CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 3 décembre 1990

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 14225/88                       by Ulla-Brita NORDH and others                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 3 December 1990, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              Mr.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                   A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                Mr.   H.C. KRÜGER, Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 27 July 1988 by Ulla-Brita Nordh against Sweden and registered on 20 September 1988 under file No. 14225/88;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the applicants, may be summarised as follows.           The applicants are the following Swedish citizens:   1.       Ulla-Brita Nordh, born in 1926 and resident at Västra         Frölunda;   2.       Sune Nordh, born in 1926 and resident at Västra Frölunda;   3.       Carl Swenson, born in 1927 and resident in Gothenburg.           The applicants are represented by Mr.   Carl-Einar Mellander, a lawyer practising in Gothenburg.           On 30 November 1977 a natural disaster occurred in a residential area at Tuve outside Gothenburg when a large area of earth slipped and 67 houses, including the applicants' houses, were destroyed.   The applicants' buildings were insured but the land was not insured.           After the disaster, the Government announced that the State would compensate the property owners.   On 1 March 1978 a press release from the Ministry of Local Government announced that the State would compensate the land in the area destroyed.   In the Government Bill (p. 96) it was said that the compensation which would have to be paid by the State essentially concerned the land.   In March 1978 Parliament allocated funds for the compensation.   On 1 June 1978 the Government established a "market value" for the different properties.   As regards the property owned jointly by the first and second applicants the value was set at 810.000 SEK and the third applicant's property was evaluated at 510.000 SEK.           By agreements of 18 March and 3 May 1978 the municipality of Gothenburg took possession of the applicants' properties stating that:           "the State has declared its intention to give the victims         the same financial situation as before the disaster.         Within the Government the work is guided by the principle         that a generous assessment shall be made as regards         compensation to (the victims)".           Subsequently, the State and the insurance companies made an agreement according to which the insurance companies would pay 70 % and the State 30 % of the compensation to the victims.           The applicants obtained compensation from their insurance companies at a level which slightly exceeded the "market value" established by the Government.   But this compensation did not comprise the land.   The applicants are of the opinion that the State is obliged to compensate them also for the market value of the land under the decision made by Parliament.   The Government, however, took the view that the State should only compensate the property owners for the amount which corresponded to the established market value after deduction of the amount paid by the insurance companies.           The applicants state that as a result of the agreement between the State and the insurance companies and the view taken by the Government, it became meaningless to complain about the compensation received from the insurance company since, if the compensation exceeded 70 % of the Government's "market value", the State's share of the compensation would be reduced correspondingly.           By a subsequent agreement, the applicants surrendered their ownership of the properties to the Gothenburg municipality for 100 SEK.   The applicants submit that they did not surrender their properties freely because, if they had not signed the agreement, they would have been struck off the priority list for receiving new building plots in the Gothenburg area.   Moreover, the compensation of 100 SEK constituted payment for a building plot, which in the applicants' view had a value exceeding 100,000 SEK, and, as regards the third applicant, the payment also covered compensation for a garage which was not destroyed.           Following refusals by the Government to grant the applicants any compensation, the applicants brought proceedings against the State before the District Court (tingsrätten) of Stockholm claiming compensation for the land.   On 22 February 1982 the District Court dismissed the applicants' claims, inter alia, on the ground that Parliament's decision to allocate funds was of a public law character and could not directly be the basis for a claim of a civil right character.   On 15 February 1985 the Svea Court of Appeal (Svea hovrätt) confirmed the District Court's findings.   The applicants lodged a further appeal with the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen) which on 1 February 1988 confirmed the Court of Appeal's finding.   The Supreme Court considered that the applicants' claims were based on the allegation that the Government had refused to implement Parliament's decision about compensation to the victims of the disaster and, in that context, had introduced conditions for compensation which had not been put by Parliament.   The issue was whether an ordinary court had jurisdiction to examine a claim on such a ground.   The Supreme Court found that an ordinary court did not have jurisdiction.   It referred to the fact that Parliament decided about the State's expenses and the Government had the task of implementing those decisions.   A court was not suitable - where the decision to allocate resources had not been regulated in a legal text - to determine matters concerning the implementation of such a decision.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants complain that they have not had a court examination of the merits of their claim against the State within a reasonable time.   They allege violations of Article 6 of the Convention.   2.       The applicants also allege violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, inter alia, on the ground that they were dispossessed of their properties on conditions which were subsequently not respected and on the ground that no compensation has been paid for the land.   3.       The applicants also allege violations of Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention.   4.       Finally, the applicants allege that they have been discriminated against contrary to Article 14 of the Convention in that they have not received any compensation from the State as offered to the other victims and on the ground that there has been discrimination in the proceedings between the State and the applicants.   THE LAW   1.       The applicants allege violations of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, the first sentence of which reads:   "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations   ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law."           The Commission has first examined whether this provision is applicable to the dispute between the applicants and the State.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) applies to disputes over "rights" which can be said, at least on arguable grounds, to be recognised under domestic law.   It applies not only to disputes over well established "rights" but also to disputes as to whether a particular "right" exists under domestic law (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Lithgow and Others judgment of 8 July 1986, Series A No. 102, p. 70, para. 192). Moreover, Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) only applies if the "right" is "civil" in character (see Eur. Court H.R., Benthem judgment of 23 October 1985, Series A No. 97, p. 14, para. 32).           The Commission first observes that there is no provision in Swedish law according to which the State is obliged to pay compensation to victims of a natural disaster.   Moreover, the Parliamentary decision of 1978 did not result in any Act or other legal provision regulating the right to compensation.   The decision simply concerned the allocation of funds to compensate the victims of the Tuve disaster.   The payment of compensation to the victims of the disaster was consequently a unilateral decision of the State of a public law character.   The Commission considers, irrespective of whether the applicants could claim that a "right" followed from the State's decision, that any such "right" was of a public law nature and cannot be characterised as a "civil" right (cf.   No. 10612/83, Dec. 10.12.84, D.R. 40 p. 276).   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is therefore not applicable to this dispute.           It follows that, in this respect, the application is incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the Convention and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2).           As regards any dispute over the agreements entered into between the applicants and the Gothenburg municipality, the Commission observes that the applicants could have brought any such dispute before the ordinary courts.   However, they do not allege any violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) in this respect.   2.       The applicants also allege violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention, which provides:   "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.   The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."           The Commission recalls that the applicants' ownership was transferred by agreement to the municipality of Gothenburg after the Tuve disaster.   It further recalls that there is no right under Swedish law to compensation for the effects of a natural disaster and the Parliament's decision to allocate certain funds to compensate the victims did not create any right under Swedish law for the applicants.   Nor can such a right be derived from Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).   The Commission further recalls that the applicants received compensation from their insurance company for the loss of the   buildings, but they did not receive any compensation for the land.   Nevertheless, according to the Government, the compensation for the buildings covered the value of the properties, including the land.           The Commission finds, in view of the above, that the facts of the case do not disclose an interference by the State with the applicants' right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions.           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       The Commission finds no appearance of a violation of the other provisions invoked by the applicants.   The remainder of the application is therefore also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     Secretary to the Commission              President of the Commission          (H. C. KRÜGER)                          (C.A. NØRGAARD)