CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 1 juillet 1991

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 13800/88                       by K.                       against Sweden             The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 1 July 1991, the following members being present:                 MM. C.A. NØRGAARD, President                   J.A. FROWEIN                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   E. BUSUTTIL                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A. WEITZEL                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Mrs.   G. H. THUNE              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ RUIZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              Mrs.   J. LIDDY              MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                   J.-C. GEUS                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                   B. MARXER                Mr.   J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission           Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;           Having regard to the application introduced on 14 September 1987 by K. against Sweden and registered on 26 April 1988 under file No. 13800/88;           Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;           Having regard to the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 30 January and 27 August 1990 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant on 5 June 1990 and 22 January 1991;           Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.           The applicant is a Swedish citizen, born in 1925.   She resides at L., Sweden.   Before the Commission she is represented by her lawyer, Mr.   Magnus Möller, Värnamo, Sweden.   A.       The particular circumstances of the case           The applicant was previously married to H. K..   In 1962 the District Court (tingsrätten) of Värnamo established judicial division of the joint estate (boskillnad) of the spouses at their request.   In 1977 their marriage was dissolved by the District Court of Halmstad at the request of both spouses.   The applicant maintains that she and her ex-husband have lived apart since then.           In 1986 H. K. owed approximately 60.000 Swedish crowns to the Swedish State, inter alia for arrears of taxes.   In order to cover these debts and other debts to a private creditor, the Enforcement Office (kronofogdemyndigheten) of Värnamo decided to seize (utmäta) property at the applicant's house.   On 27 October 1986 representatives of the Enforcement Office of Värnamo entered the applicant's house. She was at that moment in hospital, a fact of which the bailiff was not aware.   Furniture, such as sofas, paintings, carpets and tables, was seized as well as 30,000 Swedish crowns in cash which was found in a plastic bag under a carpet.   The decision to seize was based on "the presumption of ownership of property possessed by cohabiting couples" in Chapter 4, Section 19 of the 1981 Code of Enforcement (Utsökningsbalken) as the Enforcement Office was of the opinion that the applicant and her ex-husband still lived together.           The applicant had not been informed in advance of the bailiff's intentions.   H. K., however, was informed, in conformity with Chapter 4, Section 12 of the Code of Enforcement, about the fact that the matter of execution for his debts was pending before the Enforcement Office and that the bailiff could be expected to seize his property to cover his debts.   This information was sent to him at his address in the city of Värnamo where he rented a flat, consisting of one room and a small kitchen.   H. K. was not informed about the time and place of the seizure.   According to the Government this was in order to prevent the seizure from being obstructed.   The Enforcement Office considered the matter as urgent as it had earlier on the same day seized property at the house of some relatives of the applicant and her ex-husband.   The Enforcement Office considered there was a risk that the applicant or her ex-husband might be warned about the planned seizure by their relatives.   For the same reasons the bailiff found it necessary to enter the applicant's house without her consent.   The bailiff was assisted by a locksmith and the lock of one of the two outer doors was changed.   The Government further submit that a note was placed on the door to inform the applicant about the changing of the lock.   The applicant maintains that there was no note on the door, but that a bill from the locksmith had been left in the house.   The applicant also maintains that her house was in disorder after the seizure; for example the contents of drawers had been thrown all over the floor.   The Government deny this.           The applicant objected to the seizure submitting that she and her ex-husband divorced in 1977, and she maintained that all property seized belonged to her.   On 11 November 1986 the Enforcement Office rejected the applicant's objection.           On 17 November 1986 the applicant appealed against the seizure to the Göta Court of Appeal (Göta hovrätt).   The other parties were the State, represented by the Enforcement Office, and subsequently also her ex-husband and one of his creditors.   The applicant requested the Court to invalidate the seizure as she was the lawful owner of the furniture and money seized and had lived apart from her former husband since their divorce in 1977.   She maintained that she had an income of her own, which had made it possible for her to purchase the seized property.           On 18 December 1986 the Court of Appeal decided to stay the forced sale of the furniture until its final decision had been pronounced.   The applicant's opposite parties were invited to submit observations to the Court.           