CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 20 mai 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }      EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      Application No. 12350/86                      Friedrich Wilhelm KREMZOW                               against                               AUSTRIA   REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 20 May 1992)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                           Page   I.         INTRODUCTION           (paras. 1 - 19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             A.    The application                (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             B.    The proceedings                (paras. 5 - 14). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             C.    The present Report                (paras. 15 - 19) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.        ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS           (paras. 20 - 75). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4             A.    The particular circumstances of the case                (paras. 20 - 59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4             1.    The institution of criminal proceedings                against the applicant                (paras. 20 - 24) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4             2.    The applicant's trial before the                Court of Assizes                (paras. 25 - 30) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4             3.    The proceedings before the Supreme Court                (paras. 31 - 59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5                  a) Remedies taken by the Parties                (paras. 31 - 34) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5                  b) The consultation of the Attorney                General's office                (paras. 35 - 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5                  c) Additional evidence                (para. 39) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6                  d) Draft decision prepared by the                Judge Rapporteur                (paras. 40 - 43) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6                  e) Summons to the Supreme Court's hearing                (paras. 44 - 48) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7                  f) The applicant's request for personal                presence at the Supreme Court's hearing                (paras. 49 - 53) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8                  g) The Supreme Court's hearing and judgment                (paras. 54 - 59) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8             B.    Relevant domestic law                (paras. 60 - 75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10             1.    Plea of nullity                (paras. 60 - 66) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10             2.    Appeal against sentence                (paras. 67 - 69) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             3.    Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure                (paras. 70 - 75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12   III. OPINION OF THE COMMISSION           (paras. 76 - 154) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             A.    Complaints declared admissible                (para. 76) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             B.    Points at issue                (para. 77) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             C.    Personal appearance at the hearing                (paras. 78 - 106). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14             1.    Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) of                the Convention                (paras. 78 - 102). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14                  a) Presence at the hearing of the pleas of                nullity                (paras. 82 - 89) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15                  b) Presence at the hearing of the appeals                against sentence                (paras. 90 - 101). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16                  Conclusion (para. 102) . . . . . . . . . . . 19             2.    Article 14 in conjunction with Article 6                of the Convention                (paras. 103 - 105) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19                  Conclusion (para. 106) . . . . . . . . . . . 19             D.    Fairness of the Supreme Court's proceedings                (paras. 107 - 135) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19             1.    Preparation of the judgment prior to                the Supreme Court's hearing                (paras. 107 - 110) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19                  Conclusion (para. 111) . . . . . . . . . . . 20             2.    Opportunity for the defence to obtain, and                to comment on, the Attorney General's                position paper                (paras. 112 - 121) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20                  Conclusion (para. 122) . . . . . . . . . . . 22             3.    Other complaints                (paras. 123 - 134) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22                  Conclusion (para. 135) . . . . . . . . . . . 