CEDH · CASELAW;DECISIONS;DECCOMMISSION;ENG — 13 mai 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                        AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF                         Application No. 17279/90                       by Walter ZUKRIGL                       against Austria           The European Commission of Human Rights sitting in private on 13 May 1992, the following members being present:              MM.    E. BUSUTTIL, Acting President of the First Chamber                  F. ERMACORA                  E. BUSUTTIL                  A.S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK            Sir    Basil HALL            Mr.    C.L. ROZAKIS            Mrs.   J. LIDDY            MM.    M. PELLONPÄÄ                  B. MARXER              Mr.    M. de SALVIA, Secretary to the First Chamber         Having regard to Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms;         Having regard to the application introduced on 31 July 1990 by Waler Zukrigl against Austria and registered on 10 October 1992 under file No. 17279/90;         Having regard to the report provided for in Rule 47 of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission;         Having deliberated;           Decides as follows:   THE FACTS         The applicant is an Austrian citizen born in 1933.   He is represented before the Commission by Mr. W. Dietrich, a lawyer practising in Vienna.         The facts of the application, as submitted by the applicant, may be summarised as follows.         The applicant is a homosexual, aware of his sexuality since his youth.         In early 1986 the applicant met and became friends with a boy who, at the time, was not yet 18 years old.   The applicant's homosexual feelings towards the boy were reciprocated.   Because of the provisions of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) the applicant was not permitted to - and did not - have sexual relations with his friend.         The applicant introduced two constitutional complaints with the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof), one concerning the wording of Article 209 up to 31 December 1988, and one concerning the new wording which was in force from 1 January 1989.         The Constitutional Court rejected the first constitutional complaint( concerning the old wording of Section 209) on the grounds that the applicant no longer stood under any threat of being prosecuted under that provision as it was no longer in force.   As to the second constitutional complaint, concerning the current wording of Section 209, the Constitutional Court, in its decision of 3 October 1989, found that the applicant had locus standi to make the complaint as he was a person who was actually affected by the provision.   Only a constitutional complaint could remedy the alleged interference with the applicant's rights.         The Constitutional Court continued:   (Translation)         "The appellant especially sees a violation of equal rights       in the passage of the law he challenges in its allegedly       treating men and women differently, in a way that is not       justified on any relevant grounds, with respect to       homosexual activities with young people under 18.   It is       claimed that if the legislature has in mind the protection       and the safeguarding of the undisturbed sexual development       of young people, there is no difference at all between the       development of male and female sexuality.   It is also       asserted that if in order to justify exemption from       punishment for female homosexual acts involving under-age       partners a position is taken up which is based on whether       the effects of such acts are harmful, this standpoint       cannot be given up when it comes to judging homosexual       contacts with male under-age persons.         The Constitutional Court continues to hold the view it has       consistently expressed in previous cases that the scope       given to the ordinary legislature by the constitution with       respect to the passing of legislation applies both to the       aims it is seeking to achieve and to the choice of the       methods serving to achieve those aims.   The ordinary       legislature is free to decide - while taking into account       either desired side-effects or those it is prepared to       accept - what instruments it considers suitable in order to       achieve its aims and then actually applies in a given       situation.   In this connection it is only barred from       exceeding the limits imposed by the constitution, for       example by violating the requirement to be objective (which       results from the principle that everyone must be treated       equally) by choosing completely unsuitable means of       achieving an aim or by choosing means which, although       basically suitable, lead to a distinction being made for       which no valid reasons can be given.   The development of       the criminal law in the last few decades has shown that the       legislature is striving to apply the system of criminal       justice in a significantly more restrictive way than before       - in pursuance of the efforts it is undertaking in       connection with its policy on the treatment of offenders,       which have become known under the general heading of       "decriminalisation".   