CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 avril 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF     Application No. 12391/86 by John DI STEFANO against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 13 April 1989, the following members being present:                   MM.   S. TRECHSEL, Acting President                      F. ERMACORA                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                 Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                   Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 14 October 1985 by John DI STEFANO against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 August 1986 under file No. 12391/86.           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows: THE FACTS           The applicant is an Italian citizen born in 1955 and resident in Cambridge.   The applicant is represented by the Legal Department of United Air Travel (Services) Ltd.   The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.           On 19 June 1984, the applicant was arrested on a charge of fraud.   He was released on bail.   On 21 August 1984, the applicant was arrested again and charged with offences committed in July and August 1984.   His solicitor was informed of his arrest that day and was present when the police searched the applicant's home and her own office under warrant.   The applicant appeared before the Magistrates Court the same day.   The police asked for conditions of bail to ensure his future attendance since they feared he would abscond.   These conditions included surrender of his passport, reporting to the police station and £15,000 bail.   The applicant however could not fulfil these conditions and remained in police custody.           The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices on 23 August 1984.   The notes of the court clerk record that the charge which the applicant faced was a holding charge.   The Detective Inspector in court gave an assurance that a decision on the substantive charges would be made next day and the applicant brought to court again as soon as possible.   The Detective Inspector is also recorded as explaining that the applicant had been arrested with others in connection with a worldwide fraud and that he had refused access to the applicant by his solicitor as that could prejudice his enquiries.   The Court granted bail subject to conditions.   Since these conditions were not fulfilled, the applicant was retained in custody until 24 August 1984, when a full bail application was made on his behalf by a legal representative.   The application was refused.           In September 1984, a bail application before Mr.   Justice Otten was adjourned and in November 1984, bail was subsequently refused when the police informed the judge that the applicant was part of organised crime with connections in the United States and that they feared that he might abscond.           In February 1985 the applicant was committed for trial without another application for bail being heard.   In March 1985, a bail application was heard in the Central Criminal Court but refused. Following a complaint by the applicant that remand in custody for such a long period was oppressive and illegal, it was ordered by Mr.   Justice John Owen that his trial date be fixed for 23 September 1985.   The prosecution applied unsuccessfully to break the fixture in May 1985.   In June 1985, a bail application failed following an allegation by the prosecution that the applicant had written to prosecution witnesses offering money to them in return for failing to appear.   The letters however were not produced in Court.           Further bail applications were refused by Mr.   Justice Tudor Price on 2 August, 8 August and 28 August 1985 on the grounds that the trial was fixed for September.   The prosecution did not inform the Court that an application was to be made to the Court to postpone the trial.   On 6 September 1985, the prosecution informed the Court that they wished to join another defendant to the indictment and that this person was awaiting "extradition" in Gibraltar.   The judge ordered the trial to be postponed to the Spring.         On 20 September 1985, the applicant applied for bail once more.   The applicant alleges that, when the judge appeared willing to grant bail, the prosecution stated that they preferred in such circumstances to proceed without waiting for the "extradition" to be completed.   The trial was subsequently fixed for November 1985.   The trial began on 13 November 1985 and lasted until 19 March 1986, the indictment against the applicant containing 11 counts of fraud.   The trial involved over 100 witnesses and approximately 3,000 pages of documents.           The applicant was convicted on 19 March 1986 of three counts and acquitted of the rest.   He was sentenced to a total of five years' imprisonment: fraudulent trading (2 years imprisonment), conspiracy to obtain property by deception (3 years) and obtaining £80,000 by deception (18 months concurrent to the first two consecutive sentences).   On 14 August 1986, he was granted leave to appeal against conviction.   His appeal was heard on 27 January 1987 but was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.     COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that, by the time his trial was concluded, he had been in custody for almost 19 months.   The applicant contends that this is an unreasonable time to be held in custody awaiting trial and invokes Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   He contends that the police allegations against him were false, and that since his family were settled in England, there would have been no risk that he would abscond.           The applicant also complains that on his arrest he was refused access to his lawyer or the Italian consulate.   