CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 février 1990

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }  AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF     Application No. 13228/87 by M. M. against the United Kingdom             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 13 February 1990, the following members being present:                   MM.   J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      A. WEITZEL                      J.C. SOYER                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                      G. BATLINER                      H. VANDENBERGHE                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 M.    C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                 Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                   Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission             Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 28 December 1985 by M.M. against the United Kingdom and registered on 24 September 1987 under file No. 13228/87;           Having regard to:        -   the reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure         of the Commission;        -   the written observations submitted by the respondent         Government on 31 August 1988 and the observations in         reply submitted by the applicant on 13 December 1988;        -   the submissions of the parties at the hearing of 13 February         1990;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The applicant is a British citizen born in 1954.   The facts as submitted by the parties may be summarised as follows.           The applicant gave birth in 1971 to her first child A. who suffered brain damage and is mentally and physically handicapped.   She subsequently married her first husband, Mr.   J., and had four daughters, B. born in 1973, C. born in 1974, D. born in 1978 and E. born in 1979.   The applicant left her husband in 1979 and began cohabiting with the man she was later to marry as her second husband, Mr.   K.   In 1980, she gave birth to a son F.   In 1981, another son was born but died in 1982.           The Lancashire County Council (hereafter the local authority) felt some concern with regard to the well-being of the applicant's children and between 1978 and 1982 the children were placed on the non-accidental injury list.   While over nine months pregnant with her eighth child, the applicant admits losing her temper with her daughter C. and hitting her with a belt.   The same day, 3 November 1982, the applicant who was suffering from pre-eclamptic toxoemia, was taken in to hospital and gave birth to a son G. Meanwhile, as a result of the incident with C. and another alleged incident with her daughter B., the applicant's six children were removed by the local authority under a Place of Safety Order on 3 November 1982 and care proceedings commenced.   The applicant was also unable to take her son G. home with her on leaving hospital.           The applicant was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily harm to B. and C.   She pleaded guilty and was made the subject of a probation order.           The applicant alleges that the local authority told her that if she agreed to five of her children remaining in care, she would be allowed to have the two youngest back.   The care proceedings under Section 1(2)a of the Children and Young Persons Act 1969 were heard by the Juvenile Court on 21 December 1982.   The magistrates found and the applicant apparently acknowledged that the children's "proper development was being avoidably prevented or neglected or their health was being avoidably impaired or neglected or they were being ill-treated".           Accordingly, five children A., B., C., D. and E. were made subject to care orders while F. and G., the two youngest, were allowed home under supervision orders.           The five children initially stayed in a children's home together.   D. and E. were moved to a foster home in May 1983. However, D.'s behaviour apparently proved unacceptable to the foster parents and in October 1983, D. was moved to another foster home.           In July 1983, the applicant applied to revoke the care orders.   The application was heard on four separate days between 4 November 1983 and 28 February 1984 by the Juvenile Court.   At the conclusion of the hearings, the care order in respect of A., her handicapped son, was revoked and he was allowed home under a supervision order.   The magistrates however maintained the care orders in respect of her daughters C., D. and E., and decided that B. should be made the subject of wardship proceedings so that her future could be considered by a higher court which had the power to allow her to return home under supervision.           On 8 March 1984 the applicant commenced wardship proceedings seeking the return of her children to her care and control.   All four daughters were made wards of court with the agreement of the local authority and the care orders made in respect of them were later revoked to enable the whole family to be considered together.   On 26 March 1984, the applicant was granted legal aid for representation in the wardship proceedings.           On 30 March 1984, Mr.   Furniss, the social worker Area Officer, filed an affidavit.   The affidavit included the two reports of 3 December 1982 and 6 September 1983 of Dr.   Bowers, the child psychiatrist instructed by the local authority in the care proceedings.   