CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 17 avril 1991

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS   Application No. 13441/87   Stig and Gun OLSSON   against   SWEDEN   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION   (adopted on 17 April 1991)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                               page     I.    INTRODUCTION (paras. 1-13) ...........................    1        A.   The application          (paras. 2-4)   ....................................    1        B.   The proceedings          (paras. 5-9) .....................................    1        C.   The present Report          (paras. 10-13) ...................................    2     II.   ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS (paras. 14-93) ............    3        A.   The particular circumstances of the case          (paras. 14-70) ...................................    3        B.   Relevant domestic law          (paras. 71-93) ...................................   22            a.   The 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the              Care of Young Persons (paras. 72-78) .........   22            b.   The Social Services Act (paras. 79-84) .......   23            c.   The Parental Code (paras. 85-91) .............   24            d.   The 1990 Act (para. 92) ......................   25            e.   The Administrative Courts Procedure Act              (para. 93) ...................................   26     III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION (paras. 94-185) ............   27        A.   Complaints declared admissible          (para. 94) .......................................   27        B.   Points at issue          (para. 95) .......................................   27        C.   Scope of the Commission's examination          (paras. 96-99) ...................................   27        D.   Article 8 of the Convention          (paras. 100-130) .................................   28            a.   Whether there was an interference with the              the applicants' right to respect for their              family life (paras. 103-106) .................   29            b.   Whether the interference was "in accordance              with the law" (paras. 107-118) ...............   30                aa.   The restrictions on access                   (paras. 110-113) ........................   30                bb.   The prohibition on removal                   (paras. 114-118) ........................   31              c.   Whether the interference pursued a legitimate              aim (para. 119) ..............................   31            d.   Whether the interference was "necessary in a              democratic society" (paras. 120-130) .........   32        E.   Article 6 of the Convention          (paras. 131-168) .................................   35            a.   Judicial review of the restrictions on              access (paras. 132-134) ......................   35            b.   Length of the proceedings concerning the              termination of the care orders              (paras. 135-147) .............................   36            c.   Length of the proceedings relating to the              applicants' request under Chapter 21 Section 7              of the Parental Code (paras. 148-151) ........   38            d.   Hearing before the Supreme Administrative              Court (paras. 152-161) .......................   38            e.   The appointment of the guardian ad litem              on 17 July 1987 (paras. 162-165) .............   40            f.   Length of the proceedings concerning the              appointment of a guardian ad litem              (paras. 166-168) .............................   41        F.   Article 13 of the Convention          (paras. 169-175) .................................   41            a.   The claim in respect of the restrictions              on access (paras. 172-173) ...................   41            b.   The claim in respect of the guardian              ad litem (paras. 174-175) ....................   42        G.   Recapitulation (paras. 176-185) ..................   42   Partly dissenting opinion of Mr.   Trechsel joined by MM. H.G. Schermers and J.-C. Geus ......................   44   APPENDIX I :   HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ..................   45   APPENDIX II:   DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ...............   46   I.       INTRODUCTION   1.       The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.     A.       The application   2.       The applicants are a married couple, the husband born in 1941 and the wife in 1944.   They are Swedish citizens and reside at Angered in the vicinity of Gothenburg.   The applicants are represented before the Commission by Mrs.   Siv Westerberg, a lawyer practising at Gothenburg.   3.       The application is directed against Sweden.   The Government are represented by their Agent Mr.   Carl Henrik Ehrenkrona, legal adviser at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, Stockholm.   4.       The case relates to the prohibition on the applicants to remove their children from their foster homes and to various proceedings relating to the termination of the care order, regarding the applicants' children and the prohibition on removal.   The case raises issues under Articles 6, 8 and 13 of the Convention.     B.       The proceedings   5.       The application was introduced on 23 October 1987 and registered on 3 December 1987.   The Commission decided on 14 December 1988 to give notice of the application to the respondent Government and to invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application.           The Government's observations were dated 27 April 1989 and the applicants' observations in reply were dated 13 June 1989. Further observations were received from the Government on 14 September 1989 and from the applicants on 27 September, 6 and 13 October, 6, 16, 17 and 22 November, 6, 20 and 21 December 1989, 25 and 31 January, 13, 21, 23 and 28 February, 29 March and 9 April 1990.   