CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 9 mai 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }    Application No. 12175/86     Patricia Hope HEWITT and Harriet HARMAN   against   the UNITED KINGDOM                         REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 9 May 1989)     - i -     TABLE OF CONTENTS     I.       INTRODUCTION         (paras. 1 - 13) ....................................     1 - 2             A.       The application                 (paras. 2 - 4 ) .............................      1           B.       The proceedings                 (paras. 5 - 8) ..............................      1           C.       The present Report                 (paras. 9 - 13) .............................      2     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS         (paras.   14 - 22)   ..................................    3 -   7           A.       The particular circumstances of the case                 (paras. 14 - 19 ) ...........................    3 -   5           B.       Relevant domestic law                 (paras. 20 - 22 ) ...........................    5 -   7     III.      OPINION OF THE COMMISSION          (paras. 23 - 60) ...................................    8 - 14           A.       Points at issue                 (para. 23) ..................................      8           B.       Article 8 of the Convention                 (paras. 24 - 43) ............................    8 - 11           C.       Articles 10 and 11 of the Convention                 (paras. 44 - 49) ............................   11 - 12           D.       Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction                 with Article 8                 (paras. 50 - 56) ............................   12 - 13           E.       Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction                 with Articles 10 and 11 (paras. 57 - 59) ....     14           F.       Recapitulation                 (para. 60) ..................................     14   APPENDIX I       :   HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ...............     15   APPENDIX II      :   DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ............   16 - 28     I.       INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.     A.       The application   2.       The first applicant, Ms Patricia Hope Hewitt, is a United Kingdom citizen, born in 1948, and resident in London.   She was General Secretary of the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) between September 1983 and May 1984.           The second applicant, Ms Harriet Harman, is a citizen of the United Kingdom, born in 1950 and resident in London.   She is a solicitor and a Labour Member of Parliament.           Both applicants are represented, in the proceedings before the Commission, by Ms Madeleine Colvin, Legal Officer, NCCL, and Mr.   Geoffrey Robertson, Q.C., of counsel.   3.       The application is directed against the United Kingdom.   The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr.   M. C. Wood, Foreign and Commonwealth Office.   4.       The case concerns the secret surveillance of the applicants by the Security Service and the consequent gathering and storing of information about them.   The applicants invoke Articles 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention.   B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced before the Commission on 4 September 1985 and registered on 22 May 1986.   On 2 December 1986 the Commission decided in accordance with Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of its Rules of Procedure to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to present before 16 March 1987 their observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application insofar as it raised issues under Articles 8, 10, 11 and 13 of the Convention.   Following an extension of the time-limit, these observations were submitted on 29 May 1987.   The applicants' observations in reply were received on 22 December 1987.   6.       The application was again examined by the Commission on 12 May 1988 when it was declared admissible.   7.       The parties were then invited to submit further observations on the merits by 5 August 1988.   After an extension of the time-limit the applicants submitted further observations on 19 December 1988.   No further observations were received from the Government.   8.       After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In the light of the parties' reactions, the Commission now finds that there is no basis upon which a friendly settlement can be effected.   C.        The present report   9.       The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:                 MM. J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A. WEITZEL                   J. C. SOYER                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C. L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES   10.       The text of this Report was adopted by the Commission on 9 May 1989 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   11.       The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is:   (i)     to establish the facts, and   (ii)    to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the Convention.   12.       A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's Decision on the Admissibility of the Application forms Appendix II.   13.       The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.       The particular circumstances of the case   14.      The first applicant was General Secretary of the NCCL between September 1983 and May 1984.   The second applicant was employed as a legal officer by the NCCL from 1978 until 1982.   15.       The NCCL is an unincorporated association which works to monitor and defend civil and political rights in the United Kingdom. Pursuant to its constitution, the NCCL is a non-party and non- denominational organisation.   