In his affidavit, Mr.   Furniss stated that the social workers involved with B., C., D. and E. had grown convinced that the children's best interests lay in permanent substitute homes.   He concluded that the two older girls had been badly emotionally damaged by the violence and arguments which they had witnessed and had on occasions lived in fear of the applicant's erratic personality.   He was equally convinced that it would be a major tragedy for D. and E. to return home.   Dr.   Bowers' report of 6 September 1983 stated that D. was a disturbed child and considered that the signs of improvement would be reversed if returned to the applicant.   He found that E. had become attached to the foster-mother and a return to the applicant would disrupt this bond and expose her to the deficiencies and distortions in the applicant's care of her children.           The District Registrar issued directions about the conduct of proceedings on 2 and 19 April 1984.   On 19 April 1984, the court awarded interim care and control of the children to the local authority and decided to invite the Official Solicitor to act as the guardian ad litem for the children.   The Official Solicitor accepted the role on 24 May 1984 and requested evidence from the local authority.   During this period, further evidence was also sought on the education and background of the children.   The local authority sought evidence from the police officers involved on the history of the matter but did not obtain their affidavits until July due to the absence of the officers during the miners' strike.           On 25 May 1984, the applicant's solicitors wrote to the local authority notifying them of their intention to serve an affidavit in reply but delaying doing so until receipt of further evidence from the local authority.           On 12 June 1984, Mr.   J.'s solicitor informed the Official Solicitor that Mr. J. intended to seek access to all four children and possibly care and control of C.           On 15 June 1984, Mrs.   Page, the social worker with responsibility for B., C., D. and E., filed her affidavit.   Mrs.   Page reported that the children were settling down well in foster-homes. D. was now with Mr. and Mrs. L. and was enjoying a loving secure relationship with them.   E. had also formed a close bond with her foster-parents, Mr. and Mrs. L.   She concluded that to return the children to the applicant would jeopardise the future security both of these children and of the children still living with the applicant.           On 15 June 1984, Mrs. Bullas, the social worker assistant involved with the family from 1977 to 1983 filed an affidavit in which she reviewed her past involvement with the applicant and her family and concluded with her opinion that the children could not possibly grow into emotionally secure adults if they returned home.           On 15 June 1984, the Official Solicitor reviewed the state of the case and decided to interview other interested parties.   On 27 June 1984, the Offical Solicitor wrote to Mr. J.'s solicitor seeking permission to interview his client.   On 3 July 1984, the Official Solicitor wrote to the local authority seeking further information and permission to interview social workers.           On 13 July 1984, an affidavit was filed by WPC Musker concerning the injuries sustained by B. and C.           On 23 July 1984, the applicant's solicitor indicated to the local authority that she intended to prepare the applicant's affidavit only when all the affidavits of the local authority were served.           On 14 August 1984, the Official Solicitor interviewed Mr. Furniss, Mrs. Page and Mrs. Bullas.   On 15 August 1984, he interviewed the applicant, Mr. K. and Mr. J.   On 16 August 1984, he interviewed B. and B.'s foster-parents, K. and K.'s foster-parents, D. and D.'s foster-parents and also E. and E.'s foster-mother.           On 17 September 1984, E.'s placement with her foster-family broke down and she was returned to a children's home.           On 21 September 1984, F. started a serious accidental fire at the applicant's home, forcing the family to move into temporary two bedroom accommodation.           At the end of September and beginning of October, a senior officer at the Official Solicitor gave further consideration to the case, in particular to further involvement of the child psychiatrist Dr.   Bowers, whom the applicant had stated on 13 June 1984 she was not prepared to talk to again.   A letter was sent on 19 October 1984 to the applicant's solicitors to ascertain the applicant's position.           On 19 and 20 October 1984, the Official Solicitor sought further information including a report from Mr.   Blunt, the social worker concerned with the applicant's family at home, and information concerning the applicant, Mr. J. and Mr. K.   He also notified the parties of his intention to seek a psychiatric assessment from Dr. Bowers.           On 29 October 1984, the applicant's solicitors informed the Official Solicitor that they had no objection to Dr. Bowers being approached but pointed out that his evidence was very strongly challenged before the Magistrates Court and that Dr. Miller had been called as a witness on behalf of the applicant.           On 19 November 1984, the applicant and Mr. K. filed their affidavits.           On 28 November 1984, the Official Solicitor sought information from the applicant's solicitors concerning Dr. Miller.   