The Enforcement Office submitted observations to the Court of Appeal on 27 November and 8 December 1986 in which it was maintained that the applicant and her ex-husband still lived together and that their divorce was merely pro forma.   This view was supported inter alia by evidence submitted to the Enforcement Office by a neighbour and a person who wanted to remain anonymous.   According to the Code of Enforcement the ex-husband was therefore to be considered as the owner of the furniture seized.   This presumption the applicant had not been able to refute.   The Enforcement Office furthermore submitted evidence supporting its view that the applicant had had no financial possibility to acquire the property in question.           In reply to these observations, a copy of which she received, the applicant maintained that she did not live together with her ex-husband and that her neighbours had shown hostility towards her. The applicant did not request a hearing before the Court of Appeal nor that any witnesses be heard.           The case was examined, without a hearing, by the Court of Appeal on 2 February 1987 on the basis of the written observations submitted by the parties.   In its decision of the same day the Court stated:   (translation)   "According to Chapter 4, Section 17 of the Code of Enforcement personal property may be seized if it appears to belong to the debtor or if he, in accordance with the subsequent Sections, is to be regarded as the owner.   Section 19 provides inter alia that where the debtor actually cohabits with someone under circumstances similar to a marriage he is to be regarded as the owner of personal property which they have in their common possession if it is not rendered probable that the property is joint property or it is shown that the property belongs to the other.   In the present case the property seized was found in [the applicant's] house.   The property may - since it has not otherwise been shown that it belongs to [H.K.] - only   be seized if the examination of the case leads to the conclusion that [the applicant] and [H.K.] cohabit.   In the travaux préparatoires to the Code of Enforcement (Government Bill 1980/81:8 p. 1210) it is stated that it is not the intention that the Enforcement Office should examine very closely the cohabitants' private situation.   Further it is stated that joint ownership ought not to be presumed if it should appear questionable whether actual cohabitation under circumstances similar to a marriage exists.   This, however, does not exclude that the question of cohabitation is considered in the light of all the material the Enforcement Office has submitted.   The examination of the case shows to the Court of Appeal that [H.K.] and [the applicant] cohabit under circumstances similar to a marriage.   The property is therefore to be regarded as belonging to [H.K.] unless it may be regarded as belonging to [the applicant] or someone else. [The applicant] has not been able to show that the seized property belongs to her.   It has not been alleged that she is co-owner of the property.   There is no reason to order [the applicant] to institute proceedings in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement.   For these reasons the appeal is rejected."   In a dissenting opinion one of the judges stated:   "As regards the question whether [H.K.] actually cohabits with [the applicant] under circumstances similar to a marriage the Code of Enforcement does not permit the Enforcement Office to investigate the matter in addition to what can be established during the execution of the enforcement order or through information submitted by the debtor.   It is therefore inadmissible to base an evaluation, as in the present case, on information submitted by a neighbour and by an anonymous person.   The remaining evidence does not sufficiently establish that [H.K.] actually cohabits with [the applicant] under circumstances similar to a marriage.   For these reasons, and since the property was in [the applicant's] possession when it was seized, the seizure must be annulled."           On 23 February 1987 the applicant asked for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court (Högsta domstolen).   She requested the Court to annul the seizure.   She maintained in particular that the evidence submitted showed that the property belonged to her and that the Court of Appeal's evaluation of this, based to some extent on information from an anonymous person, was unacceptable.   Furthermore she challenged the concept of ownership set out in the Code of Enforcement which in her opinion led to unacceptable results.   The applicant did not complain about the fact that the Court of Appeal had examined the case without an oral hearing.           On 24 March 1987 the Supreme Court refused leave to appeal.           The Enforcement Office's handling of the matter was subsequently reported to the Parliamentary Ombudsman (Justitieombudsmannen) by the applicant.   Written observations were submitted to the Ombudsman by the Enforcement Office.           In his report of 23 December 1988 the Parliamentary Ombudsman stated:   (translation)   "The point of departure for the Enforcement Office was that the two divorced spouses were cohabiting under conditions similar to marriage at [the applicant's] house and that the ex-husband for that reason should be regarded as the owner of the property in question in accordance with the provisions in the Code of Enforcement and that [the applicant] had not been able to refute this presumption.   The opinion of the Enforcement Office has been accepted by the superior instances.   I have no reason to take a position on whether this assessment was correct or not.   From this point of view and under the circumstances indicated by the Enforcement Office I can neither blame the Enforcement Office for not having informed [the applicant] about the time set for the enforcement, nor for the fact that her house was entered by force.   