24             E.    Effective domestic remedies                (paras. 136 - 140) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25                  Conclusion (para. 141) . . . . . . . . . . . 25             F.    Detention as a convicted prisoner                (paras. 142 - 146) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25                  Conclusion (para. 147) . . . . . . . . . . . 26             G.    Recapitulation                (paras. 148 - 154) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26   Dissenting opinion of Mr. H. Danelius, joined by MM. C.A. Nørgaard and G. Jörundsson . . . . . . . . . . . . 27   Dissenting opinion by MM. S. Trechsel, H. Schermers and A.V. Almeida Ribeiro. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28   APPENDIX I      :     HISTORY OF THE PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE                     COMMISSION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29   APPENDIX II     :     DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . 31   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    THE APPLICATION   2.    The applicant, an Austrian citizen born in 1938 and former judge, is currently serving a life sentence for murder in Vienna.   He is represented before the Commission by Mr. Wilfried Ludwig Weh, a lawyer practising in Bregenz.   3.    The application is directed against Austria whose Government are represented by their Agent, Ambassador Helmut Türk, Deputy Secretary General and Legal Counsel of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   4.    The application, in so far as declared admissible, relates to criminal appeal proceedings before the Austrian Supreme Court in which the applicant's conviction of murder was confirmed and his sentence increased.   He complains that he was not allowed to be present in person at the Supreme Court's hearing (Article 6 paras. 1 and 3 (c) in conjunction with Article 14 of the Convention) and that the Supreme Court's proceedings were unfair (Article 6 para. 1) in that its judgment was prepared and communicated to the Attorney General before the hearing   and in that he did not have sufficient time to prepare his defence (Article 6 para. 3 (b)).   The applicant further alleges violations of Article 5 in conjunction with Article 14, and of Article 13 of the Convention.   B.    THE PROCEEDINGS   5.    The application was introduced on 1 August and registered on 22 August 1986.   6.    On 19 January 1989 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit before 7 April 1989 their observations in writing on its admissibility and merits.   7.    Following an extension of this time-limit, the Government submitted their observations on 23 May 1989.   The applicant was requested to reply thereto before 10 July 1989.   At his request, the time-limit was extended and he submitted his observations on 18 August 1989.   8.    On 2 April 1990 the Commission decided to invite the parties to submit further observations in writing before 15 June 1990 and also to submit observations orally at a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case.   9.    After both parties had been granted extensions of the above time- limit, the applicant submitted additional observations on 29 June 1990 and the Government on 17 July 1990.   10.   The oral hearing took place on 5 September 1990.   The Government were represented by their Agent, Mr. Helmut Türk, who was assisted by Mr. Wolf Okresek of the Federal Chancellery and Mr. Gert Felsenstein of the Federal Ministry of Justice.   The applicant was represented by his counsel, Mr. Wilfried Ludwig Weh, assisted by Mrs. Eva Weh.   11.   On the same day the Commission declared the applicant's complaints relating to the Supreme Court's proceedings admissible while rejecting the remaining complaints.   12.   The text of the decision on admissibility was approved by the Commission on 12 October 1990.   The parties were invited to submit supplementary observations on the merits before 3 December 1990.   13.   The Government submitted such observations on 4 December 1990, and the applicant, after having been granted an extension of the time- limit, on 15 February 1991.   14.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 para. 1 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    THE PRESENT REPORT   15.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             MM.   C. A. NØRGAARD, President                J. A. FROWEIN                S. TRECHSEL                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A. WEITZEL                H. G. SCHERMERS                H. DANELIUS           Mrs. G. H. THUNE           Sir   Basil HALL           Mr.   C. L. ROZAKIS           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   L. LOUCAIDES                A. V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO   16.   The text of this Report was adopted on 20 May 1992 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   17.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention is:   i)    to establish the facts, and   ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a      breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the      Convention.   18.   A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   19.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    THE PARTICULAR CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE   1.    