and the danger that evidence would be destroyed.   It also stated that an appeal against the order of arrest could be filed within 48 hours with the Public Prosecutor's Office (Staatsanwaltschaft) of the Canton of Zurich.   16.      The applicant was released from detention on remand on 19 August 1983.   17.      On 12 October 1984 the Zurich District Attorney's Office indicted the applicant before the Judge in Criminal Cases at the Zurich District Court (Einzelrichter in Strafsachen am Bezirksgericht) on the grounds of false testimony in court proceedings and alternatively (eventualiter) of the hindrance of criminal proceedings and requested a punishment of 5,000 SFr.   The bill of indictment was signed by the District Attorney D.J. who had also signed the warrant of arrest.   18.      The trial took place on 10 January 1985.   According to the minutes of the trial, the applicant's representative stated as follows: <Translation>           "In this case the first thing to note is a violation of the human right embodied in Article 5 para. 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which states that anyone who is arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of Article 5 para. 1 (c) of the Convention has to be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power.   This never happened in the present case.   Rather, the person who remanded the accused in custody, District Attorney J., is today at the same time the author of the bill of indictment."   <German>           "Vorliegend wurde zunächst das in Art. 5 Ziff. 3 der Konvention zum Schutze der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten (EMRK) statuierte Menschenrecht verletzt, wonach jede nach der Vorschrift von Art. 5 Ziff. 1 c) EMRK festgenommene oder in Haft gehaltene Person unverzüglich einem Richter oder einem anderen, gesetzlich zur Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten vorgeführt werden muss.   Eine solche Vorführung hat vorliegend nie stattgefunden; vielmehr ist derjenige, der die Angeklagte in Haft genommen hat, heute gleichzeitig Ankläger, nämlich der Bezirksanwalt J."   19.      On 10 January 1985 the Zurich District Court acquitted the applicant on the grounds that she had never been invited (vorgeladen) to an interrogation for which reason her testimony was invalid and could not be considered.   The judgment does not refer to the issues raised at the trial by the applicant's lawyer under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.   20.      Upon appeal (Berufung) by the Public Prosecutor's Office the Zurich Court of Appeal (Obergericht) on 13 September 1985 convicted the applicant of attempted false testimony and sentenced her to a fine of 4,000 SFr.   The Court found that her testimony was not invalid and could be used.   It further referred to the monitoring of telephone conversations between the applicant and Mr.   K. which had been lawfully undertaken by the authorities in Germany and the minutes of which had been transmitted by way of legal cooperation to Switzerland.   The Court concluded on the basis of these minutes that the applicant had in fact known Messrs.   K. and B.   21.      The judgment of the Court of Appeal also refers to the issue under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention:   <Translation>           "Finally it must be noted that the applicant's lawyer unjustifiably put forward the objection that in the context of her arrest and in contravention of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention the accused had not been brought before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power.   For, according to the case-law of the Federal Court, the Zurich District Attorney exercises in the procedural stage of investigation also judicial power within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention (ATF [Arrêts du Tribunal Fédéral] 102 Ia 179)." <German>           "Schliesslich ist festzuhalten, dass der Einwand der Verteidigung, die Angeklagte sei im Zusammenhang mit ihrer Verhaftung in Verletzung von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK keinem Richter oder einem anderen gesetzlich zur Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigten Beamten vorgeführt worden, zu Unrecht erfolgte.   Nach der Rechtsprechung des Bundesgerichtes übt nämlich der zürcherische Bezirksanwalt im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung auch richterliche Funktionen im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK aus (BGE 102 Ia 179)."   22.      The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeits- beschwerde) which was dismissed by the Zurich Court of Cassation (Kassationsgericht) on 1 July 1986.   The Court found that the issue under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention was irrelevant for the present case.   If the applicant therefore challenged the District Attorney she should have done so already during the investigation.   23.      The applicant then lodged a public law appeal with the Federal Court (Bundesgericht) in which she complained, inter alia, that, contrary to Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention, the Zurich District Attorney had not only remanded the applicant in custody but also indicted her.   24.      The Federal Court dismissed the applicant's public law appeal on 24 November 1986.   The decision was served on the applicant on 18 December 1986.   