CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 15 octobre 1991

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 12235/86                       by Firma F.M. ZUMTOBEL and Martin ZUMTOBEL                       against Austria   The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 15 October 1991, the following members being present:                 MM. J.A. FROWEIN, Acting President                   S. TRECHSEL                   F. ERMACORA                   G. JÖRUNDSSON                   A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                   A. WEITZEL                   J.-C. SOYER                   H.G. SCHERMERS                   H. DANELIUS              Sir   Basil HALL              MM.   F. MARTINEZ                   C.L. ROZAKIS              MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                   J.-C. GEUS                   M.P. PELLONPÄÄ                   B. MARXER                Mr. J. RAYMOND, Deputy Secretary to the Commission   Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;   Having regard to the application introduced on 10 June 1986 by Firma F.M. ZUMTOBEL and Martin ZUMTOBEL against Austria and registered on 13 June 1986 under file No. 12235/86;   Having regard to :   -the observations submitted by the respondent Government on 23 July 1990 and the observations in reply submitted by the applicants on 11 October 1990;   -the submissions of the parties at the hearing of 15 October 1991;   Having deliberated;   Decides as follows: THE FACTS           The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.           The first applicant was, when filing the application, a commercial firm in Dornbirn, established as a limited partnership (Kommanditgesellschaft) under Austrian law.   The second applicant, an Austrian citizen, resides at Dornbirn in Austria.   When filing the application, he was the general partner (Mehrheitsgesellschaft) of the first applicant and its manager (Geschäftsführer).   Meanwhile, the first applicant has changed its legal structure and is completely owned by the second applicant.           Before the Commission the applicants are represented by Mr. W.L. Weh, a lawyer practising in Bregenz.     Particular circumstances of the case                                      I.           The case concerns the construction in Vorarlberg of the L 52, a new Provincial Road (Landesstrasse) as a bypass (Umfahrung) in the area of the Rankweil municipality.   In the course of the planning procedure the construction was discussed inter alia in separate landscape proceedings concerning the compatibility of the proposed stretch of road from the environmental point of view.   The project was open for consultation, and possible objection, by the public in the Rankweil municipal office from 1 October to 1 November 1984.   The project also concerned the applicants' property though they filed no objection thereto.           On 28 February 1985 the Provincial Road Administration (Landesstrassenverwaltung) of the Vorarlberg Provincial Government (Landesregierung) instituted expropriation proceedings in relation to 2,140 m² real property of the first applicant.   The expropriation was based on the Vorarlberg Provincial Road Act (Landesstrassengesetz) and was to enable construction of the L 52.   As a result, the first applicant's property, formerly a continuous area of some 55,000 m², was to be divided into two smaller areas of approximately 20,000 m² and 30,000 m² respectively.   The property of other owners was only to be marginally affected.           Expropriation proceedings were then conducted before the administrative authorities of the Provincial Government.   The authorities consulted several experts.   During these proceedings the first applicant filed several requests for the taking of evidence, concerning inter alia a report of the Court of Audit (Rechnungshofsbericht);   the views of an expert opinion on the protection of the environment; the decision of the Feldkirch, Meiningen and Rankweil municipalities on the stretch of road to be built; and an opinion by the environmental department of the Provincial Government.           On 25 June 1985 a hearing was held.   According to the minutes of the hearing the first applicant's representative was present as well as the chairman and three experts, i.e. for road construction, landscape protection and road traffic "of the Office of the Provincial Government" ("vom Amt der Landesregierung"). There were furthermore present representatives of the Feldkirch Provincial Road Construction Office and the Rankweil municipality as well as a sworn valuation expert (gerichtlich beeideter Sachverständiger für die Durchführung der Schätzung).           At the hearing, the experts submitted their opinions and made further submissions thereupon.   The experts for road construction and for road traffic submitted in particular that the proposed stretch of road was important for the traffic between Rankweil and Feldkirch, as the existing connection between the two communities led through densely built areas.   The existing road was partly very narrow, had various sharp bends, and crossed with many other roads.   In the experts' views, the existing road was also very dangerous for children on their way to school.   