CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 7 janvier 1991

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                          AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12526/86                       by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED                       against Sweden           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 7 January 1991, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   S. TRECHSEL                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H. DANELIUS              Sir   Basil HALL              Mr.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              MM.   J.-C. GEUS                   A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                Mr.   J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 10 June 1986 by Elsa BJÖRKGREN and Sture ED against Sweden and registered on 10 November 1986 under file No. 12526/86;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having regard to the observations submitted by the Government on 31 March 1989, on 8 June 1989 and on 11 May 1990 and the observations submitted by the applicants on 18 May 1989, on 13 March 1990 and on 5 July 1990;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.           The application was originally lodged by Elsa Björkgren and Sture Ed, both Swedish citizens living in Johanneshov and Stockholm, respectively.   They were both retired.   On 4 January 1990 the first applicant died.   Her husband and sole heir, Tage Björkgren, decided to pursue the application.   The applicants are represented by Jan Axelsson, a lawyer practising in Stockholm.           The applicants, who were brother and sister, owned the property Sicklaön 13:48 in the municipality of Nacka in the County of Stockholm.           Soon after the applicants' father's acquisition of the property, on which a dwelling-house and certain other buildings had previously been constructed, Regulations for Non-Planned Areas (utomplansbestämmelser) were introduced, requiring a permit for construction on the property.           According to the applicants a prohibition on construction (byggnadsförbud) was, in 1948, issued to prevent urban development (tätbebyggelse) within an area not covered by a town plan or a building plan.   In the Government's view the applicants in this respect probably refer to a prohibition on construction similar to the kind of prohibition based on Section 56 of the 1959 Building Ordinance (byggnadsstadgan), according to which the authorities were, in principle, obliged not to grant permits for such new buildings or major alterations of buildings as would have resulted in urban development within an area not covered by a town plan or a building plan.           In 1954 the applicants acquired the property as a gift from their father.           On 25 August 1976 Mrs.   Björkgren's request for a provisional decision regarding an exemption from the prohibition on construction was refused by the Building Committee (byggnadsnämnden; hereinafter "the Committee") of the municipality of Nacka.   Mrs.   Björkgren wished to erect a new house on the property with the intention of making it the permanent home of the applicants.           On the same day the Committee, under penalty of a fine of 10.000 SEK, ordered the applicants to demolish those buildings on the property which were considered to be beyond repair.   These were subsequently pulled down by the applicants, with the exception of the dwelling-house.           Following a proposal for a town-plan for the area, the County Administrative Board (länsstyrelsen; hereinafter "the Board") of the County of Stockholm on 18 February 1977, on the municipality's request, issued a prohibition on construction of all new buildings until 18 February 1978, pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building Act (byggnadslagen).   Such a prohibition was valid for only one year, but it could be prolonged for two years at a time.           A similar prohibition on construction was issued on 28 March 1978.   This was valid until 18 March 1979.           On 27 March 1979 the Board again issued a similar prohibition on construction.   This was valid until 28 March 1981.           On 21 November 1979 the Committee's decision, insofar as it concerned the request for an exemption from the prohibition on construction, was upheld on appeal by the Board, which, however, quashed the demolition order, since it was considered possible that the dwelling-house could be restored and that it might be of historical interest.   On 23 February 1981 the Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Stockholm rejected the Committee's appeal.           On 24 February 1981 the Board prolonged the prohibition on construction until 28 March 1983.   The applicants' appeal in this respect was rejected by the Government on 29 April 1982.           On 21 October 1982 the Government rejected Mrs.   Björkgren's appeal regarding the provisional opinion.           On 7 June 1984 the Board issued a new prohibition on construction pursuant to Sections 15 and 35 of the Building Act.   This was valid until 7 June 1985.           On 13 June 1984, the Committee, under penalty of a fine of 5.000 SEK, issued a new demolition order concerning the dwelling- house, finding that the poor condition of the house excluded repair.           Mrs.   Björkgren states that, on 15 December 1984, she lodged a request for a building permit, but never obtained any answer.   This has not been confirmed by the Government.           On 7 March 1985 the applicants' appeal against the demolition order of 13 June 1984 was rejected by the Board, which, however, divided the penalty between the applicants.           On 31 May 1985 the Board prolonged the prohibition on construction until 31 May 1987.   This decision was upheld on appeal by the Government on 17 October 1985.           