This means that it only leaves       offences on the statute book or creates new offences if       such punishment of behaviour harmful to society is still       found absolutely necessary and indispensable after the       strictest criteria have been applied.   The criminal       provision which has been challenged is included in that       group of acts considered unlawful in order to protect - to       an extent thought to be unavoidable - a young, maturing       person from developing sexually in the wrong way       ("Homosexual acts are only offences of relevance to the       criminal law inasmuch as a dangerous strain must not be       placed by homosexual experiences upon the sexual       development of young males ...").   Seen in this light, it       is the conviction of the Constitutional Court that from the       point of view of the principle of equality contained in       Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law and       Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act those legislating       on the criminal law cannot reasonably be challenged for       taking the attitude, by reference to authoritative expert       opinions coupled with experience gained, that homosexual       influence endangers maturing males to a significantly       greater extent than girls of the same age, and conclude       that it is necessary to punish under the criminal law       homosexual acts committed with young males, as provided for       under s. 209 of the Penal Code.   This conclusion was also       based on their views of morality, which they wanted to       impose while duly observing current policy on criminal       justice, which aims at moderation and at restricting the       punishment of offences (while carefully weighing up all the       manifold advantages and disadvantages).   Taking everything       into account, we are dealing here with a distinction which       is based on factual differences and therefore       constitutionally admissible from the point of view of       Article 7 para. 1 of the Federal Constitutional Law, in       conjunction with Article 2 of the Basic Constitutional Act.       The Constitutional Court thus endorses the legal view held       by the Supreme Court, which did not raise any       constitutional doubts concerning the legal rule contained       in the earlier version of s. 209 of the Penal Code, the       basic conception of which was comparable with respect to       the different treatment of under-age males and females.       This has already been demonstrated in several judgments       (cf. OGH 15 September 1981, 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 No.       35; 23 April 1986, 9 Os 38/86; see also OGH 10 September       1981, 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl 1982 No. 65m; 24 August 1982, 9       Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50).   The restriction contained in the       Juvenile Court Law 1988 (Federal Law Gazette 599) of the       group of offenders to (male) adults also raises no doubts       with respect to the constitutional law.   The Constitutional       Court basically shares the view expressed by the Federal       Government, the gist of which is that this is only an       expression of the basic legal idea that the strict,       rigorous means of punishment available under the criminal       law must be handled sparingly and with proper restraint.       Contrary to the appellant's view, the criminal provision       which is challenged cannot violate Article 8 of the       European Convention on Human Rights simply because the       interference with private and family life, which it is       claimed has taken place, is quite obviously a legislative       measure for the protection of the rights of others which is       admissible under Article 8 para. 2 of the Convention,       namely the protection of the undisturbed development of       persons affected by criminal acts.         It therefore follows that the application to annul s. 209       of the Penal Code (Federal Law Gazette 60/1974, as amended:       Federal Law Gazette 599/1988) had to be dismissed as       ill-founded."   (Original)         "Die Gleichheitswidrigkeit der angegriffenen Gesetzesstelle       erblickt der Einschreiter insbesondere darin, daß sie       Männer und Frauen in bezug auf homosexuelle Handlungen mit       Jugendlichen in sachlich nicht gerechtfertigter Weise       unterschiedlich behandle.   Habe der Gesetzgeber den Schutz       und die Sicherung der ungestörten sexuellen Entwicklung       junger Menschen vor Augen, so bestehe kein Unterschied in       der Entwicklung männlicher und weiblicher Sexualität       überhaupt.   Werde zur Rechtfertigung der Straflosigkeit       weiblicher homosexueller Kontakte zu jüngeren Partnerinnen       eine Position bezogen, die sich an schädigenden Wirkungen       orientiere, könne dieser Standpunkt bei der Beurteilung       homosexueller Kontakte zu männlichen jüngeren Personen       nicht aufgegeben werden.         