6.       On 16 February 1990 the Commission granted legal aid to the applicants.   7.      On 7 May 1990 the Commission declared the application admissible.   8.        On 18 May 1990 the text of the decision on admissibility was communicated to the parties who were invited to submit any additional observations or further evidence they wished to submit and to reply to certain questions put by the Commission.   The applicants submitted observations by letter dated 19 June 1990 and the Government by letter dated 19 September 1990.   Further letters were received from the applicants on 11 and 31 May, 1, 9, 12, 17 and 29 June, 6 and 17 July, 1, 9, 10, 14, 24 and 31 August, 4, 17 and 25 September, 12, 15, 19 and 23 October, 13 and 22 November as well as 19 December 1990 and 15 and 28 January 1991.   9.      After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement of the case.   In the light of the parties' reactions the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which a friendly settlement can be effected.     C.       The present Report   10.      The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes in plenary session, the following members being present:                   MM.   C.A. NØRGAARD, President                      J.A. FROWEIN                      S. TRECHSEL                      F. ERMACORA                      G. SPERDUTI                      E. BUSUTTIL                      G. JÖRUNDSSON                      A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                      H.G. SCHERMERS                      H. DANELIUS                 Mrs.   G.H. THUNE                 Sir   Basil HALL                 MM.   F. MARTINEZ                      C.L. ROZAKIS                 Mrs.   J. LIDDY                 MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                      J.C. GEUS                      A.V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO                      M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                      B. MARXER           The text of the Report was adopted by the Commission on 17 April 1991 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   11.      The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 para. 1 of the Convention, is           (1)      to establish the facts, and           (2)      to state an opinion as to whether the facts found                 disclose a breach by the State concerned of its                 obligations under the Convention.   12.      A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application forms Appendix II.   13.      The pleadings of the parties and the documents concerning the case are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.       Particular circumstances of the case   14.      The applicants have three children: Stefan, born in June 1971, Helena, born in December 1976, and Thomas, born in January 1979.   15.      The children were taken into public care, pursuant to Sections 25 (a) and 29 of the 1960 Act on Child Welfare (barnavårdslagen), by a decision of the Social District Council No. 6 (sociala distriktsnämnden 6) of Gothenburg of 16 September 1980.   Since the applicants did not consent to the Council's decision, the matter was submitted to the County Administrative Court (länsrätten) of the County of Gothenburg and Bohus, which by a judgment of 30 December 1980 confirmed the Council's decision.   The Court found that the health and development of the children were jeopardised as a result of the parents' inability to give them satisfactory care and education. The Administrative Court of Appeal (kammarrätten) of Gothenburg, on 8 July 1981, confirmed the judgment of the County Administrative Court and the Supreme Administrative Court (regeringsrätten) refused leave to appeal on 27 August 1981.   16.      On being taken into care the applicants' children were placed in a children's home in Gothenburg.   From 28 February 1981 Stefan was placed in a foster home at Tibro, approximately 100 kilometres from the applicants' home in Gothenburg, and from 28 June 1983 in a children's home at Vänersborg, approximately 80 kilometres north of Gothenburg.   Helena and Thomas were placed in separate foster homes - Helena at Näsviken on 21 October 1980 and Thomas at Ljusne on 10 November 1980.   These foster homes are situated about 100 kilometres from each other and the distances between the foster homes and Gothenburg are about 630 and 590 kilometres, respectively.   17.      The applicants' right of access to their children was restricted during the periods in which the children were in public care.   Stefan spent three or four weeks with his parents in the summer of 1982.   On 10 August 1982 the Social Council decided, pursuant to Section 16 (1) of the 1980 Act with Special Provisions on the Care of Young Persons (lagen med särskilda bestämmelser om vård av unga, hereinafter referred to as "the 1980 Act"), to limit their access to him to one visit every six weeks.   After 22 April 1984 the applicants were allowed to see Stefan every week, mostly at their home.   18.      On 21 October 1980 the Social Council decided to prohibit access to Helena and Thomas at their foster homes, in accordance with Section 41 of the 1960 Act, and to prohibit disclosure of their whereabouts.   The applicants were allowed to meet the children elsewhere every second month.   The restriction was lifted in September 1981, but in February 1983 the Social Council decided to restrict the applicants' right of access to Helena and Thomas to one visit every third month in the foster homes.   This restriction remained in force for the remainder of the period during which Helena and Thomas were in public care.   19.      The applicants made a request for termination of the care of their children in 1982, which was rejected by the Social Council.   The rejection was confirmed by the County Administrative Court on 17 November 1982 and by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 20 December 1982.   The Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.   20.      Another request by the applicants to the Social Council for termination of the care of the children was refused on 6 December 1983.   21.      On 9 October 1984 the Social Council refused to accept Mrs.   Westerberg as representative of the applicants in matters under the 1980 Act.   The applicants' appeal was rejected by the County Administrative Court on 14 January 1985 and by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 7 February 1985.   On 10 May 1985 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed the above decisions, finding no sufficient reasons for not accepting Mrs.   Westerberg as the applicants' representative.   22.      On 30 October 1984 and 17 September 1985, the Social Council rejected further requests by the applicants for termination of the care of Helena and Thomas and of Stefan, respectively.   Appeals by the applicants against these decisions were rejected by the County Administrative Court on 3 October 1985 and 3 February 1986, respectively.   23.      The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal, which joined the two cases.   The hearing was scheduled for 21 August 1986, but was postponed.   After holding a hearing on 4 February 1987 at which the applicants were present and gave evidence, the Administrative Court of Appeal, by judgment of 16 February 1987, decided that the public care of Stefan be terminated.   Stefan was subsequently reunited with his parents.   However, the appeal concerning Helena and Thomas was dismissed.   The Administrative Court of Appeal's decision that the public care of these two children should continue was based primarily on the finding that the applicants were unable to understand and satisfy the special needs arising in connection with the reunification of parents and children after so long a period of separation.   24.      Following a further appeal by the applicants, the Supreme Administrative Court, by judgment of 18 June 1987, ordered that the public care of Helena and Thomas should terminate there being no sufficiently serious circumstances to justify its continuation.   The Supreme Administrative Court pointed out that the question to be determined in deciding whether care should be discontinued pursuant to Section 5 of the 1980 Act was whether there was still a need for care. The problems associated with the removal of a child from a foster home and its possible detrimental effects on him and with his reunification with his natural parents - on which the Administrative Court of Appeal had relied - were matters to be considered not under Section 5 but in separate proceedings, namely an investigation under Section 28 of the 1980 Social Services Act (socialtjänstlagen).   The latter Section empowers a Social Council to prohibit, for a certain period of time or until further notice, the removal from a foster home of a minor who is not or is no longer in public care, if there is thereby a risk, which is not of a minor nature, of harming his physical or mental health.   25.      The applicants have previously submitted an application (No. 10465/83) concerning the public care of their children.   The applicants mainly complained about the taking into care of their children, about the refusal to terminate the care and about the implementation of the care decision.   The Commission found that the care decisions concerning the applicants' children in combination with the placement of the children in separate foster homes far from each other and far away from the applicants constituted a violation of Article 8 of the Convention (Olsson v.   Sweden, Comm.   Report 2.12.86, para. 179, Eur.   Court H.R., Series B No. 130).   The Court found that the implementation of the care decision, but not the decision itself or its maintenance in force, gave rise to a breach of Article 8 of the Convention (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A No. 130-A).   The Court stated inter alia:   "... the Court has come to the conclusion that the impugned decision (care order) was supported by 'sufficient' reasons and that, having regard to their margin of appreciation, the Swedish authorities were reasonably entitled to think that it was necessary to take the children into care, especially since preventive measures had proved unsucessful" (para. 74);   and:   "the Court has come to the conclusion that in 1982 the Swedish authorities had 'sufficient' reasons for thinking that it was necessary for the care decision to remain in force.   Neither has it been established that a different situation obtained when they subsequently maintained the care decision until its final reversal on different dates in the first half of 1987" (para. 77);   and as for the implementation of the care order:   "the Court would first observe that there appears to have been no question of the children's being adopted.   The care decision should therefore have been regarded as a temporary measure, to be discontinued as soon as circumstances permitted, and any measures of implementation should have been consistent with the ultimate aim of reuniting the Olsson family.   In point of fact, the steps taken by the Swedish authorities ran counter to such an aim.   The ties between members of a family and the prospects of their sucessful reunification will perforce be weakened if impediments are placed in the way of their having easy and regular access to each other. Yet the very placement of Helena and Thomas at so great a distance from their parents and from Stefan ... must have adversely affected the possibility of contacts between them. This situation was compounded by the restrictions imposed by the authorities on parental access; whilst those restrictions may to a certain extent have been warranted by the applicants' attitude towards the foster families ..., it is not to be excluded that the failure to establish a harmonious relationship was partly due to the distances involved.   