CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 16 janvier 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                           Application No. 12875/87                               Ingrid HOFFMANN                                   against                                       AUSTRIA                            REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                        (adopted on 16 January 1992)                                TABLE OF CONTENTS   I.       INTRODUCTION         (paras. 1 - 20) .........................................1           A.       The application                 (paras. 2 - 4) ..................................1           B.       The proceedings                 (paras. 5 - 15) .................................1           C.       The present Report                 (paras. 16 - 20) ................................2   II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS         (paras. 21 - 64) ........................................4           A.       The particular circumstances of the case                 (paras. 21 - 39) ................................4                   1.   The institution of custody proceedings                     concerning the applicant's children                     (paras. 21 - 25) ............................4                   2.   The decision of the District Court                     (paras. 26 - 30) ............................4                   3.   The decision of the Regional Court                     (paras. 31 - 35) ............................6                   4.   The decision of the Supreme Court                     (paras. 36 - 39) ............................7           B.       Relevant domestic law and practice                 (paras. 40 - 64) ................................8                   1.   The provisions on child custody in the                     Civil Code                     (paras. 40 - 42) ............................8                   2.   The Religious Education Act                     (para. 43) .................................10                   3.   Law and practice concerning                     blood transfusions                     (paras. 44 - 60) ...........................11                   4.   Procedural provisions                     (paras. 61 - 64) ...........................15   III.     OPINION OF THE COMMISSION         (paras. 65 - 118) ......................................17           A.       Complaints declared admissible                 (para. 65) .....................................17           B.       Points at issue                 (para. 66) .....................................17                                   - ii -           C.       As to the alleged violation of Article 8 of                 the Convention, read in isolation or in                 conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention                 (paras. 67 - 105) ..............................17                   1.   Interference with the applicant's family                     life (Article 8 para. 1)                     (paras. 70 - 75) ...........................18                   2.   Justification of the interference                     (Article 8 para. 2 and Article 14)                     (paras. 76 - 104) ..........................18                       a) Lawfulness                        (paras. 79 - 82) ........................19                       b) Legitimate aim                        (para. 83) ..............................20                       c) Necessity in a democratic society                        and non-discrimination                        (paras. 84 - 104) .......................20                   Conclusion                 (para. 105) ....................................24           D.       As to the alleged violation of Article 9 of the                 Convention, read in isolation or in conjunction                 with Article 14 of the Convention                 (paras. 106 - 110) .............................25                   Conclusion                 (para. 110) ....................................25           E.       As to the alleged violation of Article 2 of                 Protocol No. 1, read in isolation or in                 conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention                 (paras.   111 - 115) ............................25                   Conclusion                 (para. 115) ....................................26           F.       Recapitulation                 (paras. 116 - 118) .............................26   SEPARATE OPINION of MM. C.A. NØRGAARD and G. JÖRUNDSSON ........27   DISSENTING OPINION of Mr. F. ERMACORA   .........................28   DISSENTING OPINION of Mr. H.G. SCHERMERS .......................30   PARTLY DISSENTING OPINION of Sir Basil HALL ....................34   DISSENTING OPINION of Mr. L. LOUCAIDES .........................35   APPENDIX I       :   HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS ..................38   APPENDIX II      :   DECISION ON THE ADMISSIBILITY ...............40                             I.      INTRODUCTION     1.     The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.     A.     The application   2.     The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1958 who lives in Innsbruck.   She is represented by Mr. Reinhard Kohlhofer, a lawyer practising in Vienna.   3.     The application is directed against Austria.   The respondent Government are represented by their Agent, Mr. Helmut Türk, Head of the International Law Department of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   4.     The applicant, a Jehovah's Witness, complains that she was deprived of the custody of her two children on the ground of her religious convictions.   