CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 mai 1990

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 13441/87                       by Stig and Gun OLSSON                       against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 7 May 1990, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER                   J. CAMPINOS                   H. VANDENBERGHE              Mrs.   G.H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 23 October 1987 by Stig and Gun OLSSON against Sweden and registered on 3 December 1987 under file No. 13441/87;           Having regard to the reports provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having regard to the Government's written observations of 27 April and 14 September 1989 and the applicants' written observations of 13 June, 27 September, 6 and 13 October, 6, 16, 17 and 28 November, 6, 20 and 21 December 1989, as well as their letters of 25 and 31 January and 13, 21, 23 and 28 February, 29 March and 9 April 1990.           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.           The applicants are a married couple, the husband born in 1941 and the wife in 1944.   They are Swedish citizens and reside at Angered. Before the Commission they are represented by Mrs.   Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.           The applicants have three children: Stefan, born in June 1971, Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in January 1979.           The applicants' three children were taken into public care, pursuant to Sections 25 (a) and 29 of the 1960 Act on Child Welfare (barnavårdslagen), by a decision of the Social District Council No. 6 (sociala distriktsnämnden 6) of Gothenburg of 16 September 1980.   Since the applicants did not consent to the Council's decision, the matter was submitted to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Gothenburg and Bohus, which by a judgment of 30 December 1980 confirmed the Council's decision.   The basis for the care decision was that the health and development of the children were jeopardised as a result of the parents' inability to give them satisfactory care and education.   The Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Gothenburg, on 8 July 1981, confirmed the judgment of the County Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (regerings- rätten) refused leave to appeal on 27 August 1981.           After having been taken into care the applicants' children were placed in a children's home in Gothenburg.   From 28 February 1981 Stefan was placed in a foster home at Tibro, approximately 100 kilometres from the applicants' home, and from 28 June 1983 in a children's home at Vänersborg, approximately 80 kilometres north of Gothenburg.   Helena and Thomas were placed in separate foster homes - Helena at Näsåker on 21 October 1980 and Thomas at Maråker on 10 November 1980.   The foster homes are situated about 100 kilometres from each other and the distances between the foster homes and Gothenburg are about 630 and 590 kilometres, respectively.           The applicants' right of access to their children was restricted during the periods in which the children were in public care.   Stefan spent three or four weeks with his parents in the summer of 1982.   On 10 August 1982 the Social Council decided, pursuant to Section 16 (1) of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, hereinafter referred to as "the 1980 Act"), to limit their access to him to one visit every six weeks.   After 22 April 1984 the applicants were allowed to see Stefan every week, mostly at their home.           On 21 October 1980 the Social Council decided to prohibit access to Helena and Thomas at their foster homes, in accordance with Section 41 of the 1960 Act, and to prohibit disclosure of their whereabouts.   The applicants were allowed to meet the children elsewhere every second month. The restriction was lifted in September 1981, but in February 1983 the Social Council decided to restrict the applicants' right of access to Helena and Thomas to one visit every third month in the foster homes.   This restriction continued in force for the remainder of the period during which Helena and Thomas were in public care.           The applicants made a request for termination of the care of their children in 1982, which was rejected by the Social Council.   The rejection was confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 17 November 1982 and by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 20 December 1982.   The Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.           Another request by the applicants to the Social Council for termination of the care of the children was refused on 6 December 1983.           On 30 October 1984 and 17 September 1985, the Social Council rejected further requests by the applicants for termination of the care of Helena and Thomas and of Stefan, respectively.   Appeals by the applicants against these decisions were rejected by the County Administrative Court on 3 October 1985 and 3 February 1986, respectively.           The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, which joined the two cases.   After holding a hearing at which the applicants were present and gave evidence, the Administrative Court of Appeal, by judgment of 16 February 1987, decided that the public care of Stefan be terminated.   Stefan was subsequently reunited with his parents.   However, the appeal concerning Helena and Thomas was dismissed.   The Administrative Court of Appeal's opinion that the public care of these two children should continue was based primarily on the finding that the applicants were unable to understand and satisfy the special needs arising in connection with the reunification of parents and children after so long a period of separation.           