CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 mai 1990

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF   Application No. 14234/88          Application No. 14235/88 by OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD.     by DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE & Others against Ireland                   against Ireland             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 15 May 1990, the following members being present:                MM.   C. A. NØRGAARD, President                   J. A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. SPERDUTI                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL                   H. G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS                   G. BATLINER              Mrs. G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              Mr.   L. LOUCAIDES                Mr.   H. C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission,           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 19 August 1988 by OPEN DOOR COUNSELLING LTD. against Ireland and registered on 23 September 1988 under file No. 14234/88;           Having regard to the application introduced on 15 September 1988 by DUBLIN WELL WOMAN CENTRE AND OTHERS against Ireland and registered on 22 September 1988 under file No. 14235/88;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 40 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The first application (No. 14234/88) is brought by Open Door Counselling Ltd., which is represented by Mr. James Hickey, solicitor, of the firm of Amorys, Solicitors, Dublin.           The second application (No. 14235/88) is brought by the following applicants:   -        Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.;   -        Ms.   Bonnie Maher, born in 1945, a citizen of the United States of America, who works as a trained counsellor for the   Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.;   -        Ms.   Ann Downes, born in 1960, a citizen of Ireland, who also works as a counsellor for the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.;   -        Mrs.   X, born in 1950, a citizen of Ireland, who is a television producer and is married with three children.   -        Miss Y, born in 1970, a citizen of Ireland, who is, at present, unemployed.           The applicants in the second application are represented by Mrs.   Mary Robinson, S.C., of counsel and Barbara Hussey and Co., solicitors, Dublin.           The first applicant company was engaged inter alia in non-directive counselling of pregnant women in Dublin and other parts of Ireland.   The second applicant company was established in 1977 to provide a broad range of services relating to counselling and marriage, family planning, procreation and health matters.   The services offered by the Centre relate to every aspect of women's health, ranging from smear tests to breast examinations, infection testing, screening, gynaecological problems, contraception, infertility, artificial insemination and non-directive counselling of pregnant women.   The Centre employs doctors, nurses and counsellors and operates two clinics in Dublin.           The facts which are not in dispute between the parties are as follows:           The applicant companies were defendants in proceedings in the High Court which were commenced on 28 June 1985 as a private action brought by the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. (SPUC) which was converted into a relator action brought at the suit of the Attorney General by order of the High Court of 24 September 1986 (the Attorney General at the relation of the Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.   Open Door Counselling Ltd. and the Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd.).           The plaintiff sought a declaration that the activities of the applicant companies in counselling pregnant women within the jurisdiction of the court to travel abroad to obtain an abortion were unlawful having regard to Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution.   The plaintiff further sought an order restraining the defendants from such counselling or assistance.           No evidence was adduced at the hearing of the action which proceeded on the basis of certain agreed facts which were admitted by each of the two defendants.   The relevant agreed facts concerning the second applicant company may be summarised as follows:   a.    it counsels in a non-directive manner pregnant      women resident in Ireland;   b.    abortion or termination of pregnancy may be one of      the options discussed within the said counselling;   c.    if a pregnant woman wants to consider the abortion      option further, arrangements will be made by the      applicant to refer her to a medical clinic in      Great Britain;   d.    in certain circumstances, the applicant may arrange      the travel requirements of such pregnant woman;   e.    the applicant will inspect the medical clinic in      Great Britain to ensure that it operates at the      highest standards;   f.    at those medical clinics abortions have been performed      on pregnant women who have been previously counselled      by the applicant;   g.    pregnant women resident in Ireland have been referred to      medical clinics in Great Britain where abortions are      performed for many years including the months of November      and December 1984.           The first applicant company agreed in substance to all of the above facts with the exception of point (d).           The parties also agreed on the meaning of the concept of non-directive counselling which was subsequently described by the Supreme Court as follows (judgment of 16 March 1988, Mr.   Justice Finlay C.J., p. 6):   "It was submitted on behalf of each of the Defendants that the meaning of non-directive counselling in these agreed sets of facts was that it was counselling which neither included advice nor was judgemental but that it was a service essentially directed to eliciting from the client her own appreciation of her problem and her own considered choice for its solution.   This interpretation of the phrase 'non-directive counselling' in the context of the activities of the Defendants was not disputed on behalf of the Respondent.   It follows from this, of course, that non-directive counselling to pregnant women would never involve the actual advising of an abortion as the preferred option but neither, of course, could it permit the giving of advice for any reason to the pregnant women receiving such counselling against choosing to have an abortion."           