In order to achieve its aims to uphold human rights the NCCL works inter alia by briefing and lobbying Members of Parliament, submitting evidence to official enquiries, conducting research and issuing publications, and taking test cases to local and international courts.   It sometimes sends impartial observers to monitor demonstrations as part of its function to defend the right of freedom of assembly but it does not sponsor or organise demonstrations.           As revealed by Ms Cathy Massiter, a former intelligence officer of one branch of the Security Service (MI5) on a television programme broadcast on 8 March 1985, and in an affidavit dated and sworn for the purposes of judicial review proceedings in another case, both applicants were placed by the Security Service in the category of "communist sympathisers" due to their prominent participation in the activities of the NCCL.           In her affidavit Ms.   Massiter states that the NCCL was classified as a communist controlled subversive organisation by the Security Service.   As regards the secret surveillance of the applicants, she states as follows:     "...   Harriet Harman has been on record with the security service since the period when she was an NCCL legal officer.   She has never been the subject of a telephone or mail intercept through the security services to my knowledge.   However references to her on other intercepts and contacts with individuals who were themselves the subject of such intercepts would usually find their way on to her file.   The file would be used as the basis for an assessment of Ms Harman when she became a parliamentary candidate.   Assessments of newly elected MPs are passed on to the Cabinet Office where there is information about the person concerned which might throw doubt upon their security fitness for inclusion on certain parliamentary committees requiring access to highly classified and/or sensitive information.   I did not see any assessment of Harriet Harman but I would think it unlikely that exclusion from any committees would have been recommended on the basis of her security service record.           In order to open a file on Harriet Harman the security service would have to find a category in which to place her.   She was clearly not a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain.   However she was legal officer for NCCL which had been assessed as a subversive organisation. The only category open in which to record her was 'Communist sympathiser'.   Although she was not a member of the Communist Party and there was not evidence that she was sympathetic to the Communist Party, bureaucratically this was the only appropriate category into which she could be placed.           Patricia Hewitt was recorded on the same basis as Harriet Harman.   As well as her NCCL connections she was also known to be living with a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain although he later left the party.   As in the case of Harriet Harman, up to the time of my leaving the security service Patricia Hewitt had not at any time been the subject to a security service initiated telephone or mail intercept.   She was however subject to the same 'indirect interception'.           If someone to whom Harriet Harman or Patricia Hewitt was talking was subject to an intercept then the tapes of the telephone conversation would be played to a transcriber. The transcriber receives a brief and does not transcribe irrelevant information.   Political information was generally transcribed and personal information might be transcribed. Everything which has been transcribed from an individual's conversation is on a linked supplementary file to that individual's file and a single copy of the entire transcript is kept and is not destroyed.   To the best of my knowledge and belief the transcriber would not necessarily have directions to respect doctor patient or lawyer client relationships or the sub judice rule.   The transcript would be sent to the desk officer who was responsible for the warrant.   If that officer saw the name of someone of interest to my desk they would pass that part of the transcript to me.   ..."   16.      Security service files were described by Ms Massiter as including the following material:           - fullest possible personal particulars of the individual (name, date and place of birth, addresses, occupation, employer and past employment);           - a photograph, usually taken from the individual's passport application;           - data from surveillance by local police special branch in the area where he or she lives;           - press reports relating to the individual's activities and political views;           - references to the subjects in telephone or mail intercepts operating against other individuals or organisations;           - references to the subject in agents' reports.     17.      The applicants allege that surveillance of both applicants was continued after they had left the NCCL on the basis that they were candidates for elected office.   18.      The above allegations are neither confirmed nor denied by the respondent Government.   They point out that the policy of successive governments of the United Kingdom is not to disclose information about the operations of the security service or to comment on particular allegations.   19.      By a letter dated 21 February 1985 the second applicant wrote to the Prime Minister (Mrs Margaret Thatcher) seeking confirmation that she had been subject to surveillance and also seeking access to her file.   Her request was rejected in a letter dated 11 March 1985. By a letter dated 29 March 1985, addressed to the General Secretary of the NCCL, the Home Secretary declined to order an enquiry into the matters of which the applicants complain and failed to provide an assurance that they are, or the NCCL is, not a target of secret surveillance.   B.       Relevant domestic "law" and practice   20.      The Security Service was established and exists for the exclusive purpose of the defence of the Realm.   