CEDH · CASELAW;REPORTS;ENG — 20 mai 1992

.sDD6737AE { font-size:11pt } .s211D6B00 { margin-top:0pt; margin-bottom:0pt; line-height:normal; widows:0; orphans:0; font-size:8.5pt } .sBB9EE52A { font-family:Arial }                    EUROPEAN COMMISSION OF HUMAN RIGHTS                      APPLICATION No. 12593/86                              R. and R.                               against                               AUSTRIA                      REPORT OF THE COMMISSION                      (adopted on 20 May 1992)   TABLE OF CONTENTS                                                           Page   I.         INTRODUCTION           (paras. 1 - 20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             A.    The application                (paras. 2 - 4) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             B.    The proceedings                (paras. 5 - 15). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1             C.    The present Report                (paras. 16 - 20) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2   II.        ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS           (paras. 21 - 61). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3             A.    The particular circumstances of the case                (paras. 21 - 54) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3             1.    The seizure of the jewellery pledged to                the applicants                (paras. 21 - 26) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3             2.    The institution of criminal proceedings                against the applicants' client                (paras. 27 - 31) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3             3.    Requests for restitution of the jewellery                (paras. 32 - 38) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4             4.    Lifting of the criminal seizure                (paras. 39 - 44) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5             5.    The customs and object liability proceedings                (paras. 45 - 54) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6             B.    Relevant domestic law                (paras. 55 - 61° . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7             1.    Forfeiture in criminal proceedings                under the Code of Financial Offences                (paras. 55 - 58) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7             2.    Object liability in respect of customs duties                (paras. 59 - 61) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9   III.       OPINION OF THE COMMISSION           (paras. 62 - 92°. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             A.    Complaint declared admissible                (para. 62) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             B.     Points at issue                (para. 63) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             C.    Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 of the                Convention                (paras. 64 - 75) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11             D.    Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 of the                Convention                (paras. 76 - 91) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13             E.    Conclusion                (para. 92° . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15   APPENDIX I   : HISTORY OF PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION. 16   APPENDIX II : DECISION AS TO THE ADMISSIBILITY. . . . . . . 18   I.    INTRODUCTION   1.    The following is an outline of the case as submitted to the European Commission of Human Rights, and of the procedure before the Commission.   A.    The application   2.    The applicants are two banks established as co-operatives (Genossenschaften) in the area of Salzburg.   They are represented by Mr. Herwig Liebscher, a lawyer practising in Salzburg.   3.    The application is directed against Austria whose Government are represented by their Agent, Ambassador Helmut Türk, Deputy Secretary General and Legal Counsel of the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.   4.    The application relates to two sets of proceedings concerning a client of the applicants, i.e. criminal proceedings in which jewellery pledged to the applicants was seized with a view to its forfeiture, and customs proceedings in which the seizure was maintained with a view to satisfying the State's customs claims against the applicants' client. The applicants claim that these proceedings involved a determination of their civil rights and complain that the length of the proceedings exceeded a reasonable time contrary to Article 6 para. 1 of the Convention.   B.    The proceedings   5.    The application was introduced on 29 September 1986 and registered on 19 November 1986.   6.    On 6 March 1989 the Commission decided to bring the application to the notice of the respondent Government and to invite them to submit before 19 May 1989 observations in writing on the admissibility and merits of the application.   7.    