On 19 December 1986 Mr.   Justice Hamilton found that the activities of the defendants in counselling pregnant women within the jurisdiction of the Court to travel abroad to obtain an abortion or to obtain further advice on abortion within a foreign jurisdiction were unlawful having regard to the provisions of Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution of Ireland.   This provision provides as follows:   "The State acknowledges the right to life of the unborn and, with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother, guarantees in its laws to respect, and, as far as practicable, by its laws to defend and vindicate that right."   An injunction was therefore granted "... that the Defendants and each of them, their servants or agents, be perpetually restrained from counselling or assisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction of this Court to obtain further advice on abortion or to obtain an abortion."           The High Court made no order relating to the costs of the proceedings, leaving each side to bear its own legal costs.           The defendants appealed against the decision of the High Court to the Supreme Court which delivered judgment on 16 March 1988 rejecting the appeal.           The Supreme Court noted that the appellants did not consider it essential to the service which they provided for pregnant women in Ireland that they should take any part in arranging the travel of such women who wished to go abroad for the purpose of having an abortion or that they arranged bookings in clinics for such women.   However, it was considered essential to the service they sought to provide that they should be at liberty to inform such women who wished to have an abortion outside the jurisdiction of the court of the name, address, telephone number and method of communication with a specified clinic which they had examined and were satisfied that it was one which maintained a high standard.           As regards the central issue in the case, the Supreme Court found as follows:   "... the essential issues in this case do not in any way depend upon the Plaintiff establishing that the Defendants were advising or encouraging the procuring of abortions. The essential issue in this case, having regard to the nature of the guarantees contained in Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution is the issue as to whether the Defendants' admitted activities were assisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction to travel outside that jurisdiction in order to have an abortion.   To put the matter in another way, the issue and the question of fact to be determined is:   were they thus assisting in the destruction of the life of the unborn?           I am satisfied beyond doubt that having regard to the admitted facts the Defendants were assisting in the ultimate destruction of the life of the unborn by abortion in that they were helping the pregnant woman who had decided upon that option to get in touch with a clinic in Great Britain which would provide the service of abortion. It seems to me an inescapable conclusion that if a woman was anxious to obtain an abortion and if she was able by availing of the counselling services of one or other of the Defendants to obtain the precise location, address and telephone number of and method of communication with, a clinic in Great Britain which provided that service, put in plain language, that was knowingly helping her to attain her objective.   I am, therefore, satisfied that the finding made by the learned trial Judge that the Defendants were assisting pregnant women to travel abroad to obtain further advice on abortion and to secure an abortion is well supported on the evidence ...".           Mr.   Justice Finlay C.J. indicated in the judgment of the Court that the phrase in Article 40.3.3° "with due regard to the equal right to life of the mother" did not arise for interpretation in the case since the applicants were not claiming that the service they were providing for pregnant women was "in any way confined to or especially directed towards the due regard to the equal right to life of the mother ...".           The Supreme Court also found that there was no constitutional right to information about the availability of abortion outside the State.   The Court stated as follows:           "The performing of an abortion on a pregnant woman terminates the unborn life which she is carrying.   Within the terms of Article 40.3.3° it is a direct destruction of the constitutionally guaranteed right to life of that unborn child.           It must follow from this that there could not be an implied and unenumerated constitutional right to information about the availability of a service of abortion outside the State which, if availed of, would have the direct consequence of destroying the expressly guaranteed constitutional right to life of the unborn.   As part of the submission on this issue it was further suggested that the right to receive and give information which, it was alleged, existed and was material to this case was, though not expressly granted, impliedly referred to or involved in the right of citizens to express freely their convictions and opinions provided by Article 40.6.1° (i) of the Constitution, since, it was claimed, the right to express freely convictions and opinions may, under some circumstances, involve as an ancillary right the right to obtain information.   I am satisfied that no right could constitutionally arise to obtain information the purpose of the obtaining of which was to defeat the constitutional right to life of the unborn child."   The Court upheld the decision of the High Court to grant an injunction but varied the form of the order as follows:   "And it is ordered that the Defendants and each of them, their and each of their servants or agents be perpetually restrained from assisting pregnant women within the jurisdiction to travel abroad to obtain abortions by referral to a clinic, by the making for them of travel arrangements, or by informing them of the identity and location of and the method of communication with a specified clinic or clinics or otherwise."           In a further hearing before the Supreme Court on 3 May 1988 the costs of the Supreme Court appeal were awarded against the defendants, making them liable for costs amounting to £42,166.71.           Following the judgment of the Supreme Court the first applicant company ceased to operate.           