She invokes her right to respect for her family life (Article 8 of the Convention), her right to freedom of religion (Article 9 of the Convention), and her right to ensure the education of her children in conformity with her own religious convictions (Article 2 of Protocol No. 1).   She further claims that the refusal of custody was discriminatory (Article 14 of the Convention).     B.     The proceedings   5.     The application was introduced on 20 February 1987 and registered on 15 April 1987.   6.     On 13 December 1988, the Commission gave notice of the application to the respondent Government inviting them to submit before 10 March 1989 observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.     Following an extension of the time-limit, the Government submitted their observations on 14 April 1989.   Following an extension of the time-limit set for her reply, the applicant replied on 19 June 1989.   8.     On 12 March 1990 the Commission decided to hold a hearing with the parties on the admissibility and merits of the case.   9.     At the hearing on 10 July 1990, the Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. Helmut Türk, Mr. Stefan Rosenmayr, of the Constitutional Law Department, Federal Chancellery, and Mrs. Ulrike Kathrein of the Federal Ministry of Justice, as advisers; the applicant, who was present, was represented by Mr. Reinhard Kohlhofer and by the following German lawyers as advisers: Messrs. Armin Pikl and Klaus-Peter Heym, Neu-Isenburg, Mr. Andreas Paul, Frankfurt/Main, and Mr. Willy K. Pohl, Selters.   10.    Following the hearing, the Commission declared the application admissible.   11.    The Government were invited to submit, before 17 September 1990, information concerning the practice in cases of Jehovah's Witnesses who refuse blood transfusions.   Following communication of the admissibility decision, the parties were further invited to submit any supplementary legal observations before 22 October 1990.   On 5 October, following an extension of the relevant time-limit, the Government submitted the requested information.   12.    The applicant was invited to comment before 16 November 1990 on the information submitted by the Government.   This time-limit and that for the submission of legal observations was extended at her request to 14 December 1990.   On 14 December 1990 the applicant submitted legal observations and comments on the material submitted by the Government. She also submitted information of her own on the same subject, which she supplemented in January 1991.   13.    The Government likewise submitted additional material on 27 February 1991.   14.    On 9 November 1990 the Commission granted free legal aid to the applicant.   15.    After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.     The present Report   16.    The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:              MM.    C.A. NØRGAARD, President                  J.A. FROWEIN                  S.    TRECHSEL                  F.    ERMACORA                  G.    SPERDUTI                  E.    BUSUTTIL                  G.    JÖRUNDSSON                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                  H.G. SCHERMERS                  H.    DANELIUS            Sir    Basil HALL            Mrs.   J.    LIDDY            MM.    L.    LOUCAIDES                  J.-C. GEUS   17.    The text of this Report was adopted on 16 January 1992 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   18.    The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention, is:   i)     to establish the facts, and   ii)    to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a       breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the       Convention.   19.    A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   20.    The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.                     II.      ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.     The particular circumstances of the case         1.    The institution of custody proceedings concerning            the applicant's children   21.    The applicant married in 1980.   Both the applicant and her husband were Roman Catholics at that time.   Two children, a boy and a girl, were born to the couple in 1980 and 1982 respectively.   They were baptised as Roman Catholics.   The applicant subsequently joined the Jehovah's Witnesses.   The children did not become Jehovah's Witnesses.   22.    In 1984 the marriage broke down.   In August the applicant left the matrimonial home together with the children.   Divorce proceedings were subsequently instituted.   The divorce was finally pronounced in June 1986.   23.    While the divorce proceedings were still pending, both parents applied to be granted custody of the children.   The applicant claimed that she was better qualified than her husband to care for the children to whom she could devote her full time.   The husband allegedly did not fulfil his obligation to pay maintenance for them.   24.    The husband, on the other hand, opposed the grant of custody to the applicant, mainly on the ground that she was a Jehovah's Witness. The husband contended that principles of education applied by this sect were hostile to society (gemeinschaftsfeindlich) and intolerant.   They forbade contacts with persons of a different faith, the participation in school prayers and even harmless festivities such as the celebration of birthdays.   They also forbade patriotic manifestations such as the singing of the national anthem and, in particular, the son would suffer from this as he would have to refuse both military and civil service. Finally, there could be a danger to the life and health of the children as the Jehovah's Witnesses objected to blood transfusions.   By these principles of education the children would be unjustifiably separated from society, in particular, in kindergarten and later in school.   The applicant had already refused to send the boy to the kindergarten.   