At the Government's request, the time-limit was extended to 9 June 1989.   The Government submitted observations on 19 June 1989 and the applicants replied thereto on 10 August 1989.   8.    On 23 April 1990 the applicants submitted information on the further development of the domestic proceedings.   9.    On 7 May 1990 the Commission decided to invite the parties to submit further observations orally at a hearing on the admissibility and merits of the case.   10.   On 27 August 1990 the applicants submitted supplementary written observations in preparation of the hearing.   11.   The hearing took place on 10 October 1990.   The parties were represented as follows: the Government by their Agent, Mr. Helmut Türk, who was assisted by Mr. Wolf Okresek of the Federal Chancellery and Mrs. Irene Gartner of the Federal Ministry of Justice; the applicants by Mr. Christoph Liebscher, a lawyer practising in Salzburg who was subdelegated by their counsel, Mr. Herwig Liebscher.   12.   On the same day the Commission declared the application admissible.   13.   The text of the decision on admissibility was approved by the Commission on 8 November 1990.   The parties were invited to submit supplementary observations on the merits before 7 January 1991.   14.   The applicants submitted such observations on 19 December 1990, the Government on 7 January 1991.   15.   After declaring the case admissible, the Commission, acting in accordance with Article 28 (b) of the Convention, also placed itself at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing a friendly settlement.   In the light of the parties' reaction, the Commission now finds that there is no basis on which such a settlement can be effected.   C.    The present Report   16.   The present Report has been drawn up by the Commission in pursuance of Article 31 of the Convention and after deliberations and votes, the following members being present:             MM.   J. A. FROWEIN, Acting President                E. BUSUTTIL                G. JÖRUNDSSON                A. S. GÖZÜBÜYÜK                A. WEITZEL                H. G. SCHERMERS                H. DANELIUS           Sir   Basil HALL           MM.   F. MARTINEZ                C. L. ROZAKIS           Mrs. J. LIDDY           MM.   J.-C. GEUS                A. V. ALMEIDA RIBEIRO                M. P. PELLONPÄÄ   17.   The text of this Report was adopted on 20 May 1992 and is now transmitted to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, in accordance with Article 31 para. 2 of the Convention.   18.   The purpose of the Report, pursuant to Article 31 of the Convention is:   i)    to establish the facts, and   ii)   to state an opinion as to whether the facts found disclose a      breach by the State concerned of its obligations under the      Convention.   19.   A schedule setting out the history of the proceedings before the Commission is attached hereto as Appendix I and the Commission's decision on the admissibility of the application as Appendix II.   20.   The full text of the parties' submissions, together with the documents lodged as exhibits, are held in the archives of the Commission.   II.    ESTABLISHMENT OF THE FACTS   A.    The particular circumstances of the case   1.    The seizure of the jewellery pledged to the applicants   21.   One of the applicants' clients had taken out loans against securities in the form of pledged jewellery (valued at approximately 12 million AS) which was deposited in the applicants' safes.   Financial difficulties subsequently prevented the client from repaying the loans and in 1982 he agreed to the sale of the pledged jewellery by the applicants in order to fulfil his obligations.   The applicants then commissioned a jeweller in Salzburg to organise a sales exhibition.   22.   The sales exhibition was visited by officers of the Customs Office (Zollamt) of Salzburg who on 10 April 1982 seized (Beschlagnahme) the jewellery pledged to the second applicant, which was displayed at the exhibition.   On 14 April 1982 the Customs Office seized the remaining jewellery which still was in the first applicant's safe.   The seizures were made for the purpose of securing evidence (Beweissicherung) in connection with investigations conducted against the applicants' client on the suspicion of his having committed financial offences.   23.   The applicants and their client successfully challenged the seizures before the Constitutional Court (Verfassungsgerichtshof).   24.   As regards the seizure of 14 April 1982, the court found by a decision of 26 November 1982 that Section 89 of the Code of Financial Offences (Finanzstrafgesetz) had been violated in that the seizure had been effected without a prior administrative decision, although an immediate danger (Gefahr in Verzug), justifying a seizure without such a decision, had not existed.   As a consequence the constitutional right to the inviolability of property had been violated.   25.   As regards the seizure of 10 April 1982, the Constitutional Court, by a decision of 12 June 1984, quashed certain provisions of Section 25 of the Code of Financial Offences on which it had been based, finding that these provisions violated the constitutional principle of equality before the law and lacked the clarity required by Article 18 of the Federal Constitution (Bundes-Verfassungsgesetz), in particular as regards the delimitation of the scope of application of Sections 25 and 89 of the Code.   26.   