In a subsequent case concerning abortion information contained in a students' publication the Supreme Court issued an interlocutory injunction restraining students from "publishing or distributing or assisting in the printing, publishing or distribution of any publication produced under their aegis providing information to persons (including pregnant women) of the identity and location of and the method of communication with a specified clinic or clinics where abortions are performed" (Society for the Protection of Unborn Children (Ireland) Ltd. v.   Stephen Grogan and Others, judgment of 19 December 1989).           Mr.   Justice Finlay C.J. (Griffin J and Hederman J concurring) considered that the reasoning of the Court in the case brought against the applicant companies applied to the activities of the students (loc. cit., p. 11):   "I reject as unsound the contention that the activity involved in this case of publishing in the students' manuals the name, address and telephone number, when telephoned from this State, of abortion clinics in the United Kingdom, and distributing such manuals in Ireland, can be distinguished from the activity condemned by this Court in the Open Door Counselling case on the grounds that the facts of that case were that the information was conveyed during periods of one-to-one non-directive counselling.   It is clearly the fact that such information is conveyed to pregnant women, and not the method of communication which creates the unconstitutional illegality, and the judgment of this Court in the Open Door Counselling case is not open to any other interpretation."   COMPLAINTS           Article 10 of the Convention           The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors complain under Article 10 of the Convention that there is an unjustifiable interference with their right to impart specific information about abortion clinics in Britain to pregnant women who seek this information in the context of non-directive pregnancy counselling.   They contend that this interference is not prescribed by law and is disproportionate to the aims pursued since there are no restrictions on pregnant women travelling to Great Britain in order to obtain an abortion and there has been no reduction in the number of Irish women having abortions in Great Britain.           The applicants X and Y complain that, as women of child-bearing age, they have a right to receive information relating to abortion clinics operating lawfully in Britain whether this information is imparted in the context of a counselling service in the event of pregnancy or of a broader information service on issues relevant to women.           Article 8 of the Convention           The first applicant company complains that the judgment of the Supreme Court constitutes a violation of the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.           The applicants X and Y maintain that the denial to them of access to information concerning abortion in Great Britain also constitutes an unjustifiable interference with their right to respect for private life.   They submit that they have a right to such information either as part of a general information service on women's health questions or in the context of non-directive pregnancy counselling in the event of either applicant being pregnant.           Article 14 of the Convention           The first applicant company complains that the decision of the Supreme Court discriminates against women contrary to Article 14 of the Convention since it is only women who are directly affected by the denial of assistance and information.   It is contended that there is no legitimate justification for this difference in treatment or, alternatively, that there is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be realised.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           Application No. 14234/88 (Open Door Counselling Ltd.) was introduced on 19 August 1988 and registered on 22 September 1988.           Application No. 14235/88 (Dublin Well Woman Centre and Others) was introduced on 15 September 1988 and registered on 22 September 1988.           The applications were first considered by the Commission on 14 March 1989 when it was decided to join them pursuant to Rule 29 of the Commission's Rules of Procedure.   It was further decided, pursuant to Rule 42 (b) of the Rules of Procedure, to bring the applications to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit before 2 June 1989 joint observations on the admissibility and merits of the applications insofar as they raised issues under Article 10 and (as regards Application No. 14235/88) Article 8 of the Convention.           The Government's observations were subsequently submitted on 15 September 1989 following extensions of the time limit until 1 September 1989.   The applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 9 November 1989.           The Commission next considered the applications on 5 February 1990 and decided, in accordance with Rule 42, para. 3 of its Rules of Procedure, to invite the parties to appear before it at a joint hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applications insofar as they raised issues under Articles 8 and 10 of the Convention.           The hearing took place in Strasbourg on 15 May 1990 and the parties were represented as follows:   Respondent Government   Mr.   Peter E. Smyth                       Agent   Mr.   Dermot Gleeson SC                    Counsel   Mr.   James O'Reilly SC                    Counsel   Mr.   John F. Gormley                      Adviser,                                         Office of the Attorney General   Ms.   Emer Kilcullen                       Adviser,                                         Department of Foreign Affairs   The applicants   Mrs.   Mary Robinson SC                    Counsel   Mr.   Frank Clarke SC                      Counsel   Ms.   Barbara Hussey                       Solicitor (Hussey & Bates)   Ms.   Rita Burtonshaw                      Adviser ) Dublin Well Woman                                                 ) Centre Limited Ms.   Mary McNeaney                        Adviser )   THE LAW           The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors complain that they are unable to impart specific information about abortion clinics in Great Britain to pregnant women who seek this information.   In addition, two women of child-bearing age, X and Y, complain that in the event of becoming pregnant they will be denied access to accurate advice and information concerning abortion facilities in Great Britain.           All of the applicants invoke Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.   The first applicant company also invokes Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.   