25.    The youth office of the Innsbruck District Authority (Bezirkshauptmannschaft, Abteilung Jugendfürsorge) pronounced itself in favour of granting custodial rights to the applicant.   This view was also supported by the report of an expert on child psychology.         2.    The decision of the District Court   26.    On 8 January 1986, the District Court (Bezirksgericht) of Innsbruck granted the applicant's application and rejected that of her husband.   It noted that the applicant did not work and therefore could devote much time to the children.   She did not send the boy to kindergarten because she considered that he should not leave home too early and that there were enough contacts with other children in the neighbourhood.   She planned to send him to kindergarten in the following year.   The applicant looked after the children and cared for their education.   If custody were to be given the father, who worked, they would be looked after by his mother with whom they had good contacts and who was capable of assuming that function and willing to do so.   The children had good relations with their father but the most important person for them was their mother.   According to the psychological expert opinion a separation from her would be a shock for the children.   27.    The Court noted that the applicant had joined the Jehovah's Witnesses some time ago and that she also tried to organise her daily life in conformity with the principles of this religious group. Accordingly she would refuse consent to a blood transfusion, but she would nevertheless comply with a judicial decision ordering it.   She refused to celebrate Christmas or Easter according to the local customs with the children, but was not opposed to the children doing so with their father.   She went to meetings of the Jehovah's Witnesses twice a week, once in the evening and once on Sunday morning.   During the evening meetings the children were looked after by a baby-sitter, but she took them with her for the Sunday meeting.   She also made missionary visits about once a week, without being accompanied by the children.   28.    While the principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses thus influenced to a certain degree the education of the children and made their integration in society more difficult, it had nevertheless not been proven that they would be completely isolated from their social environment.   Other negative influences on the living circumstances and the development of the children had not been established.   The parties disagreed on whether or not education of the children according to the principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses would push them to the margin of society (in eine gesellschaftliche Aussenseiterposition gedrängt). However, the psychological expert had thoroughly dealt with that aspect and had concluded that, despite certain difficulties which must be expected concerning the children's integration in kindergarten or school, serious isolation from society had not occurred so far and was not to be feared in future.   The applicant had stated that she wished to prevent isolation of her children.   The children were open-minded and capable of social contacts; they showed the signs of a harmonious development.   The psychologist had recommended that the mother be granted custody of the children.   29.    The custody decision was to be based exclusively on the interests of the children, having regard to the living conditions of the parents and the emotional links of the children to them.   Both parents were capable of caring for and educating the children, but the father could do so only with the assistance of his mother.   Furthermore, the children had a stronger emotional link to the applicant who had looked after them for one and a half years.   During this period the children had become accustomed to the situation and had developed in a good and harmonious manner.   A change of the situation by the separation of the children from their mother would expose them to a shock and would probably lead to grave repercussions on their eventual well-being.   In the case of awarding custodial rights to the father, the children would have to be educated mainly by their grandmother.   Thus leaving them with their mother was justified since education by one of the parents must, in principle, be given precedence over education by grandparents.   30.    The fact that the applicant belonged to the Jehovah's Witnesses and thus to a religious minority was not in itself a reason to withhold custodial rights from her.   The religious denomination of the parents was not a relevant legal criterion for the determination of parental rights according to Section 177 of the Civil Code.   The Court had, nevertheless, examined whether the religion of the applicant could have a negative influence on the education of the children and on their legitimate interests.   However, it had not been established that the children would be totally isolated from society because of their mother's religion.   The fact that she would not consent to blood transfusions was not decisive because her consent could be replaced by a judicial decision under Section 176 of the Civil Code.   The fact that she refused to celebrate festivities such as Easter or Christmas with the children was not decisive either because she had declared that she would not oppose the celebration of such festivities by the children with their father.   The only relevant disadvantage of the applicant's religion for the children thus was the fact that their education in conformity with the principles of this religion might, to a certain degree, interfere with their social integration.   However, this was not sufficient to conclude that the interests of the children would be so gravely impaired that to separate them from their mother, with whom they had close emotional links and to whom they were accustomed, was justified.   