The institution of the criminal proceedings against the applicant   20.   The applicant was a judge in the Austrian courts from 1964 to 1978 when he retired for reasons of health.   He then worked as consultant of various practising lawyers in the area of Vienna, including Mr. P.   21.   On 16 December 1982 the applicant voluntarily presented himself before the Regional Court (Kreisgericht) of Korneuburg and confessed to having killed P.   22.   Criminal proceedings were instituted and the applicant has remained in detention ever since.   23.   Immediately following his arrest, the applicant was taken into psychiatric treatment and observation in view of a danger of his committing suicide and of his overall mental condition.   After a period in the psychiatric hospital of Vienna he was detained in the Mittersteig special institution for mentally deranged offenders.   24.   On 30 November 1983 the public prosecutor filed an indictment charging the applicant with murder under Section 75 of the Penal Code (Strafgesetzbuch) and with illegal possession of a firearm under Section 36 of the Firearms Act (Waffengesetz) as well as a number of further offences.   It was alleged that dire financial straits had led the applicant to defraud P. and that the homicide had been motivated by a desire to cover up the fraud.   The prosecution requested that the applicant be committed to an institution for mentally abnormal criminals (Anstalt für geistig abnorme Rechtsbrecher) under Section 21 of the Penal Code.   2.    The applicant's trial before the Court of Assizes   25.   On 13 June 1984 the applicant's trial (Hauptverhandlung) commenced before a Court of Assizes of the Regional Court of Korneuburg sitting with a jury (Geschworenengericht).   The applicant was represented by an official defence counsel (Pflichtverteidiger), the court having refused the applicant's request based on Article 6 para. 3 (c) of the Convention to defend himself in person.     26.   At the first session of the trial the applicant retracted his confessions which he said were the product of a psychotic aberration. He now asserted that P. had committed suicide in his presence.   The trial was discontinued and referred back to the investigating judge with a view to clarifying the facts as now alleged by the applicant.   27.   Following supplementary investigations by the investigating judge, a new trial began on 5 November 1984 before the Court of Assizes.   28.   The applicant states that he and his counsel disagreed on trial strategy and that no relation of confidence existed between them.   29.   On 18 December 1984 the jury found the applicant guilty of murder and unlawful possession of a firearm.   The charges of fraud had earlier been dropped by the prosecution.   The jury found that the applicant did not lack criminal responsibility and, in their handwritten statement of reasons (Niederschrift der Geschworenen), expressed the opinion that "the motive remains unknown, too many possibilities".   30.   The bench, sitting with the jury, set the applicant's sentence at twenty years' imprisonment, the maximum determinate sentence possible under Austrian law in a case of murder.   It ordered him to be committed to an institution for mentally abnormal criminals.   3.    The proceedings before the Supreme Court   a)    Remedies taken by the Parties   31.   The applicant filed a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) with the Supreme Court (Oberster Gerichtshof) complaining that he had been denied the right to defend himself and that the trial had not been fair.   32.   The applicant's mother and wife filed a further plea of nullity and an appeal (Berufung) with the Supreme Court complaining of the length of the sentence and the commitment of the applicant to an institution for mentally abnormal criminals.   33.   The public prosecutor appealed against the sentence and asked that a life sentence be imposed because of the "cold blooded planning and particular insidiousness of the applicant's offence" ("kaltblütige Planung und besondere Heimtücke der Tat").   A further appeal was filed by the private party, Mr. R. P., the son of Mr. P.   34.   On 26 March 1985 the applicant, in observations in reply (Gegenausführung) to the prosecution's appeal, claimed that the prosecution's above new assertion was incompatible with the psychiatric expertise according to which his mental capacity to act with insight had been considerably reduced.   b)    The consultation of the Attorney General's office   35.   On 2 May 1985 the Supreme Court informed the Attorney General's office (Generalprokuratur) of the remedies taken in the applicant's case and transmitted the file.   According to the transmission note the file included the following documents: the judgment of the Court of Assizes, the defendant's plea of nullity, the defendant's mother's and wife's plea of nullity and appeal, the public prosecutor's appeal and the private party's appeal.   The note mentioned the Judge Rapporteur's name ("BE: Dr. Steininger") and was signed by him.   36.   On 3 May 1985 the Attorney General's office acknowledged receipt of the file including appendices by a stamp on the transmission note which was signed by an agent of the Attorney General's office.   37.   The Attorney General's position paper ("croquis") dated 24 July 1985 was received by the Supreme Court on 2 August 1985.   It dealt in detail, on 49 pages, with the various grounds of nullity invoked by the applicant and his mother and wife in their respective pleas of nullity.   