A different route for the stretch was not possible, inter alia in view of a pre-fixed crossing with another important road.           By decision of 13 February 1986 the Office (Amt) of the Vorarlberg Provincial Government ordered the expropriation.           In its decision the Provincial Government fixed the compensation to be paid to the first applicant as amounting to 620 AS per m².   This sum was based on the valuation of the expropriated land by a sworn valuation expert (gerichtlich beeideter Sachverständiger). The Provincial Government did not, however, follow this expert's further view that an additional sum should be adjudicated in view of the depreciation (Wertminderung) of the first applicant's remaining land. It also rejected the first applicant's request to hear a second valuation expert.           The expropriation was to take effect as soon as the compensation had been paid to the first applicant, and it was further stated that the Provincial Road Administration would have five years from the date of the decision to complete the construction work.   In view of the legal obligation to retransfer the expropriated land in case the object of the expropriation was not actually implemented, the Provincial Government did not find it appropriate to expressly recognise the right to retransfer as requested by the first applicant.           In its decision the Provincial Government further noted that the expert for road traffic had confirmed the necessity to construct the new road, and that the experts for road construction and for landscape protection found no better solution.   In particular, it was impossible for the new road to avoid crossing through the land owned by the first applicant.           The Provincial Government rejected the first applicant's objections against the expropriation, inter alia that it was premature, as the projected road had not legally existed when the proceedings were instituted and that the planning procedure concerning that road was defective, several experts and public bodies having earlier pronounced themselves against the project.   Various requests of the first applicant to be fully informed of the planning procedure were rejected as being irrelevant.   The first applicant's request to consult a neutral road traffic expert on the necessity of the road was dismissed on the ground that the particular official expert was not biased in favour of the Provincial Road Administration and that he had delivered a convincing report.           The Provincial Government finally rejected the first applicant's claim for reimbursement of its own costs of procedure by analogous application of Section 44 of the Railway Expropriation Act (Eisenbahn-Enteignungsgesetz).   It found that this Act was not applicable and that the Road Act did not provide for the reimbursement of the expropriated party's own costs.                                      II.           Against this decision the first applicant lodged a complaint (Beschwerde) with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof). Therein he also requested the Court to order suspensive measures.           With reference inter alia to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention, the first applicant submitted in particular that an administrative expropriation procedure subject to the ultimate control of the Administrative and the Constitutional Courts was not in conformity with this provision and violated its right of access to a court with full jurisdiction on both questions of fact and law. The first applicant further alleged a violation of the principle of equality of arms due to the fact that the authority only heard the official experts attached to it and refused to hear any independent experts.           The first applicant moreover invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention, read alone and in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention, claiming that the expropriation was unlawful on various grounds.   In particular, the proceedings had been instituted prematurely when the road construction project had not legally existed. It was not necessary to construct the road and the relevant planning procedure had been defective.   By refusing to consider arguments against the road project, the expropriation authority had taken an arbitrary decision.   Finally, the first applicant's property rights had been unlawfully interfered with by the refusal of the reimbursement of its costs caused by the expropriation proceedings.           On 7 May 1986 the Constitutional Court refused the first applicant's request for suspensive measures.           On 27 November 1987, the Constitutional Court, in non-public proceedings under Article 144 para. 2 of the Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), decided not to deal with the complaint as it lacked prospects of success.           In its decision the Constitutional Court referred to its previous case-law concerning the authorities' discretion when fixing the outline of a road and concerning Article 6 of the Convention (see below Relevant domestic law and practice).   The Constitutional Court found no indication of unconstitutionality of applicable legal rules.   The case did not appear to raise specific constitutional issues, but only questions of lawfulness to be decided by the Administrative Court.                                      