Notwithstanding these decisions, the seized objects were not returned to the applicants.   2.    The institution of criminal proceedings against the applicants'      client   27.   On 14 October 1982 the Customs Office in Salzburg reported to the public prosecutor's office in Salzburg a suspicion of financial offences (smuggling, evasion of import duties) by the applicants' client.   In this context the Customs Office found that the applicants were not responsible for careless conduct within the meaning of Section 17 para. 3 of the Code of Financial Offences.   28.   The public prosecutor's office requested the opening of criminal proceedings before the Regional Criminal Court (Landesgericht für Strafsachen) of Vienna, where other criminal proceedings against the applicants' client were already pending.   29.   By decisions of 5 and 25 November 1982 the investigating judge of this court "confirmed" the seizure of the jewellery on the ground that there was "a grave suspicion of a financial offence".   30.   Upon appeal by the applicants' client this decision was in part confirmed by the Review Chamber (Ratskammer) of the Regional Court on 5 January 1983.   It held that the investigating judge's above decisions constituted new seizures under Sections 98 and 143 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (Strafprozessordnung); therefore it was irrelevant that the first seizures by the Customs Office had been found to be unconstitutional.   The Review Chamber ordered the exclusion of certain pieces of jewellery, but simultaneously issued a preliminary injunction (einstweilige Verfügung) in respect of these objects in order to secure the payment of the fines which were expected to be imposed on the applicants' client.   It further held it lawful that the jewellery continued to be detained for the Regional Court of Vienna by the Customs Office in Salzburg.   31.   The criminal proceedings against the applicants' client concerning the financial offences at issue were subsequently transferred to the Regional Court of Salzburg.   On 13 May 1983 the investigating judge of that court ordered the seizure of further objects which had previously been confiscated by the Customs Office of Innsbruck.   The Review Chamber of the Regional Court of Salzburg confirmed this decision on 6 and 13 July 1983.   3.    Requests for restitution of the jewellery   32.   The applicants made repeated requests to the Customs Office and the courts in order to obtain the restitution of the jewellery.   33.   The first requests, made by each of the applicants on 27 April 1982, and their further requests of 14 December 1982 to recognise that the seized objects had been validly pledged to them, were dealt with on 11 March 1983.   The Customs Office rejected them as inadmissible, considering that, after the new seizures ordered by the Regional Court of Vienna, it was no longer competent to deal with the matter.   34.   These decisions were confirmed by the Salzburg Regional Directorate of Finance (Finanzlandesdirektion, Regional Directorate) on 6 and 10 May 1983 and by the Administrative Court (Verwaltungs- gerichtshof) on 18 April 1985.   The Administrative Court held, inter alia, that the delays in the Customs Office's procedure (it had reported the case to the public prosecutor more than six months after the initial seizure and had dealt with the applicants' request for restitution almost a year after it had been made) did not make its decision unlawful.   The investigating judge's decision to order a new seizure had been given within the statutory time-limit under Section 54 para. 2 of the Code of Financial Offences.   It was irrelevant that it had been partially quashed by the Review Chamber because the Chamber had at the same time issued a preliminary injunction.   35.   On 1 February 1983 the second applicant, being an interested party (Verfallsbeteiligter) in the criminal proceedings against its client, requested the Regional Criminal Court of Vienna to restitute the seized jewellery.   On 9 June 1983 the first applicant also made a request for the restitution of the seized jewellery.   36.   On 20 December 1983 the investigating judge of the Salzburg Regional Court rejected both requests, finding it necessary to await the final judgment in the case against the applicants' client.   He observed that the final judgment might order the forfeiture of the seized objects, notwithstanding the fact that they were pledged to the applicants, if their responsibility for careless conduct (Section 17 para. 3 of the Code of Financial Offences) was established.   As to a possible priority of the applicants' pledge, the investigating judge referred them to an action (Pfandvorrechtsklage) under the Enforcement Proceedings Act (Exekutionsordnung).   37.   The Review Chamber of the Salzburg Regional Court confirmed this decision on 18 January 1984.   38.   