Der Verfassungsgerichtshof hält an seiner in ständiger       Rechtsprechung vertretenen Auffassung fest, daß die dem       einfachen Gesetzgeber verfassungsmäßig eingeräumte       rechtspolitische Gestaltungsfreiheit sowohl für die       angestrebten Ziele als auch für die Auswahl der zur       Zielerreichung dienlichen Mittel gilt: Der einfache       Gesetzgeber kann frei entscheiden, welche Instrumente er -       under Berücksichtigung erwünschter oder in Kauf genommener       Nebenwirkungen - in der jeweils gegebenen Situation zur       Verwirklichung seiner Zielsetzungen geeignet erachtet und       anwendet.   Verwehrt ist ihm hiebei nur die Überschreitung       der von Verfasssungs wegen gezogenen Schranken, so die       Verletzung des aus dem Gleichheitssatz erfließenden       Sachlichkeitsgebots, indem beispielsweise zur       Zielerreichung völlig ungeeignete Mittel gewählt werden       oder die vorgesehenen, an sich geeigneten zu einer sachlich       unbegründbaren Differenzierung führen.   Die Fortentwicklung       der Strafrechtsordnung in den letzten Jahrzehnten zeigt       nun, dass der Gesetzgeber das Justizstrafrecht - in       Verfolgung seiner unter dem Überbegriff       "Entkriminalisierung" bekannt gewordenen       kriminalpolitischen Bestrebungen - deutlich restriktiver       als zuvor einzusetzen trachtet, Straftatbestände also nur       dann bestehen läßt oder neu schafft, wenn eine derartige       Pönalisierung sozialschädlichen Verhaltens auch nach       strengsten Kriterien unbedingt geboten und unerläßlich ist.       Die angefochtene Strafnorm zählt zu jener Gruppe von       Unrechtstatbeständen, die dem Schutz des heranreifenden       jungen Menschen vor sexueller Fehlentwicklung - im       unumgänglich befundenen Umfang - dient ["Homosexuelle       Betätigung ist strafrechtlich nur insofern relevant, als       die sexuelle Entwicklung männlicher Jugendlicher nicht       durch homosexuelle Erlebnisse in gefährdender Weise       belastet werden soll...").   So betrachtet kann dem       Strafgesetzgeber aber nach Überzeugung des       Verfassungsgerichtshofs unter dem Aspekt des       Gleichbehandlungssatzes der Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG und 2 StGG       nicht mit Grund entgegengetreten werden, wenn er - unter       Berufung auf maßgebende Expertenmeinungen in Verbindung mit       Erfahrungstatsachen den Standpunkt einnehmend, daß eine       homosexuelle Einflußnahme männliche Heranreifende in       signifikant höherem Grad gefährde als gleichaltrige Mädchen       - auf dem Boden und in Durchsetzung seiner       Wertvorstellungen mit Beachtung der eingeschränkten,       maßhaltenden Ziele der vorherrschenden Strafrechtspolitik       (bei sorgsamer Abwägung aller vielfältigen Vor- und       Nachteile) ableitet, es sei mit einer strafrechtlichen       Ahndung homosexueller Handlungen an jungen Menschen       männlichen Geschlechts, wie in § 209 StGB festgelegt, das       Auslangen zu finden.   Denn es handelt sich hier   - alles in       allem genommen - um eine Differenzierung, die auf       Unterschieden im Tatsachenbereich beruht und deswegen aus       der Sicht des Art. 7 Abs. 1 B-VG iVm Art. 2 StGG       verfassungsrechtlich zulässig ist.   Der       Verfassungsgerichtshof tritt damit im Ergebnis der       Rechtsmeinung des Obersten Gerichtshofs bei, der - wie       schon in mehreren Entscheidungen dargelegt (vgl. OGH       15.9.1981 9 Os 144/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr. 35, 23.4.1986, 9 Os       38/86;   s. auch OGH 10.9.1981 13 Os 115/81 = EvBl. 1982 Nr.       65m 24.84.1982 9 Os 114/82 = SSt. 53/50) - die in ihrer       Grundkonzeption vergleichbare Strafnorm des § 209 StGB       (frühere Fassung) aus dem Blickwinkel der unterschiedlichen       Behandlung von männlichen und weiblichen Minderjährigen       verfassungsrechtlich nicht in Zweifel zog.   Doch auch die       hier relevierte, mit dem Jugendgerichtsgesetz 1988, BGBl.       599, verfügte Einschränkung des Täterkreises auf       (männliche) Volljährige begegnet keinen verfassungs-       rechtlichen Bedenken.   Der Verfassungsgerichtshof teilt       dazu im wesentlichen die Auffassung der Bundesregierung,       die (sinngemäß) zutreffend darauf hinweist, daß hierin nur       der rechtspolitische Grundgedanke zum Ausdruck komme, die       einschneidenden strengen Mittel des Kriminalrechts in       sachgerechter Weise zurückhaltend und sparsam zu handhaben.       Gegen Art. 8 EMRK wieder kann die angefochtene Stafnorm       entgegen der Meinung des Antragstellers allein schon       deshalb nicht verstoßen, weil der behauptete Eingriff in       das Privat- und Familienleben ganz offenkundig eine nach       Art. 8 Abs. 2 EMRK zulässige gesetzgeberische Maßnahme       zum Schutz der Rechte anderer ist, nämlich zum Schutz der       ungestörten Entwicklung der von den Straftaten betroffenen       Personen.         Daraus folgt aber, daß der Antrag, § 209 StGB, BGBl.       60/1974 idF BGBl.   599/1988, als verfassungswidrig       aufzuheben, als unbegründet abzuweisen war."     Relevant provisions of domestic law   Up to 31 December 1988:   (Translation)         s. 209.   A male person who after attaining the age of       eighteen fornicates with a youth of the same sex shall be       sentenced to detention of between six months and five       years.   (Original)         § 209.   Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach       Vollendung des achtzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer       jugendlichen Person gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht treibt,       ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu fünf       Jahren zu bestrafen.   From 1 January 1989:   (Translation)         s. 209.   A male person who after attaining the age of       nineteen years fornicates with a person of the same sex who       has attained the age of fourteen years but not the age of       nineteen years shall be sentenced to detention of between       six months and five years.   (Original)         § 209.   Eine Person männlichen Geschlechtes, die nach       vollendung des neunzehnten Lebensjahres mit einer Person,       die das vierzehnte, aber noch nicht das achtzehnte       Lebensjahr vollendet hat,   gleichgeschlechtliche Unzucht       treibt, ist mit Freiheitsstrafe von sechs Monaten bis zu       fünf Jahren zu bestrafen.   COMPLAINTS         The applicant alleges that the continued existence of Article 209 of the Criminal Code constitutes an unjustified interference with his right to respect for private life, as guaranteed by Article 8 of the Convention.   He also considers that the fact that Article 209 only applies to relations between men, and not to relations between women, violates Article 14 in connection with Article 8 of the Convention.   THE LAW   1.     The applicant alleges violation of Article 8 (art. 8) of the Convention by virtue of the existence of legislation which makes it a criminal offence for a man over the age of 19 to have homosexual relations with a boy between the ages of 14 and 18.   Article 8 (Art. 8) of the Convention provides as follows:         1.    Everyone has the right to respect for his private and       family life, his home and his correspondence.         2.    There shall be no interference by a public authority with       the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with       the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests       of national security, public safety or the economic well-being       of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the       protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the       rights and freedoms of others.         The applicant in the present case has not been prosecuted under the new version of Section 209 of the Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch). The Commission must accordingly consider whether he may claim to be "the victim of a violation" of Article 8 (Art. 8) within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.         The Commission recalls that in its judgment in the Marckx case the European Court of Human Rights held the following:         "Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention entitles       individuals to contend that a law violates their rights by       itself, in the absence of an individual measure of       implementation, if they run the risk of   being directly       affected by it."   (Eur. Court H.R., Marckx judgment of 13       June 1979, Series A no. 31, p. 13, para. 27).         The Commission has had regard to the jurisprudence of the Court according to which the very existence of legislation may continuously affect the exercise of a right under the Convention (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Dudgeon judgment of 22 October 1981, Series A no. 45, p. 18, para. 41) even in the absence of an individual measure of implementation (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Johnston and Others judgment of 18 December 1986, Series A no. 112, p. 21, para. 42) and even where the risk of such an implementation is minimal (cf. Eur. Court H.R., Norris judgment of 26 October 1988, Series A no. 142, p. 16, para. 33).         Moreover, the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof) found, for the purposes of Austrian law, that the current text of Section 209 of the Criminal Code   (Strafgesetzbuch) affected the applicant in the enjoyment of his rights.   Having regard to the above jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, and to the finding of the Constitutional Court, the Commission finds that the applicant may claim to be a victim of a violation within the meaning of Article 25 (Art. 25) of the Convention.         To the extent that the applicant is required to exhaust domestic remedies in connection with a complaint concerning the effect of a provision on his right to respect for private life, the Commission finds that, by putting his complaint to the Constitutional Court, the applicant has exhausted domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law.         Having regard to the above-mentioned Dudgeon and Norris judgments of the Court, and to the Commission's Report in the case of Modinos v. Cyprus (No. 15070/89, Report 3.12.91), the Commission finds that the existence of Article 209 of the Criminal Code amounts to an interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life as guaranteed by Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, that the interference is "in accordance with the law", and that the aim of the interference is the "protection of the rights and freedoms of others" and the "protection of morals".         