III.           Against the decision of the Provincial Government of 13 February 1986 the first applicant also filed a complaint with the Administrative Court (Verwaltungsgerichtshof).   Therein it invoked in essence the same arguments as before the Constitutional Court, this time alleging violations of procedural and substantive law.   It also requested suspensive measures and the appointment of an expert.           On 7 April 1986 the Administrative Court dismissed the request for suspensive measures. By decision of 22 September 1989 the Administrative Court dismissed the first applicant's complaint.           In its decision the Administrative Court stated that it had no doubts concerning the organisation of the authorities competent to decide on expropriations for road construction purposes.   It refused to refer this matter to the Constitutional Court, as raising an issue under Article 6 of the Convention.   The Administrative Court accepted that a party to expropriation proceedings for road construction purposes could contest the appropriateness of the project.   It considered that Section 44 para. 1 of the Vorarlberg Provincial Road Act required the balancing of contradicting interests, namely traffic, and landscape protection, while also taking into account the economic suitability of the planned road.           The Court found that the first applicant had failed to demonstrate that the contested decision was unlawful.   The decision states:   [Translation]   "Against the background of the object of examination falling to the Administrative Court according to Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act it cannot be regarded as unlawful that the respondent authority - from the vantage point of the interests of traffic - based its decision on the relevant facts in particular that no other, more expedient solution - than the one proposed for the new construction of the L 52 in the proposed road construction project - was possible.   As can be seen from the facts established in the contested decision, the respondent authority took the view that it was in the interests of traffic to remove through-traffic from the Rankweil-Brederis built-up area, while at the same time this would create a useful contribution to the existing road network in the Feldkirch- Rankweil area."   [German]   "Vor dem Hintergrund der dem Verwaltungsgerichtshof nach Abs. 41 VwGG gestellten Prüfungsaufgabe kann es nicht als rechtswidrig erkannt werden, wenn die belangte Behörde   - unter dem Gesichtspunkt der Interessen des Verkehrs - ihrem Abspruch als maßgebenden Sachverhalt zugrunde legte, daß eine andere, zweckmäßigere Lösung   - als der vorgesehene Neubau der L 52 im gegenständlichen Baulos - nicht möglich sei.   Wie sich aus den Feststellungen im angefochtenen Bescheid ergibt, ist die belangte Behörde bei ihrem Abspruch davon ausgegangen, daß es im Interesse des Verkehrs gelegen sei, den Durchzugsverkehr aus dem besiedelten Gebiet von Rankweil - Brederis herauszuführen, wobei auch eine sinnvolle Ergänzung des bestehenden Straßennetzes im Raum Feldkirch - Rankweil geschaffen werde."           The Administrative Court further explained why, in its view no doubts arose in respect of the evidence provided by the official experts.   The Court also noted that the contested decision took account of environmental protection when assessing the interests at stake.   It had been lawful to limit the proceedings to the part of the road which affected the first applicant's property and to conduct the expropriation proceedings before the adoption of the ordinancy of the provincial road.           With regard to the first applicant's complaint about the lack of independence of the experts in the expropriation proceedings the Court noted that the expropriating authority was in principle required to consult its own official experts.   The merely general reference to the problem of dependency did not suffice to prove partiality, which had to be examined in each individual case.           In respect of the first applicant's complaint that it could not consult all the documents the Court noted that the first applicant had not been a party to the landscape proceedings for which reason it was not permitted to consult the respective case-file.   With regard to a report of the Court of Audit and other documents the Court found nothing therein which was relevant to the first applicant's case.   The Court also noted that the expert opinion of the independent traffic expert Be. had actually been included in the expropriation file, though the first applicant could not claim a right to receive photocopies therefrom.           The Court then addressed the first applicant's request for the preparation of a new expert opinion by a neutral traffic expert by referring to a ruling of the enlarged Panel of the Administrative Court as follows:   [Translation]   "According to this ruling, the Administrative Court is barred from taking evidence which the administrative authority may have failed to take, and from taking evidence itself in order to supplement the facts that have been ascertained during investigations.   