On 5 December 1985 the applicants again requested the restitution of the seized objects, but the investigating judge, without taking a formal decision, informed them on 23 April 1986 that these objects were still needed as evidence.   4.    Lifting of the criminal seizure   39.   After an indictment had been preferred against the applicants' client on 27 February 1987 and after they had been informed by the client's defence counsel that the indictment did not include offences relating to the seized jewellery, the applicants on 2 April 1987 again requested the restitution of this jewellery.   As no decision had been taken the applicants repeated their requests on 12 May 1987.   40.   Already on 27 February 1987 the public prosecutor had also requested the Regional Court to return the seized jewellery to the applicants.   However, the Customs Office, consulted under Section 46 para. 3 of the Customs and Excise Act (Zollgesetz), objected on the ground that the jewellery was needed as security for unsatisfied customs claims (import duties) in the amount of some 3,5 million AS.   41.   On 3 July 1987 the Regional Court lifted the seizure in respect of the jewellery not covered by the indictment, but at the same time conferred the power to dispose of this jewellery to the Customs Office. On 15 July 1987 the Review Chamber of the Regional Court furthermore lifted the preliminary injunction of 5 January 1983 ordering that the jewellery affected by this measure should also remain with the Customs Office for further action.   42.   Only two pieces of jewellery pledged to the second applicant continued to be seized by the court as they were covered by the indictment against the applicants' client.   The indictment of 27 February 1987 was quashed by the Linz Court of Appeal (Oberlandes- gericht) on 20 May 1987 following objections by the applicants' client.   43.   A dispute arose as to whether in view of the value of the jewellery the criminal proceeding should be referred to the Customs Office.   On 13 July 1988 the Linz Court of Appeal held that the case still came within the jurisdiction of the courts.   44.   On 17 January 1990 a new indictment was preferred against the applicants' client.   The proceedings were eventually discontinued on 8 February 1991 in view of the client's health conditions which made him unfit to stand trial.   On 14 March 1991 the Regional Court of Salzburg decided to lift the seizure also as regards the remaining two pieces of jewellery.   This decision was taken at the request of the public prosecutor who saw no reasons for not recognising the applicant's right of pledge.   However, the jewellery was not returned to the second applicant but, like the other pieces, handed over to the Customs Office for further action.   5.    The customs and object liability proceedings   45.   In the customs proceedings, the applicants' client was ordered by two separate decisions of 16 September 1983, to pay import duties of AS 585,887 and AS 2,946,081 respectively.   46.   On 13 August 1987, in connection with the above decisions in the criminal case, the Customs Office seized the relevant jewellery and claimed its object liability (Sachhaftung) for the customs duties under Section 178 of the Customs and Excise Act.   Both applicants were affected by this measure and filed appeals.   47.   On 25 January 1988 the first applicant obtained redress in that after the Regional Directorate's decision of 18 November 1987 the objects pledged to it were returned and the object liability lifted by a decision of the Regional Directorate on 1 March 1990.   48.   No decision was taken by the Regional Directorate on the second applicant's appeal within the statutory time-limit of six months, and therefore it filed an action for default (Säumnisbeschwerde) with the Administrative Court on 3 April 1989.   After that court had set a time- limit for the Regional Directorate's decision, the latter rejected the second applicant's appeal on 25 October 1989.   49.   In its decision the Regional Directorate fixed the amount of object liability (AS 2,621,699).   It noted that the decision prescribing the import duties had become final and that the conditions for claiming the object liability of the jewellery were therefore met. This liability was not limited to customs duties in the strict sense, but also concerned import turnover tax.   While object liability arose ex lege irrespective of the rights of third persons, the Customs Office's power to claim object liability was nevertheless discretionary.   It had to exercise its discretion having regard to the criteria laid down in Section 20 of the Federal Code of Taxation (Bundesabgabenordnung), i.e. in accordance with equity and expediency having regard to all relevant circumstances.   "Equity" meant the justified interests of the party, and "expediency" the public interest in the securing of duty.   In the present case the discretion had been correctly exercised, in particular the principle of equity had not been violated because it appeared from the outset that the second applicant must have anticipated difficulties in the realisation of its right of pledge, the value of the pledged objects exceeding by far the amount of the loans.   50.   