He alleges that he was not allowed to see a solicitor from 21 to 24 August 1984 and that he did not in fact see a solicitor until after his bail application on 24 August had been refused and he had been remanded in custody.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 14 October 1985 and registered on 27 August 1986.   On 13 July 1987, the Commission decided to invite the respondent Government to provide information on the application pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (a) of the Commission's Rules of Procedure.   The Government submitted the information on 8 September 1987 and the applicant submitted his comments in reply on 11 October 1987.           The Commission considered the admissibility of the application on 9 March 1988 and decided to invite the Government to submit observations on the admissibility and merits of the applicant's complaint of refusal of access to his solicitor.   The Government submitted their observations on 13 May 1988 and the applicant submitted his observations in reply on 20 July 1988 after a one month extension of the time-limit.           On 10 March 1989, the Commission again examined the admissibility of the application and decided to adjourn its examination. SUBMISSIONS OF THE PARTIES   A.       The respondent Government   1.       The facts           The applicant was the Director and Controller of a company called Mastbid Limited.   Whilst the company was insolvent from May to June 1984 the applicant purchased by deception video tapes valued in excess of £500,000.   This was the offence of fraudulent trading for which he was arrested on 19 June 1984 and later granted bail.   Between July and August 1984 the applicant with others operated an organisation which purported to be a bank and was also known as Mastbid Limited.   The applicant and his associates circulated banking documentation throughout Western Europe, the Far East and the United States of America.   The face value of the documentation was in excess of £25 million; and the eventual loss to customers was put at between 2 and 3 million US dollars.   The applicant was arrested in respect of these offences in August 1984 and remained in custody until his conviction.           The applicant was arrested at 11.40 on 19 June 1984 and taken to Wood Street police station in the City of London.   His custody record shows that on that date he was permitted to telephone his solicitor, Miss Robinson, at 22.50.   He received a visit from his solicitor at 10.40 on 20 June and made a comprehensive statement to the police in the presence of his solicitor between 10.50 and 14.50 on that day.   The applicant was charged at 21.41 on 20 June and remained in custody until his appearance before the Guildhall Justices at 9.00 on 21 June.           It was necessary to delay giving permission for the applicant to contact his solicitor on 19 June because, during that period, other persons suspected of involvement in the crime were being arrested and premises suspected of containing material evidence were being searched. It was feared that knowledge of the applicant's arrest could have led to suspects absconding and evidence being destroyed.           On 21 August 1984 at 17.05 the applicant was arrested in connection with offences of obtaining property by deception and conspiracy.   His solicitor, Miss Robinson, was informed of his arrest at 20.00 on that day.   She was present when, at 20.10 that evening, the applicant's home was searched by police acting under a warrant. Immediately following the search of the applicant's home, Miss Robinson's office was also searched under a warrant and property relating to the crimes was seized.           The applicant was brought before the Guildhall Justices at 10.10 on 23 August 1984, when he was remanded back into police custody until he could meet the conditions of his bail.   He was permitted access to his solicitor while he was at the Guildhall court.   He appeared before the justices again on 24 August, when he was further remanded into prison custody until 30 August.           Notwithstanding the note taken by the clerk of the court, Detective Inspector's recollection remains that the applicant's solicitor was not denied access to him between 20 and 23 August 1984. There is no police record which supports the applicant's solicitor's contention in this respect.   The applicant must have had legal advice by 24 August because he was legally represented when an application for bail was made on that day.   2.       Domestic law and practice           The law governing the right of access to legal advice for persons in custody is now contained in Section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.   That Act came into force on 1 January 1986.   However, the events in issue in this application took place in 1984, and were accordingly not governed by the Police and Criminal Evidence Act.           At the relevant time a detained person's access to a solicitor was covered by the Judges' Rules.   These Rules, which related to the treatment of persons suspected of crime, were issued by the judges of the Queen's Bench Division in 1964.           The Rules are preceded by a number of principles, which are statements of the common law, against which the Rules are to be read. Paragraph (c) recalls:           "That every person at any stage of an investigation         should be able to communicate and to consult privately         with a solicitor.   This is so even if he is in custody         provided that in such a case no unreasonable delay or         hindrance is caused to the processes of investigation         or the administration of justice by his doing so."   3.       Admissibility and merits           The Government submit firstly that the fact that the applicant did not have access to his solicitor in relation to his bail application of 23 August 1984 could not in itself constitute a violation of the Convention.   