By a reply received on 28 December 1984, he was informed that the applicant would call Dr. Miller if his report was favourable.           On 24 December 1984, E. was moved from the children's home to join her sister D. at Mr. and Mrs. L.'s home.           From 3 to 9 January 1985, the senior officers at the Official Solicitor, reviewed the case.   They considered the Official Solicitor's draft report and discussed the difficult problem as to whether to proceed to trial or to instruct Dr. Bowers or a fresh independent psychiatrist, which would lead to delay.   It was decided to seek directions from the court on this point.           On 4 January 1985, social workers carried out foster-parent reviews of the L. family for D. and E. and on C.'s foster-parents.           On 6 January 1985, B. was placed with new foster-parents after breakdown of her previous placement.   B. later ran away from this foster-home on 10 February 1985 and returned to the applicant.           On 7 January 1985, the Official Solicitor wrote to the applicant's solicitor seeking a copy of Dr. Miller's previous report.           On 14 January 1985, the Official Solicitor issued a summons seeking the decision of the court as to whether the evidence of an independent child psychiatrist should be sought.           On 16 January 1985, the Official Solicitor consulted various parties concerning inter alia the question of psychiatric evidence. The local authority was in favour of updating Dr. Bowers' reports while the applicant's solicitor had "no firm view concerning the calling of psychiatric evidence".           On 16 January 1985, the Official Solicitor produced his first report and expressed the view that the wardship proceedings be heard at the earliest opportunity.   He reached the initial conclusion in his report that the children, especially D. and E. who would find re-adjustment difficult, should not return to the applicant.           On 18 January 1985, the District Registrar directed by consent order that another psychiatric report should be sought in order to assess the prospects of rehabilitation.   The Registrar also directed that the case should be listed for hearing not before 1 June 1985 and after the parties informing the Court of their readiness, the matter should proceed to trial.   On 6 February 1985 the Official Solicitor instructed a consultant child psychiatrist, Dr. Leslie, who undertook to report by May 1985.           On 25 February 1985, the applicant gave birth to a son H.           On 28 February 1985, the Official Solicitor sent further information and an update to Dr. Leslie.           On 1 March 1985, Mr. Furniss, the Area Officer social worker, filed a second affidavit answering the applicant's affidavit and dealing with recent events involving B.   Mrs. Bullas' second affidavit was filed on the same day.           During March, the applicant and her family returned to her home, repaired after the fire.   On 19 March 1985, Dr. Leslie visited the applicant and Mr. K. at home and also interviewed B.           On 2 April 1985, the Official Solicitor phoned the applicant's solicitor to explain that Dr. Leslie's report was expected by late May.   He agreed that the applicant needed time to prepare a report in reply and to seek a hearing in mid-July subject to the availability of witnesses.           On 9 April 1985, the applicant's solicitors wrote to the local authority suggesting mid-July as a possible hearing date and enquiring whether the local authority was ready and its witnesses available.           On 17 April 1985, Dr. Leslie visited C. and C.'s foster-parents.   On 26 April 1985, Dr. Leslie visited D. and E. at Mr. and Mrs. L.'s.   On 24 May 1985, Dr. Leslie notified the Official Solicitor by telephone that her report was completed in draft but that due to her and her secretary's absence would not be ready until June.           By letter of 5 June 1985, the local authority informed the applicant's solicitor that 15-19 July and 30 August would be convenient dates for them.           On 11 June 1985, Dr.   Leslie submitted her report, which recommended that B. remain at home, that the applicant's access to C. be increased with a view to rehabilitation and that D. and E. should remain with their foster-parents, access to them by the applicant being terminated.   Dr. Leslie gave her opinion on D. and E. as follows:           "D.           D. is a child who is insecure at present.   She fears         removal from her foster-parents to whom she has now become         deeply attached.   D. was four years old when the children         went into care and she is now seven.   A large part of her         life has therefore been spent away from her natural family         and it would be extremely risky to uproot her after all         this time and expect her to integrate back into her family         of origin, given the instability of its history, the known         conflicts especially with the maternal grandmother and its         large size.   Large family size is, of itself, a known risk         factor for psychiatric disorder.   It would therefore seem         to be in D.'s best interests to stay with Mr. and Mrs.   L.         on a long term basis.           E.           E. is at present less attached to her foster-parents         in view of the shorter period of time she has been there         but she appears to me to be very contented and pleased to         be with D.   E. has very little memory of any of her         life in her family of origin as she was only three when         she was taken into care.   