Concerning the handling of the contents of certain drawers, the information submitted by the parties is irreconcilable. A continued investigation would probably not lead to clarity with respect to this issue.   For that reason I leave this question.   The case is closed."           The applicant has not instituted separate civil proceedings in respect of the question of ownership of the seized property.   B.       Applicable domestic law and practice           Enforcement           The Swedish Code of Enforcement of 1981, which entered into force on 1 September 1982, contains the rules applicable to the enforcement of judgments or decisions requiring a person to fulfil certain obligations, e.g. the payment of a certain amount of money. More detailed rules concerning the proceedings before the enforcement authorities are found in the 1981 Ordinance on Enforcement (Utsökningsförordningen 1981:981).           Seizure           Chapter 4 of the Code of Enforcement contains special rules concerning seizure.   By seizure is meant that property belonging to the debtor is secured by the Enforcement Office to cover the creditor's claims against the debtor.   Seized property may be sold by the Enforcement Office in accordance with the specific rules laid down in Chapter 8 of the Code of Enforcement, and the creditors are compensated by the sum obtained from the sale.           According to Chapter 4, Section 8, a request for seizure shall be made to the Enforcement Office in the district where the debtor is resident.   Such a request is made by the creditor.   After having investigated whether the debtor owns any property that can be seized, the Enforcement Office shall carry out the seizure as soon as possible (Chapter 4, Sections 9-10).           The debtor's right to be informed etc.           Before the Enforcement Office seizes the property in question, the debtor shall be informed about the case by letter or otherwise.   If there is a risk that the debtor may remove or destroy his property or if the case is urgent, this information is not required.   The enforcement may take place without the debtor being present, provided it is not required that he should be heard (Chapter 4, Sections 12-13).           Chapter 2, Section 17 of the Code of Enforcement provides that the bailiff, if needed, may search a house for carrying out the seizure.   The bailiff may unlock closed doors or in other ways enter a house for the purpose of finding objects or property that can be seized.   However, he may not enter a dwelling when the person in possession of the property is not present, unless the person in possession of the property has been informed about the time for the enforcement by letter sent to the person in possession of the property or delivered in some other appropriate manner, or there are reasons to believe that the person in possession of the property is deliberately staying away, or there are other special reasons.           According to the travaux préparatoires to the Code of Enforcement (Government Bill 1980/81:8, p. 251) special reasons for not informing the person in possession of the property usually exist in those cases where it is apparent that the debtor or someone else is trying to obstruct the enforcement.   Such reasons also exist in the circumstances mentioned in Chapter 4, Section 12, i.e. if there is a risk that property will be removed or destroyed or when the matter is urgent.   In these circumstances the Enforcement Office does not have to inform the person concerned about the enforcement.           The provision in Chapter 2, Section 17 of the Code of Enforcement is applicable not only to a dwelling owned by the debtor but also to dwellings owned by persons other than the debtor.   The same conditions as regards the obligation to give information about the enforcement apply in these cases.           The relation to a third party           According to Chapter 4, Section 17 of the Code of Enforcement, removable property may be seized on condition that it is clear that the property in question belongs to the debtor or if he is to be presumed to be the owner in accordance with what is stated in Chapter 4, Sections 18 and 19 of the Code.           The last-mentioned two provisions contain certain rules on the legal presumption of ownership for the purpose of seizure.           Chapter 4, Section 18 of the Code of Enforcement states that property in the debtor's possession shall be considered to belong to the debtor if it cannot be shown that the property belongs to someone else.           Chapter 4, Section 19 of the Code of Enforcement contains a special rule focusing on moveable property that spouses or other cohabiting couples jointly possess.   In this provision it is stated that, if the debtor is married and the spouses are cohabiting or if the debtor cohabits with someone under conditions similar to marriage, the debtor shall be presumed to be the owner of the property that they have in their joint possession.   The presumption no longer applies if it is made probable that the cohabiting persons are joint owners of the property in accordance with a special Act, the 1904 Act on Joint Ownership (lagen 1904:48, s 1 om samäganderätt), or if it is shown that the property belongs to the other cohabitee or to someone else.           The presumption of ownership applies only if it is established that the debtor is cohabiting with his spouse or with someone else under conditions similar to marriage.   The burden of proof in regard to cohabitation rests with the person who requests the seizure or, when the Enforcement Office represents the State as creditor, with that Office.   There are no specific rules in the Code of Enforcement concerning the evidence required.           The purpose of these rules is to establish who shall be regarded as the owner of the property for the purpose of seizure.   The assessments made by the Enforcement Office or the courts under these provisions have no other legal effects.   