It is true that regular contacts were maintained between Helena and Thomas, but the reasons given by the Government for not placing them together ... are not convincing.   It is also true that Stefan had special needs, but this is not sufficient to justify the distance that separated him from the other two children. ...   There is nothing to suggest that the Swedish authorities did not act in good faith in implementing the care decision. However, this does not suffice to render a measure "necessary" in Convention terms ...: an objective standard has to be applied in this connection.   Examination of the Government's arguments suggests that it was partly administrative difficulties that prompted the authorities' decisions; yet, in so fundamental an area as respect for family life, such considerations cannot be allowed to play more than a secondary role.   In conclusion, in the respects indicated above and despite the applicants' unco-operative attitude ..., the measures taken in implementation of the care decision were not supported by 'sufficient' reasons justifying them as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   They were therefore, notwithstanding the domestic authorities' margin of appreciation, not 'necessary in a democratic society'" (paras. 81-83).   26.      On 23 June 1987 (five days after the last judgment terminating the care), the Social Council, pursuant to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, prohibited the applicants until further notice from removing Helena and Thomas from their respective foster homes.   The Council considered that there was a risk, which was not of a minor nature, of harming Helena's and Thomas' physical and mental health by separating them from the foster homes.   The reasons given for this were inter alia that a long time had passed since their parents last took care of them, that they only had little contact with their parents during the public care, that they had emotional ties with their foster homes and that Helena had expressed a wish not to leave the foster home.   27.      On 25 June 1987 the applicants' application for a suspension (inhibition) of this prohibition was refused by the County Administrative Court.   This decision was confirmed by the Administrative Court of Appeal on 2 July 1987 and, on 17 August 1987, the Supreme Administrative Court refused leave to appeal.   28.      On 4 August 1987 the applicants' representative, Mrs. Westerberg, received some documents in the case, relating to the prohibition on removal, from the County Administrative Court.   Among these was a decision of 17 July 1987, whereby the District Court (tingsrätten) of Gothenburg, upon a request made by the Social Council on 1 July 1987, had appointed CÅ guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas according to Chapter 18 Section 2 of the Parental Code (föräldrabalken).   The Social Council had requested that the matter be decided urgently, for which reason the applicants were not heard.   The applicants had not been informed of the decision by the District Court and the time limit for an appeal had expired.   29.      On 5 August 1987 the applicants requested that the guardian ad litem be dismissed.   Their request was granted by the District Court on 26 October 1987.   The Court stated that CÅ had been appointed guardian ad litem for the purpose of applying for legal aid for Thomas and Helena and for the appointment of an official counsel for them.   CÅ was appointed their official counsel by the County Administrative Court on 31 July 1987 and on the same day they were granted legal aid.   The Court dismissed CÅ as guardian ad litem as he had completed this mission.   30.      On 27 October 1987 the Social District Council again requested that CÅ be appointed guardian ad litem for Helena and Thomas.   This time the District Court invited the applicants to state their opinion before the decision was taken.   On 12 February 1988 the Court granted the request finding that the children's interests might be opposed to those of their parents in the proceedings concerning the prohibition on removal and also in proceedings concerning the applicants' request that the children be returned to them in accordance with the rules laid down in Chapter 21 of the Parental Code.   The Court considered CÅ suitable as guardian ad litem as he was well acquainted with the matter.   It found that the objections made by the spouses Olsson as regards CÅ's suitability were due to the fact that he had taken a position opposite to theirs.   31.      The applicants appealed to the Court of Appeal for Western Sweden (hovrätten för Västra Sverige), which on 23 August 1988 rejected their appeal.   On 8 November 1988 the Supreme Court (högsta domstolen) refused the applicants leave to appeal.   32.      In the meantime, the applicants appealed to the County Administrative Court against the decision to prohibit them from moving Helena and Thomas.   They requested that the Court appoint Dr. Fedor-Freybergh to give an expert opinion.   On 3 July 1987 the Court decided to ask Chief Doctor Per Jonsson and Chief Doctor George Finney to give an opinion not later than 6 August 1987 as to whether there would be any risk of harm to Helena and Thomas if they were to be moved from their foster homes.   These doctors had previously given expert opinions in the proceedings concerning the termination of the care order.   33.      Chief Doctor Per Jonsson in an opinion of 14 July 1987 concluded that "moving Helena against her will would entail a considerable risk to her mental well-being and also a great risk to her physical health if, in desperation, she were to implement her plans of running away".   In an opinion of 3 September 1987 Chief Doctor George Finney stated inter alia that "moving Thomas now would be disastrous to his mental development both emotionally and intellectually".   In an opinion of the same date the certified psychologist Göran Löthman stated that moving Thomas would not be in his best interests.   34.      The Social Council and CÅ recommended that the appeal be rejected.   