On 9 March 1986 the Administrative Court of Appeal upheld the decision by the Board of 7 March 1985.           On 9 June 1986 the applicants' request to the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) for a re-opening of the case (resning) concerning the prolongation of the prohibition on construction issued on 31 May 1985 was refused.           On 24 June 1986 Mrs.   Björkgren, in a letter to the Minister of Housing and Physical Planning (bostadsministern), requested that the municipality of Nacka should buy the applicants' property.           On 23 July 1986 the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal against the decision by the Administrative Court of Appeal of 9 March 1986.           By letter of 10 October 1986 the Minister of Housing and Physical Planning informed Mrs.   Björkgren that the municipality of Nacka had no legal obligation to buy or acquire the applicants' property and that she should contact the municipality, if she objected to the new town plan under preparation.           On 15 June 1987 a new town plan was adopted by the municipality of Nacka, to the effect that a special prohibition on construction entered into force in accordance with Sections 14 and 35 of the Building Act.           On 30 June 1987 the municipality applied for a permit from the Board to expropriate the applicants' property, on which the dwelling-house still remained.           On 1 July 1987 the new Plan and Building Act (plan- och bygglagen) entered into force.   As a result, the general and special prohibitions on construction were cancelled.           On 19 October 1987 the Board granted the municipality of Nacka a permit to expropriate the applicants' property on the grounds that it was required for future urban development in accordance with Chapter 2 Section 1 of the 1972 Expropriation Act (expropriations- lagen).   The applicants appealed to the Government, arguing that, under the terms of Chapter 2 Section 12 of this Act, the purpose of the expropriation could appropriately be attained by other means and that the detriment to the applicants' interest occasioned by such expropriation would outweigh any advantage gained.           On 22 January 1988 the new town plan, according to which dwellings containing two stores were allowed to be erected on the applicants' property, was confirmed by the Board.           In its decision of 28 April 1988 rejecting the applicants' appeal regarding the expropriation permit, the Government stated that on the basis of the preparatory works to the 1972 Expropriation Act no decisive consideration could be given to the interests of a property owner in the determination of the right of priority to land required for urban development.   Even though a property owner was equally willing to develop a property in the intended way, the municipality had to be given a permit to expropriate the property at issue.           On 17 October 1988 the municipality of Nacka requested the Real Estate Court (fastighetsdomstolen) of Stockholm to decide on the question of compensation to the applicants.   The applicants were offered 165.000 SEK by the municipality.   In the municipality's view, the dwelling-house had lost its historical value and was now in a state which prevented repair.           On 20 November 1989 the applicants sold their property to a tenant-owners' society with which the municipality had come to a development agreement (exploateringsavtal).   The expropriation proceedings instituted before the Real Estate Court were therefore discontinued and the case was struck from the Court's list.           The selling price has not been submitted by the applicants. However, in their view they received a marginally better price for their property than could be expected to be awarded by a court, but it was considerably lower than a free market price.   The applicants were also granted, for the same price as offered to the public, the right to acquire a flat in the dwelling-house erected by the tenant-owners' society.   COMPLAINTS   1.       The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an expropriation permit in respect of their property.   They allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   2.       The applicants furthermore complain that the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, caused severe deterioration of their property and deprived them of its practical use; that the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984 interfered with their right to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions; and that the decision to issue the expropriation permit deprived them of their property.   They allege violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.   3.       The applicants finally complain that they did not have an effective remedy before a national authority for the above violations of their rights under the Convention.   They allege a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.   PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 10 June 1986 and registered on 10 November 1986.           On 12 December 1988 the Commission decided that notice of the application should be given to the respondent Government and that the parties should be invited to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           After an extension of the time-limit, the Government's observations were submitted on 31 March 1989.   The applicants' observations in reply were submitted on 18 May 1989.           Further observations were submitted by the Government on 8 June 1989.   The applicants submitted further observations on 13 March 1990.   After an extension of the time-limit the Government submitted further observations in reply on 11 May 1990.   Further observations by the applicants were submitted on 5 July 1990.           The Commission decided to grant legal aid to the applicants on 14 April 1989.   THE LAW   1.       Mr.   Tage Björkgren, the husband and sole heir of Mrs. Björkgren, has expressed the wish to pursue the application introduced by Mrs.   