The Attorney General expressed the view that the Supreme Court should hold a public hearing and reject these pleas.   He did not make any submissions regarding the various appeals against the sentence.   38.   On 18 September 1985 the applicant, on 2 October 1985 his official defence counsel applied for the communication of the Attorney General's position paper.   However, these requests were not acted upon. The position paper was served on counsel only on 9 June 1986 (see para. 46 below).   c)    Additional evidence   39.   On 31 December 1985 the private party Mr. R. P. submitted a number of missing diary-sheets of the victim P. to the Supreme Court. During the trial the applicant had repeatedly requested the production of missing parts of Mr. P.'s diary as evidence that P. had intended to commit suicide.   Subsequently he had also introduced a civil action against Mr. R. P. to produce those documents.   After having been informed in connection with the civil case that parts of the diary had been submitted to the Supreme Court, the applicant on 22 January 1986 requested the Regional Court of Korneuburg to order a search of the home of Mr. R. P. whom he suspected of withholding further relevant documents.   This request was rejected, but copies of the diary-sheets submitted to the Supreme Court were served on the applicant through the Regional Court.   d)    Draft decision prepared by the Judge Rapporteur   40.   Prior to the fixing of the date of the Supreme Court's hearing, the Judge Rapporteur prepared a draft judgment which was included in the Supreme Court's file as Document No. 19.   The draft was apparently revised.   Parts were written on different typewriters and a number of pages added or replaced.   On this draft the Rapporteur generally followed the line adopted in the Attorney General's position paper and proposed to reject the various pleas of nullity.   The draft also dealt with the question of the diary-sheets.   41.   Several years later (in an official statement submitted on 19 June 1989, in connection with disciplinary proceedings against the applicant) the Judge Rapporteur observed:   (German)        "Daß die Stellungnahme der Generalprokuratur zu den      Nichtigkeitsbeschwerden des Angeklagten und der übrigen      Rechtsmittelwerber keineswegs in toto der hg Entscheidung über      diese Rechtsmittel zugrunde gelegt wurde, sondern von mir als      Berichterstatter ein umfangreicher eigenständiger      Entscheidungsentwurf ausgearbeitet wurde, ergibt sich aus meinem      Urteilsantrag ... .   Soweit der Antragsteller ... eine Äußerung      des damaligen Senatsvorsitzenden ins Treffen führt, so hat sich      diese (...) offensichtlich eben darauf bezogen, daß ein      eigenständiger umfassender Entscheidungsentwurf vom      Berichterstatter verfaßt wird, zumal darüber mehrfach in den      Sitzungen des Senates diskutiert wurde."   (Translation)        "My proposal for the judgment shows that the observations of the      Attorney General's office on the pleas of nullity brought by the      accused and the other appellants were by no means used in their      entirety as the basis for the Supreme Court's decision on these      remedies, but that in my capacity as Judge Rapporteur I prepared      an extensive, original draft judgment... .   In so far as the      applicant quotes comments by the then President of the Chamber,      ..., they obviously refer (...) to the very fact that an      original, extensive draft judgment is prepared by the Judge      Rapporteur, particularly since the matter was discussed more than      once by the Chamber."   42.   The applicant observes that there is no trace of such discussions in the Supreme Court's file, as would have been required under Section 23 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung) and Section 65 para. 2 of the Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure (Geschäftsordnung).   He further concludes from the Judge Rapporteur's above statement that there were deliberations on the merits of his case in the Supreme Court already before the public hearing.   43.   The Government do not deny that preliminary deliberations (Vorberatungen) took place between the members of the competent Supreme Court Chamber prior to the hearing.   It appears that statements by other members of the Chamber concerning the draft decision were taken to the file as Document No. 22, i.e. in the period between the summons and the public hearing.   e)    Summons to the Supreme Court's hearing   44.   On 4 June 1986 the Supreme Court set the hearing of the pleas of nullity and the appeals for 2 July 1986.   The summons was sent to the parties on 9 June 1986.   The Attorney General's office acknowledged receipt on 10 June 1986, the applicant received it on 17 June 1986.   45.   The notification of the date of the hearing provided that at the hearing of the pleas of nullity the applicant, being incarcerated, could only appear through his official defence counsel according to Sections 286 para. 2 and 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.   At the hearing of the appeals he would not be brought to the court as the conditions of Section 296 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure were not met.   46.   The notification also mentioned the documents to be transmitted to the various parties.   It was ordered that the Attorney General's position paper should be sent to the applicant's official defence counsel and to the lawyer of his wife and mother.   