In the Neumeister judgment, Series A no. 8, paras. 22-24, the Court, in relation to the principle of equality of arms inherent in Article 6 para. 1, did "not consider however that this principle is applicable to the examination of requests for provisional release".   (See also the Decision of the Commission on the admissibility of Application No. 6541/74, X v.   FRG, D.R. 1, p. 82). The Government accordingly submit that the provisions of Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c), which are specific applications of the principle set out in Article 6 para. 1, have no application to proceedings relating to the examination of requests for provisional release, such as bail applications.   In the circumstances, the fact that the applicant was not legally represented in relation to his bail application on 23 August 1984, and that such representation was not available until his next application on the following day, did not constitute a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (b) or (c) of the Convention.           Second, the Government submit that the reason recorded for the denial of access was sufficient, and that this did not affect the fairness of the applicant's trial, when the proceedings are taken as a whole.   The Government also note that the applicant has not complained that the trial which took place between November 1985 and March 1986 was itself unfair.   His complaint relates solely to the denial of access to a solicitor for three days in August 1984; it does not appear to be related to the fairness of the applicant's trial.         The reason recorded for the denial of access, namely that contact with his solicitor could be prejudicial to the police inquiries, was sufficient to justify the measure taken.   It was known that the applicant was involved with a number of others suspected of involvement in crimes involving substantial amounts of money.   The applicant's solicitor's office had been searched and property relating to the applicant's offences was seized.   In the circumstances, it is submitted that denial of access to a solicitor during the limited period in question was not a disproportionate measure, having regard to the aim pursued and having regard to the substantial amount of time that the applicant had to prepare a defence to the charges on which he was ultimately tried.           As regards the position under Article 6 para. 3 (b), it appears that when the applicant appeared in court on 23 August 1984 he was only subject to a holding charge.   Other charges may have been preferred on 24 August and possibly later.   Whenever the charges were preferred, the applicant would not have been aware of the full extent of the prosecution case against him until he was committed for trial in February 1985.   Although a defendant is made aware of the nature of the allegations against him when he is charged, it is only at the committal proceedings that he receives copies of the statements of witnesses who are to give evidence against him.   The greater part of the preparation of the applicant's case would have taken place between the committal in February 1985 and the start of the trial in November 1985.   Given that the applicant was, until 24 August 1984, detained only on a holding charge and could not therefore have known the greater part of the prosecution's case against him, it is difficult to see how denial of access to a solicitor during the period in question could have had any effect on the preparation of a defence to the charges which were the subject of the trial.   The Government therefore submit that denial of access to a solicitor between his arrest on 21 August and the second appearance in court on 24 August cannot have had any effect on the applicant's ability to prepare his defence, nor to defend himself at trial.           As regards Article 6 para. 3 (c), it appears that the applicant had access to legal assistance of his own choosing at least from 24 August when he did have the services of a lawyer to make a full bail application.   There is no suggestion that the applicant experienced any difficulties in obtaining legal assistance of his own choosing after the period 21 to 23 August 1984, or indeed at any other time before his trial started in November 1985.   As explained above, the greater part of the preparation of the applicant's case would have taken place in the period from February to November 1985.   In the circumstances, the Government submit that the applicant has failed to show that, if he was denied access to his solicitor from 21-23 August, this affected his ability to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing at his trial or at any stage of his preparation for that trial.   B.       The applicant   1.       The facts           While the applicant had access to a solicitor on 24 August 1984 when he was represented at a bail application, he was not permitted to speak to his solicitor before or during the application. He was only able to speak to the solicitor briefly after the application.   In such circumstances the bail application was bound to be jeopardised, the applicant not being in a position properly to instruct his legal advisers.   2.       Domestic law and practice   i)       The Judges' Rules           The main purpose of the Judges' Rules is to give guidelines as to when evidence may be deemed inadmissible by reason of having been obtained in potentially unproper circumstances.   Paragraph c of the Rules sets out a fundamental principle unaffected by the Rules.           The Judges' Rules were however established as guidelines without the force of law.   They are prefixed by a letter to the police force in general whereby the police officers are exhorted "to try to be fair" and "scrupulously to avoid any method which could be regarded as in any way unfair or oppressive".   