Finally, the two women of child-bearing age also complain of an interference with their right to respect for private life contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention           The Government submit that the applications should be rejected on the grounds that none of the applicants is a "victim" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention.   They contend:   (1) that the applicant companies as legal persons have no capacity to enjoy human rights such as the right to impart information or the right to privacy;   (2) that the applications are an attempt to test Irish law in abstracto against the provisions of the Convention since none of the applicants are pregnant women who can claim to have been directly affected by the Supreme Court injunction and the applicants have not been able to identify such a pregnant woman.           Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1), first sentence, states as follows:   "The Commission may receive petitions addressed to the Secretary- General of the Council of Europe from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention, provided that the High Contracting Party against which the complaint has been lodged has declared that it recognises the competence of the Commission to receive such petitions.   ..."           As regards the Government's first plea, the Commission notes that the applicant companies fall clearly within the category of "non-governmental organisation" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention.   Moreover, they were parties to the proceedings before the Irish courts and were and continue to be directly affected by the Supreme Court's injunction.   The Commission further recalls that Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention applies to "everyone" whether natural or legal persons (see, as the most recent authority, Eur. Court H.R., Autronic AG judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A, no. 178, para. 47).   Accordingly, it is open to these applicants as corporate bodies to complain that they are "victims" of interferences with Convention rights arising out of the facts underlying the applications (see No. 6538/74, Dec. 21.3.75, D.R. 27, at p. 95).           As regards the Government's second plea under Article 25 (Art. 25), the Commission observes that the applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors are prevented by the Supreme Court injunction from imparting specific information about abortion clinics in Great Britain.   They can thus claim to be "victims" of a violation of their rights under Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.           It is true that neither of the women of child-bearing age is pregnant.   However, the Government have not shown that they would be entitled, under the legal situation prevailing in Ireland, to receive such information in advance of any pregnancy.   Moreover, information concerning abortion is a matter which may fall within the field of both Articles 8 (Art. 8) and 10 (Art. 10) respectively.   The Commission does not consider that applicants must be pregnant before they can complain of the legal regulation in this area (see No. 6959/75, Dec. 19.5.76, Brüggemann and Scheuten v. Federal Republic of Germany, D.R. 5, at p. 115).           The Commission therefore finds that the applicants are not seeking to challenge in abstracto the compatibility of Irish law with the provisions of the Convention and can, for the above reasons, claim to be "victims" within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1), first sentence, of the Convention.            Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention   Six months rule           The Government further submit that the applications should be rejected on the basis of the six months rule contained in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   They maintain that the applicants in the course of their pleadings have presented a much wider and factually different complaint to the Commission than that which was the subject of litigation before the courts.           Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention states as follows:   "The Commission may only deal with the matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken."           The Commission notes that all of the applicants' complaints under the Convention were raised in the petitions filed with the Commission on 19 August 1988 (Open Door Counselling Ltd.) and on 15 September 1988 (Dublin Well Woman Centre Ltd. and Others).   The six months rule in Article 26 (Art. 26) does not prevent the applicants from developing their legal submissions in respect of these complaints in the course of their written and oral submissions to the Commission.   In particular, they have not sought to make new complaints in the guise of legal submissions.           The final decision being that of the judgment of the Supreme Court dated 16 March 1988 the applications comply with the six months rule.   Exhaustion of domestic remedies           The Government further contend that the applicants have not exhausted domestic remedies as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.   They submit (1) that the applicants did not seek to raise before the courts any issue relating to the "equal right to life of the mother" contained in Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution.   In this regard they note that the applicants make numerous submissions concerning the impact of the Supreme Court ruling on the health of women in Ireland;   (2) that the applicant counsellors present to the Commission a complaint which is factually different from that decided on agreed facts by the courts;   (3) that the applicants seek to rely on United States constitutional case-law which was not pleaded before the Irish courts;   (4) that the applicant women of child-bearing age have not pursued any domestic remedies relating to their personal rights to marital and individual privacy which have been recognised by the courts in Ireland.           The Commission recalls that the only remedies which Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention requires to be exhausted are those that relate to the breaches alleged and that the existence of such remedies must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness. Moreover, it falls to the Government to establish that remedies satisfy these conditions (see, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R., Johnston judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 22, para. 45).           