On 7 December 1989 the second applicant lodged a constitutional complaint against this decision in which it invoked inter alia Article 6 of the Convention, Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and the principle of equality.   On 25 September 1990 the Constitutional Court refused to deal with the complaint and referred the matter to the Administrative Court.   The latter court rejected the second applicant's complaint on 14 February 1991.   51.   In the meantime, on 11 December 1987, the Customs Office had ordered the applicants' client to pay import duties also in respect of some further pieces of jewellery pledged to the second applicant.   His appeal against this decision was rejected by the Regional Directorate on 26 June 1990.   52.   On 28 March 1990 the Customs Office issued a new seizure order concerning this jewellery claiming object liability in respect of the second applicant.   The latter's appeal against this decision was rejected by the Regional Directorate on 14 December 1990.   The second applicant complained to the Administrative Court which rejected the complaint on 24 May 1991.   53.   Subsequent negotiations between the second applicant and the Regional Directorate to come to a settlement of the matter failed.   The Regional Directorate was not prepared to consent to the sale of the jewellery pending the proceedings before the Administrative Court and without the second applicant paying the import duties owed by its client (more than AS 3,000,000).   The second applicant, on the other hand, was not willing to pay these duties.   54.   The jewellery is still in the hands of the Customs Office.   Since a new estimation showed that its value was much less than earlier assumed and that therefore the customs duties prescribed might be excessive, the second applicant requested a reopening of the customs proceedings.   This request was rejected by two decisions of 25 September 1991.   The second applicant's appeals against these decisions are still pending.   B.    Relevant domestic law   1.    Forfeiture in criminal proceedings under the Code of Financial      Offences   55.   In Austrian criminal law forfeiture is provided for as an ancillary sanction for certain offences.   Relevant provisions are contained both in the Penal Code (Sections 20 and 26) and in the Code of Financial Offences (Finanzstrafgesetz).   56.   Section 17 para. 1 of the latter Code stipulates that forfeiture may be pronounced only in the cases where this sanction is specifically provided for.   One of these cases is the offence of indirect tax evasion (Abgabenhehlerei) under Section 37 of the Code, which was the basis of the charges against the applicants' client in the present case.   57.   Section 17 paras. 2-6 read as follows:        (German)        "(2) Dem Verfall unterliegen        a) die Sachen, hinsichtlich derer das Finanzvergehen begangen      wurde, samt Umschließungen;        ...        (3) Die im Abs. 2 genannten Gegenstände sind für verfallen zu      erklären, wenn sie zur Zeit der Entscheidung im Eigentum oder      Miteigentum des Täters oder eines anderen an der Tat Beteiligten      stehen.   Weisen andere Personen ihr Eigentum an den Gegenständen      nach, so ist auf Verfall nur dann zu erkennen, wenn diesen      Personen vorzuwerfen ist, daß sie        a) zumindest in auffallender Sorglosigkeit dazu beigetragen      haben, daß mit diesen Gegenständen das Finanzvergehen begangen      wurde, oder        b) beim Erwerb der Gegenstände die deren Verfall begründenden      Umstände kannten oder aus auffallender Sorglosigkeit nicht      kannten.        Hiebei genügt es, wenn der Vorwurf zwar nicht den Eigentümer des      Gegenstands, aber eine Person trifft, die für den Eigentümer über      den Gegenstand verfügen kann.        ...        (5) Wird auf Verfall erkannt, so sind nachgewiesene Pfandrechte      oder Zurückbehaltungsrechte dritter Personen an den für verfallen      erklärten Gegenständen anzuerkennen, wenn diese Personen kein      Vorwurf im Sinne des Abs. 3 trifft.        (6) Das Eigentum an den für verfallen erklärten Gegenständen geht      mit Rechtskraft der Entscheidung auf den Bund über; Rechte      dritter Personen erlöschen, sofern sie nicht gemäß Abs. 5      anerkannt wurden."        (Translation)        "(2) The following are liable to forfeiture        a) Items in respect of which a tax offence has been committed,      together with whatever they are contained in;        ...        (3) Items prescribed in paragraph 2 shall be declared forfeited      if, at the time of such decision, they are the property of, or      part-owned by, the offender or any other person involved in the      offence.   If any other person established ownership of the items,      forfeiture may only be ordered if        a) at least by conspicuous negligence, he helped bring about the      commission of the offence or        b) when he acquired the items, he was aware of the circumstances      warranting their forfeiture or by conspicuous negligence was      unaware of them.        Negligence for the purposes of paragraphs 3 (a) and (b) means      negligence of the owner or of any person who has the owner's      authority to act in respect of the items.        ...        (5) If forfeiture is ordered, claims of third parties arising      from pledge of or liens on the forfeited items shall be      recognised if such parties have not been negligent within the      meaning of paragraph 3.        (6) When the forfeiture order becomes final, ownership of the      forfeited items shall pass to the Federation; any rights of third      parties not recognised under paragraph 5 shall be extinguished."   58.   The legal position of third parties accessorily affected by a measure of forfeiture is regulated in Sections 76 and 122 of the Code of Financial Offences.   In so far as relevant, these provisions read as follows:        (German)        § 76        "Nebenbeteiligte sind        a) vom Beschuldigten verschiedene Personen, denen das      Eigentumsrecht oder ein Pfand- oder Zurückbehaltungsrecht an der      verfallsbedrohten Sache zusteht (Verfallsbeteiligte).   Verfalls-      beteiligt ist auch, wer ein solches Recht behauptet."        § 122        "(1) Die Finanzstrafbehörde erster Instanz hat Verfallsbe-      teiligte sowie Haftungsbeteiligte, deren Haftung in Anspruch      genommen werden soll, dem Verfahren zuzuziehen, wenn ihr      Aufenthalt bekannt ist ... ."        (Translation)        Section 76        "Private parties are        a) persons other than the accused who have the right of property,      a right of pledge or a right of retention concerning the object      threatened with forfeiture (parties accessorily affected by      forfeiture).   Persons who claim such a right shall also be      regarded as parties accessorily affected."        Section 122        "(1) The administrative tax offences authority of first instance      shall join to the proceedings any parties of known address who      would be accessorily affected by a forfeiture or who are      accessorily liable ... ."   2.    Object liability in respect of customs duties   59.   Section 178 para. 1 of the Customs and Excise Act (Zollgesetz) reads as follows:        (German)        "Waren, für die die Zollschuld unbedingt oder bedingt entstanden      ist, haften ohne Rücksicht auf die Rechte anderer Personen für      den auf sie entfallenden Zoll und können aus diesem Grund nach      Maßgabe des § 20 der Bundesabgabenordnung vom Zollamt      beschlagnahmt werden.   Die Haftung beginnt mit dem Entstehen und      endet mit dem Erlöschen der Zollschuld."        (Translation)        "Items in respect of which customs duty is or may be payable      shall be liable for such duty regardless of the rights of third      parties and may accordingly be seized by the customs authorities      in pursuance of Section 20 of the Federal Code of Taxation      Procedure.   The liability shall begin when the duty falls payable      and shall end when the duty is extinguished."   60.   The reference in this provision to Section 20 of the Federal Code of Taxation Procedure was inserted in 1978 following the quashing of the earlier version by the Constitutional Court.   It was thus made clear that notwithstanding the fact that object liability arises directly under the law the customs authorities have a discretionary power to claim or not to claim object liability in respect of particular items.   61.   Section 20 of the Federal Code of Taxation Procedure reads as follows:        (German)        "Entscheidungen, die Abgabenbehörden nach ihrem Ermessen zu      treffen haben (Ermessensentscheidungen), müssen sich in den      Grenzen halten, die das Gesetz dem Ermessen zieht.   Innerhalb      dieser Grenzen sind Ermessensentscheidungen nach Billigkeit und      Zweckmäßigkeit unter Berücksichtigung aller in Betracht kommenden      Umstände zu treffen."        (Translation)        "Decisions which the tax authorities have to take according to      their discretion (discretionary decisions) must remain within the      limits of discretion circumscribed by the law.   Within these      limits, the discretionary decisions have to be made on the basis      of fairness and expediency taking into account all circumstances      which might be relevant."   III.   OPINION OF THE COMMISSION   A.    Complaint declared admissible   62.   The Commission has declared admissible the applicants' complaint that in connection with both the criminal proceedings against their client and the subsequent customs proceedings their civil rights have not been determined within a reasonable time.   B.    Points at issue   63.   The Commission must accordingly examine:   -     whether Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention applied      to the proceedings at issue;   -     whether the length of the proceedings complained of exceeded the      "reasonable time" referred to in Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of      the Convention.   C.    Applicability of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention   64.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention includes the following provision:        "In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...,      everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time      by [a] ... tribunal ..."   65.   