The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before the County Administrative Court.   In its judgment of 3 November 1987 the Court stated the following:           "According to Section 28 of the Social Services Act, the         Social Council may, for a certain period of time or until         further notice, prohibit the guardian of a minor from taking         the minor from a foster home, if there is a risk, which is         not of a minor nature, of harming the child's physical or         mental health by separating it from the foster home.           As a background to how Section 28 of the Social Services         Act should be interpreted the County Administrative Court         quotes the Minister in the Government Bill proposing the         Social Services Act and the Standing Social Committee of         the Parliament (riksdagens socialutskott).           The Minister: 'The aim of the provision is to safeguard the         best interests of the children.   Basically it is the         guardian's right to determine the domicile of the child.         This right can in certain circumstances be in conflict with         the child's best interests.   The provision provides a         possibility to suspend the guardian's right to decide over         the child.           The condition for this is that there is a risk which is not         of a minor nature that the child's physical or mental health         would be harmed, if it was forced to move from the home where         it is staying.   Only a passing disturbance or other occasional         disadvantage is not a sufficient ground for issuing a         prohibition on removal.   Among the factors to be considered         are the age of the child, the degree of development, character         and emotional ties.   Furthermore, the time the child has been         cared for away from the parents, the living conditions it has         and those it would come to, must be considered.   The parents'         contacts with the child during the period they have been         separated must also be taken into account.   An important         element in the assessment whether there is a need to issue a         prohibition on removal is the child's own preference.   If the         child has reached the age of 15 years, its preference must not         be opposed without good reasons.   Even the preferences of         younger children must be considered.   The child's preferences         can be of importance in considering the risk of damage to the         child as a result of a removal.   In this connection it should         be noted that a prohibition on removal according to the new         provisions can be issued until the child is 18 years old.'           The Standing Social Committee of the Parliament: 'The fact         that the Section follows the pattern of a previous provision         regulating the same matter, does not imply that the intention         is to codify earlier practice characterised by the views of the         past on children's rights and needs.   The Committee therefore,         in connection with the statements on the issue in the         Government Bill (Volume A p. 541), stresses that the provision         is aimed at safeguarding the best interests of the child.   The         guardian's interest in determining the domicile of the child         must give way when it conflicts with what is in the best         interests of the child.   In addition to what has been stated         in the Government Bill the Committee wants to point out that         a separation generally involves a risk of damage to the         child.   Repeated transfers and transfers which take place         after a long time when the child has managed to develop strong         links with the home where it lives should thus not be accepted         without good reasons.   Children's needs for secure relations         and living conditions must to as large an extent as possible be         decisive in any decision on these questions.'           From the judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of         18 June 1987 it appears that Helena and Thomas were taken into         public care in September 1980 by the Social District Council         No. 6 of Gothenburg.   The Council's decision was confirmed by         the County Administrative Court.   The Administrative Court of         Appeal of Gothenburg confirmed the County Administrative         Court's judgment and the Supreme Administrative Court did not         grant leave to appeal.   The children were placed in separate         foster homes, Helena at Näsviken and Thomas at Ljusne, both           homes approximately a thousand kilometres from the home of         their parents.   The addresses of the foster homes were not         given to the spouses Olsson during the period October 1980 to         September 1981.   From then and during most of the stay in the         foster homes the spouses Olsson's right of access to the         children has been restricted to one visit every three months.           According to the information submitted by the children's         guardian ad litem, Gun Olsson has not met Helena and Thomas         since the summer of 1984.   Stig Olsson has, together with         Stefan, visited Helena and Thomas in the spring of 1987         and on a few occasions during the last years he has contacted         the foster homes by telephone.           The contacts between the parental home and the children,         according to the information given, have been very limited.           This might be due both to the Social District Council and the         spouses Olsson and the limited contacts between parents and         children also make a reunification appear complicated.   Firstly,         to assess the children's own preferences, it appears natural to         the County Administrative Court that the children are opposed         to moving, be it only for the reason that they, like most human         beings, try to avoid changes and prefer to stay in the         environment they are used to.   