Following an appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative Court, by judgment of 18 June 1987, ordered that the public care of Helena and Thomas should terminate there being no sufficiently serious circumstances to justify its continuation.   The Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that the question to be determined in deciding whether care should be discontinued pursuant to Section 5 of the 1980 Act was whether there was still a need for care.   The problems associated with the removal of a child from a foster home and its possible detrimental effects on him and with his reunification with his natural parents - on which the Administrative Court of Appeal had relied - were matters to be considered not under Section 5 but in separate proceedings, namely an investigation under Section 28 of the 1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen).   The latter Section empowers a Social Council to prohibit, for a certain period of time or until further notice, the removal from a foster home of a minor who is not or is no longer in public care, if there is thereby a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of harming his physical or mental health.           The applicants have previously submitted an application (No. 10465/83) concerning the public care of their children.   The applicants mainly complained about the taking into care of their children, about the refusal to terminate the care and about the implementation of the care decision.   The Commission found that the care decisions concerning the applicants' children in combination with the placement of the children in separate foster homes far from each other and far away from the applicants constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Olsson v.   Sweden, Comm.   Report 2.12.86, para. 179, Eur.   Court H.R., Series B No. 130).   The Court found that the implementation of the care decision, but not the decision itself or its maintenance in force, gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A No. 130-A).           On 23 June 1987 the Social Council, pursuant to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, prohibited the applicants until further notice from removing Helena and Thomas from their respective foster homes. The Council considered that there was a risk, which was not of a minor nature, of harming Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health by separating them from the foster homes.   The reasons given for this were inter alia that a long time had passed since their parents last took care of them, that they only had little contact with their parents during the public care, that they had emotional ties with their foster homes and that Helena had expressed a wish not to leave the foster home.           On 25 June 1987 the applicants' application for a suspension (inhibition) of this prohibition was refused by the County Administrative Court.   This decision was confirmed by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 2 July 1987 and, on 17 August 1987, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.           On 4 August 1987 the applicants' representative, Mrs.   Westerberg, received some documents in the case, relating to the prohibition on removal, from the County Administrative Court.   Among these was a decision of 17 July 1987, whereby the District Court (tingsrätten) of Gothenburg, upon a request made by the Social Council on 1 July 1987, had appointed CÅ guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas according to Chapter 18 Section 2 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken).   The Social Council had requested that the matter be decided urgently, for which reason the applicants were not heard.   The applicants had not been informed of the decision by the District Court and the time limit for an appeal had expired.           On 5 August 1987 the applicants requested that the guardian ad litem be dismissed.   Their request was granted by the District Court on 26 October 1987.   In its decision the Court stated that CÅ had been appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose of applying for legal aid for Thomas and Helena and for the appointment of an official counsel for them.   CÅ was appointed their official counsel by the County Administrative Court on 31 July 1987 and on the same day they were granted legal aid.   The Court dismissed CÅ as guardian ad litem as he had completed his mission.           On 27 October 1987 the Social District Council again requested that CÅ be appointed guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas.   This time the District Court invited the applicants to state their opinion before the decision was taken.   On 12 February 1988 the Court granted the request finding that the children's interests might be opposed to those of their parents in the proceedings concerning the prohibition on removal and also in proceedings concerning the applicants' request that the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code.   The Court considered CÅ suitable as guardian ad litem as he was well acquainted with the matter.   It found that the objections made by the spouses Olsson as regards CÅ's suitability were due to the fact that he had taken a position opposite to theirs.           The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden (hovrätten för Västra Sverige), which on 23 August 1988 rejected their appeal.   On 8 November 1988 the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.           In the meantime, the applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court against the decision to prohibit them from moving Helena and Thomas.   They requested that the Court appoint Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh to give an expert opinion.   On 3 July 1987 the Court decided to ask Chief Doctor Per Jonsson and Chief Doctor George Finney to give an opinion not later than 6 August 1987 as to whether there would be any risk of harm to Helena and Thomas if they were to be moved from their foster homes.   