The activities of the Security Service are governed by the published Directive of the Home Secretary to the Director-General of the Service, a Crown Servant, dated 24 September 1952 ("the Directive") as follows:   "1.   In your appointment as Director-General of the Security Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary personally.   The Security Service is not, however, a part of the Home Office.   On appropriate occasion you will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister.   2.   The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country.    Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to the State.   3.   You will take special care to see that the work of the Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task.   4.   It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole.   5.   No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Government Department unless you are satisfied that an important public interest bearing on the Defence of the Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.   6.   You and your staff will maintain the well-established convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issue on which guidance is sought."   21.      Members of the Security Service are public officials but unlike, for example, police officers, immigration officers or officers of HM Customs and Excise, they have conferred on them no special powers whether under any law or by virtue of the Directive.   Members of the Service are Crown Servants, subject to the disciplinary control of the Crown but are otherwise in no position different from private citizens.   Their activities are constrained by the criminal law and the law of torts in the same way as the activities of citizens generally are so constrained.   Thus, if they carry out or engage in matters which it is unlawful for citizens generally to carry out or engage in, it is likewise unlawful for them to do so and they would thereby be liable to be proceeded against for any offence which was thereby committed, or liable in any civil proceedings in respect of any tort which had resulted.   22.      From June to September 1963 Lord Denning, one of the then most senior Judges of the Supreme Court, at the request of the Prime Minister, undertook an examination of the operation of the Security Service in the light of the resignation of the then Secretary of State for War.   At paragraph 239 of his Report dated 16 September 1963 (Cmnd. 2152), Lord Denning, after hearing a considerable body of evidence, found general approval that the Directive embodied the correct principles, which principles (inter alia) he summarised as follows:   "(1) The Head of the Security Service is responsible directly to the Home Secretary for the efficient and proper working of the Service and not in the ordinary way to the Prime Minister.   (2) The Security Service is, however, not a department of the Home Office.   It operates independently under its own Director-General, but he can and does seek direction and guidance from the Home Secretary, subject always to the proviso that its activities must be absolutely free from any political bias or influence.   (3)   The function of the Security Service is to defend the Realm as a whole from dangers which threaten it as a whole, such as espionage on behalf of a foreign Power, or internal organisations subversive of the State.   For this purpose, it must collect information about individuals, and give it to those concerned.   But it must not, even at the behest of a Minister or Government Department, take part in investigating the private lives of the individuals except in a matter bearing on the Defence of the Realm as a whole.   (4)   The Head of the Security Service may approach the Prime Minister himself on matters of supreme importance and delicacy, but this is not to say that the Prime Minister has any direct responsibility for the Security Service.   He has certainly none in day-to-day matters.   It would be a mistake for the Prime Minister to take such responsibility because he cannot in practice exercise adequate supervision, and he has not the secretariat for the purposes."     III.     OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.       Points at issue   23.      The following are the principal points at issue in the case:           - Whether the surveillance of the activities of the applicants by the Security Service and the consequent compilation and retention of information concerning their private lives constituted a violation of their right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention;            - Whether the above actions of the Security Service constituted a violation of the applicants' right to freedom of expression contrary to Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention;           -   Whether the above actions of the Security Service constituted a violation of the applicants' right to freedom of association contrary to Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention;            -   Whether there exists an effective remedy under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of the applicants' complaints under Articles 8, 10 and 11 as required by Article 13 (Art. 8, 10, 11, 13) of the Convention.   B.       Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention   24.      The applicants complain that they were the subject of secret surveillance by the Security Service and that information concerning their activities was compiled and retained by the Security Service. They claim that, by reason of their association with the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL), they were classified as "subversives" and "communist sympathisers" by the Security Service. They contend that the above actions of the Security Service constitute an unjustified interference with their right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   25.      Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:   "1.       Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.   