However, the Administrative Court may take evidence to determine whether there has   been an essential procedural defect and is therefore authorised to take evidence for examining the question whether a procedural defect is essential or whether the incriminated authority might have arrived at a different decision by avoiding the alleged procedural defect; the Administrative Court may resort to these measures also in order to review the assessment of evidence. With regard to the above explanations concerning the weighing up of interests by the respondent authority and the factual basis by which they are carried, the Administrative Court sees no reason to accede to the request to take evidence."   [German]   "Danach is es dem Verwaltungsgerichtshof verwehrt, in der von der Verwaltungsbehörde behandelten Sache anstelle der belangten Behörde eine von dieser allenfalls versäumten Beweisaufnahme nachzuholen und in Ergänzung des Vermittlungsverfahrens zur Feststellung des Sachverhaltes selbst Beweise aufzunehmen.   Der Verwaltungsgerichtshof kann aber Beweise aufnehmen, um zu prüfen, ob ein wesentlicher Verfahrensmangel vorliegt, und er ist demnach berechtigt, zur Prüfung der Frage, ob ein Verfahrensmangel wesentlich ist oder ob die belangte Behörde unter Vermeidung des gegebenen Verfahrensmangels zu einem anderen Bescheid hätte kommen können, eine Beweisaufnahme durchzuführen; dies auch zum Zwecke der Kontrolle der Beweiswürdigung.   Im Hinblick auf die obigen Darlegungen zur Interessensabwägung der belangten Behörde und der diese tragenden Sachverhaltsgrundlagen sieht sich der Verwaltungsgerichtshof jedoch nicht zur beantragten Beweisaufnahme veranlaßt."           As to the refusal to reimburse the applicants' costs incurred in connection with the expropriation proceedings, the Administrative Court considered itself incompetent as this matter was part of the question of compensation to be decided by the civil courts.                                      IV.           Meanwhile, the first applicant requested the Feldkirch District Court (Bezirksgericht) to determine the compensation for the expropriated land.   On 17 December 1987 the latter awarded the first applicant compensation of 1,460,000 AS for the expropriated real property, and a lump sum of 8,503,032.50 AS for the depreciation of the remaining real property.   The Provincial Government was ordered to pay the total sum of 9,963,032.50 AS within 14 days.           Upon appeal (Rekurs), the Feldkirch Regional Court (Landesgericht) reduced in its decision of 24 March 1988 the total sum to 4,560,000 AS.   The first applicant's further appeal (Revisionrekurs) was dismissed by the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) on 6 October 1988.   In these proceedings the applicant was also awarded costs amounting to 199,350 AS.     Relevant domestic law and practice     As to the expropriation proceedings           According to Section 5 of the Vorarlberg Provincial Road Act the Provincial Government may declare by Ordinance (Verordnung) that roads or parts thereof become Provincial Roads (Landesstrassen), even if they have not yet been built.   Para. 2 of Section 5 states:   [Translation]   "The Provincial Government must declare all roads as Provincial Roads which are necessary for the traffic between communities. Those roads shall be considered necessary which are the only immediate road connection from one community to the next and which can also be used by lorries.   There shall be no necessity if such a traffic communication is provided for by a third party   ..."   [German]   "Die Landesregierung hat die für den überörtlichen Verkehr notwendigen Strassen als Landesstrassen zu erklären. Notwendig sind diejenigen Strassen, welche die einzige, auch für Lastkraftwagen benützbare unmittelbare Strassenverbindung von einer Gemeinde in eine Nachbargemeinde oder über die Landesgrenze darstellen.   Eine Notwendigkeit liegt nicht vor, wenn von anderer Seite für eine solche Verkehrsverbindung Vorsorge getroffen wird   ..."           In practice, Section 5 implies that if real property is expropriated for the construction of a Provincial Road, the Provincial Government must enact an Ordinance.   The latter will contain the name, number and length of the road and a short description thereof.   Thus, the Provincial Government express their intention to construct the road.   To the extent that the Ordinance does not describe in detail the stretch to be constructed, the persons whose property shall be expropriated have the right in the expropriation proceedings to call in question the adequateness of the proposed stretch.           Section 44 para. 1 of the Provincial Road Act states the conditions for expropriation as follows:   [Translation]   "In order to construct or maintain Provincial Roads and Municipal Roads, an expropriation is only admissible if another stretch of road, or its maintenance, is not possible which is more adequate from the point of view of traffic, economy and protection of the environment."   [German]   "Zum Bau oder zur Erhaltung von Landesstraßen und Gemeindestraßen ist eine Enteignung nur zulässig, wenn eine andere unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Verkehrs, der Wirtschaftlichkeit und des Landschaftsschutzes zweckmäßigere Führung oder Erhaltung der Straße nicht möglich ist."           