The question of which of two parties shall be regarded as the owner of property, when a dispute has arisen in this respect, must be determined by a court according to the usual principles of civil law in civil law proceedings.           Therefore, according to Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement, the Enforcement Office or a court, if there are sufficient reasons, shall invite a third party who claims to be the owner of seized property to institute proceedings against the debtor and the creditor within one month, in order to obtain the court's ruling with regard to the question of ownership.   If the third party chooses not to institute proceedings within this time-limit he loses his right against the creditor.           The application of this provision is left to the discretion of the Enforcement Office and the courts, which shall apply it only if there are sufficient reasons to invite the third party to institute proceedings.   If it is found evident that there is no purpose in instituting such proceedings the rule is not applied.   According to the established case-law in this field, it is normally required that the third party is able to make it probable that he is the owner of the seized property.           However, proceedings concerning the question of ownership can always be instituted as a matter of civil law.   Such proceedings can be instituted under Chapter 13, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure (rättegångsbalken) which, in so far as relevant, has the following wording:           (translation)           "An action to establish whether a specific legal relationship         exists or does not exist is admissible if there is an         uncertainty as to the legal relationship and this uncertainty         is to the detriment of the plaintiff."           By virtue of this provision a person who claims to be the owner of seized property can obtain the court's ruling as to the question of ownership.   The provision applies regardless of whether the third party has been invited to institute proceedings as a result of directions issued in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement, as appears from a decision of the Swedish Supreme Court of 28 March 1984 (NJA 1984 p. 222).           There are some differences between proceedings instituted as a result of directions issued in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement and proceedings instituted without such a direction.   According to Chapter 8, Section 5 para. 1 of the Code of Enforcement seized property may not be sold until the proceedings instituted as a result of directions issued in pursuance of Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement have been concluded.   As regards proceedings instituted without such a direction the same effect does not apply.   But the Enforcement Office may nevertheless, if required, according to the second paragraph of Chapter 8, Section 5 of the Code of Enforcement, postpone the date set for the sale when such proceedings have been instituted.   However, the court before which such proceedings have been instituted, is not empowered to stop further enforcement of the seizure as an interim measure.   This appears from the travaux préparatoires to the Code of Enforcement (Government Bill 1980/81:8, p. 572).           Proceedings before the Court of Appeal           According to Chapter 18, Section 1 of the Code of Enforcement the decision of the Enforcement Office to seize property can be appealed against to the Court of Appeal.   With respect to the proceedings before the Court of Appeal, the provisions of the Code of Judicial Procedure apply.   The relevant rules are found in Chapter 52 of that Code.           The proceedings according to Chapter 52 of the Code of Judicial Procedure are normally conducted in writing.   The written appeal is communicated to the other party if the appeal is not rejected immediately by the Court of Appeal.   If the appeal is communicated to the other party that party is invited to submit its opinion on the appeal.   All written material submitted by the parties is available to the Court during the deliberations and when it makes its decision.           Chapter 52, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure contains a special provision according to which the Court of Appeal may, if deemed necessary, conduct a hearing.   The first sentence of this provision reads :           (translation)           "Where it is required for the purposes of the investigation         of a case that a party or other person be heard orally         by the Court of Appeal, the Court of Appeal shall decide on         such a hearing as it finds appropriate."           The decision of the Court of Appeal can be appealed against to the Supreme Court.   However, as in other cases, the substance of the appeal will only be examined if the Supreme Court first has granted leave to appeal.   COMPLAINTS           The applicant complains under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention that there was no public hearing in the Court of Appeal and that its decision was based on statements from an anonymous witness.           The applicant also complains of the circumstances whereby the Enforcement Office seized the personal property in question.   She submits that she was not informed in advance of the bailiff's intentions and that the lock of her house had been changed so that she could not enter when she returned from hospital.   She furthermore submits that some of her belongings kept in drawers had been thrown over the floor.   The applicant contends that this procedure amounts to disrespect for her private life and her home.   She invokes Article 8 of the Convention.           Finally the applicant alleges that she has been deprived of her property contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 14 September 1987 and registered on 26 April 1988.           