The Attorney General's office was requested to submit a new extract from the applicant's criminal record.   47.   The applicant claims that the whole of the Supreme Court's file, including the draft decision prepared by the Judge Rapporteur, was transmitted to the Attorney General's office together with the summons. The relevant passage read: "Der Generalprokuratur zur Kenntnis zu Gs 948/85" ("For the attention of the Attorney General's office under file No. Gs 948/85").   In the subsequent disciplinary proceedings the corresponding part of the summons of 19 October 1988 read: "Der Generalprokuratur zu Gd 58/88 zur Kenntnis (ohne Entwurf des BE [= Berichterstatters])" ("For the attention of the Attorney General's office under file No. Gd 58/88 (without draft decision of the Judge Rapporteur))".   48.   The Government submit that only the summons was sent to the General Attorney's office and that the Supreme Court's file, and in particular the draft decision prepared by the Judge Rapporteur, was not simultaneously transmitted to that office.   They refer to the regular practice of the Supreme Court and Section 60 para. 3 of the latter's Rules of Procedure (see para. 72 below).   f)    The applicant's request for personal presence at the Supreme      Court's hearing   49.   On 19 June 1986 the applicant petitioned the Supreme Court to be allowed to attend the hearing of the pleas of nullity in person, a right accorded to defendants who are not incarcerated.   He invoked Articles 6 and 14 of the Convention and observed that in 1986 alone he had been granted permission thirty times to appear personally before various courts and administrative authorities in Vienna.   He relied on his right to defend himself in person, as guaranteed in Article 6 para. 3 (c), and observed that he had consistently objected to his being represented by official defence counsel and that under Section 296 para. 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure detained defendants were entitled to be brought to a hearing on appeal against sentence.   50.   At the same time the applicant observed that no decision had so far been taken on his request to get a copy of the Attorney General's "croquis" and that a procedure whereby the Attorney General, but not the defence, was informed of the views of the members of the Supreme Court on the various remedies would violate the principle of equality of arms stipulated in Article 6 of the Convention.   51.   On 25 June 1986 the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's petition to be brought to the hearing on the pleas of nullity and his motion to discover the "croquis" of the Attorney General and to inspect the case-file.   The Supreme Court noted that the applicant had not applied to be brought to the hearing of the appeals.   It had no doubts concerning the constitutionality and conformity with Article 6 of the Convention of Section 286 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure which stipulates that an accused in detention has no right to appear personally at the hearing of a plea of nullity, but only a right to be represented by counsel.   The Supreme Court mentioned that the proceedings concerning the appeal and those concerning pleas of nullity differed and therefore could not be compared.   52.   In the same decision the Supreme Court stated that the applicant personally was not entitled to receive a copy of the Attorney General's "croquis".   Article 6 of the Convention had been observed because a copy of this document had been made available to his official defence counsel.   53.   The applicant's defence counsel was notified of this decision at the hearing on 2 July 1986.   g)    The Supreme Court's hearing and judgment   54.   The Supreme Court's hearing of the pleas of nullity and appeals was held on 2 July 1986 in the absence of the applicant, the latter being represented by his official defence counsel.   55.   The hearing was opened at 9h and closed at 11h25.   The court heard submissions of the applicant's official defence counsel, the lawyer of his wife and mother, the lawyer of the private party, and a representative of the Attorney General's office.   According to affidavits submitted by the applicant the subsequent deliberations of the court lasted about half an hour, the reading of the judgment about five minutes.   56.   By this judgment, the Supreme Court rejected the applicant's and his relatives' pleas of nullity.   It allowed both the public prosecutor's appeal and in part the appeal of the applicant's relatives, sentencing the applicant to life imprisonment and nullifying the commitment to an institution for mentally abnormal criminals, the applicant thus being required to serve the life sentence in prison.   57.   The Supreme Court evaluated the aggravating and mitigating circumstances discussed by the trial court and found that it had incorrectly refused to recognise the applicant's self-surrender as a mitigating circumstance under Section 34 para. 16 of the Penal Code. It then continued:   (German)        "Bei der Ausmessung der verwirkten Strafe hat das Erstgericht die      besondere Schwere der personalen Täterschuld des Angeklagten in      Verbindung mit dem objektiven Gewicht der verschuldeten      Rechtsgutverletzung, wie sie der (vorsätzlichen) Tötung eines      Menschen unter den gegebenen Umständen innewohnt, zu wenig      berücksichtigt.   