As to the question of necessity, the Commission recalls that the Convention organs have on three occasions considered the criminalisation of homosexual activities between consenting male adults as not "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention (Dudgeon and Norris judgments and Modinos case,   referred to above).   The present case, however, relates not to a prohibition on homosexual acts between consenting male adults, but rather to legislation fixing an age of consent to homosexual activities, with a separate age of criminal responsibility for the relevant offences (cf. No. 7215/75, Comm. Report 12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras. 139-158).         It is, in the first place, for the domestic authorities to assess whether a pressing social need exists for an interference with the rights set out in Article 8 para. 1 (Art. 8-1) of the Convention, and that in making this assessment, a margin of appreciation is left to the States (cf. Norris judgment, referred to above, p. 20, para. 45 with further references).         The Commission recalls that it has already considered that there was a realistic basis (in 1978) for the conclusion that young men in the age-bracket 18-21 who are involved in homosexual relationships would be subject to substantial social pressures which could be harmful to their psychological development (No. 7215/75, referred to above, para. 154).   In that case, the Commission found that the United Kingdom Government had not gone beyond its obligations under the Convention in attempting to strike a balance between the conflicting interests involved.         In the present case, the age of "consent" is lower than in the previous case concerning the United Kingdom, and the age at which criminal responsibility will be imputed for breach of the respective provisions is higher in Austria than in the United Kingdom.   Although it appears from the extensive documents submitted by the applicant that attitudes in general may have evolved since 1978, the Commission finds nothing in the present case to distinguish it from Application No. 7215/75, save that the Austrian legislation is less restrictive.         The interference with the applicant's right to respect for his private life can therefore be considered "necessary in a democratic society" within the meaning of Article 8 para. 2 (Art. 8-2) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill- founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.   2.     The applicant also alleges a violation of Article 14 of the Convention in connection with Article 8 (Art. 14+8).   He points out that Section 209 of the Criminal Code relates only to male homosexual behaviour, and considers that the fact that female homosexual behaviour is not included amounts to an unjustified distinction in the enjoyment of Article 8 (Art. 8) rights, contrary to Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.   Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention provides as follows:         "The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this       Convention shall be secured without discrimination on any       ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,       political or other opinion, national or social origin,       association with a national minority, property, birth or       other status."         This issue is also canvassed in the Commission's Report in Application No. 7215/75, (Comm. Report 12.10.78, D.R. 19 p. 66, paras. 166-170).   In addition, in the present case, the Constitutional Court has discussed, in the context of the principle of equality before the law, whether a discrimination was involved.   The Constitutional Court noted that the reason why female homosexuality had been excluded from the scope of Section 209 was because it was the policy of the legislator only to impose criminal sanctions in cases where such penalty was absolutely necessary, even using the strictest criteria. It further noted that the legislator had considered that there was considerably more danger of homosexual influence on adolescent males than girls of the same age.   Accordingly, although there was a difference in treatment, the Constitutional Court found that the existence of Section 209 did not raise constitutional problems.         Bearing in mind both its previous Report in Application No. 7215/75 (referred to above) and the reasons set out in the Constitutional Court's decision of 3 October 1989, the Commission finds that the application of Section 209 of the Criminal Code to males but not to females does not constitute discrimination against the applicant within the meaning of Article 14 (Art. 14) of the Convention.         It follows that this part of the application is also manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 27 para. 2 (Art. 27-2) of the Convention.         For these reasons, the Commission by a majority         DECLARES THE APPLICATION INADMISSIBLE.     Secretary to the First Chamber     Acting President of the First Chamber             (M. De SALVIA)                         (E. BUSUTTIL)