According to Section 46 of the Provincial Road Act, "the expropriating agency has to compensate the expropriated party for all pecuniary disadvantages arising from the expropriation" ("Der Enteigner hat den Enteigneten für alle durch die Enteignung verursachten vermögensrechtlichen Nachteile angemessen zu entschädigen").           Section 47 concerns the expropriation proceedings.   Thus, if no agreement can be reached as to the amount of compensation, a sworn court expert must assess the value.   Once the expropriation has been determined, the expropriated party may apply within six weeks to a court for the judicial determination of the amount of compensation.             The Austrian Constitutional Court's interpretation of the scope of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention           The Austrian Constitutional Court pronounced itself on the applicability and scope of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention to proceedings originating before Austrian administrative authorities in its decision of 14 October 1987 (B 267/86, VfSLG 11500/1987).   The Court distinguished between decisions concerning the core of civil law (i.e. disputes among private persons) and decisions on disputes which only concern civil rights in their effects (namely the relationship between the private person and the public).   In order to avoid a complete change of the Austrian state structure, the Court considered that the requirements of a tribunal within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention should depend on whether the dispute concerned the one or the other category.   With regard to decisions concerning civil rights only in their effects the Court found that it sufficed under Article 6 para. 1 if a tribunal undertook a mere subsequent control of the decision.   The decision continues:   [Translation]   "Such a subsequent control would in any event have to suffice if, regardless of its nature as a merely subsequent control which did not provide for renewed proceedings, the court effectively (and not merely theoretically and in the abstract) has the possibility to convince itself of the correctness of the solution as well as of the facts and the law applied and can also execute its judgment on the matter.   Such a control falls to the Austrian Administrative Court in the light of an understanding of the Administrative Court Act which is oriented towards the Constitution."   [German]   "Eine solche nachprüfende Kontrolle müsste jedenfalls dann genügen, wenn sie ungeachtet ihres bloss nachprüfenden, nicht auf einer Neudurchführung des Verfahrens beruhenden Charakters dem Gericht - nicht bloss theoretisch und abstrakt, sondern im Ergebnis auch wirksam - Gelegenheit gibt, sich von der Richtigkeit der Lösung sowohl der Tat - wie der Rechtsfrage zu überzeugen und sein Urteil über die Sache auch durchzusetzen, wie dies bei einem an der Verfassung orientierten Verständnis des Verwaltungs-gerichtshofgesetzes dem österreichischen VwGH aufgetragen ist."     Jurisdiction of the Austrian Constitutional and Administrative Courts           According to Article 144 of the Austrian Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz) an appeal can be filed with the Constitutional Court in which the applicant can claim a violation of his constitutional rights.   He can also complain that his rights have been violated on account of an unlawful ordinance, an unconstitutional Act, or an unlawful international treaty.           According to Article 130 para. 1 of the Federal Constitution the Administrative Court will review allegations of unlawfulness of an administrative decision.   According to Section 130 para. 2, "no unlawfulness exists where legislation forbears from the establishment of a binding rule on an administrative authority's conduct, leaving the determination of such conduct to the authority itself, and the authority has made use of this discretion in the spirit of the law" ("Rechtswidrigkeit liegt nicht vor, soweit die Gesetzgebung von einer bindenden Regelung des Verhaltens der Verwaltungsbehörde absieht und die Bestimmung dieses Verhaltens der Behörde selbst überläßt, die Behörde aber von diesem freien Ermessen im Sinne des Gesetzes Gebrauch gemacht hat").   The Administrative Court is also competent to deal with complaints that the administrative authority has violated its duty to take a decision (Article 132).           Section 41 of the Administrative Court Act provides, insofar as relevant:   [Translation]   "(1)   Insofar as the Administrative Court does not find unlawfulness on account of a lack of jurisdiction of the authority against whom the appeal is directed or on account of a violation of procedural provisions (Section 42 para. 2 [2] and [3]) ..., the Court must examine the contested decision on the basis of the facts as accepted by the authority against which the appeal is directed within the framework of the alleged complaint ...   If it is of the opinion that reasons would be relevant for the decision on the unlawfulness of the contested decision ... which were so far not known to a party, it must hear the parties thereupon and, if necessary, adjourn the proceedings." [German]   "(1)   Der Verwaltungsgerichtshof hat, soweit er nicht Rechtswidrigkeit wegen Unzuständigkeit der belangten Behörde oder wegen Verletzung von Verfahrensvorschriften gegeben findet (§ 42 Abs. 2 Z 2 und 3) ... den angefochtenen Bescheid auf Grund des von der belangten Behörde angenommenen Sachverhaltes im Rahmen der geltend gemachten Beschwerdepunkte ... zu überprüfen.   