On 12 October 1989 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit, by 5 January 1990, written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application, limited to the issues under Articles 6 and 8 of the Convention.           After an extension of the time-limit the Government submitted their observations on 30 January 1990.   After extensions on 26 March, 25 April, 10 May and 23 May 1990 of the time-limit the applicant's observations in reply were submitted on 5 June 1990.           Further observations were submitted by the Government on 27 August 1990 and by the applicant on 22 January 1991.     THE LAW   1.       The applicant complains that there was no public hearing in the Göta Court of Appeal and that the Court's decision was based on statements from an anonymous witness.   She invokes Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) reads as follows:   "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interests of morals, public order or national security in a   democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice."           The Government submit that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is not applicable to the proceedings in the present case as enforcement proceedings do not concern a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1. They further submit that the applicant has not exhausted domestic remedies as she did not institute separate civil proceedings in order to have the ownership of the seized property determined.           The Government also submit that the fact that the applicant did not get a public hearing in the Court of Appeal does not constitute a violation under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) as she must be considered to have waived her right in that respect by not requesting such a hearing.   They invoke the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights (Eur.   Court H.R., Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171).   As regards the information provided by an anonymous witness the Government submit that, as opposed to criminal proceedings where there is a right to have witnesses examined, in civil proceedings the Convention does not guarantee such a right but merely a "fair hearing".   In civil proceedings the national legislator is more free to decide what evidence is required for establishing a certain fact.   The enforcement proceedings in the present case should in this respect be considered civil proceedings, their only purpose being to establish what property could be seized.   The applicant did not request to have any witnesses examined.   Furthermore, in view of the fact that the decisions of the Court were also based on evidence other than the information provided by the anonymous witness, the Government contend that the complaints under Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention are manifestly ill-founded.           The applicant maintains that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is applicable, that the relevant domestic remedies have been exhausted and that the Court of Appeal should have given her a public hearing regardless of whether she asked for it or not.   Furthermore she maintains that she was deprived of the possibility to refute the statements of the anonymous witness.           As regards the applicability of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention the Commission recalls that decisions taken by a court enforcing adjudicated claims do not necessarily entail a new separate determination of civil rights (cf.   No. 11258/84, Dec. 7.7.86, D.R. 48 p. 225).   In the present case, however, the enforcement proceedings, though based on already established claims, raised new legal issues under the Code of Enforcement, providing remedies for the applicant to avoid the seizure of the property which she alleged belonged to her.           In these circumstances the Commission considers that the proceedings at issue concerned a determination of the applicant's civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           As regards the applicant's complaint of the lack of an oral hearing the Commission recalls that the public character of court hearings constitutes a fundamental principle enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 6 (Art. 6-1), although neither the letter nor the spirit of this provision prevents a person from waiving of his own free will, either expressly or tacitly, the entitlement to have his case heard in public (see for example Eur.   Court H.R. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere judgment of 23 June 1981, Series A no. 54, p. 25, para. 59, and the H. v.   Belgium judgment of 30 November 1987, Series A no. 127, p. 36, para. 54).   However, a waiver must be made in an unequivocal manner and must not run counter to any important public interest.           No express waiver was made in the present case.   The question is whether there was a tacit one.   In this respect the Commission recalls that Swedish law expressly provides for the possibility of holding public hearings in Chapter 52, Section 10 of the Code of Judicial Procedure.   Since in Sweden the enforcement proceedings complained of usually take place without a public hearing the applicant could have been expected to ask for such a hearing if she had found it important that one be held.   However, she did not do so. She must thereby be considered to have unequivocally waived her right to a public hearing before the Göta Court of Appeal (cf.   Eur.   Court H.R. Håkansson and Sturesson judgment of 21 February 1990, Series A no. 171, pp. 20-21, paras. 64-68).   Her misgivings as to her treatment before that Court only seem to have emerged in the course of the proceedings before the Commission as she did not raise, either in form or in substance, in the proceedings before the Göta Court of Appeal or before the Supreme Court any complaint in this respect.   Furthermore, the Commission does not find that the case involved questions of public interest which could have made a public hearing necessary.           