Half of her life has now been         spent away from there.   E. is a child who should benefit         from the sustained attention and encouragement which she         will receive from the L.'s and which she will be         unlikely to receive were she to return home.   I would         therefore recommend that she too stays where she is on         a long term basis.           Access           In the case of D. and E. their needs are similar.   Their         father Mr. J. has waived his interests in access to them.         I have come to the view that the present access         arrangements are serving very little purpose for the two         younger children and may increasingly put a strain on the         placement.   I must stress that Mrs. L. has not suggested         that access is curtailed but her evidence that both girls         show some degree of strain exemplified by D.'s anxious         questioning and E.'s enuresis and withdrawal would suggest         that if the Court agrees that their home is to be with the         L.'s on a long term basis, access for the time being should         cease.   Links with the family of origin can be maintained         by means of cards, presents, exchange of photographs.         Access even as infrequently as four times a year might         only serve to confuse these two children if rehabilitation         is not being contemplated.   They are becoming aware of the         fact that their natural mother cannot accept the situation         and the attachments they must inevitably develop towards their         foster-parents if they are to become emotionally secure."           On or before 18 June 1985, the applicant's solicitor notified the Official Solicitor that her psychologist was not available in July and that they were quite happy to wait until after the long vacation for a hearing.           On 20 June 1985, the Official Solicitor wrote to the applicant's solicitor asking for views about listing the case for hearing.           On 25 June 1985, the Official Solicitor spoke to the local authority and applicant's solicitor by phone informing them that he hoped to seek a hearing in July.   The applicant's solicitor confirmed that the applicant's psychologist would not be available and that in any case the High Court list in Manchester was believed to be full.           On 26 June 1985, the Official Solicitor wrote to the Court proposing that the case be listed "at the earliest opportunity".           On 1 July 1985, the Official Solicitor filed his second report, which recommended that B. remain with the applicant subject to supervision, that C., D. and E. remain with their foster-parents, with reasonable access by the applicant to C. but no access to D. and E.           On 8 July 1985, the District Registrar ordered the matter to be set down for hearing at Manchester, estimated length of hearing two days.   On 9 July 1985, the Chief Clerk at Manchester District Registry sent the Court file to the civil Listing Office, "for hearing urgently as per ... letter from Official Solicitor".           By letter of 9 July 1985 to the Official Solicitor, the applicant's solicitor disputed the time estimated for trial and stated that the earlier hearing date would appear to be after 30 August 1985.           By letter of 17 July 1985 to the local authority and the applicant, the Official Solicitor referred to the parties being agreed that it was not practical for the matter to be heard that term.   He commented that he assumed that the matter would now be listed before Mr. Justice Ewbank in Manchester during November or December.           On 25 July 1985, the Official Solicitor sought an updated report from Mr. Blunt.           On 2 September 1985, B. made allegations of sexual abuse against Mr. K., which she later withdrew during questioning by the police.   On 25 September 1985, B. repeated the allegations to social workers and demanded to be taken into care.   B. was received into care with the applicant's consent.           On 30 September 1985, the case was reviewed by a senior officer at the Official Solicitor and the decision taken to notify Dr. Leslie of recent developments and request a further report.           On 24 October 1985, B. ran away from the children's home and returned to the applicant.   On 25 October, a Place of Safety Order was made in respect of B. who was placed in an assessment centre.           On 28 October 1985, the applicant filed an affidavit responding to the reports of the Official Solicitor and Dr. Leslie and defending Mr. K. against the allegations of sexual abuse.   The applicant filed a further affidavit the same day responding to the affidavits of Mr. Furniss, the police officer, Mrs. Bullas and Mr. J.           On 31 October 1985, the Court informed the parties of the provisional listing of the case for hearing on 26 November 1985.           On 4 November 1985, Dr. Leslie filed a second report dealing with the allegations of sexual abuse made by B.   In light of these developments, she recommended that B. and C. not be rehabilitated with the applicant.           On 12 November 1985, Mr. Blunt submitted his updated report expressing the opinion that the applicant should have had the opportunity to look after all the children but that the passage of time had rendered it unpractical.           On 12 November 1985, Mrs. Halliday filed a further affidavit recommending permanent fostering of D. and E. without access by the applicant.           