In respect of the applicant's complaint under Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention the Federal Court held:   <Translation>           "As the applicant has long since been released from detention on remand, she no longer has an actual practical interest in a response to this complaint for which reason the Court can no longer deal with it.   The objection would in any event be unfounded since both the Federal Court (ATF 102 Ia 179 et seq.) and the European Court of Human Rights (judgment of 4 December 1979 in the Schiesser case) have declared that the Zurich District Attorney qualifies in the procedural phase of the investigation as an 'officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power' within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention."   <German>           "Nachdem die Beschwerdeführerin längst aus der Untersuchungshaft entlassen worden ist, hat sie jedoch kein aktuelles praktisches Interesse mehr an der Behandlung dieser Rüge, weshalb darauf nicht einzutreten ist.   Der Vorwurf wäre übrigens unbegründet, da sowohl das Bundesgericht (BGE 102 Ia 179ff.) als auch der Europäische Gerichtshof für Menschenrechte (Urteil vom 4.   Dezember 1979 in Sachen Schiesser) erklärt haben, der zürcherische Bezirksanwalt sei im Verfahrensstadium der Untersuchung ein 'gesetzlich zur Ausübung richterlicher Funktionen ermächtigter Beamter' im Sinne von Art. 5 Ziff. 3 EMRK."   B.       Relevant domestic law and practice&S   25.      According to S. 32 of the Judiciary Act (Gerichtsverfassungs- gesetz, GVG) of the Canton of Zurich of 1976 the District Court examines as a criminal court all matters not falling within the jurisdiction of another court.   S. 44 and 57 GVG state the various offences which the Court of Appeal and the Jury Court, respectively, are competent to deal with; they do not include the charges brought against the applicant.   26.      S. 72 GVG provides that the District Attorney's Office acts as the indicting authority (Anklagebehörde) at the level of the District Court, and the Public Prosecutor's Office before the Court of Appeal and the Jury Court (Geschworenengericht).   S. 73 GVG states that the investigation of offences is conducted by the District Attorney's Office and the Public Prosecutor's Office.   In practice, most investigations are carried out by the District Attorney.   As a rule, District Attorneys are elected for office by the people for four years (S. 86 para. 2 GVG).   27.      S. 55 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung, StPO) of the Canton of Zurich of 1919 authorises the District Attorney to issue a warrant of arrest.   Against the latter an appeal may be filed. S. 64 StPO obliges the District Attorney to hear an arrested suspect within twenty-four hours.   According to S. 65 StPO, the suspect must thereby be clearly informed of the reasons prompting the suspicion held against him and must be given the opportunity to invalidate these reasons.   S. 31 StPO generally obliges the investigating officer to consider exculpating and inculpating circumstances with equal care.   28.      Detention on remand ordered by the District Attorney may not exceed 14 days, except if continuation is ordered by the President of the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber (Anklagekammer) of the Court of Appeal, depending on the jurisdiction of the respective Court (S. 51 StPO).   29.      Once the investigation has been closed and the District Attorney's Office does not intend to prosecute the accused, the investigation is discontinued (S. 39 StPO).   Otherwise, the indicting authority, i.e. the District Attorney's Office or the Public Prosecutor's Office, commences the main proceedings (Hauptverfahren) by submitting the bill of indictment (S. 161 StPO).   The President of the District Court or of the Prosecuting Chamber of the Court of Appeal will then decide whether or not to admit the bill of indictment (S. 165 StPO).   30.      S. 178 StPO states:   <Translation>           "The indicting authority is a party to the main proceedings.   It has as such all the rights and duties of a party.           In his statement the indicting officer should not one-sidedly confine himself to stressing items that tell against the accused, but should also take into account items in his favour."   <German>           "Die Anklagebehörde ist im Hauptverfahren Prozesspartei. Sie hat alle einer solchen zustehenden Rechte und Pflichten.           Der Ankläger soll bei seinen Vorträgen nicht einseitig nur dasjenige hervorheben, was den Angeschuldigten beschweren kann, sondern auch das berücksichtigen, was zu seinen Gunsten spricht."   31.      The District Attorney remains under the control of the Public Prosecutor's Office (S. 86 GVG), and the latter is authorised to issue directives to him (S. 27 StPO).   In practice District Attorneys receive no special orders or instructions from the Public Prosecutor's Office concerning their powers of placing individuals in detention.   32.      Apart from the power to order arrest and detention and to interrogate the arrested suspect, the District Attorney has the power to issue a summons order (Strafbefehl) if the accused has confessed and admitted his guilt, and if a fine (Busse) or prison sentence of a maximum of one month is considered to be adequate (S. 317 StPO).   33.      After conviction, S. 419 StPO allows an appeal to the Court of Appeal in which complaints may be raised alleging defects (Mängel) both of the investigation and of the procedure (Verfahren) and the decision of the first instance court.   III.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION     34.      