CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 6 juillet 1989

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 14067/88                       by D. S.                       against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 6 July 1989, the following members being present:                 MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 21 June 1988 by D. S. against the United Kingdom and registered on 29 July 1988 under file No. 14067/88;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant, D. S., is a citizen of the United Kingdom born in 1959.   He is at present detained at HM Prison, Shotts, Lanarkshire.           The facts submitted may be summarised as follows.           The applicant was tried,   on charges of murder and assault by punching following a stabbing incident, before the High Court at Dunfermline on 7 August 1986.   The applicant had gone to his girl-friend's parents' house with a knife after she had indicated her intention of leaving him.   The door of the house was opened by his girl-friend's father and a fight ensued during which the father received at least three severe wounds from the knife held by the applicant, one of which penetrated a lung and was fatal.           The principal evidence against the accused was given by his girl-friend who stated that she saw the accused dragging the deceased by the hair outside the house.   She indicated that when she went outside she saw her father staggering towards the window and the accused running at him with a knife.   She further stated that she saw her father holding the accused's wrist with the knife in it.   Other evidence against the accused related to the nature and position of the stab wounds.   The applicant stated in his defence that he was attacked by his girl-friend's father and that the knife fell out of his pocket. He picked it up and in his attempting to fend him off he, without any intention to do so, stabbed him.   In his evidence to the court, the applicant stated inter alia that the stabbing was an accident.           The trial judge did not consider that self-defence was open to the applicant in these circumstances since it required a deliberate act by the victim of an attack for his own protection.   He did, however, allow the plea of self-defence in relation to the charge of assault by punching, since the applicant had indicated in his evidence that he punched his girl-friend's father in order to protect himself from the attack.   The jury found the applicant guilty of both charges by a majority verdict and he was sentenced to life imprisonment.           On an appeal to the High Court of Justiciary, the court considered that the trial judge had misdirected the jury and ought to have allowed the plea of self-defence to be considered.   The Court considered that the applicant's evidence had been ambiguous as to whether the stabbing was accidental or whether he was defending himself.           However, the Court found that in the circumstances of the case this could not have made any difference to the outcome and in any event there was no miscarriage of justice because:   (a) the trial judge in his direction reminded the jury of the applicant's evidence and his version of the events and informed them that if they believed such version or if they had any reasonable doubts as to its correctness, it was their duty to acquit him; (b)   the jury having rejected the question of self-defence in relation to the punching of the victim by the applicant and the quarrel which ended in the fatal stabbing of the victim by the applicant would not reasonably have accepted that such stabbing occurred in the course of self-defence.   COMPLAINTS           The applicant considers that he was not given a fair hearing as a result of the misdirection by the trial judge and that the appeal court ought to have ordered a re-trial.   He invokes Article 6 of the Convention.   THE LAW           The applicant has complained under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that he did not receive a fair trial.   In particular he complains that the trial judge was found to have misdirected the jury and that the High Court of Justiciary did not order a re-trial.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) first sentence of the Convention provides:   1.    In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.           With regard to the judicial decisions of which the applicant complains, the Commission recalls that, in accordance with Article 19 (Art. 19) of the Convention, its only task is to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the Parties in the Convention.   In particular, it is not competent to deal with an application alleging that errors of law or fact have been committed by domestic courts, except where it considers that such errors might have involved a possible violation of any of the rights and freedoms set out in the Convention.   The Commission refers, on this point, to its established case-law (see e.g.   No. 458/59, Dec. 29.3.60, Yearbook 3 pp. 222, 236; No. 5258/71, Dec. 8.2.73, Collection 43 pp. 71, 77; No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 pp. 31, 45).           In the present case there is no indication from the documents submitted by the applicant that the proceedings were unfair.   In particular the Commission notes that the High Court of Justiciary upheld the applicant's claim that the trial judge had misdirected the jury but found that in the circumstances of the case this could not have made any difference to the outcome since the applicant's version of the facts which constituted the basis of the applicant's defence was placed before the jury who were instructed to acquit the applicant if they believed such version or had a reasonable doubt as to its correctness.   In addition, the jury rejected the plea of self-defence in respect of the charge of assault by punching.           In these circumstances the Commission does not consider that the rights of the defence were prejudiced by the observation of the trial judge.   It follows that the application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE   Secretary to the Commission      Acting President of the Commission          (H. C. KRÜGER)                     (J. A. FROWEIN)