The applicants complain on the one hand of criminal proceedings conducted against their client in which the objects pledged to them were seized with a view to their possible forfeiture, and on the other hand of customs proceedings involving their client in which the seizure was maintained with a view to their object liability for the client's customs duties.   66.   The Commission notes that, although the two above proceedings were of a different nature and conducted by different authorities, they were linked to each other: the criminal charges against the client were brought against him on the basis of the suspicion that he had evaded the customs duties in question; despite the judicial seizure of the objects in connection with the criminal proceedings the actual custody of these objects was left to the customs authorities throughout the relevant time; the criminal court when lifting the criminal seizure of these objects did not order their restitution to the applicants, but left them in the custody of the customs authorities; the latter then issued new seizure orders for the purpose of asserting their claim to object liability.   67.   The Commission must examine whether each of the proceedings concerned involved a determination of the applicant's civil rights.   68.   It is not contested that the applicants' right of pledge is a "civil right" within the meaning of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention.   This civil right is to a certain extent independent of the property right of the owner of the pledged objects.   In the present case the right of pledge has not been extinguished since the applicants' underlying financial claims against their client have not been satisfied to the present day.   69.   As regards the criminal proceedings the Commission notes the applicants' procedural position under the domestic law.   They were recognised as private parties to the criminal proceedings in view of the possible forfeiture of the objects pledged to them.   Private parties to criminal proceedings can in principle invoke Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) where they raise a claim of a "civil" nature which is disputed in these proceedings (cf. mutatis mutandis, Eur. Court H.R., Moreira de Azevedo judgment of 23 October 1990, Series A no. 189, pp. 16-17, paras. 63-68).   This is not contradicted by the Court's finding in the AGOSI case that Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) does not apply to forfeiture proceedings after evasion of customs duties.   In that case the only question which arose under Article 6 (Art. 6) concerned the determination of "criminal charges" (cf. judgment of 24 October 1986, Series A no. 108, p. 22, paras. 63-67).   70.   The Government submit that in the present case the criminal proceedings did not involve a direct determination of the applicants' civil rights because the validity of their right of pledge was not disputed by the prosecution authorities.   71.   The Commission observes, however, that despite this recognition the competent criminal court expressly reserved the decision on the forfeiture of the seized objects and the related decision on the recognition of the applicants' right of pledge under Section 17 para. 5 of the Code of Financial Offences to the final decision.   Even though eventually no such decision was taken, the pledged objects remained seized for this purpose.   Apart from this, in the criminal proceedings the dispute of the applicants with the prosecution authorities was not limited to the question of the recognition of the validity of their right of pledge.   It also concerned the further questions whether the seized objects should be restituted to them at an earlier date, and whether it was justified to leave the custody of these objects to the customs authorities both during the criminal proceedings and after the lifting of the judicial seizure orders.   The decisions taken by the criminal courts on these questions circumscribed the applicants' actual possibility of making use of their right of pledge and thus determined their civil rights.   72.   Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) of the Convention was therefore applicable to the criminal proceedings concerned.   73.   As regards the customs proceedings, the Commission recalls that tax proceedings are normally outside the scope of Article 6 (Art. 6) of the Convention (cf. e.g. No. 8903/80, X. v. Austria, Dec. 8.7.80, D.R. 21 p. 246; No. 9908/82, X. v. France, Dec. 4.5.83, D.R. 32 p. 266).   However, this does not exclude that in particular circumstances Article 6 (Art. 6) might be applicable.   Thus the Commission has declared admissible applications concerning tax proceedings allegedly involving a punitive element which could be qualified as amounting to a criminal charge within the meaning of Article 6 (Art. 6) (cf. e.g. No. 11464/85, Von Sydow v. Sweden, Dec. 12.5.87, D.R. 53 p. 85).   74.   The present case does not concern tax obligations of the applicants.   The obligation to pay customs duties was incumbent on their client, subject to the proviso that the objects in respect of which the duties were to be levied provided a security to the State's claim.   