2.       There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."   26.      The Government, in line with their policy of not disclosing information about the operations of the Security Service, have neither confirmed nor denied the applicants' allegations.   27.      The Commission recalls that the storing of information concerning a person's private life in a secret police register amounts to an interference with the right to respect for private life as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Leander judgment of 26 March 1987, Series A no. 116, p. 22 para. 48).   It follows that secret surveillance activities for the purpose of gathering and storing on file information concerning a person's private life also constitutes an interference with this right (see, mutatis mutandis, Eur.   Court H.R., Klass judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28;   Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82).   28.      A question arises as to whether the evidence before the Commission as to the compilation and retention of information concerning the applicants' private lives leads to the conclusion that there has been an interference with their right to respect for private life.   29.      The Commission recalls that "an individual may, under certain conditions, claim to be a victim of a violation occasioned by the mere existence of secret measures - without having to allege that such measures were in fact applied to him" (Eur.   Court H.R., Klass Judgment of 6 September 1978, Series A no. 28, p. 18 para. 34).   30.      The Court in the Klass case added that the relevant conditions were "to be determined in each case according to the Convention right or rights alleged to have been infringed, the secret character of the measures objected to, and the connection between the applicant and those measures" (ibid.).   31.      Similarly, in the Malone case, the Court agreed with the Commission that the existence of laws and practices permitting and establishing a system for effecting secret surveillance amounted in itself to an interference with the applicant's rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, apart from any measures actually taken against him (Eur.   Court H.R., Malone judgment of 2 August 1984, Series A no. 82, p. 31 para. 64).   32.      The Commission does not consider that this case-law can be interpreted so broadly as to encompass every person in the United Kingdom who fears that the security service may have compiled information about them.   The Commission, however, considers that an applicant cannot be reasonably expected to prove that information concerning his private life has been compiled and retained.   It is sufficient, in the area of secret measures, that the existence of practices permitting secret surveillance be established and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the security service has compiled and retained information concerning private life (see Application No. 12015/86, Dec. 6.7.88, to be published in D.R.).   33.      In the present case the applicants have submitted a detailed affidavit by a former intelligence officer of MI5 which indicates that the applicants were the subjects of secret surveillance by the Security Service because of their association with the National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL) and that the information gathered about them comprises inter alia information concerning their private life and is kept in records maintained by the Security Service.   34.      The Commission notes that the applicants do not allege that they were subjected to telephone or mail intercepts.   Nevertheless Ms.   Massiter's evidence states that they had been subject to "indirect interception", i.e. the recording of information about them which appeared in the telephone or mail intercepts of others.   35.      The interception and recording of such information, even though the applicants were not directly subject to interception, amounts in itself to an interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life and correspondence (see Eur.   Court H.R., Malone judgment, loc. cit., p.30 para. 64).   36.      Against the above background the Commission finds that the existence of practices permitting secret surveillance has been established and that there is a reasonable likelihood that the applicants were the subjects of secret surveillance and that the Security Service have compiled and retained information concerning their private lives.   It follows that there has been an interference inter alia with the applicants' right to respect for their private life under Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention.   37.      The Commission must next examine whether this interference is justified under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.   It must first determine whether the interference is "in accordance with the law".     38.      The Commission recalls that the phrase "in accordance with the law" includes requirements over and above compliance with the domestic law.   The "law" in question must be adequately accessible in the sense that the citizen must be able to have an indication that is adequate in the circumstances of the legal rules applicable to a given case. In addition, "a norm cannot be regarded as law unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct.   He must be able - if need be with appropriate advice - to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail." (See Eur.   Court H.R., Sunday Times judgment of 26 April 1979, Series A no. 30, p. 31 para. 49).   39.      The Court in the Malone case has further elucidated the concept of foreseeability and highlighted its importance as a safeguard against the arbitrary application of measures of secret surveillance.   