It thus appeared to be in the best interest of the children to award the custodial rights to the mother and not to the father.         3.    The decision of the Regional Court   31.    The appeal (Rekurs) of the applicant's husband against this decision was rejected by the Innsbruck Regional Court (Landesgericht) on 14 March 1986.   The appeal was essentially based on the argument that the education of the children according to the applicant's religion would lead to wrong social attitudes (soziale Fehleinstellungen) and damage to the children because of unrealistic social isolation (soziale und realitätsfremde Isolation).   32.    The Regional Court considered, however, that the Jehovah's Witnesses were a religious community not outlawed in Austria.   It must be assumed that their aims were neither unlawful nor contrary to accepted moral principles.   In view of the constitutional right to freedom of religion (Article 16 of the Basic Law on the Rights of Citizens and Article 9 of the Convention) the applicant's membership of this religious group could not therefore in itself constitute a danger to the children's interests.   33.    While it was probable that the applicant's religion would affect the children's integration in society, the District Court had conclusively explained why the father's objections in this respect were ultimately unfounded.   His new arguments did not justify another conclusion.   It was not necessary to obtain an expert opinion on the nature of the Jehovah's Witnesses, in particular their alleged lack of democratic understanding and insufficient subordination to the State. They were a recognised religious community.   34.    Nor was a medical expert opinion on the question of blood transfusions called for.   In case of urgency, where a judicial decision under Section 176 of the Civil Code might come too late, the medical practitioner concerned could take a decision based primarily on concern for the protection of life and only subsidiarily on the religious principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses.   35.    Finally, it was irrelevant whether or not the applicant had acted unlawfully when taking the children with her.   Unlawful behaviour could only be relevant if it revealed a lack of aptitude for education.   This was not the case here as both children had developed harmoniously under the care of their mother and had not suffered any physical or mental damage from the latter's religion.         4.    The decision of the Supreme Court   36.    The applicant's husband lodged a further appeal (außerordentlicher Revisionsrekurs) to the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof).   He submitted that the children had earlier been educated in the spirit of the Roman Catholic Church, and that therefore their education by their mother according to the principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses violated the provisions of the Religious Education Act (Gesetz über die religiöse Kindererziehung, Law Gazette of the German Reich, 1921 I p. 939, re-enacted by Austrian Federal Law Gazette No. 155/1984), and also the best interest of the children.   On 3 September 1986 the Supreme Court allowed the appeal on the ground that the decisions of the courts below were manifestly unlawful (offenbare Gesetzwidrigkeit) within the meaning of Section 16 of the Non-Contentious Proceedings Act (Ausserstreitgesetz).   37.    The Supreme Court noted that the courts below had not examined whether the education of the children, who incontestably were not Jehovah's Witnesses, according to the principles of this religious community violated the provisions of the Religious Education Act. According to Section 1 of the Act it was for the parents to agree on the religious education of their children.   The agreement could be revoked at any time.   If it no longer existed, Section 2 para. 1 stipulated that the principles of the Civil Code concerning child care and education were applicable.   It was, however, inadmissible for one parent during the existence of the marriage to decide without the consent of the other parent that the child should be educated according to the principles of a different religion from that to which both parents had belonged at the time of marriage, or according to which the child had hitherto been educated. The education of the applicant's children in accordance with the principles of the Jehovah's Witnesses, a religious group which was not a State-recognised religious community (anerkannte Religionsgesellschaft) and to which they did not belong, manifestly violated this provision.   38.    Moreover, the courts below had also disregarded the children's best interest.   The applicant's refusal of consent to blood transfusions violated the children's interests because the invocation of the court to replace the consent could lead to delays endangering their life while an operation without the consent of the parent having custody was regarded as unlawful.   The children would also be pushed to the margin of society.   These circumstances could not be disregarded when deciding for the first time which of the parents should be given custody.   While as a rule award of the custody of small children to the mother was justified, this was so only if the conditions concerning both parents were equivalent.   The mother had no priority to be accorded custody.   39.    The disadvantages connected with a change of custody were as a rule only of limited duration and had to be accepted in the children's best interest.   There was no basis in the file for assuming that a change in the person having custodial rights would seriously affect the children's state of mind. According to the facts established by the courts below the father was capable of educating the children with the assistance of his mother.   