These doctors had previously given expert opinions in the proceedings concerning the termination of the care order.           Chief Doctor Per Jonsson in an opinion of 14 July 1987 concluded that "moving Helena against her will would entail a considerable risk to her mental well-being and also a great risk to her physical health if, in desperation, she were to implement her plans of running away".   In an opinion of 3 September 1987 Chief Doctor George Finney stated inter alia that "moving Thomas now would be disastrous to his mental development both emotionally and intellectually".   In an opinion of the same date the certified psychologist Göran Löthman stated that moving Thomas would not be in his best interests.           The Social Council and CÅ recommended that the appeal be rejected.   The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before the County Administrative Court.   In its judgment of 3 November 1987 the Court stated the following:           "According to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, the         Social Council may, for a certain period of time or until         further notice, prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking         the minor from a foster home, if there is a risk, which is         not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or         mental health by separating it from the foster home.           As a background to how Section 28 of the Social Services         Act should be interpreted the County Administrative Court         quotes the Minister in the Government Bill proposing the         Social Services Act and the Standing Social Committee of         the Parliament (riksdagens socialutskott).           The Minister: 'The aim of the provision is to safeguard the         best interests of the children.   Basically it is the         guardian's right to determine the domicile of the child.         This right can in certain circumstances be in conflict with         the child's best interests.   The provision provides a         possibility to suspend the guardian's right to decide over         the child.           The condition for this is that there is a risk which is not         of a minor nature that the child's physical or mental health         would be harmed, if it was forced to move from the home where         it is staying.   Only a passing disturbance or other occasional         disadvantage is not a sufficient ground for issuing a         prohibition on removal.   Among the factors to be considered         are the age of the child, the degree of development, character         and emotional ties.   Furthermore, the time the child has been         cared for away from the parents, the living conditions it has         and those it would come to, must be considered.   The parents'         contacts with the child during the period they have been         separated must also be taken into account.   An important         element in the assessment whether there is a need to issue a         prohibition on removal is the child's own preference.   If the         child has reached the age of 15 years, its preference must not         be opposed without good reasons.   Even the preferences of         younger children must be considered.   The child's preferences         can be of importance in considering the risk of damage to the         child as a result of a removal.   In this connection it should         be noted that a prohibition on removal according to the new         provisions can be issued until the child is 18 years old.'           The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament: 'The fact         that the Section follows the pattern of a previous provision         regulating the same matter, does not imply that the intention         is to codify earlier practice characterised by the views of the         past on children's rights and needs.   The Committee therefore,         in connection with the statements on the issue in the         Government Bill (Volume A p. 541), stresses that the provision         is aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child.   The         guardian's interest in determining the domicile of the child         must give way when it conflicts with what is in the best         interests of the child.   In addition to what has been stated         in the Government Bill the Committee wants to point out that         a separation generally involves a risk of damage to the         child.   Repeated transfers and transfers which take place         after a long time when the child has managed to develop strong         links with the home where it lives should thus not be accepted         without good reasons.   Children's needs for secure relations         and living conditions must to as large an extent as possible be         decisive in any decision on these questions.'           From the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of         18 June 1987 it appears that Helena and Thomas were taken into         public care in September 1980 by the Social District Council         No. 6 of Gothenburg.   The Council's decision was confirmed by         the County Administrative Court.   The Administrative Court of         Appeal of Gothenburg confirmed the County Administrative         Court's judgment and the Supreme Administrative Court did not         grant leave to appeal.   The children were placed in separate         foster homes, Helena at Näsviken and Thomas at Ljusne, both         homes approximately a thousand kilometres from the home of         their parents.   The addresses of the foster homes were not         given to the spouses Olsson during the period October 1980 to         September 1981.   