The Court stated as follows (loc. cit., p. 32, para. 67):           "The Court would reiterate its opinion that the phrase 'in accordance with the law' does not merely refer back to domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law, which is expressly mentioned in the preamble to the Convention (see, mutatis mutandis, the [above-mentioned] Silver and Others judgment, p. 34, para. 90, and the Golder judgment of 21 February 1975, Series A no. 18, p. 17, para. 34).   The phrase thus implies - and this follows from the object and purpose of Article 8 (Art. 8) - that there must be a measure of legal protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by paragraph 1 (see the report of the Commission, paragraph 121).   Especially where a power of the executive is exercised in secret, the risks of arbitrariness are evident (see the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A no. 28, pp. 21 and 23, paras. 42 and 49).   Undoubtedly, as the Government rightly suggested, the requirements of the Convention, notably in regard to foreseeability, cannot be exactly the same in the special context of interception of communications for the purpose of police investigations as they are where the object of the relevant law is to place restrictions on the conduct of individuals.   In particular, the requirement of foreseeability cannot mean that an individual should be enabled to foresee when the authorities are likely to intercept his communications so that he can adapt his conduct accordingly.   Nevertheless, the law must be sufficiently clear in its terms to give citizens an adequate indication as to the circumstances in which and the conditions on which public authorities are empowered to resort to this secret and potentially dangerous interference with the right to respect for private life and correspondence."   40.      The Commission notes that the activities of the Security Service are governed by a Directive of the Home Secretary to the Director-General of the Security Service dated 24 September 1952. Although the Directive is published, it is not claimed by the Government that it has the force of law or that its contents constitute legally enforceable rules concerning the operation of the Security Service.   Nor does the Directive provide a framework which indicates with the requisite degree of certainty the scope and manner of the exercise of discretion by the authorities in the carrying out of secret surveillance activities.   41.      The Commission finds that in these circumstances the interference with the applicants' right to respect for private life was not "in accordance with the law" as required by Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.   42.      In view of the above finding, the Commission considers it unnecessary to examine whether the interference in the present case was necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.           Conclusion   43.      The Commission concludes, by 13 votes to 2, that there has been a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   C.       Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention   44.      The applicants have also complained of an interference with their freedom of expression as guaranteed by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.   They state that as a result of the secret surveillance they and those with whom they are in communication will be deterred from expressing their true opinions and beliefs.   In addition they submit that their future career prospects and political ambitions may be prejudiced by being labelled "subversive" by the Security Service.   45.      The Government submit that the applicants have at all times been free to express their opinions and have not substantiated their allegations.   46.      The applicants further complain of an interference with their right to freedom of association under Article 11 (Art. 11) of the Convention. They allege inter alia that, as a result of being classified as subversives, potential supporters of NCCL may have been inhibited from associating with the applicants.   47.     The Government contend that Article 11 para. 1 (Art. 11-1) does not guarantee a right of association in the sense described by the applicants and that, in any event, they have not substantiated their complaints.   48.      The Commission considers that the above complaints under Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention are based on the claim that the applicants were the subject of secret surveillance and that the Security Service has compiled and retained files of information relating to their private lives.   In the opinion of the Commission it is not necessary to examine these complaints separately in view of the above finding that these activities constitute a breach of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           Conclusion   49.      The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that it is not necessary to examine separately whether there has been a violation of Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention.     D.       Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 8         (Art. 13+8)   50.      The applicants complain under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention that there exists no effective remedy under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of their complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   51.      The Government have not commented on the applicants' complaint of a breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8) .   52.      Article 13 (Art. 13) provides as follows:        "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."   53.      This provision has been interpreted in the following way by the European Court of Human Rights in the case of Silver and Others (Eur.   Court H.R., Silver and Others judgment of 25 March 1983, Series A no. 61, p. 42 para. 113):           "(a) where an individual has an arguable claim to be         the victim of a violation of the rights set forth in the         Convention, he should have a remedy before a national         authority in order both to have his claim decided and,         if appropriate, to obtain redress (see the ...   