The issue to be determined in the present case is whether there has been a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, in that the applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power".           Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) states:   "3.       Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1(c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial."   35.      The Commission recalls that the "officer" referred to in Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention, while not identical with a "judge", must nevertheless have some of the latter's attributes. First, he must be independent of the executive and of the parties. Secondly, he must be under an obligation to hear the individual brought before him.   Thirdly, he must review the circumstances militating for or against detention (see Eur.   Court H.R., Schiesser judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A No. 34, p. 13 et seq. para. 31).   36.      In the present case the second and third criteria have not been called in question.   However, there is disagreement between the parties as to whether the District Attorney met the requirement of independence.   In this respect, his independence of the executive is not disputed.   In fact, as the Court found in the Schiesser case, the Zurich District Attorney acts without instructions, supervision or advice, from the Department of Justice or the Public Prosecutor's Office of the Canton of Zurich (ibid. p. 15 para. 35).   37.      Rather, in the present case the issue arises whether the District Attorney can be considered as having been independent of the parties.   38.      The applicant submits that the District Attorney was not independent within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3), since he later also indicted her.   39.      The Government submit that for purposes of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) the decisive moment must be the time of arrest.   At that stage, the District Attorney's status and powers are not affected by the fact that he may later draw up the bill of indictment.   The Government fail to see what advantage there would be for the accused if the indictment was drawn up by an officer other than the District Attorney ordering the arrest of the accused.   Indeed, the applicant did not claim during the domestic proceedings to have suffered any specific injury as a result of the complaints she is now raising before the Commission.   40.      The Commission and the Court were confronted with a similar issue in the Schiesser case.   There the Court found:   "the District Attorney intervened exclusively in his capacity as an investigating authority, that is in considering whether Mr.   Schiesser should be charged and detained on remand and, subsequently, in conducting enquiries with an obligation to be equally thorough in gathering evidence in his favour and evidence against him (Article 31 StPO).   He did not assume the mantle of prosecutor: he neither drew up the indictment nor represented the prosecuting authorities before the trial court...   He therefore did not exercise concurrent investigating and prosecuting functions" (ibid. p. 15 para. 34).   41.      Subsequently, in the Skoogström case the Commission found that the officer who decided on the applicant's continuing detention on remand was not independent of the parties since she could have been called upon to perform tasks of a prosecutor.   The Report continues:   "The fact that Mrs.   M did not herself perform the subsequent prosecution in court could not retroactively make her independent of the parties at the time when she took the detention decision.   It was a mere coincidence that all the tasks were not performed by the same prosecutor". (Comm. Report 15.7.83, Eur.   Court H.R., Series A No. 83, p. 16 para. 78).   42.      In two cases concerning military arrest and detention in the Netherlands, the Court found that the auditeur-militair concerned was liable to act in one and the same case also as the prosecuting authority after the case had been referred to trial.   He could therefore not be regarded as being independent of the parties at the preliminary stage (see Eur.   Court H.R., de Jong, Baljet and van den Brink judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A No. 77, p. 24 para. 49; van der Sluijs, Zuiderveld and Klappe judgment of 22 May 1984, Series A No. 78, p. 19 para. 44).   43.      Recently in the Pauwels case the Court concluded that the impartiality of the Belgian auditeur militaire was called in question as he combined, with regard to the same applicant, the functions of both investigation and prosecution (see judgment of 26 May 1988, Series A No. 135, p. 19 para. 38).   44.      With regard to the present case the Commission observes that according to S. 31 StPO the District Attorney, when undertaking the investigations and in particular remanding a person in custody, must consider with equal care exculpating and incriminating circumstances. Subsequently, according to S. 178 para. 1 StPO, the District Attorney as the indicting authority becomes a party to the trial proceedings.   45.      The Commission further considers that, as under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, also under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) the "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" must inspire in the public confidence in his independence, and that in such areas even appearances may be important (see Eur.   Court H.R., Piersack judgment of 1 October 1982, Series A No. 53, p. 14 et seq. para. 30).   