Manifestiert sich doch in der heimtückischen,      nachgeradezu einer 'Liquidierung' des ahnungslosen und dem      Angeklagten vertrauenden Mordopfers gleichkommenden Tatbegehung,      um die Aufdeckung eigener finanzieller Verfehlungen des      Angeklagten zu verhindern, mithin aus verwerflichen Motiven, eine      derart negative Einstellung des Rechtsbrechers (im Sinn einer      niedrigen Gesinnung) und damit ein solcher Grad an Schuld, daß      die Verhängung einer zeitlichen Freiheitsstrafe ... nach Lage des      Falles nicht (mehr) gerechtfertigt ist.   Daß der Angeklagte zur      Tatzeit sich in einem abnormen Geisteszustand befand, unter      dessen Einfluß er die Mordtat beging, fällt demgegenüber nicht      so sehr ins Gewicht und vermag daher die übrigen, den Angeklagten      belastenden Komponenten seiner Strafzumessungsschuld nicht      aufzuwiegen.   Die schuldangemessene Reaktion auf das Tatverhalten      des Angeklagten kann daher nur in der Verhängung einer      lebenslangen Freiheitsstrafe bestehen."   (Translation)        "The court of first instance failed, in assessing the sentence,      to make adequate allowance for the special gravity of the      accused's personal guilt and the objective weight of the offence      involved in (intentionally) killing a human being in the      particular circumstances of this case.   After all, this      treacherous crime, amounting in fact to 'liquidation' of the      unsuspecting victim, who fully trusted the accused, and committed      with the reprehensible intention of forestalling revelation of      his own financial misdeeds, reflects such a negative attitude      (i.e. such a debased outlook) on the perpetrator's part, and such      a degree of guilt, that the imposition of a limited prison      sentence ... no longer seems justified in the circumstances of      the case.   The fact that the accused committed the crime in an      abnormal mental state and under its influence, is in itself less      important, and cannot counter-balance the factors which tell      against him in determining the sentence.   The only sentence      appropriate to the crime and to the accused's guilt is thus life      imprisonment."   58.   The original (Urschrift) of the Supreme Court's judgment shows that the rejection of the pleas of nullity was literally based on the Judge Rapporteur's draft decision prepared before the Supreme Court's hearing.   The applicant infers from this that the submissions of the defence at that hearing were not at all taken into account.   According to him the judgment was a replica of the Attorney General's position paper.   59.   It appears that the applicant is still detained in the Mittersteig special institution for mentally deranged offenders.   B.    RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW   1.    Plea of nullity   60.   First instance judgments rendered by Chambers of a Regional Court can be challenged by a plea of nullity (Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde) to the Supreme Court on specific grounds enumerated in the Code of Criminal Procedure (Section 281 para. 1 and, as regards Assize Court judgments, Section 345 para. 1).   The grounds in question include procedural defects and misapplication of the substantive criminal law in the finding of guilt and the determination of the sentence.   In principle they do not relate to the evaluation of the evidence by the first instance court and new facts and evidence cannot be taken into account. The Supreme Court is bound by the facts and evidence established in the first instance judgment unless it finds a nullity due to a defect in the reasoning such as absence of reasons, insufficient reasons or reasons which are contradicted by the contents of the file.   61.   The nullity proceedings against Assize Court judgments differ from other proceedings in that the latter grounds of nullity are not available concerning the finding of guilt since the jury's verdict (Wahrspruch) is not reasoned.   The judgment only contains the questions put to the jury and their answers ("yes" or "no").   Summary reasons are set out in a memorandum (Niederschrift der Geschworenen) annexed to the transcript of the trial which as such cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.   62.   The Supreme Court's task in such cases is mainly to control the acts of the bench and the Presiding Judge of the Assize Court (in particular whether the conduct of the trial has complied with fundamental procedural principles, whether the right questions have been put and the right directions been given to the jury).   In so far as the jury is concerned, the Supreme Court may only verify whether it has not given unclear, incomplete or contradictory answers to the questions.   As in other cases the Supreme Court also supervises the correct application of the criminal law, but in doing so is bound by the jury's findings as to the facts.   63.   As regards the procedure, the general provisions on remedies in criminal law are applicable.   The time-limit for remedies and observations in reply thereto is four weeks from receipt of the judgment if the trial has lasted more than five days (Section 285 paras. 1 and 3 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).   64.   In certain cases the Supreme Court may reject a plea of nullity without a public hearing (cf. Section 285 c of the Code of Criminal Procedure).   In all other cases there will be a public hearing which may also be combined with a public hearing on appeals against sentence (see below).   65.   