As these objects had been pledged to the applicants, the object liability in question conflicted with the applicants' civil right of pledge.   75.   In this context the Commission notes that, while the object liability in favour of the State's claims arose directly under Section 178 of the Customs and Excise Act, its operation was nevertheless not automatic.   Since Section 178 refers to Section 20 of the Federal Code of Taxation Procedure, the customs authorities had a discretionary power to claim or not to claim object liability, and according to the principles developed in the case-law were required in this context to take into account civil rights claims of third parties such as the applicants who for this purpose also were recognised as parties to the proceedings.   This shows that like the earlier criminal proceedings the customs proceedings involved a determination of the question whether and to what extent the applicants could actually make use of their civil right of pledge.   Accordingly Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1) was applicable to these proceedings.   D.    Compliance with Article 6 para. 1 (6-1) of the Convention   76.   As to the period to be taken into account in the present case, the Commission notes that the objects pledged to the applicants were first seized in April 1982 in an administrative procedure for securing evidence for the criminal proceedings.   They were subsequently the subject of a judicial seizure in those proceedings, effected in view of a possible forfeiture.   When this judicial seizure was lifted, the objects were not restituted to the applicants, but left in the custody of the customs authorities which then issued further seizure orders in view of object liability.   The restitution of the objects pledged to the first applicant was ordered on 25 January 1988, but the claim of object liability was not revoked until 1 March 1990.   The objects pledged to the second applicant remain seized.   Their object liability was confirmed by final administrative decisions of 25 October 1989 and 14 December 1990 respectively.   Complaints' procedures before the Administrative Court concerning these decisions were concluded on 14 February and 24 May 1991.   The subsequent proceedings for the reopening of the customs case, which are still pending, are not relevant for the purposes of Article 6 para. 1 (Art. 6-1).   77.   Throughout the relevant periods, the applicants contested the justification of the measures taken in so far as they affected their right of pledge.   This question remained pending before the various authorities in different forms, from the moment when the applicants challenged the first administrative seizure orders.   The period to be considered therefore began to run, in the case of both applicants, on 27 April 1982, the date when both applicants first requested the restitution of the jewellery.   78.   As regards the end of the period, the position of the two applicants is different.   The case of the first applicant was determined on 1 March 1990 when the authorities revoked the claim to object liability.   The case of the second applicant was concluded on 24 May 1991.   79.   The proceedings in the first applicant's case therefore lasted about seven years and ten months, those in the second applicant's case nine years and one month.   80.   The Commission recalls that the reasonableness of proceedings must be assessed in the light of the particular circumstances of the case and with the help of the following criteria: the complexity of the case, the conduct of the parties and the conduct of the authorities dealing with the case (see Eur. Court H.R., Vernillo judgment of 20 February 1991, Series A no. 198, para. 30).   81.   According to the Government, the length of the period in question is due to the complexity of the case.   82.   The Commission notes that the case was a complex one, but this is not in itself sufficient to explain the length of the proceedings.   83.   The Commission further finds that, although the applicants took various remedies, they did not in any way contribute to the length of the proceedings.   Delays were rather caused by the authorities' conduct of those proceedings and the behaviour of the applicants' client.   84.   In this respect the Commission observes that the criminal information against the applicants' client was laid by the Customs Office in October 1982 while an indictment was submitted by the public prosecutor's office only in February 1987.   It is true that during this period of about four years and four months extensive and difficult investigations were conducted.   The result of these investigations, however, was that in respect of most of the objects pledged to the applicants no charges of tax evasion could be brought against their client.   The judicial seizure orders concerning those objects were therefore lifted in July 1987 and maintained only in respect of two pieces of jewellery.   85.   No satisfactory explanation has been provided as to why despite the applicants' repeated requests the seizure orders were not lifted at least partially during the investigation in conformity with the latter's development concernin