As regards the information submitted by an anonymous person the Commission recalls that the applicant raised this complaint in her appeal to the Supreme Court.   The Commission recalls, however, that the information submitted by an anonymous person was merely a part of the evidence invoked in the Enforcement Office's written submissions a copy of which the applicant received.   Accordingly she had the possibility to refute the argumentation of the Enforcement Office in her written pleadings.   As set out above she could have asked for a hearing during which witnesses could have been heard.   However, she chose not to avail herself of this possibility.   Furthermore, the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for national law, whereas the task of the Commission is to ascertain whether the proceedings considered as a whole were fair.   Having regard to the circumstances of the present case and the possibilities open to the applicant under national law, the Commission cannot find that the applicant did not get a fair hearing within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.       The applicant also complains of the circumstances in which the Enforcement Office seized the property in question: that she was not informed in advance of the bailiff's intentions, that the doorlock had been changed and that her belongings, kept in drawers, were thrown over the floor.   She invokes Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention, which reads:   "1.       Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.   2.       There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others."           The Government do not contest that the enforcement in question constituted an interference with the applicant's right to respect for her private life and her home.   The Government further submit that the applicant was not informed about the seizure because of the risk that the enforcement would be obstructed if the debtor, the ex-husband, had received information about the enforcement and because the bailiff considered the matter urgent.   The measures taken by the Enforcement Office were in accordance with domestic law and had a legitimate aim, namely the protection of the rights of others, in the present case the rights of the creditors.   The Government submit that the Contracting States have a wide margin of appreciation when determining the necessity of the measures taken in pursuance of the aims enumerated in para. 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2).   The enforcement action was based on the assumption that the applicant was still cohabiting with her former husband and the Enforcement Office was not aware of the fact that the applicant was in hospital.   The assessment made was not of such a character as to fall outside the margin of appreciation afforded to the domestic authorities.   As regards the changing of the lock of the door the Government submit that the bailiff placed a note on the door in order to inform the applicant and that the lock was changed on only one of two doors.   The Government contend that the interference was justified under para. 2 of Article 8 (Art. 8-2).           The Commission considers that the complaints relating to the bailiff's entering into the applicant's house disclose an interference with the applicant's right to respect for her private life and her home within the meaning of Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention (cf. for example Eur.   Court H.R., Chappell judgment of 30 May 1989, Series A no. 152 pp. 21-22, para. 51, and pp. 29-30, paras. 96-99).           It must therefore be examined whether this interference, caused by the action of a public authority, was justified under the terms of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.   In order to be justified an interference must satisfy three conditions: it must be "in accordance with the law", it must pursue one or more of the legitimate aims enumerated in Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) and it must be "necessary in a democratic society" for that or those legitimate aims.           As regards the phrase "in accordance with the law", the Government submit that the measures taken by the Enforcement Office were clearly in accordance with Swedish law.           The Commission recalls that according to the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the phrase "in accordance with the law" contains certain conditions.   It does not merely refer back to   domestic law but also relates to the quality of the law, requiring it to be compatible with the rule of law.   There must in addition be a measure of protection in domestic law against arbitrary interferences by public authorities with the rights safeguarded by, in this case, paragraph 1 of Article 8 (Art. 8-1).   Furthermore, a law which confers discretion is not in itself inconsistent with the requirement of foreseeability, provided that the scope of the discretion and the manner of its exercise are indicated with sufficient clarity, having regard to the legitimate aim of the measure in question, to give the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference (cf. Eur.   Court H.R., Olsson judgment of 24 March 1988, Series A no. 130, p. 30 para. 61 with further references).           The Commission finds that the enforcement legislation applied in the present case is formulated in a precise manner, even though it confers a certain discretion to the domestic authorities as regards the question when a bailiff, without having informed the person in possession of the property, may enter a dwelling (Chapter 2, Section 17 of the Code of Enforcement: "other special reasons").   Furthermore, the fact that the seizure was subject to review by the courts gives the individual adequate protection against arbitrary interferences by the authorities.   