Björkgren who died on 4 January 1990.   He argues that as he is the sole heir of Mrs.   Björkgren, he has acquired the initial and legitimate interest in having a violation established by the Commission, especially since all complaints have a bearing on his late wife's property.           The Government submit that the estate cannot arguably claim to be a victim entitled to lodge an application under Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.   In the Government's opinion a transfer of the victim notion can be accepted only if a person can be said to have been affected by the original alleged violation in a way similar to that in which the original victim was affected.           Under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention the Commission "may receive petitions... from any person... claiming to be a victim of a violation ... of the rights set forth in (the) Convention".           The Commission recalls its case-law (No. 10474/87, Dec. 6.5.86, D.R. 47 p. 116 with further references) according to which the applicant's death does not in itself dispose of his or her complaint.   In principle, it falls to the Convention organ before which the case is pending to decide whether the application should be further examined or whether it should be struck off the list of cases. In the examination of this question, special consideration must be given to the intentions exposed by the applicant's legal successor as well as to the nature of the complaint.   However, the heir of a deceased applicant cannot claim a general right to have the examination of an application introduced by a deceased person continued by the Commission (Kofler v.   Italy, Comm.   Report 9.10.82, D.R. 30 p. 9 para. 16).           The present complaints relate to the applicants' property, including the first applicant's estate.   As regards the latter, the Commission finds that the claim is transferable and that Mr.   Björkgren, as the sole heir, has a sufficient legal interest in the outcome of the proceedings before the Convention organs.   It concludes that the husband of Mrs.   Björkgren may take over and continue the proceedings instituted by Mrs.   Björkgren before the Commission.   2.       The applicants complain that they could not obtain a court determination of the lawfulness under Swedish law of the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, or of the decision to issue an expropriation permit.   They allege a violation of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention reads, insofar as it is relevant, as follows:   "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal..."           The Government submit that the proceedings of which the applicants complain must be examined separately.           The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with the first prohibition on construction and terminating with the expropriation proceedings.   Thus, the Commission should deal with this whole series of events.           The Commission considers that in the light of the nature of the applicants' complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6) the proceedings concerned must be examined separately.   (a)      Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 of the Convention refers to the prohibitions on construction issued on 18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978, on 27 March 1979 and on 7 June 1984 as well as to the prolongation on 24 February 1981 of the prohibition on construction, the Commission considers that it is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicants disclose any appearance of a violation of the Convention, as Article 26 of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken".           In the present case the decisions of the Board, which were the final decisions regarding the issuing of new prohibitions on construction, were given on 18 February 1977, on 28 March 1978, on 27 March 1979 and on 7 June 1984.   The decision of the Government, which was the final decision regarding the prolongation of the prohibition on construction, was given on 29 April 1982.   However, the application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June 1986, that is, more than six months after the dates of the above decisions. Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.           It follows that the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   (b)      Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention refers to the prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the prohibition on construction, the Commission refers to the above six months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention. The Commission furthermore recalls that according to its established case-law the "final decision" within the meaning of Article 26 (Art. 26) refers solely to the final decision involved in the exhaustion of all domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law.   In particular, only a remedy which is "effective and sufficient" can be considered for this purpose (see e.g. No. 654/59, Dec. 3.6.60, Yearbook 4 pp. 276, 282; No. 9266/81, Dec. 28.1.83, D.R. 30 pp. 155, 187).           The Commission finds that, in the present case, the applicant's request for a re-opening of the case concerning the prolongation on 31 May 1985 of the prohibition on construction was not an effective remedy under the generally recognised rules of international law.   Consequently, the decision regarding this request cannot be taken into consideration in determining the date of the final decision for the purpose of applying the six months time-limit laid down in Article 26 (Art. 26).           The final decision regarding the prolongation of the prohibition on construction issued on 7 June 1984 is accordingly the decision of the Government which was given on 17 October 1985, whereas the present application was submitted to the Commission on 10 June 1986, that is, more than six months after the date of this decision. Furthermore, an examination of the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.           