Ist er der Ansicht, dass für die Entscheidung über die Rechtswidrigkeit des Bescheides in einem der Beschwerdepunkte   ... Gründe massgebend sein könnten, die einer Partei bisher nicht bekanntgegeben wurden, so hat er die Parteien darüber zu hören und wenn nötig, eine Vertagung zu verfügen."           As regards the decisions of the Administrative Court, Section 42 para. 2 of the Administrative Court Act provides, insofar as relevant:   [Translation]     "(2) The contested decision must be quashed 1.    on account of the unlawfulness of its content, 2.    on account of unlawfulness due to the lack of      jurisdiction of the authority against which the      appeal is directed, 3.    on account of unlawfulness due to a violation of      procedural provisions in particular because     a)   the authority against which the appeal is         directed has determined the facts on an         important point contrary to the         case-file, or     b)   the facts require supplementation in an         important point, or     c)   procedural provisions have been disregarded         which, if taken into consideration by the         authority against which the appeal is         directed, would have led to a different         decision of the authority."   [German]     "(2) Der angefochtene Bescheid ist aufzuheben 1.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit seines Inhaltes, 2.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Unzuständigkeit      der belangten Behörde, 3.    wegen Rechtswidrigkeit infolge Verletzung von      Verfahrensvorschriften, und zwar weil      a)   der Sachverhalt von der belangten Behörde             in einem wesentlichen Punkt aktenwidrig             angenommen wurde oder      b)   der Sachverhalt in einem wesentlichen             Punkt einer Ergänzung bedarf oder      c)   Verfahrensvorschriften ausser acht gelassen             wurden, bei deren Einhaltung die belangte             Behörde zu einem anderen Bescheid hätte             kommen können."           The proceedings before the Administrative Court consist of an exchange of written observations between the parties (Section 36) and an oral hearing of their legal arguments (Sections 39 and 40).   The parties have a right to request a hearing (Section 39, para. 1 [1]).   Position of experts           With regard to the position of experts in expropriation proceedings, Section 52 para. 1 of the Act on General Administrative Procedure (Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz) provides that if in such cases evidence by experts is necessary, "official experts must be employed who are attributed to the authority or are at their disposal" ("so sind die der Behörde beigegebenen oder zur Verfügung stehenden amtlichen Sachverständigen [Amtssachverständige] beizuziehen").   Section 53 refers to Section 7 according to which administrative organs must renounce office in matters concerning inter alia their family members or "if there are other important reasons which may raise doubts as to their full impartiality" ("wenn sonstige wichtige Gründe vorliegen, die geeignet sind, ihre volle Unbefangenheit in Zweifel zu ziehen").     COMPLAINTS           Under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention the applicants complain that in the expropriation proceedings they did not have a procedure in conformity with this provision before an independent and impartial tribunal having full jurisdiction on questions of law and fact.   The applicants also complain of the unfairness of the proceedings in that the experts in the proceedings before the Provincial Government were not independent on account of their position in the Provincial Road Administration.   Moreover, the applicants were not allowed to consult various documents, in particular concerning the landscape proceedings, a report of the Court of Audit, and the expert opinion of an independent traffic expert Be.           With reference to Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention the applicants complain that the expropriation was not justified under the first paragraph.   It was unlawful and not in the public interest.   The complaints point out that the expropriation interfered with the planned extension of a supermarket which they have on adjoining property. Furthermore the review by the Constitutional and the Administrative Courts did not include a comprehensive assessment of the conflicting public and private interests with a view to establishing a fair balance between them.           The applicants also allege a violation of Article 13 of the Convention in that in the proceedings before the Constitutional and Administrative Courts suspensive effect was refused to their complaints. The latter cannot therefore be regarded as effective domestic remedies.         Finally, under Article 14 of the Convention the applicants complain that no administrative appeal is possible against a decision under the Road Act to expropriate, while such appeals are available under other expropriation statutes.     PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION           The application was introduced on 10 June 1986 and registered on 13 June 1986.         