CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;ADMISSIBILITY;ENG — 1 avril 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                         AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 17852/91                       by Johna and Dorothy MURPHY                       against the United Kingdom           The European Commission of Human Rights (First Chamber) sitting in private on 1 April 1992, the following members being present:                MM.    J.A. FROWEIN, President of the First Chamber                  F. ERMACORA                  G. SPERDUTI                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Sir    Basil HALL            Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER              Mr.    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 4 November 1990 by John and Dorothy Murphy against the United Kingdom and registered on 27 February 1991 under file No. 17852/91;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;         Decides as follows:   THE FACTS           The first applicant is an Irish citizen born in 1933 and resident in Manchester.   The second applicant is a British citizen born in 1937 and resident in Manchester.   The facts as submitted by the applicants may be summarised as follows.           The first applicant had two sons, N. born on 6 October 1977 and M. born on 16 April 1983.   The first applicant's wife died in 1987 and the children apparently were cared for by the first applicant and intermittently by his adult daughter J.   Social work involvement with the family began in August 1988.   In September 1988, the first applicant and Social Services apparently agreed that M. should be placed with the second applicant, who was an approved foster-parent. M. had already been placed with the second applicant by the first applicant.           Disagreement as to the care and welfare of the children appears to have developed between J. and the first and second applicants.           On 10 May 1989, N. and M. were made wards of court on the application of J.   By interim order of the High Court of 11 May 1989, N. was placed with J. and M. ordered to remain with the second applicant.         On 6 November 1989, the Court ordered that both N. and M. should stay with J.         In December 1989, the first and second applicant were married.         J. was experiencing increasing difficulties in coping with both children.   Their schools were also expressing concern about their allegedly emotionally disturbed behaviour.   On 11 April 1990 the Court Welfare Officer left both children at the applicants' home pending a hearing in court next day to consider their future.             On 12 April 1990, the court ordered that the Social Services have liberty to place N. and M. with short-term foster-parents.   The Social Services were concerned that the children had suffered psychological damage and required therapeutic treatment.   That evening, a number of policemen called at the first applicant's home to remove the children.   N. refused to go and was forcibly removed.   The applicants allege that both children were removed by force and that N. was handcuffed.   The children were kept at the police station until the arrival of a representative of the Social Services.   N. and M. were placed separately.   The Social Services considered that N. put pressure on M. and that separation would be the best way to meet their needs and to make assessments of them.   N. ran away to return   home on a number of occasions.   M.'s foster-placement broke down and he was placed in a series of children's homes.           The applicants became concerned about N.'s health in or around September 1990 (he was complaining of headaches) and consulted their doctor who had recommended referral to hospital.   N. was staying with the applicants at this period, having run away from the children's home to which he had been sent. The Social Services by letter dated 6 September 1990 objected to the steps taken by the applicants and informed them that before any treatment could take place the leave of the court had to be given.   Court approval was given on 7 September 1990 and N. was admitted to hospital.           N. was discharged from hospital despite the applicants' continued concern for his health.   On 15 October 1990 N. committed suicide.   An Inquest was ordered but adjourned, pending the compilation of a report on the Social Services' involvement with N.           On 2 November 1990, the Court ordered that M. be subject of psychological assessment, with access by the applicants at the discretion of the Social Services.           On 8 May 1991, the Court made an order with the consent of the applicants that M. remain in the care of the Social Services, that he be placed in a special children's centre and that access be granted to the applicants.   His placement was to be reviewed in November following further psychological assessment.   The applicants had been advised to consent to the order by their legal representatives on the basis that the court would have refused to return M. to their care and that they should concentrate on developing access on a meaningful basis with a view to rehabilitation at a later date.         The inquest concerning N. was held on 14 November 1991.   The jury returned an open verdict.         The first applicant began weekly access visits to M. in November 1991.   The consultant psychiatrist reported that the visits were proving positive and beneficial.   The second applicant's access started in December 1991.     COMPLAINTS           The applicants complain that they have been denied justice and their human rights. They complain of the way N. and M. were taken into care on 12 April 1990 and of their separation and treatment in care. They wish for the return of M. to their care.   They do not invoke any particular provision of the Convention.       THE LAW           The applicants complain of a number of matters concerning the taking into care of their children by the Social Services.           The Commission has examined their complaints under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention which provides as follows:           "1.   Everyone has the right to respect for his private         and family life, his home and his correspondence.           2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority         with the exercise of this right except such as is in         accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic         society in the interests of national security, public safety         or the economic well-being of the country, for the         prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of         health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and         freedoms of others."   a)       Insofar as the applicants complain of the decision of the Court giving custody of N. and M. to the Social Services and the actions of the police in removing them, the Commission finds that it is not required to decide whether or not the facts alleged by the applicant disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision, as Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention provides that the Commission "may only deal with the matter ... within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken". Where there has been no final decision, the six months time-limit runs from the date of the act or decision complained of.           In the present case, even assuming the applicants have exhausted domestic remedies, the court decision committing the children to the care of the local authority and the police actions to implement that decision took place on 12 April 1990, whereas the application was submitted to the Commission on 4 November 1990, that is, more than six months after those events.   Furthermore, an examination of the case does not disclose the existence of any special circumstances which might have interrupted or suspended the running of that period.           It follows that this part of the application has been introduced out of time and must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   b)       Insofar as the applicants complain that their children were separated when they were taken into care and of their treatment in care, the Commission recalls that it may only deal with a matter after all domestic remedies have been exhausted as required by Article 26 (Art. 26) of the Convention.           The Commission notes that the applicants did not apply to the High Court, raising their concern that interests of the children required that they be kept together.   The Commission recalls that the High Court had been seized in its wardship jurisdiction and had the competence to deal with all issues relating to the welfare of the children.           It follows that the applicants have not complied with the condition as to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and this part of the application must be rejected under Article 27 para. 3 (Art. 27-3) of the Convention.   c)       The Commission has also examined the applicants' complaints concerning the fact that M. remains in care of the Social Services. The Commission recalls that the decision of the Court of 8 September 1991 to this effect was consented to by the applicants on the advice of their legal representatives with a view to working gradually towards rehabilitation.   The Commission notes that the Court has also ordered that further psychological assessment be made of M., that the applicants be given access and the matter continue to be reviewed. The matter of M.'s long-term future has therefore yet to be decided.   The Commission also notes that access has now begun and is considered to be proving a success.           In these circumstances, the Commission finds no indication of a violation of the applicants' rights under Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention.           It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.           For these reasons, the Commission by a majority           DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.       Secretary to the First Chamber        President of the First Chamber              (M. de SALVIA)                    (J.A. FROWEIN)