On 20 November 1985, the applicant's solicitor serves Mr. Blunt's affidavit exhibiting his reports.           On 21 November 1985, the Official Solicitor filed a third report revising his recommendations in light of the alleged sexual abuse.   He now recommended that B.'s position be subject to further review, with access to B. and C. at the discretion of the local authority.           A full hearing took place before Mr. Justice Ewbank of the High Court on 26 and 27 November 1985.   The applicant was represented by counsel and solicitor.   Evidence was heard from Mr. Blunt, the applicant, Dr. Leslie, Mr. William McRobert (of the assessment centre where B. had stayed), Mr. K., Mrs. Page and Mr. Furniss.   The judge also saw B. alone in chambers.           The judge commented in his judgment on the time taken to bring the matter before him:           "The originating summons was issued on 8 March 1984 and         this hearing came to court on 26 November 1985.   There has         accordingly been a delay of over a year and a half from the         issuing of the originating summons and the hearing of the case         by a judge, and there is no sensible explanation for this         delay.   It should not have occurred, and it means that I now         have to deal with a very different situation from the         situation as it would have been if the case had been heard         much earlier."           After reviewing the history of the matter and the evidence submitted, the judge decided that B. should be allowed home on trial and that the applicant's access to C. be increased with a view to her returning home if B.'s return was a success.   He decided, however, that D. and E. should remain with their foster-parents and that the applicant's access be terminated.   He stated in his judgment with regard to D. and E.:           "D. and E. were also at the children's home to begin with,         and then they went to some people called W.   In October 1983,         however, D. had to be taken away from Mr. and Mrs. W. and went         to some people called L.   Then E.'s placement with <Mr. and         Mrs.   V.> broke down and she went back to the children's home,         but in December 1984 she joined D. with <Mr. and Mrs. L.> and         she has been there ever since; so D. has been with these         foster-parents for two years and E. for nearly a year.   These         two children are settled in their foster homes and they see         their mother only occasionally.           The mother would like to have all four children back.           I have read all the reports relating to D. and E. and it seems         quite clear to me that, whatever may happen to the two older         children, these two children are at last secure and stable in         their present foster home and, subject to the placement not         breaking down, will be best settled in their future childhood         by remaining with those foster-parents on a long term basis.         The mother, I have to say, has really nothing to offer these         two children in the future, and I am afraid that she will have         to accept the fact that they are going to make their home         permanently away from her."           The applicant was refused legal aid to seek counsel's advice as to whether grounds existed for appeal, though counsel did apparently indicate to the applicant's solicitors that there were no grounds.           B. returned to the applicant's home on 28 November 1985.           On 15 April 1986, the judge reviewed the position of B. and C. but made no change.   On 11 July 1986, the judge again reviewed the position and allowed C. to go home on trial.   On the application of the local authority, the judge gave leave for an application to be made to the High Court to free D. and E. for adoption.           D.'s and E.'s foster parents Mr. and Mrs.   L. applied to the local authority to adopt the two girls.   However on 1 January 1987, a 13 year old girl previously fostered by Mr. and Mrs. L alleged that she had been sexually abused by Mr. L.   The girl had been interviewed by a police officer and a social worker, who were convinced that she was telling the truth.   Mr. L. was subsequently interviewed by a social worker dealing with D. and E. and by a different police officer: they were both convinced by Mr. L.'s denials.           A meeting of the social services staff took place on 22 January 1987: the meeting was equally divided as to whether D. and E. should be removed from their foster home.   The matter was brought to the attention of the Official Solicitor who represented the two wards D. and E.   After a further meeting on 19 February 1987, the Social Services Department decided that the enormous damage which would be done to the two girls if they were moved again far outweighed the risks of future sexual abuse.   They therefore recommended to the High Court that the children be freed for adoption and that Mr. and Mrs. L. should be enabled to apply for an adoption order, a view supported by the Official Solicitor.   The applicant opposed the local authority's application and the local authority requested the Court to dispense with the applicant's agreement on the grounds that her consent was being withheld unreasonably.   The applicant had applied to the Court at the same time for care and control of D. and E. to be granted.           