It follows that also the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   (c)       Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention refers to the proceedings concerning the expropriation permit ending with the Government's decision of 28 April 1988, the Commission considers that the issues to be decided are whether the decision to issue an expropriation permit was decisive for the applicants' "civil rights and obligations" and, if so, whether a genuine dispute of a serious nature arose between the applicants and the authorities in relation to this decision.   In the affirmative, it would have to be determined whether the applicants had at their disposal a procedure satisfying the conditions of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention with regard to that dispute.           The Government waive objections against the admissibility of the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) and admit that it was not at the time possible under Swedish law to have the decision of 28 April 1988 reviewed by a court.           The Commission finds that the complaint in this respect under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   As no other ground for declaring it inadmissible has been established, the complaint is admissible.   3.       The applicants complain that the decision to issue the expropriation permit, the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, and the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984 violated Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.           Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) reads:   "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.   The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."           The Government submit that each measure complained of must be examined separately.   Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the prohibitions on construction based on the decisions of 18 February 1977, 28 March 1978, 27 March 1979 and 7 June 1984, the complaint is inadmissible, since the applicants did not exhaust domestic remedies.   Insofar as the complaint concerns the prohibitions on construction based on the decisions of 24 February 1981 and 31 May 1985 and the prohibitions on construction in combination with the demolition order of 13 June 1984, the applicants did not introduce their complaint within six months from the dates of the final domestic decisions.   The complaint in this respect is therefore also inadmissible.           The applicants contend that the various decisions prohibiting construction on the property, including the refusal of an exemption from this prohibition, created a continuing situation starting with the first prohibition on construction and ending with the expropriation proceedings.   Thus, the Commission should deal with this series of events as a whole.           The Commission recalls that the Court in the Sporrong and Lönnroth case (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 23 September 1982, Series A No. 52, p. 23, para. 60) considered that the expropriation permits and the prohibitions on construction at issue should in principle be examined together, as they had the single objective of facilitating development in accordance with successive plans prepared for that purpose.   Moreover, the present applicants' complaint about the demolition order is linked to the prohibitions on construction.   The Commission therefore finds that the measures of which the applicants complain under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention must be seen as a whole and be examined together.           Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) concerns the expropriation permit, the Government submit that the interference was justified in view of the aim pursued and as being effected in the general interest; that, at the time when the applicants lodged their complaints, the question of compensation for the expropriation was still pending before the Stockholm Real Estate Court, which, when considering the question of compensation, could also review the expropriation permit under certain circumstances; that the applicants can therefore not be considered to have exhausted domestic remedies; and that in, any case, consideration should be given to the agreement reached regarding compensation.           Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) refers to the prohibitions on construction and to the prohibitions on construction in combination with the demolition order, the Government submit that the complaint is manifestly ill-founded; that the decisions were justified under the second paragraph of the provision since they were made in the general interest in order to control the use of the applicants' property; that the prohibitions on construction only prevented the applicants from erecting new buildings or from building substantial additions to the existing one; and that the applicants never requested an exemption from these prohibitions. The Government invoke the wide margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State when deciding matters falling under this provision.           The applicants contend that the decision to issue the expropriation permit was an unlawful deprivation of their possessions which did not serve the public interest or the purpose of the interference.   The situation of which they complain is similar to the Sporrong and Lönnroth case (loc. cit.) in the sense that their right of ownership was rendered precarious by the expropriation permit. Thus, the case should be examined under the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and, therefore, be distinguished from the Allan Jacobsson case in which the interference was examined under the second paragraph of this provision, inter alia, on the ground that no expropriation permit was issued (Eur. Court H.R., judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A No. 163, p. 16, para. 54).           