From then and during most of the stay in the         foster homes the spouses Olsson's right of access to the         children has been restricted to one visit every three months.           According to the information submitted by the children's         guardian ad litem, Gun Olsson has not met Helena and Thomas         since the summer of 1984.   Stig Olsson has, together with         Stefan, visited Helena and Thomas in the spring of 1987         and on a few occasions during the last years he has contacted         the foster homes by telephone.           The contacts between the parental home and the children,         according to the information given, have been very limited.           This might be due both to the Social District Council and the         spouses Olsson and the limited contacts between parents and         children also make a reunification appear complicated.   Firstly,         to assess the children's own preferences, it appears natural to         the County Administrative Court that the children are opposed         to moving, be it only for the reason that they, like most human         beings, try to avoid changes and prefer to stay in the         environment they are used to.   Whether the children's         preferences shall be considered must be decided on the basis         of the children's capacity to take a stand on that issue.           A comparison must be made in this connection with the provision         in Chapter 21 Section 5 of the Parental Code, which states that         enforcement according to the Parental Code must not take place         contrary to the wishes of the child, if the child is twelve         years old or, if the child is not yet twelve years old but         mature enough to have its preference considered.   Helena will         soon be eleven years old and Thomas nine years old.   Thomas         is in this respect obviously too young to have his preference         considered.   Helena is approaching the age at which there is         a better possibility to consider her preference, but the         County Administrative Court does not find it likely that she,         not yet twelve years old, is mature enough to be compared with         a twelve-year-old child.   The County Administrative Court         therefore finds no basis for taking the children's own         preferences into account.           If the children are assessed individually Thomas' mental         health does not seem to be so strong but he seems to have         improved continuously.   The County Administrative Court         finds it likely that without preparatory contacts between         Thomas and the natural parents, Thomas' mental health will         be seriously endangered if he, without sufficient preparatory         measures, is moved to his parents' home.   A prohibition on         removal is therefore justified for his part.           Helena seems stronger than her brother, but even for her part         the idea must be that the child's interest must be considered         to be more important than the parents' rights.   For her part         it also appears, considering the sporadic contacts she has         had with her parental home, that an immediate removal and         separation from the foster home, without preparatory         measures, would bring about a risk, which is not of a minor         nature, of harm to her mental health.   Also for Helena         it appears therefore for the time being that a prohibition on         removal is well-founded.           A prohibition on removal should not, according to the opinion         of the County Administrative Court, be valid for too long a         time.   A condition for the prohibition on removal to be revoked         is therefore that the spouses Olsson as well as the Social         District Council engage actively in improving the contacts         between parents and children.   It is difficult for the County         Administrative Court, which cannot directly participate in the         work and follow the development, to decide on a time limit for         an endeavour of this kind.   The prohibition on removal issued         by the Social District Council shall therefore be valid until         further notice."           The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. In the first place, they requested that the prohibition on removal be revoked and, in the second place, that it be limited in time, at the utmost until 6 January 1988.   They requested that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert.   The Social District Council and the children's guardian ad litem recommended that the appeal be rejected.   The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before the Court.   The Court gave judgment on 30 December 1987.   It refused the applicants' request that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert and rejected the appeal, giving, inter alia, the following reasons:           "As has been accounted for in detail by the County         Administrative Court in the judgment that has been appealed         against, the contact between the spouses Olsson and their         children Helena and Thomas have for a long time been very         limited.   A reunification between them is therefore complicated         and requires relatively extensive preparations.   There is         nothing in the investigation to show that there have been any         appropriate preparations for a reunification.   The prohibition         on removal should therefore continue and according to the         Administrative Court of Appeal there is not now any basis for         deciding when the removal can be brought about without a risk         of harm to the children's mental health.   Against the         background of the conflicts that characterise the contacts         between the children's foster homes and the Social Council, on         the one hand, and the spouses Olsson and their counsel, on the         other hand, there is no reason in this case to set a time limit         for the prohibition on removal.   