The Court directed that the applicant's application and the local authority's application should be heard at the same time. Following a hearing on 23-24 July 1987, the court granted the local authority's application to free D. and E. for adoption and dismissed the applicant's application.           In his judgment, Mr. Justice Ewbank found that events had confirmed the suitability of the children's placement and that the applicant had nothing to offer them.   He also reviewed the evidence as to sexual abuse and concluded as follows:           "...   I must look at the case against him <the foster father>         and I see how this stands up.   This depends on the nature         of the allegation, the impressions of the interviewer, my         assessment of the motives of the child which may lead to         a false allegation, and the character of the child.   I         have looked at all the matters and I find that the         allegations do not stand up.   On balance, I do not accept         them.   I thought that the foster father's evidence was         convincing.   I do not find that the foster father has         sexually abused V.   D. and E. are not at risk ...           ...   As regards the natural mother, she has never accepted         that the children should have been taken away.   She says she         has no intention of ever giving her consent and she knows         a lot more than others about sexual abuse, having been         raped by four men at the age of five.   She believes V. is         telling the truth.   She goes on to say that her other         children would like to see their sisters returned.   Her         position is different from the natural father's as she has         had more contact with the children.   It is however two years         since she has had access.   In my judgment a reasonable         mother would say: I have nothing to offer these children,         they are safe and secure in a good foster home and their         future lies with the foster parents.   So I dispense with         the mother's consent and am satisfied that a freeing order         would promote and safeguard the welfare of these children."           On 22 February 1988, the local authority applied for adoption orders in respect of D. and E.           On 25 April 1988, the applicant gave birth to another son, I.           On 23 November 1988, the Court granted the local authority's application for adoption orders, ordering at the same time that D. and E. cease to be wards of court.   RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE           The Family Division of the High Court has an inherent jurisdiction, independent of statutory provisions and deriving from the prerogative power of the Crown acting in its capacity as parens patriae, to make a child a ward of court.           The effect of wardship is that custody, in a broad sense, of the child is vested in the court itself; it assumes responsibility for all aspects of his welfare and may make orders on any relevant matter whatsoever, notably as regards the care and control of and access to the child and his education, religion or property.   In making such orders, the court is required to treat the child's welfare as the "first and paramount consideration" (Guardianship of Minors Act 1971, section 1).   Unless terminated earlier by order of the court, the wardship continues until the child attains his majority.           Where there are exceptional circumstances making it impracticable or undesirable for the ward to be, or continue to be, under the care of his parents, the court may make an order committing him to the care of the local authority (Family Law Reform Act 1969, section 7(2)), subject to the power of the court to give directions (Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, section 43(5)(a)).   In such circumstances, custody of the child remains with the court and it is for the court, and not the local authority, to take major decisions regarding the ward's future; it retains, inter alia, jurisdiction to make orders for access to the child.           Wardship proceedings may be instituted by anyone who can show an appropriate interest in the child's welfare.   An application for a wardship order has to be made by originating summons.   The child becomes a ward immediately the summons is issued but the wardship automatically lapses after 21 days unless within that time an appointment is made for the hearing of the summons.   This appointment is normally held before a registrar who, subject to an appeal to a judge, may give interim directions on such matters as access to the child and may decide that other interested parties be joined in the proceedings.           A judge will hear contested wardship proceedings and also applications - which can be made at any time by any party - for the variation or discharge of an existing wardship order or for directions on such matters as access to or the education of the child.   From the judge's order, an appeal lies to the Court of Appeal and thence, with leave, to the House of Lords.           The child may be represented in wardship proceedings by a guardian ad litem appointed by the court; this is usually the Official Solicitor, who is a full-time public employee entirely independent of the executive.   COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains that she has been refused access to and custody of her daughters D. and E.   She submits that she has never harmed either of them, while the daughter whom she had struck was returned to her within nine months of being placed in care.   