In addition the Commission observes that a distinction must be drawn between an applicant's complaints and the legal submissions made in support of his complaints.   An applicant is not required to show that he has formulated the same legal submissions or arguments before national courts as those presented to the Commission.   It is sufficient that he raises before the national courts the substance of any complaint made before the Commission (see, inter alia, Eur. Court H.R., Handyside judgment of 7 December 1976, Series A no. 24, p. 20, para. 41;   Campbell and Cosans judgment of 25 February 1982, Series A no. 48, p. 18, para. 40).           As regards the Government's first plea under Article 26 (Art. 26), the Commission notes that the complaint concerns restrictions on the imparting of information and that the applicant companies have clearly raised the substance of this complaint before the Irish courts.   They have therefore exhausted their domestic remedies in this regard.           As regards the Government's second and third plea, the Commission considers that it is open to the applicants to develop their arguments in respect of Convention complaints which have been raised in substance before the national courts and that these submissions do not amount to fresh complaints in respect of which they had not exhausted domestic remedies.           Finally, as regards the Government's fourth plea, the Commission notes that the complaint concerns access to information and does not consider that the Government have shown that these applicants would have any prospects of success in asserting privacy rights, having regard to the high level of protection afforded in Ireland to the constitutional right to life of the unborn child (see p. 5 above).           Accordingly the Commission does not consider that the applicants' complaints fall to be rejected for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.           Articles 8 (Art. 8), 10 (Art. 10) and 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention           The applicant companies and the two applicant counsellors contend that the Supreme Court injunction against them constitues an unjustified interference with their right to impart specific information about abortion clinics to pregnant women who seek this information, contrary to Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.   They maintain    that such an interference is not prescribed by law since the restriction could not have been foreseeably derived from Article 40.3.3° of the Constitution.   They submit that the interference is disproportionate to the aims pursued since there are no restrictions on pregnant women travelling to Great Britain in order to obtain an abortion and there has been no reduction in the number of Irish women having abortions in Great Britain.   They also contend that the effect of the injunction has been to significantly increase the risk to life and health of such pregnant women.   In addition, two Irish women of child-bearing age who seek to have access to accurate advice and information in the event of becoming pregnant complain of an interference with their right to receive information protected by Article 10 (Art. 10) of the Convention.   They further complain that the denial to them of access to information constitutes an unjustifiable interference with their private life, contrary to Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           The first applicant company also complains that the decision of the Supreme Court constitutes a violation of the right to privacy guaranteed by Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.   The applicant company contends that the Supreme Court's decision effectively finds that the right to life of the foetus is absolute and superior to all rights of the mother.   In addition, the first applicant company complains under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention that the decision of the Supreme Court discriminates against women since it is only women who are directly affected by the denial of assistance and information.           The Government submit, with respect to the applicants' complaints under Article 10 (Art. 10) that the restriction in the present cases was foreseeable and thus prescribed by law since the right to life of the unborn is part of the common law of Ireland, is embodied in statute law and is expressly guaranteed by the Constitution of Ireland.   They further submit that, having regard to the wide margin of appreciation to which the State is entitled in the area of abortion, the interference is necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of others (i.e., the unborn) as well as the prevention of crime and the protection of morals.   They stress in this context, with particular reference to Articles 2 (Art. 2) and 17 (Art. 17) of the Convention, the finding by the Supreme Court that the activities of the applicants, especially the provision of information concerning the location, address and telephone numbers of clinics, amounted to assisting in the destruction of the life of the unborn.   They maintain, with reference to Article 60 (Art. 60) of the Convention, that it is not open to the Convention organs to question the higher protection of the rights of the unborn under Irish law, which have been fully endorsed by a recent constitutional referendum.           In addition, the Government submit that the interference with the private rights of the two applicant women of child-bearing age is justified as necessary in a democratic society for the protection of the rights of the unborn, as well as for the prevention of crime and the protection of morals.           Finally, the Government contend that it is not open to the first applicant company to complain of an interference with a right to privacy under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention or of discrimination under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.           The Commission considers, in the light of the parties' submissions, that the applications as a whole raise complex issues of law and fact under the Convention, the determination of which depends on an examination of the merits of the applications.           It concludes, therefore, that the applications cannot be regarded as manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention and no other ground for declaring them inadmissible has been established.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATIONS ADMISSIBLE         without prejudging the merits of the case.   Secretary to the Commission              President of the Commission          (H. C. KRÜGER)                           (C. A. NØRGAARD)