Therefore the Commission concludes that the interference was "in accordance with the law".           As regards the question of whether the measure had a legitimate aim the Government submit that the enforcement was in the interest of the rights of the creditors of the applicant's ex-husband.           The Commission shares this view.   The protection of the creditors' rights is a legitimate aim under Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2), covered by the expression "for the protection of the rights ... of others".           It remains to be examined whether the enforcement was "necessary in a democratic society" in the interest of the creditors.           The Government submit that there is a wide margin of appreciation afforded to the Contracting States and their authorities as regards the determination whether a specific measure could be considered necessary for a specific aim.   The applicant was not informed about the seizure because there was a risk that the enforcement would be obstructed if the debtor would receive such information.   The Enforcement Office did not know that the applicant was in hospital at the time, and they considered the matter urgent. The Government further submit that the Enforcement Office and the bailiff weighed the interference with the applicant's rights against the risk for the creditors and concluded that the measures taken were necessary for the protection of the rights of the creditors.           The applicant submits that there has never been any reason to believe that she would obstruct the enforcement or otherwise act in such a manner as to entitle the authorities to enter her house in her absence and without informing her in advance.   Furthermore she refutes the Government's allegation that a note was left on the door concerning the changing of the lock.   She maintains that her belongings were thrown all over the floor and that the authorities went beyond what may possibly be considered necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.           The Commission recalls that according to the established case-law of the European Court of Human Rights the notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds to a pressing social need and that it is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Furthermore it is to be taken into account that a margin of appreciation is left to the Contracting States (see for example Eur. Court H.R., Olsson judgment mentioned above, pp. 31-32, para. 67 with further references).           In the present case the Commission recalls that the parties disagree on the factual circumstances regarding the manner in which the bailiff carried out his duties.   The Commission notes, however, that the Parliamentary Ombudsman found no reason to criticise the authorities or the mode of execution and that the Court of Appeal established that the Enforcement Office had been entitled to carry out the seizure of the property in question.   The Commission notes that the bailiff's duties by their very nature were bound to cause some difficulties for the applicant and it finds that the manner in which the execution was effected would in normal circumstances be considered to be harsh.   However, having regard to the circumstances of the present case, in particular the special problems connected with the enforcement of the claims against the applicant's former husband, the Commission finds that the procedure followed was not only in conformity with Swedish law but could also reasonably be regarded as proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued.   Accordingly, it finds, having regard to their margin of appreciation, that the authorities did not go beyond what could be regarded as necessary in a democratic society within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       The applicant finally complains that she has been deprived of her property contrary to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention.           With regard to this complaint the Commission recalls that, according to Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention, it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted according to the generally recognised rules of international law. Accordingly the Commission must first examine whether the applicant has exhausted the remedies available to her under domestic law.           It is not in dispute between the parties that the applicant could in principle have instituted separate civil proceedings in the ordinary courts of law after the enforcement proceedings, in order to have the ownership of the seized property determined.           However, the applicant alleges that civil proceedings would be without any prospects of success as she was not directed to institute such proceedings during the enforcement proceedings in accordance with Chapter 4, Section 20 of the Code of Enforcement so that the Enforcement Office was free to sell the property regardless of the outcome of any subsequent civil proceedings.           The Government submit in their observations concerning Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention that the applicant should have instituted civil proceedings according to Chapter 13, Section 2 of the Code of Judicial Procedure in order to exhaust domestic remedies and that this should have been done regardless of whether she, during the enforcement proceedings, was directed to do so or not, as the Enforcement Office, according to Chapter 8, Section 5, para. 2 of the Code of Enforcement, could have agreed to postpone the sale of the seized property under such circumstances.           The Commission recalls that the proceedings concerning the enforcement did not determine the question of ownership of the property concerned but only whether the Enforcement Office was entitled to seize it.   Nevertheless the Commission has consistently held that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies requires the use of those remedies only