She also complains of the delays in bringing the matters before the court which resulted in the judge deciding that D. and E. should remain in care.           The applicant further complains that D. and E. were freed for adoption by Mr. and Mrs.   L., the former of whom had had an allegation of sexual abuse made against him.           The applicant invokes Article 6 and Article 8 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 28 December 1985 and registered on 24 September 1987.           On 6 May 1988, the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations in its admissibility and merits pursuant to Rule 42 para. 2 (b) of the Rules of Procedure.           The observations of the respondent Government were submitted on 31 August 1988 after a six weeks extension in the time-limit and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 13 December 1988.           The respondent Government submitted supplementary observations and documents on 28 February 1989.   The applicant was granted legal aid on 12 May 1989 and by letter dated 11 July 1989 the applicant's solicitors submitted a further brief statement on behalf of the applicant.           On 6 September 1989, the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the application.           At the hearing, which was held on 13 February 1990, the parties were represented as follows:           The respondent Government           Mr.   M. C. WOOD, Agent, Foreign and Commonwealth Office         Mr.   M. F. BAKER, Counsel         Miss J.H. DRAPER, Department of Health         Mrs.   A. WHITTLE, Department of Health         Mr.   H.J. BAKER, Offical Solicitor's Department         Miss D.L. BROOKES, Foreign and Commonwealth Office           The applicant           Mrs.   S. HARLOW, Counsel         Mrs.   S. MELIA, Solicitor's clerk           The applicant was also present.   THE LAW           The applicant complains of being deprived of access to and custody of her daughters D. and E.   She complains of delays in bringing the matter before the High Court and invokes Articles 6 and 8 (Art. 6, 8) of the Convention.   1.       Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention           The Government have submitted that the applicant has failed to exhaust the domestic remedies available to her in respect of her complaints as to the delay in the wardship proceedings, in that she did not, for example, seek the court's directions as to expediting the procedure or setting a time table or apply for the hearing to be heard in London during the long vacation of 1985.           The applicant has disputed that these options were open to her or, if they were, that they would have been effective.           The Commission recalls that Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention only requires the exhaustion of such remedies which relate to the breaches of the Convention alleged and at the same time can provide effective and sufficient redress.   An applicant does not need to exercise remedies which, although theoretically of a nature to constitute a remedy, do not in reality offer any chance of redressing the alleged breach (cf. No. 9248/81, Dec. 10.10.83, D.R. 34 p. 78).           It is furthermore established that the burden of proving the existence of the available and sufficient domestic remedies lies upon the State invoking the rule (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Deweer judgment of 27 February 1980, Series A no. 35, p. 15, para. 26, Commission's decision No. 9013/80, Dec. 11.12.82, D.R. 30 p. 96, p. 102).           Having regard to the complexity of the proceedings, which involved four of the applicant's children and a considerable number of other parties, the Commission finds it open to doubt whether the measures suggested by the Government would have constituted an effective remedy which could have ensured the expedition of the proceedings.   Similarly, the Commission has not found it established that it would have been practicable or reasonable to have expected the applicant to seek a hearing of the matter in London during the long vacation, when it is not known for example whether the High Court judge to whom the matter had been reserved was available at that time. The Commission consequently considers that these factors are more relevant to the examination under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention of the role played by the conduct of the parties in the course of the proceedings.   The Commission accordingly is unable to accept that this aspect of the application be declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.   2.       Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention provides inter alia:           "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations         or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is         entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable         time by an independent and impartial tribunal established         by law."           In the present case, the applicant made her daughters wards of court and applied before the High Court in wardship proceedings for custody.   The Commission finds, in the light of previous case-law (see e.g. Eur. Court H.R., W. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 121, pp. 32-35, paras. 72-79, and H. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 8 July 1987, Series A no. 120, p. 58, paras. 68-69) that these proceedings involved the determination of the applicant's "civil rights" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   The C