Concerning the hearing on pleas of nullity Section 286 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides:     (German)        "1. Wird ein Gerichtstag zur öffentlichen Verhandlung der Sache      anberaumt, so ist die Vorladung des Angeklagten ... vorzunehmen,      ... .      2. Ist der Angeklagte verhaftet, so wird er vom Gerichtstage mit      dem Beisatz in Kenntnis gesetzt, daß er nur durch einen      Verteidiger erscheinen könne."   (Translation)        "1. When the date of the public hearing is being fixed, the      accused ... shall be summoned ... .        2. If the accused is under arrest, the notice of the hearing      given to him shall mention that he may only appear through      counsel."   66.   However, if the hearing is a combined one on pleas of nullity and appeals against sentence, an accused who is personally present for the latter purpose may also exercise his rights concerning the pleas of nullity.   In particular he will be given the last word.   2.    Appeal against sentence   67.   While legal defects of the sentencing procedure may also form the subject of a plea of nullity, the sentence as such can only be challenged by way of an appeal against sentence (Berufung).   It may concern both points of law (in particular whether mitigating or aggravating circumstances have correctly been taken into account) and considerations relating to the assessment of the sentence.   In this respect the appellate court is bound by the legal qualification of the offence in the finding of guilt and it must limit its examination to the grounds invoked in the appeal (cf.   Section 295 para. 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure).   68.   As regards the procedure, the same time-limits apply for the filing of appeals as for the filing of pleas of nullity (cf. para. 63 above).   In certain cases of formal defects the appeal may be rejected by the Supreme Court without an oral hearing (cf. Section 296 para. 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure), however where the appeal is examined as to its substance a public hearing must be held.   69.   Concerning the personal appearance of the accused at such hearings, Section 296 para. 3, second sentence of the Code of Criminal Procedure provided at the relevant time:   (German)        "Für die Anberaumung und Durchführung des Gerichtstages gelten      die Bestimmungen der §§ 286 und 287 dem Sinne nach mit der      Maßgabe, daß der nicht verhaftete Angeklagte stets vorzuladen und      auch die Vorführung des verhafteten Angeklagten zu veranlassen      ist, wenn er dies in seiner Berufung oder Gegenausführung      beantragt hat oder die Vorführung sonst im Interesse der      Rechtspflege geboten erscheint."   (Translation)        "The provisions of Sections 286 and 287 are applicable, mutatis      mutandis, to the fixing of the date and the holding of the public      hearing subject to the proviso that an accused who is not      detained shall always be summoned and that an accused who is      detained shall also be brought before the court if he has made      a request to this effect in his appeal or counter-statement or      otherwise if his personal presence appears necessary in the      interest of justice."   3.    Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure   70.   The Supreme Court's internal procedure is regulated in the Supreme Court Act (OGH-Gesetz) and in the Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure (Geschäftsordnung) adopted as an internal instrument (Verwaltungsverordnung) according to Section 22 of this Act.   The Rules of Procedure have not been published.   71.   According to the Supreme Court Act the Supreme Court sits in chambers composed of five members, one of them acting as Presiding Judge, one of them as Judge Rapporteur (Sections 5 and 6, paras. 1 and 2).   They are determined by the annual assignment of functions (Section 13 para. 1).   Section 20, last sentence, provides that the name of the Judge Rapporteur shall not be disclosed to the parties.   72.   Section 60 of the Supreme Court's Rules of Procedure reads as follows:   (German)        "(2) ... ist ... der Akt ... dem nach der Geschäftsverteilung      bestimmten Berichterstatter vorzulegen.        (3) Ist der Akt in der Folge der Generalprokuratur zur Äußerung      oder Antragstellung oder über ihr Ersuchen vor Erledigung der      Sache zur Einsicht zuzuleiten, sind Aktenstücke, aus denen auf      den Inhalt der vom Obersten Gerichtshof zu fällenden Entscheidung      oder den Gang der Beratung geschlossen werden könnte      (Erledigungsentwurf, Äußerungen von Senatsmitgliedern udgl.)      zurückzuhalten, soweit nicht eine gegenteilige richterliche      Anordnung vorliegt.        (4) Nach Rücklangen des Aktes von der Generalprokuratur      übermittelt der Berichterstatter mit dem Erledigungsentwurf die      Akten dem Senatsvorsitzenden zur weiteren Veranlassung.      ...      (6) Bei Anordnung eines Gerichtstages ist der Generalprokuratur      nur das Ausschreibungsformular zur Kenntnisnahme des Termines zu      übermitteln.   Bei dieser Gelegenheit findet eine Aktenübersendung      nur über richterliche Anordnung statt.        (7) Soweit die Generalprokuratur ausgearbeitete Stellungnahmen      abgegeben hat, sind Gleichschriften hievon spätestens anläßlich      der Anberaumung des Gerichtstages den anderen am Verfahren über      die Nichtigkeitsbeschwerde beteiligten Parteien zuzustellen,      soweit nicht eine gegenteilige richterliche Anordnung vorliegt."   (Translation) &#