On 6 March 1989 the Commission decided to adjourn further examination of the admissibility of the application until the Administrative Court had given its decision.         The Administrative Court gave its decision on 22 September 1989. The applicants filed comments thereupon on 4 December 1989.         On 2 April 1990 the Commission decided to communicate the application to the respondent Government and invite them to submit written observations on the admissibility and merits of the application limited to the issues under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.         Following a prolongation of the time-limit, the Government's observations were received on 23 July 1990.   Following a further prolongation of the time-limit, the applicants' observations were received on 11 October 1990.           On 29 May 1991 the Commission decided to invite the parties to a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the applicants' complaints under Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.           The hearing took place on 15 October 1991.   The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. W. Okresek, Head of Department at the Federal Chancellery in Vienna, and by Mr. F. Haug of the International Law Department in the Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Vienna. The applicants were represented by their lawyer, Mr. W.L. Weh.   The second applicant and Mr. E. Girardi, signing clerk (Prokurist) for the first applicant, were also present.     THE LAW   1.       The applicants complain under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention that they had no access to a court within the meaning of this provision. They also raise complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) and Articles 13 and 14 (Art. 13, 14) of the Convention.           The Government submit at the outset that the domestic proceedings concerned only the first applicant and that the second applicant was not directly affected by the contested decisions.           Under Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention the Commission may only deal with an application where a person "(claims) to be the victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in (the) Convention".   In the present case the Commission considers that the second applicant was at the time of filing the application the general partner and manager of the first applicant.   The second applicant was thus likewise affected by the decisions complained of and can therefore claim to be a victim within the meaning of Article 25 para. 1 (Art. 25-1) of the Convention (see No. 10259/83, Dec. 10.12.84, D.R. 40 p 170).   2        .Under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention the applicants complain that in the expropriation proceedings they had no access to a court with full jurisdiction on questions of law and fact. They contend in particular that the Administrative Court cannot independently assess the facts or the merits of a case, that there is no oral hearing in these proceedings, and that this court can only quash the previous decision. The applicants recall the indeterminate concepts stated in Section 44 of the Provincial Road Act with which the Administrative Court was confronted and which, in fact, were determined by official experts.           The applicants further complain that the experts in the expropriation proceedings before the Provincial Government were not independent on account of their position in the Provincial Road Administration.   Reference is made to Section 20 of the Federal Constitutional Act according to which all administrative organs are subordinate to their superiors.   The applicants also complain that they were not allowed to consult various documents, in particular concerning the landscape proceedings, a report of the Court of Audit, and the expert opinion of an independent traffic expert.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention states, insofar as relevant:   "1. In the determinatiom of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law ..."           The Government submit that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention is not applicable to expropriation proceedings which do not relate to civil rights.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) is directed at the traditional core areas of private law, and it cannot be said that the practice of the Convention States has changed this scope.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not include relations between the individual and the general public as only the effects of these relations concern civil rights.           The Government submit that in any event this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded.   In particular, the applicants had access to two courts, namely the Constitutional Court and the Administrative Court.   With regard to the scope of the Administrative Court's review reference is made to Section 42 para. 2 subpara. 3 (a) - (c) of the Administrative Court Act according to which the Court can actually undertake a far-reaching review of the facts in a concrete case.   In the present case the Court did so within the criteria established by Section 44 of the Provincial Road Act.   