46.      In the Commission's opinion, if an accused is heard by a District Attorney, who may order detention, and later in the trial risks again to be confronted with the same person, now as the opponent who is prosecuting the accused, the public are entitled to fear that, when remanding the accused into custody, the District Attorney does not offer sufficient guarantees of independence, as required by Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.   47.      In the present case, the District Attorney concerned was likely to, and indeed did, become one of the parties to the proceedings.   It follows that he lacked the required independence when hearing the applicant upon her arrest.   48.      Consequently, the Commission finds that the District Attorney cannot be considered an "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the meaning of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.           Conclusion   49.      The Commission concludes, by 12 votes to 2, that there has been a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention in that the applicant, upon her arrest and detention, was not brought before an "officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power" within the meaning of this provision.       Secretary to the Commission      Acting President of the Commission               (H.C. KRÜGER)                        (J.A. FROWEIN)           &-OPINION CONCURRENTE DE M. H. VANDENBERGHE&S                   Pour arriver à la conclusion de la violation de l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention, la Commission, se référant à la jurisprudence développée par la Cour dans l'arrêt Schiesser et suivie ultérieurement, constate aux par. 44 et svts que le procureur de district zurichois qui a ordonné l'arrestation de la requérante a, par la suite, également dressé l'acte d'accusation.   Elle en déduit que le procureur manquait d'indépendance envers la requérante au moment de l'arrestation et ne répondait donc pas aux critères exigés à l'article 5 par. 3.           Je suis au regret de constater que je ne puis suivre cette argumentation a posteriori.   Il me semble que c'est au moment de l'arrestation qu'on doit pouvoir contrôler si la décision a été prise par un magistrat qui satisfait aux conditions posées par l'article 5 par. 3.   Une circonstance de fait dépendant du déroulement postérieur de la procédure pénale, circonstance qui n'est donc pas accessible au moment de la décision de l'arrestation, ne me semble pas rentrer en ligne de compte pour ce contrôle.           A l'instar de la Commission, je suis d'avis qu'il y a violation de l'article 5 par. 3.   En ce qui concerne la motivation, je me réfère à l'opinion dissidente exprimée par le Président Ryssdal dans l'arrêt Schiesser où il déclare : "Un principe fondamental commande de séparer poursuite et pouvoir judiciaire.   Selon moi, il vaut également pour l'interprétation de l'article 5 par. 3 et au sens de ce texte un magistrat qui agit comme autorité de poursuite ne peut passer pour un 'magistrat habilité par la loi à exercer des fonctions judiciaires' "(Cour eur.   D.H., arrêt Schiesser du 24 octobre 1989, Série A no 34, p. 19 et svt).           Je voudrais ajouter que dans la mesure où le parquet est uni et indivisible, la réponse à la question de savoir si c'est la même personne qui a ordonné l'arrestation et a, par la suite, prononcé l'acte d'accusation, ne me semble pas pertinente sur le point organique.   &-OPINION DISSIDENTE DE M. F. MARTINEZ&S     1.       A mon très grand regret je ne peux pas suivre la majorité de la Commission dans son raisonnement.           La Commission trouve que le cas d'espèce se distingue de l'affaire Schiesser dans le fait que le procureur de district qui a ordonné l'arrestation a, par la suite, également dressé l'acte d'accusation.   Et elle en déduit que la détention provisoire qu'il a ordonnée n'aurait pas été conforme à l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.           Je ne saurais être d'accord avec une telle analyse.   2.       Mon point de départ est l'arrêt Schiesser, dans lequel la Cour européenne examine le statut du procureur de district zurichois pour conclure qu'il répond bien à la notion de "magistrat habilité par la loi" prévue par l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.           Certes, la Cour dit, en examinant le rôle du procureur dans l'affaire Schiesser, qu'il n'avait ni rédigé l'acte d'accusation ni exercé la poursuite devant les juges du fond.   Mais je ne pense pas que, dans les circonstances de notre cas d'espèce, le simple fait que le procureur ait dressé l'acte d'accusation puisse avoir le poids nécessaire pour faire adopter une position autre que celle prise par la Cour dans son arrêt.           D'une part, je crois que la doctrine de l'arrêt Schiesser demeure solide sans le soutien du membre de phrase "he neither drew up the indictment" (par. 34 de l'arrêt), que la Commission a estimé être la clef de voûte.   A mon avis cette seule circonstance ne suffit pas à contrecarrer l'ensemble de tous les autres éléments pris en considération par la Cour.           D'autre part, il me semble important de souligner certaines circonstances concrètes qui - je le pense - enlèvent beaucoup de poids au fait que le même procureur a dressé l'acte d'accusation.   Ce sont les suivantes :       a)   Le procureur accorde la mise en détention provisoire le         11 août 1983, la révoque le 19 août 1983 et ne dresse l'acte         d'accusation que le 12 octobre 1984, soit quatorze mois plus         tard.       b)   Il n'a jamais été requis contre la requérante une peine         privative de liberté, mais seulement une amende.       