ii)      Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984           The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 came into force on 3 January 1986.   Whilst it is conceded that at the time of the applicant's detention by the police that Act was not in force, it is submitted that its provisions are relevant in determining whether or not in the circumstances of this matter the police were justified in refusing access to lawyers for a period of some three days.   It is submitted that the Act is a valuable source in this regard because it codifies existing practice, and establishes the guidelines that the British Parliament recognises as constituting proper procedure.   In this respect it is based to some extent on the pre-existing Judges' Rules, and is relevant in providing a benchmark of approved practice against which the practice in the circumstances of this matter can be considered.   The relevant provisions of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act relied upon are set out below:           "58 (1)   A person arrested and held in custody in a police         station or other premises shall be entitled, if he so         requests, to consult a solicitor privately at any time.           (4)   If a person makes such a request, he must be permitted         to consult a solicitor as soon as is practicable except to         the extent that delay is permitted by the Section.           (5)   In any case he must be permitted to consult a solicitor         within 36 hours from the relevant time, as defined in         Section 41 (2) above.           (6)   Delay in compliance with a request is only permitted:                (a)   in the case of a person who is in police              detention for a serious arrestable offence; and                (b)   if an officer of at least the rank of              superintendent authorises it."         The applicant will submit that the enactment of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 evidences an approved code of practice, and that deviance from the code will constitute an unacceptable breach, and potentially a violation of a human right.   iii)     Criminal Law Act 1977           Section 62 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 provides:           "Where any person has been arrested and is being held in         custody in a police station or other premises, he shall         be entitled to have intimation of his arrest and of the         place where he is being held sent to one person reasonably         named by him, without delay or, where some delay is         necessary in the interest of the investigation or of         prevention of crime or the apprehension of offenders,         with no more delay than is so necessary."   3.       Admissibility and merits           The Government contend that the entitlement under para. 3 (c) of Article 6 to legal assistance is not an entitlement to such legal assistance for the purposes of bail applications, but is simply an entitlement to enable a proper defence to be prepared.   The applicant denies that such a construction is to be placed on the provisions of Article 6.   The decision in Neumeister simply concerns the proper construction to be placed on "equality of arms".   The applicant knows of no authority for the proposition that access to a lawyer may be refused when a bail application is pending.   However, even if the Government's interpretation of Article 6 is in this respect correct, the applicant was denied access to a solicitor altogether, and not merely for the purposes of the pending bail application.   The applicant was unfamiliar with police procedure and the provisions of the criminal law; his denial of access to a legal adviser coupled with his first period of imprisonment in police custody, constituted a severe violation of his rights, and jeopardised his ability adequately to prepare his defence.           The applicant denies that the reasons given for denial of access to a lawyer were sufficient and submits that the fairness of his trial was affected.   The reasons given for denial of access - that access "may be prejudicial to enquiries" - were vague and ambiguous. Reading between the lines of the Court record however, it is to be inferred that the involvement of "others" and the "worldwide" nature of the alleged offence may have been features thought by the police to warrant a denial of access.   The Government have submitted no evidence to substantiate their allegations that the applicant was involved with a number of others suspected of involvement in crimes concerning large amounts of money.   The applicant alone was charged and tried in relation to this matter.   The only connection with "worldwide" offences was the maintenance of accounts or connections with banking corporations in London, whose head offices are located overseas.   In the circumstances, it is almost impossible to meet the Government's submission that denial was justified for the reasons recorded, as it is far from clear what reason is relied upon.           The applicant submits that the reasons given on later occasions for the refusal of bail following an objection was by the police to the granting of bail were erroneous, misconceived or plainly wrong.         It is also suggested that the fact that the applicant's solicitor's office was searched in itself was reason to prevent the applicant from having access to that solicitor.   The applicant would not have insisted upon access to that particular solicitor, but simply required access to competent legal advice which was denied him.           The applicant submits that it is not for him to establish how a solicitor, had he had access to such a solicitor at an early stage, would have assisted him.   It is sufficient for him to establish that he was denied access in circumstances which establish a violation of his rights.   The applicant submits that a fair trial was thereby precluded and that had he had earlier access the outcome would have been very different.           