The Administrative Court of         Appeal therefore agrees with the County Administrative Court's         assessment that the prohibition shall be valid until further         notice."           The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court requesting, firstly, that the prohibition on removal be revoked, and secondly, that it be limited in time until 15 March 1988.   They requested that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert by the Court.   They alleged inter alia that, as the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 24 March 1988 had found that Sweden had violated the Convention by keeping Helena and Thomas in foster homes far from them and from each other and with a very restricted access to the children for the applicants, a continued prohibition on removal would mean that Sweden continues to violate their human rights and that Sweden refuses to abide by the judgment of the Court.   The applicants requested a hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court.           On 4 February 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicants leave to appeal and decided to hear the National Board of Health and Welfare (socialstyrelsen) and the Social District Council.           In their opinion of 22 March 1988 the Social District Council stated inter alia that it appeared from the written evidence of the case that there was a risk which was not of a minor nature of harming Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health if they were to be separated from their foster homes.   This risk could not be eliminated by a prohibition on removal limited in time.   The Council further stated that it intended to make a request to the District Court that the custody of the children be transferred to the foster parents if the Supreme Court rejected the applicants' appeal.           The National Board of Health and Welfare, in their opinion dated 23 March 1988, stated that the child psychiatric investigation which had been carried out was sufficient.   It stressed that the decisive factor as regards the transfer of children, having lived in a foster home as long as in the present case, must be the relationship between the children and their parents.   In order to create good contact, and eventually a reunification, co-operation between the social welfare officers and the foster home on the one hand and the parents on the other hand is necessary.   The Board considered that it appeared from the case-file that the applicants' counsel had not tried to co-operate and that this had been unfortunate for the children.   It had had the consequence that no such relation had been established between the children and their parents as would make it possible for the children to move to their parents without there being a serious risk of harm to the children.   The Board recommended the Social District Council to examine the possibility of having the custody of the children transferred to the foster parents and advised against granting the applicants' appeal.           The Supreme Administrative Court, in its judgment of 30 May 1988, rejected the appeal, the request to appoint Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh as an expert and the request for a hearing, but amended the judgment of the Administrative Court of Appeal to the effect that the prohibition on removal was limited in time until 30 June 1989.   However, one of the four judges gave a dissenting opinion wishing to confirm the judgments of the lower courts.   The Court's reasons read inter alia as follows:           "Section 28 of the Social Services Act provides that the         Social Council, for a certain time or until further notice,         may prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking the minor         from a home of the kind mentioned in Section 25 (i.e. a foster         home), if there is a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of         harming the child's physical or mental health by separating it         from the foster home.   The aim of this provision has been         accounted for in the statements made by the responsible Minister         and by the Standing Social Committee of the Parliament, as         quoted by the County Administrative Court of Gothenburg in         its judgment of 3 November 1987.           When Section 28 of the Act is applied in this case a balance         must be struck between, on the one hand, respect for the spouses         Olsson's and their children's private and family life,         including the spouses Olsson's rights as guardians according         to the Parental Code and, on the other hand, the need to         safeguard the children's health (cf.   Chapter 1 Section 2         third paragraph of the Instrument of Government [regeringsformen]         and Sections 1 and 12 of the Social Services Act; through these         provisions the protection for private and family life referred         to in Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human         Rights and Fundamental Freedoms can be ensured).   In this         assessment it must be considered that Section 28 of the Social         Services Act as well as other provisions specifying the         conditions for coercive measures must be interpreted so that         such measures may be used only when the conditions specified in         the text of the statutes are really satisfied.   There are         special reasons to underline this as certain statements of the         Standing Social Committee could be interpreted as if a more         extensive right to take coercive measures exists than is         allowed under the texts of the statutes.           