Klass and         others judgment, Series A no. 28, p. 29, para. 64);           (b)   the authority referred to in Article 13 (Art. 13) may not         necessarily be a judicial authority but, if it is not,         its powers and the guarantees which it affords are         relevant in determining whether the remedy before it is         effective (ibid., p. 30, para. 67);           (c)   although no single remedy may itself entirely satisfy         the requirements of Article 13 (Art. 13), the aggregate of remedies         provided for under domestic law may do so (see, mutatis         mutandis, ...   X v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A         no. 46, p. 26, para. 60 and the Van Droogenbroeck judgment         of 24 June 1982, Series A no. 50, p. 32, para. 56);           (d)   neither Article 13 (Art. 13) nor the Convention in general lays         down for the Contracting States any given manner for ensuring         within their internal law the effective implementation of any         of the provisions of the Convention - for example, by         incorporating the Convention into domestic law (see the         Swedish Engine Drivers' Union judgment of 6 February 1976,         Series A no. 20, p. 18, para. 50).           It follows from the last-mentioned principle that the         application of Article 13 (Art. 13) in a given case will depend         upon the manner in which the Contracting State concerned         has chosen to discharge its obligation under Article 1         (Art. 1) directly to secure to anyone within its jurisdiction the         rights and freedoms set out in section I (see ...   Ireland         v. the United Kingdom judgment, Series A no. 25, p. 91,         para. 239)."   54.      The Commission recalls the above conclusion that there is a breach of Article 8 (Art. 8) in the present case.   Article 13 (Art. 13) is applicable in such a case.   55.      The Commission has not been informed of the existence of an effective remedy under the law of the United Kingdom in respect of the applicants' complaint under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   The Commission therefore finds that the applicants do not have an effective remedy as required by Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention.           Conclusion   56.      The Commission concludes, by 13 votes to 2, that there has been a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the Convention.   E.       Article 13 of the Convention in conjunction with Articles 10         and 11   (Art. 13+10+11)   57.      As regards the applicants' complaints of a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11), the Commission recalls that it does not consider it necessary to examine the complaints relating to Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) separately in view of the finding of a violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   58.      For the same reasons and in view of the above finding of a breach of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 (Art. 13+8), the Commission does not consider it necessary to examine separately the complaint relating to Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11).           Conclusion   59.      The Commission concludes, by a unanimous vote, that it is not necessary to examine separately the applicants' complaint of a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11) of the Convention.   F.       Recapitulation   60.      The Commission concludes           -   by a vote of 13 votes to 2, that there has been a            violation of Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention (para. 43            above);           -   by a unanimous vote that it is not necessary to examine            separately whether there has been a violation of            Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 10, 11) of the Convention            (para. 49 above);           -   by a vote of 13 votes to 2, that there has been            a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with            Article 8 (Art. 13+8) of the Convention (para. 56 above);           -   by a unanimous vote, that it is not necessary to            examine separately the applicants' complaint of            a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with            Articles 10 and 11 (Art. 13+10+11) of the Convention            (para. 59 above).     Secretary to the Commission           Acting President of the Commission           (H.C. KRÜGER)                            (J.A. FROWEIN)     APPENDIX I     HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS     ______________________________________________________________________   Date                             Item   ______________________________________________________________________       4 September 1985                Introduction of the application   22 May 1986                      Registration of the application   Examination of Admissibility     2 December 1986                 Commission's decision to invite                                 the Government to submit                                 observations on the admissibility                                 and merits of the application   29 May 1987                      Government's observations   22 December 1987                 Applicant's observations in reply   12 May 1988                      Commission's decision to declare                                 the application admissible.       Examination of the merits     9 June 1988                     Decision on admissibility transmitted                                 to the parties   19 December 1988                 Applicant's observations on the merits     9 October 1988     )             Commission's consideration of the 11 March 1989       )             state of proceedings     5 May 1989                      Commission's deliberations on the                                 merits and final votes     9 May 1989                      Adoption of the Report