The applicant submits that the primary basis of his conviction was the evidence of police officers Couling and Randall.   The police officers referred to alleged conversations, unsigned statements and alleged admissions made in the three day period of incommunicado.   The police notes of these conversations were not produced at the trial, and were alleged to have been lost.   The applicant submits that if he had been granted proper legal representation for the duration of those three days, evidence would have been available to the Court in a proper form on the basis of a note of the question and answer session.   Those notes would have shown that no admissions or other concessions were given by the applicant.   The applicant's counsel challenged the police evidence on the basis of breach of the Judges' Rules but with no success.   Moreover, the applicant submits that police officers seized a number of documents in the three day period and did not provide a proper receipt for those documents, thereby hindering the applicant's preparation of a defence.           The Government maintain that from 24 August 1984 full and free access was given to legal advice.   The applicant denies that full and free access to legal advisers was made available to him thereafter; it was only available to him on an intermittent basis.           The applicant submits that by reason of the refusal of access to a lawyer at an early and crucial stage in the proceedings, the applicant's trial was thereby prejudiced.   The applicant contends that the police conduct in maintaining him in communicado for a period of more than three days constitutes a prima facie breach of the Judges' Rules.   The Judges' Rules declare that everyone is entitled to communicate and to consult privately with a solicitor.   This was not permitted.   It is submitted by the applicant that "no unreasonable delay or hindrance" would have been caused to the process of investigation or the administration of justice by such access, and that the police have failed to prove that there was even a reasonable suggestion that such hindrance or delay would have thereby occurred. The applicant also submits that no intimation of his whereabouts was given to the solicitor of his choosing contrary to Section 62 of the Criminal Law Act.   It is also clear that the proper procedure as recognised in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was not observed.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains that he was prevented from contacting the Italian consulate and from seeing his solicitor during the first four days of his arrest.         The Commission has examined these complaints under Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c) of the Convention which provides that:           "Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following         minimum rights:           ...           (b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation         of his defence;           (c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance         of his own choosing or, if he has not sufficient means to         pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the         interests of justice so require..."           As regards his complaint concerning the Italian consulate, the Commission notes that the applicant has lived in England for many years and has apparently no difficulty with the English language. There is no indication that the applicant was in any way prejudiced in the criminal proceedings against him by the temporary refusal of access to the consulate.           As regards the applicant's complaint concerning access to his solicitor, the Commission first observes that the Convention does not expressly guarantee the right of an accused to communicate freely with his defence counsel for the preparation of his defence, though the fact that this right is not specifically mentioned does not mean that it may not be implicitly inferred from its provisions, in particular those of Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c).   The right for an accused to communicate with his lawyer has been recognised by the Commission as a fundamental part of the preparation of his defence.   However such a right to have conversations with one's lawyer and exchange confidential instructions cannot be said to be insusceptible of restriction (see e.g.   Can v.   Austria, No. 9300/81, Comm.   Rep 12.7.84, Eur.   Court H.R., Series A no. 96, p. 17 and Egue v.   France, No. 11256/85, Dec. 5.9.88, to be published in D.R.).           As held by the Commission in the Can case (loc. cit.), the guarantees enshrined in Article 6 para. 3 (Art. 6-3) are not an aim in themselves but must be interpreted in light of the general principle of fairness laid down in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           The Commission must therefore consider whether the restrictions imposed on the applicant's access to his solicitor were in conformity with these provisions of the Convention.           It appears that the applicant was held in custody from 17.05 p.m. on 21 August until 24 August 1984 without seeing his solicitor. The Commission recalls that the note of the court clerk records that the applicant had been refused access to his solicitor as the police feared that it could prejudice their enquiries.   The Commission notes in this regard that on 21 August 1984 the police had already searched the applicant's solicitors office under warrant concerning the offences with which the applicant was charged.           The period during which the applicant was denied access to his solicitor was comparatively short, at most two and a half days. Thereafter, he had the possibility for over one year prior to his trial to communicate with his solicitor and to prepare his defence. The applicant has not contended that he had insufficient contact with his solicitor to enable him to prepare his defence.           