The children were on good terms both with him and their grandmother.   Therefore it was only by awarding the custodial rights to the father that the children's best interest could be preserved.   B.     Relevant domestic law and practice         1.    The provisions on child custody in the Civil Code   40.    The Austrian Civil Code (Allgemeines Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch - ABGB) in the version of 1977 contains a number of provisions on child custody in Sections 137 et seq.   The provision dealing specifically with the custody of children in the case of a divorce or separation of the parents is Section 177 which reads as follows:         "(1) Ist die Ehe der Eltern eines minderjährigen ehelichen Kindes       geschieden, aufgehoben oder für nichtig erklärt worden oder leben       die Eltern nicht bloss vorübergehend getrennt, so können sie dem       Gericht eine Vereinbarung darüber unterbreiten, wem von ihnen       künftig die Obsorge für das Kind allein zukommen soll.   Das       Gericht hat die Vereinbarung zu genehmigen, wenn sie dem Wohl des       Kindes entspricht.         (2) Kommt innerhalb angemessener Frist eine Vereinbarung nicht       zustande oder entspricht sie nicht dem Wohl des Kindes, so hat       das Gericht, im Fall nicht bloss vorübergehender Trennung der       Eltern jedoch nur auf Antrag eines Elternteils, zu entscheiden,       welchem Elternteil die Obsorge für das Kind künftig allein       zukommt."   (Translation)         "(1) Where the marriage between the parents of an under-age       legitimate child has been dissolved or annulled, or where the       parents are separated other than for a temporary period, they may       submit to the court an agreement stating which of them shall in       future have custody of the child.   The court shall approve the       agreement when it is in the interest of the child's welfare.         (2) Where no agreement is reached within a reasonable time, or       if it is not in the interest of the child's welfare, the court       shall decide which parent is to have sole custody of the child       in the future; in the case of a not merely temporary separation       of the parents such a decision shall be taken only on application       of one of them."   41.    Furthermore, a court may at any time make orders to withdraw or restrict custodial rights of a parent if the child's welfare is in danger.   In this respect Section 176 para. 1 of the Civil Code provides the following:         "Gefährden die Eltern durch ihr Verhalten das Wohl des       minderjährigen Kindes, so hat das Gericht, von wem immer es       angerufen wird, die zur Sicherung des Wohles des Kindes nötigen       Verfügungen zu treffen; eine solche Verfügung kann auf Antrag       eines Elternteils auch ergehen, wenn die Eltern in einer       wichtigen Angelegenheit des Kindes kein Einvernehmen erzielen.       Besonders darf das Gericht die Obsorge für das Kind ganz oder       teilweise, auch gesetzlich vorgesehene Einwilligungs- und       Zustimmungsrechte, entziehen. Im Einzelfall hat das Gericht auch       eine gesetzlich erforderliche Einwilligung oder Zustimmung eines       Elternteils zu ersetzen, wenn keine gerechtfertigten Gründe für       die Weigerung vorliegen."   (Translation)         "Where the conduct of the parents threatens the welfare of an       under-age child, the court shall be required, irrespective of who       has made application to it, to make the orders necessary for the       protection of the child's welfare;   such order may also be made       on application from one of the parents when the parents have       reached no agreement concerning a matter of importance to the       child.   In particular the court may withdraw custody of a child,       either wholly or in part, including rights of agreement and       consent provided by law.   In individual cases the court is also       required to act in loco parentis in providing approval or consent       required of parents by law, when there is no justifiable reason       for such agreement or consent to be withheld."   42.    In decisions under Sections 176 and 177 the courts have to observe inter alia the following principles laid down in Sections 178a. and 178b. of the Civil Code:         "§ 178a. Bei Beurteilung des Kindeswohls sind die Persönlichkeit       des Kindes und seine Bedürfnisse, besonders seine Anlagen,       Fähigkeiten, Neigungen und Entwicklungsmöglichkeiten, sowie die       Lebensverhältnisse der Eltern entsprechend zu berücksichtigen.         § 178b. Vor Verfügungen, die die Pflege oder Erziehung eines       Kindes betreffen, hat das Gericht das Kind tunlichst persönlich       zu hören; ein noch nicht zehnjähriges Kind kann auch durch den       Jugendwohlfahrtsträger oder in anderer geeigneter Weise befragt       werden. Das Kind ist nicht zu hören, wenn durch die Befragung       oder durch einen Aufschub der Verfügung das Wohl des Kindes       gefährdet wäre oder im Hinblick auf das Alter oder die       Entwicklung des Kindes eine Meinungsäusserung nicht zu erwarten       ist."   (Translation)         "S 178a. In assessing the welfare of the child, the personality       and needs of the child must be taken into consideration,       particularly his talents, abilities, inclinations and       developmental opportunities, as well as the material       circumstances of the parents.         S 178b. Before making orders affecting the care or education of       a child, the court shall where possible hear the child in person;       a child which has not yet reached the age of ten may also be       questioned by the youth welfare officer or in some other       appropriate manner.   The child shall not be heard in cases where       the questioning, or the postponement of the order, would       jeopardise the child's welfare or where no expression of opinion       can be expected in view of the child's age or development."         