The Government refer in this context to a passage of the Administrative Court's decision of 22 September 1989 (cited above in Particular circumstances of the case, at III.).   Finally, if the Court quashes a decision the respondent authority is bound by its legal views.           The Government further submit that official experts are not subject to instructions when preparing their opinions.   In the present case the opinions were reviewed by the Administrative Court as to their conclusiveness.   The applicants could also have submitted their own private expert opinions in the expropriation proceedings and the authorities would have been obliged to comment thereupon.   Insofar as the applicants complain that they could not consult certain documents, the Government recall that the domestic authorities found that the documents were irrelevant to the case.           The Commission, having regard to the parties' submissions under Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention, considers that these complaints raise serious issues of fact and law which require an examination of the merits.   This part of the application cannot, therefore, be declared manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   3.       Under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) the applicants complain that the expropriation was unlawful and not in the public interest.   By splitting the proceedings up into distinct cases, they did not include a comprehensive assessment of the conflicting public and private interests with a view to establishing a fair balance between them.           The Government submit that the expropriation satisfied the requirements of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) in that there was an actual need therefor, that the expropriation was in the public interest and that it occurred as a last resort.   The expert opinions showed for instance the importance of rerouting the provincial road inter alia   to provide for the safety of school children.   Thus a fair balance was struck between public and private interests.   Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) to the Convention states as follows:   "Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.   No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.   The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties."           The Commission considers that the applicants were deprived of their possessions by the expropriation within the meaning of Article 1 para. 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1).           However, the Commission finds, with reference to the Administrative Court's decision of 22 September 1989, that the expropriation was "subject to the conditions provided for by law" within the meaning of this provision in that the expropriation was based on the Vorarlberg Provincial Road Act.   Moreover, the Commission considers that the authorities concerned struck a fair balance between public and private interests.   Thus, the authorities found that the expropriation was necessary in particular to construct a provincial road as a bypass between two communities where the existing road led through densely populated areas.   Moreover, after considering the demands of traffic and the environment as well as the safety of school children on their way to school, the authorities concluded that it was impossible to avoid the new road crossing through the applicants property.           Insofar as the applicants may be understood as complaining that compensation for the expropriation was insufficient, the Commission recalls that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1) does not guarantee the right to a particular amount of compensation.   In view of the total sum awarded to the applicants (see above, Particular circumstances of the case, at IV.), the Commission does not find that compensation was reduced to such an extent that it affected the very substance of their right to compensation (see No. 7987/77, Dec. 13.12.79, D.R. 18 p. 31).           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   4.       Under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention, the applicants complain that in the proceedings before the Constitutional and Administrative Courts their complaints were not effective in that they were not endowed with suspensive effect.           The Commission has just declared admissible the applicants' complaints concerning access to court within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   According to the Convention organs' case- law, the requirements under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention are less strict than, and are here absorbed by those of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (see Eur. Court H.R., Philis judgment of 27 August 1991, Serie A no. 209, para. 67).   No separate issue arises therefore under Article 13 (Art. 13) of the Convention. It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   5.       Under Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention, taken together with Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (P1-1), the applicants complain that no administrative appeal is possible against a decision under the Road Provincial Act to expropriate, whereas such appeals are available under other e