The applicant alleges, however, that during the short initial period in which he was denied access to his solicitor the police took certain documents and that at his trial, police officers referred to alleged admissions made by him during this period, which he could have refuted if his solicitor had been present to note his answers to police questioning.   The Commission finds however that these allegations, the latter of which is somewhat hypothetical, have not been substantiated.           In light of the above circumstances, the Commission finds that, on the facts of the case, the applicant has not established that the non-access to his solicitor during the initial period of two and a half days of detention prejudiced the preparation of his defence or the fairness of his trial.           The possibility of communicating with a lawyer at the initial stage of the proceedings may also be required by Article 6 para. 3 (c) (Art. 6 -3-c) of the Convention in respect of the important function which defence counsel may perform in challenging the lawfulness of any measures taken in the course of the investigations, and in particular, the legality of any detention.   The Commission notes in the present case however that on 24 August 1984 a full bail application was made to the Court on behalf of the applicant by his legal representative.           The Commission consequently finds no appearance of a violation of Article 6 para. 3 (b) and (c) (Art. 6-3-b, 6-3-c)of the Convention.           It follows that these complaints are manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant also complains of the length of his detention on remand prior to his trial.   He invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   The Commission has however examined this complaint under Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.           Insofar as relevant, Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention provides:           "Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the         provisions of para. 1, sub-para. c of this (Art. 5-1-c) Article         shall be ... entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release         pending trial.   Release may be conditioned by guarantees to         appear for trial."           The period, the reasonableness of which the Commission is called upon to consider, starts on the 21 August 1984, when the applicant was arrested.   The period ends on 18 March 1986, the date of the applicant's conviction.   Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) does not apply to the period subsequent to the conviction in first instance.   After the conviction the applicant was detained in accordance with Article 5 para. 1 (a) (Art. 5-1-a) of the Convention, which provides for "the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court" (cf.   Eur. Court H.R., Wemhoff judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A No. 7).   The relevant period therefore lasted almost nineteen months.         The applicant alleges that the length of his detention on remand exceeded a "reasonable time" as guaranteed by Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3).   Whether the length of detention pending trial is reasonable cannot be determined in abstracto.   It is primarily on the basis of the reasons stated in the decisions relating to applications for release and of the facts mentioned by the applicant in his appeals that the question of violation must be considered (Eur.   Court H.R., Neumeister judgment of 27 June 1968, Series A no. 8, p. 37, para. 5).           The applicant made numerous applications for release on bail during his detention but these were consistently refused.   It appears that, in opposing bail, the police relied on the gravity of the charges and also stated that the applicant had links with organised crime in the United States.   The police further relied on the risk that the applicant would abscond alleging that he had no ties with the United Kingdom.   The Commission notes in this regard that, while the applicant contends that he has strong ties with the United Kingdom since he and his family have been settled there for 20 years, the applicant is still an Italian citizen.   On another occasion, during the applicant's detention, the police informed the Court that the applicant had been making improper approaches to prosecution witnesses.           The Commission also notes that in the present case the charges against the applicant were of significant complexity.   The applicant was charged on 11 counts of fraud involving large sums of money.   The complexity of the matter is also indicated by the length of the trial, which appears to have taken four months, from 13 November 1985 to 19 March 1986, and involved 100 witnesses and over 3,000 pages of documents.   As regards the handling of the case by the authorities, the Commission notes that, although the police requested a postponement of the trial to Spring 1986 in order to join another defendant to the indictment, who was awaiting extradition from Gibraltar, the prosecution nonetheless allowed the trial to begin in November 1986 when it became apparent that on further delay the judge would grant the applicant bail.           The Commission finds that the reasons given by the authorities for refusing bail were relevant and sufficient to justify the applicant's continued detention, and that, the length of time in detention prior to trial was not unreasonable given the complex fraud charges in issue.   The Commission therefore concludes that there is no appearance of a violation of Article 5 para. 3 (Art. 5-3) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     Secretary to the Commission          Acting President of the Commission                (H.C. KRÜGER)                            (S. TRECHSEL)