2.    The Religious Education Act   43.    The Federal Religious Education Act (Bundesgesetz über die religiöse Kindererziehung), which is a re-enactment (Wieder- verlautbarung) of German legislation introduced in Austria in 1939, provides inter alia the following:         "§ 1. Über die religiöse Erziehung eines Kindes bestimmt die       freie Einigung der Eltern, soweit ihnen die Pflege und Erziehung       zustehen. Die Einigung ist jederzeit widerruflich und wird durch       den Tod eines Ehegatten gelöst.         § 2. (1) Besteht eine solche Einigung nicht oder nicht mehr, so       gelten auch für die religiöse Erziehung die Vorschriften des ABGB       über die Pflege und Erziehung.         (2) Es kann jedoch während bestehender Ehe von keinem Elternteil       ohne die Zustimmung des anderen bestimmt werden, dass das Kind       in einem anderen als dem zur Zeit der Eheschliessung gemeinsamen       Bekenntnis oder in einem anderen Bekenntnis als bisher erzogen,       oder dass ein Kind vom Religionsunterricht abgemeldet werden       soll.         (3) Wird die Zustimmung nicht erteilt, so kann die Vermittlung       oder Entscheidung des Vormundschaftsgerichts beantragt werden.       Für die Entscheidung sind, auch soweit ein Fall des § 176 ABGB       nicht vorliegt, die Zwecke der Erziehung massgebend. Vor der       Entscheidung sind die Ehegatten sowie erforderlichenfalls       Verwandte, Verschwägerte und die Lehrer des Kindes zu hören, wenn       es ohne erhebliche Verzögerung oder unverhältnismässige Kosten       geschehen kann. Das Kind ist zu hören, wenn es das zehnte Jahr       vollendet hat."   (Translation)         "§ 1. The religious education of a child shall be decided upon       by mutual agreement between the parents, in so far as the       responsibility for the child's care and upbringing is vested in       them.   Such agreement may be revoked at any time and is       terminated on the death of one of the parents.         § 2. (1) In the absence of such agreement or where such agreement       has ceased, the provisions of the Civil Code on the care and       education of children shall extend to their religious education.         (2) For the duration of their marriage neither parent may decide       without the consent of the other parent that the child is to be       brought up in a faith different from that shared by both parents       at the time of their marriage, or in a different faith from that       in which it has hitherto been brought up, or that a child is to       cease to attend religious education classes.         (3) In the absence of such consent, it shall be possible to apply       for the mediation of, or a decision by, the guardianship court.       In any such decision the interests of education shall be       paramount even in cases not covered by section 176 of the Civil       Code.   Before the decision is taken the child's parents, and if       necessary relatives, relatives by marriage and teachers, must be       heard if this is possible without significant delays or       disproportionate costs.   The child itself must be heard if it has       reached the age of ten."         3.    Law and practice concerning blood transfusions   44.    There are no specific provisions in Austrian law regulating the administration of blood transfusions in cases where a patient or his legal representative raises objections.   This question must therefore be solved on the basis of the general law applicable to medical treatment, i.e. the relevant provisions of the Hospitals Act (Krankenanstaltengesetz) and of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch).   45.    Section 8 of the Hospitals Act reads as follows:         "(1) Der ärztliche Dienst muss so eingerichtet sein, dass       ärztliche Hilfe in der Anstalt jederzeit sofort erreichbar ist.         (2) Pfleglinge von Krankenanstalten dürfen nur nach den       Grundsätzen und anerkannten Methoden der medizinischen       Wissenschaft ärztlich behandelt werden.         (3) Besondere Heilbehandlungen einschliesslich operativer       Eingriffe dürfen an einem Pflegling nur mit dessen Zustimmung,       wenn aber der Pflegling das 18. Lebensjahr noch nicht       zurückgelegt hat oder er mangels geistiger Reife oder Gesundheit       die Notwendigkeit oder Zweckmässigkeit der Behandlung nicht       beurteilen kann, nur mit Zustimmung seines gesetzlichen       Vertreters durchgeführt werden. Die Zustimmung ist nicht       erforderlich, wenn die Behandlung so dringend notwendig ist, dass       der mit der Einholung der Zustimmung des Pfleglings oder seines       gesetzlichen Vertreters oder mit der Bestellung eines       gesetzlichen Vertreters verbundene Aufschub das Leben gefährden       würde oder mit der Gefahr einer schweren Schädigung der       Gesundheit verbunden wäre. Über die Notwendigkeit und       Dringlichkeit einer Behandlung entscheidet der ärztliche Leiter       der Krankenanstalt oder der für die Leitung der betreffenden       Anstaltsabteilung verantwortliche Arzt."   (Translation)         "(1) The medical service shall be organised in such a manner that       medical assistance is available at any time immediately in the       hospital.         (2) Patients of hospitals may only be treated medically in       accordance with the principles and recognised methods of medical       science.         (3) Special curative treatments including surgical operations may       be administered to a patient only with the latter's consent, but       where the patient has not yet reached the age of 18 or where he       cannot assess the necessity or usefulness of the treatment, only       with the consent of his legal representative.   Such consent is       not required where the treatment is so urgently necessary that       the delay entailed by obtaining the consen