As appears from what has been stated above the children were         placed in the two foster homes because they had been taken         into public care; by virtue of the new Act the care has been         transformed into care according to Section 1 paragraph 2 of         the 1980 Act.   The care was caused by the lack of care for         the children or other conditions in the home which entailed a         danger to their health and development.   The aim when such a         decision is taken, and when the children subsequently stay in         a foster home, should normally be the reunification of the         children with their parents as soon as circumstances allow.         When the care is terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980         Act the reunification should normally take place as soon as         possible.   A reunification needs to be prepared actively and         with understanding.   The appropriate preparations should be         made immediately after the care has been terminated.   This         should apply even if a prohibition under Section 28 of the         Social Services Act has been issued or is being examined by a         higher instance.   The character and the extent of the         preparations, as well as the time required for them, depend on         the circumstances in each case; one or more suitably arranged         and successful visits by the children to their parents' home         must always be required.   The need for a more definite         prohibition on removal can normally only be assessed after the         appropriate preparations have been carried out.   It is the         Social Council's responsibility to arrange the appropriate         preparations for reuniting parents and children after the care         has been terminated according to Section 5 of the 1980 Act.         The Social Council's responsibility includes an obligation to         be persistent in trying to make the parents and their counsel         actively take part in the preparations in the interests of the         children.   The Social Council is not discharged of its         responsibility only because the parents and their counsel, by         appealing against the Council's decisions or in other ways,         show that they dislike the measures taken by the Council or         its personnel.   According to Section 68 of the Social Services         Act the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen) should         assist the Council with advice and ensure that the Council         performs its duties in an appropriate way.           Pending the beginning and completion of the appropriate         preparations for the reunification of parents and children the         question of a more temporary prohibition on removal under         Section 28 of the Social Services Act can also arise.   Such a         prohibition should be seen as a temporary measure awaiting         that the child can be separated from the foster home without         any risk of harm as mentioned in the section.           The elements that should be considered when a decision on         prohibition of removal is taken are - according to the quoted         preparatory works - the age of the child, the degree of         development, character and emotional ties, the time the child         has been cared for away from the parents, the living conditions         it has and those it would come to and the parents' contacts with         the child during the period they have been separated.           From the investigation in the present case it appears that no         appropriate preparations have been made to reunite parents and         children.   The time after the Supreme Administrative Court's         decision to terminate the care seems to have been spent         litigating instead.           The issue whether a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of         the Social Services Act is needed in this case, must therefore         be examined without considering the effect of preparations         that have already been carried out.   The Supreme Administrative         Court's decision must therefore concern the kind of temporary         prohibition on removal that, according to what has been         stated above, can be issued awaiting that more appropriate         preparations are carried out.           From the investigation - above all the opinion given by the         National Board of Health and Welfare and the medical         certificates quoted in it - it clearly appears that for the         time being, before any preparations have been made, there is a         risk which is not of a minor nature of harming Helena's and         Thomas' physical and mental health by separating them from         their foster homes.   Accordingly, there are sufficient reasons         for a prohibition on removal under Section 28 of the Social         Services Act.           As concerns the length of a prohibition on removal the Supreme         Administrative Court, in a previous decision (cf.   RÅ 1984         2:78), has stated inter alia the following:   If, when the         prohibition is issued, it is already possible to assess with         sufficient certainty that there will be no such risk after a         specific time - at which some measures will have been taken or         the effect of them will have had time to occur - the         prohibition must be valid only until that time.   If, on the         other hand, it is uncertain when the child, without a risk         which is not of a minor nature, can be moved to its parents,         the prohibition should be valid until further notice and the         question of a removal be raised again at a later stage, when         it is easier to assess the risk of harming the child's health.           An application of this rule would in the present case lead to         a prohibition on removal valid until further notic