The applicants contend that the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, constituted an unjustified interference, as they had to bear an individual and excessive burden, not having the possibility of claiming compensation for the prohibitions; that they objected to the prohibitions in several applications and appeals; and that they once asked for a preliminary opinion regarding an exemption from a prohibition.           Insofar as their complaint refers to the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, in combination with the demolition order, the applicants contend that the bad state of the building was caused by the prohibitions on construction, which prevented repair.           The Commission considers that the complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) raises the issue whether the cumulative effect of, on the one hand, the decisions to prohibit construction, seen as a whole, and, on the other hand, the expropriation permit may be said to be justified under this provision, or, alternatively, whether the prohibitions on construction, seen as a whole, were justified under the second paragraph of Article 1 (Art. 1-2).           The Commission does not, for the reasons stated below, find it necessary to determine whether the complaint should be examined under the first or the second sentence of Article 1 (Art. 1).   It notes that the applicants acquired their property only after a prohibition on construction had already come into effect.   The Court has found that a property owner cannot reasonably have been unaware of the state of the law as to the restrictions on the use of his property already imposed on the property when this was acquired by him (above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit., p. 18, paras. 59-61).           Furthermore, the Commission observes that the decisions to prohibit construction issued under Sections 15 and 35 of the Building Act were only valid for one year, with the possibility of a prolongation for a period of two years at a time.   The need to maintain them was thus examined at regular intervals.   Moreover, the proceedings following a request for a provisional or final decision regarding an exemption from a prohibition on construction provided a possibility for weighing the public interest against that of the individual (above-mentioned Allan Jacobsson judgment, loc.cit., pp. 18-19, para. 62).   Finally, contrary to the Sporrong and Lönnroth case where the expropriation permits were in force for twenty-three and eight years, respectively, the expropriation permit was, in the present case, in force for only two years before the development agreement was reached and the expropriation proceedings were discontinued.           In view of the above considerations an examination of this complaint as it has been submitted does not disclose any appearance of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).           It follows that this complaint is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.       The applicants finally complain that they had no effective remedy before a national authority for the above violation of their rights under the Convention.   They allege a violation of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, which reads:   "Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity."           The Government submit that no separate issue arises under this provision.           The Commission finds that the issue under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, insofar as it concerns the absence of a court determination with regard to the expropriation permit, is closely linked to the corresponding issue under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention which the Commission has found above to be admissible. This complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention is therefore also admissible.           Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention concerns the absence of a court determination with regard to the decisions to prohibit construction, the Commission has found above that the corresponding complaint under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention must be rejected as introduced out of time. Consequently, the complaint in this respect under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention must be rejected on the same grounds.           Insofar as the applicants' complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention concerns the alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the Commission has found above that the complaint under Article 1 (Art. 1) is manifestly ill-founded.   The Commission finds, for similar reasons, that the applicants' claim of a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) cannot be regarded as "arguable" for the purpose of Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Powell and Rayner judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A No. 172, para. 33). Accordingly, Article 13 of the Convention does not in this respect entitle the applicants to a remedy in domestic law.   Consequently, this complaint under Article 13 (Art. 13) is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission, by a majority,           DECLARES ADMISSIBLE, without prejudging the merits of the         case, the applicants' complaints under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1)         and Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention concerning the         absence of a court determination of the lawfulness of the         expropriation permit;           DECLARES INADMISSIBLE the remainder of the application.     Deputy Secretary to the Commission       President of the Commission                (J. RAYMOND)                         (C.A. NØRGAARD)