Whether the children's         preferences shall be considered must be decided on the basis         of the children's capacity to take a stand on that issue.           A comparison must be made in this connection with the provision         in Chapter 21 Section 5 of the Parental Code, which states that         enforcement according to the Parental Code must not take place         contrary to the wishes of the child, if the child is twelve         years old, or if the child is not yet twelve years old but         mature enough to have its preference considered.   Helena will         soon be eleven years old and Thomas nine years old.   Thomas         is in this respect obviously too young to have his preference         considered.   Helena is approaching the age at which there is         a better possibility to consider her preference, but the         County Administrative Court does not find it likely that she,         not yet twelve years old, is mature enough to be compared with         a twelve-year-old child.   The County Administrative Court         therefore finds no basis for taking the children's own         preferences into account.           If the children are assessed individually Thomas' mental         health does not seem to be so strong but it seems to have         improved continuously.   The County Administrative Court         finds it likely that without preparatory contacts between         Thomas and the natural parents, Thomas' mental health will         be seriously endangered if he, without sufficient preparatory         measures, is moved to his parents' home.   A prohibition on         removal is therefore justified for his part.           Helena seems stronger than her brother, but even for her part         the idea must be that the child's interest must be considered         to be more important than the parents' rights.   For her part         it also appears, considering the sporadic contacts she has         had with her parental home, that an immediate removal and         separation from the foster home, without preparatory           measures, would bring about a risk, which is not of a minor         nature, of harm to her mental health.   Also for Helena         it appears therefore for the time being that a prohibition on         removal is well-founded.           A prohibition on removal should not, in the opinion of the         County Administrative Court, be valid for too long a time.         A condition for the prohibition on removal to be revoked         is therefore that the spouses Olsson as well as the Social         District Council engage actively in improving the contacts         between parents and children.   It is difficult for the County         Administrative Court, which cannot directly participate in the         work and follow the development, to fix a time limit for an         endeavour of this kind.   The prohibition on removal issued         by the Social District Council shall therefore be valid until         further notice."   35.      The applicants appealed to the Administrative Court of Appeal. In the first place, they requested that the prohibition on removal be revoked and, in the second place, that it be limited in time, at the utmost until 6 January 1988.   They requested that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert.   The Social District Council and the children's guardian ad litem recommended that the appeal be rejected. The applicants did not request a hearing and no hearing was held before the Court of Appeal.   The Court gave judgment on 30 December 1987.   It refused the applicants' request that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert and rejected the appeal, giving, inter alia, the following reasons:           "As has been accounted for in detail by the County         Administrative Court in the judgment that has been appealed         against, the contact between the spouses Olsson and their         children Helena and Thomas have for a long time been very         limited.   A reunification between them is therefore complicated         and requires relatively extensive preparations.   There is         nothing in the investigation to show that there have been any         appropriate preparations for a reunification.   The prohibition         on removal should therefore continue and according to the         Administrative Court of Appeal there is not now any basis for         deciding when the removal can be brought about without a risk         of harm to the children's mental health.   Against the         background of the conflicts that characterise the contacts         between the children's foster homes and the Social Council, on         the one hand, and the spouses Olsson and their counsel, on the         other hand, there is no reason in this case to set a time limit         for the prohibition on removal.   The Administrative Court of         Appeal therefore agrees with the County Administrative Court's         assessment that the prohibition shall be valid until further         notice."   36.      The applicants appealed against the judgment to the Supreme Administrative Court requesting, firstly, that the prohibition on removal be revoked, and secondly, that it be limited in time until 15 March 1988.   They repeated their request that Dr.   Fedor-Freybergh be appointed an expert.   They alleged inter alia that, as the European Court of Human Rights in its judgment of 24 March 1988 had found that Sweden had violated the Convention by keeping Helena and Thomas in foster homes far from them and from each other and with a very restricted access to the children for the applicants, a continued   prohibition on removal would mean that Sweden continued to violate their human rights and refused to abide by the judgment of the European Court.   The applicants requested a hearing before the Supreme Administrative Court.   37.      On 4 February 1988 the Supreme Administrative Court granted the applicants leave to appeal and decided to ask for a written opinion from the National Board of Heal