c)   Le procureur en question n'a pas exercé l'accusation pendant         la procédure au fond.       d)   On ne peut imaginer aucun avantage que la requérante aurait pu         tirer du fait que l'acte d'accusation aurait été signé d'un         autre procureur, par exemple celui qui a exercé l'accusation         pendant la procédure par devant les juges du fond.   3.       Cela dit, il me faut constater qu'il existe une certaine analogie entre la position qu'a prise le procureur de Zurich et celle d'un juge d'instruction français.   Celui-ci statue sur la détention provisoire et dresse aussi l'acte d'accusation.   Car il n'y a pas de   différence fondamentale entre l'acte d'accusation du procureur zurichois et l'ordonnance de renvoi du juge d'instruction français. Et personne n'a songé à contester que le juge d'instruction français peut remplir le rôle mentionné à l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.   4.       La conclusion de la Commission rend extrêmement difficile la structure juridique de la violation qu'elle trouve, parce qu'à l'origine existe un acte valable selon l'arrêt Schiesser : l'intervention du procureur de district du 11 août 1983.   Ce n'est que plus d'une année aprés - le 12 octobre 1984 - que l'acte, valable à l'origine, devient violateur de la Convention, parce que le même procureur - et non l'un de ses collègues - dresse l'acte d'accusation pour requérir une peine d'amende.           Mais comment envisager à bon droit cet effet rétroactif ?           S'agirait-il dès l'origine d'un acte constituant une violation soumise à la condition suspensive que le même procureur dresse plus tard l'acte d'accusation ?   S'agirait-il d'un acte en principe conforme à la Convention mais sous condition résolutoire ?   5.       Serait-il raisonnable d'avoir un délai d'incertitude - quatorze mois dans notre cas - sans vraiment savoir s'il existera ou non une violation de l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention ?           Il ne me semble pas que cette situation puisse se concilier avec le principe de sécurité juridique.           Et pourtant la sécurité juridique est inhérente au fonctionnement de la Convention.           Une publication de la Convention préparée au sein du Conseil de l'Europe est assortie d'un avant-propos dans lequel on peut lire ceci:           "La Convention européenne des Droits de l'Homme constitue la garantie collective sur le plan européen de certains des principes énoncés dans la Déclaration universelle des Droits de l'Homme, renforcée par un contrôle international judiciaire dont les décisions doivent être respectées par les Etats." (C'est moi qui souligne).           Ainsi les arrêts de la Cour européenne guident les Etats membres pour leur dire ce qu'ils peuvent faire et ce qu'ils doivent éviter pour respecter leurs engagements vis-à-vis de la Convention.           La Cour européenne a dit à la Suisse dans l'arrêt Schiesser que la détention ordonnée par le procureur de Zurich était conforme à l'article 5 par. 3 de la Convention.   La Suisse a ainsi reçu un gage de sécurité de la part de la Cour européenne, au point que le Tribunal fédéral a fait état de cette sécurité dans l'arrêt qu'il a rendu le 24 novembre 1986 sur le recours de droit public introduit par la requérante.           Je pense donc que notre Cour européenne, pour ébranler la sécurité qu'elle-même a donné à la Suisse, aurait besoin d'un argument beaucoup plus fort que la simple signature de l'acte d'accusation (pour requérir une peine d'amende) par le même procureur qui, quatorze mois auparavant, avait ordonné la détention provisoire et ensuite la mise en liberté de la requérante.       &-DISSENTING OPINION OF Mrs.   J. LIDDY&S                     I consider that the course which the proceedings actually took at domestic level in relation to the District Attorney's exercise of his powers and consequently the facts as established in the present Report provide an insufficient basis for distinguishing the present case from the Schiesser case (Judgment of 4 December 1979, Series A no. 34), particularly taking account of the considerations set out in Mr.   Martinez' dissenting opinion.   Accordingly, I was unable to join the majority and have voted for no violation of Article 5 para. 3 of the Convention.     .IG ***         &-APPENDIX I&S     HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS             Date                     Item   ----------------------------------------------------------------------   27 February 1987         Introduction of the application   13 March 1987            Registration of the application   Examination of admissibility   7 October 1987           Commission's decision to invite                         the Government to submit observations                         on the admissibility and merits of the                         application   18 December 1988         Government's observations   13 April 1988            Applicant's observations in reply   9 July 1988              Commission's decision to declare                         the application partly admissible   Examination of the merits     6 October 1988          Government's supplementary observations   10 December 1988         Commission's consideration of the state                         of proceedings   10 April 1989            Commission's deliberations on the merits                         and final vote and adoption of the Report